Executive Compensation as an AgencyProblem高管薪酬问题研究

Executive Compensation as an AgencyProblem高管薪酬问题研究

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1、JournalofEconomicPerspectives—Volume17,Number3—Summer2003—Pages71–92ExecutiveCompensationasanAgencyProblemLucianAryeBebchukandJesseM.Friedxecutivecompensationhaslongattractedagreatdealofattentionfromfinancialeconomists.Indeed,theincreaseinacademicpapersontheEsubjectofCEOcompensationdur

2、ingthe1990sseemstohaveoutpacedeventheremarkableincreaseinCEOpayitselfduringthisperiod(Murphy,1999).Muchresearchhasfocusedonhowexecutivecompensationschemescanhelpalleviatetheagencyprobleminpubliclytradedcompanies.Tounderstandade-quatelythelandscapeofexecutivecompensation,however,onemus

3、trecognizethatthedesignofcompensationarrangementsisalsopartlyaproductofthissameagencyproblem.AlternativeApproachestoExecutiveCompensationOurfocusinthispaperisonpubliclytradedcompanieswithoutacontrollingshareholder.Whenownershipandmanagementareseparatedinthisway,manag-ersmighthavesubst

4、antialpower.Thisrecognitiongoesback,ofcourse,toBerleandMeans(1932,p.139)whoobservedthattopcorporateexecutives,“whileinoffice,havealmostcompletediscretioninmanagement.”SinceJensenandMeck-ling(1976),theproblemofmanagerialpoweranddiscretionhasbeenanalyzedinmodernfinanceasan“agencyproblem.”

5、ManagersmayusetheirdiscretiontobenefitthemselvespersonallyinavarietyyLucianAryeBebchukistheWilliamJ.FriedmanProfessorofLaw,EconomicsandFinance,HarvardLawSchool,andResearchAssociate,NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,bothinCambridge,Massachusetts.JesseM.FriedisaProfessorofLawatBoaltHallSc

6、hoolofLaw,UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,Berkeley,California.Theire-mailaddressesarebebchuk@law.havard.eduandfriedj@law.berkeley.edu,respectively.72JournalofEconomicPerspectivesofways(ShleiferandVishny,1997).Forexample,managersmayengageinempirebuilding(Jensen,1974;Williamson,196

7、4).Theymayfailtodistributeexcesscashwhenthefirmdoesnothaveprofitableinvestmentopportunities(Jensen,1986).Managersalsomayentrenchthemselvesintheirpositions,makingitdifficulttooustthemwhentheyperformpoorly(ShleiferandVishny,1989).Anydiscussionofexecutivecompensationmustproceedagainstthebac

8、kgrou

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