国有企业经营者股票期权激励研究

国有企业经营者股票期权激励研究

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时间:2019-05-10

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1、天津大学博士学位论文国有企业经营者股票期权激励研究姓名:刘鸿雁申请学位级别:博士专业:金融工程与金融管理指导教师:张维20031201ABSTRACTIntheframeworkofprincipal-agenttheory,thisdissertationstudiestheroleofmanagerialstockoptioncompensationintheimprovingofthecorporategovemanceinChina’Sstate—ownedenterprises(SOEs).Wedefinecorporategove

2、manceastheprotectionofbothstockholders’andbondhelders’interests.First,weimprovedthetraditionalmodelontherelationshipbetweenmanagerialeffortandfirmperformance,byassumingmanagerialefforttobethreedimensionalinsteadofonlyone.Weasstffnemanagerscanspendthreedifferentkindsofeffort

3、s,i.e.,short-termeffortwhichcouldincreaseshort-termfirmperformanceattheexl:}enseoflong—termfirmperformance,long-termeffortwhichcouldenhancelong-termfirmperfoiTnancebutcouldreducecurrentprofit,commoneffortwhichiSneithershoa-termnorlong-termeffort.Usingthisnewmodel,weanalyzed

4、thedifferentincentiveeffectsoffixedsalary,managerialcontractresponsibilitysystem,annualsalarysystemandstockoptioncompensation.Wefindthatbothmanagerialcontractresponsibilitysystemandannualsalarysystemcould,todifferentextents,encouragemanagerialshort-termismwhilestockoptiondo

5、esnot.So,weadvisethatChinafirmsshouldadoptmanagerialstockoptioncompensation.Next,weuseddatafromU.S.totestwhetherthereiSapositiverelationbetweenmanagerialstockoptioncompensationandfutureformperformance.Theresultsprovedthat.Here,animportantfeaturethatdistinguishesourempirical

6、studyfromallothersisthatweusedthemanager’Srealizedincomesfromexercisingoptionsasanapproximationforthevalueofexecutiveoptioncompensations.Next,byusingamodel,wediscussedhowthedesignofmanagerialstockoptioncouldalleviateagencycostsinunleveredfirms.SinceafeatureofourSOEsisthatth

7、eyarelevered,wefurther,bymodilyingtheabovemodelalittle,analyzedwhethertheproperdesignofmanagerialstockoptioncouldalleviateoraggravagateagencycostsinleveredfirms,sincesomebelievethelatteristhecase.IfSO,China’SSOEscouldnotadoptstockoptioncompensation,However,ourmodelandsimula

8、tionresultsshowthatinleveredfirms,ifproperlydesignedandmanaged,stockoptionmayinduc

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