大股东控制、定向增发与盈余管理——来自中国证券市场的经证据

大股东控制、定向增发与盈余管理——来自中国证券市场的经证据

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时间:2019-02-15

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1、AbstractEarningsmanagementoflistedcompanieshasbeenthefocusofacademicresearchathomeandabroad,andthebehaviorofearningsmanagementintheprocessofrefinancingequityismuchmoreconcernedabout.InChina,morethan80%listedcompaniesareinthefactsuper-controlofmajorityshareholder(bytheen

2、dof2009statisticaldata),majorityshareholdersarerarelyconstrainedbytheothershareholders.InordertoobtainmoreControl—self-interest,majorityshareholderspreferstoCalTyoutearningsmanagementinthecourseofrefinancingequity,acquiringthequalificationoftherightsofferingandpublicsea

3、sonedequityoffering,andachievingthepurposeofraisingmoremoneyinthesecuritiesmarketandinvadingtheinterests、fromtheminorityshareholders.Aftertheequitydivisionreform,moreandmorelistedcompaniesshowastrongpreferencetoearlyouttheprivateequityplacement(non-publicseasonedequityp

4、lacement)withoutminimumsurplus-required,whichisessentiallythebehaviorofrefinancingequityunderthecontrolofthemajorityshareholders.Thus,undertheconditionoftheweaknessexternalregulation、poorinternalgovernanceandlow-degreedprotectionofminorityshareholders,majorityshareholde

5、rshavestrongmotivationtoimplementthebehaviorofeamingsmanagementintheprocessoftheprivateequityplacement,totransferthewealthfromminorityshareholders.Thepaperconductsthetheoreticalanalysisfromthefouraspects:thecontrolfeaturesofmajorityshareholders,themotivationofthebehavio

6、rofearningsmanagementintheprocessoftheprivateplacementandtheeconomicconsequences.Conclusionisthatmajorityshareholderhasbigpowerstocontrolthelistedcompany,andhasmotivationtomanagetheearningsoftheprocessoftheprivateplacement;弱thesametime,thereisapositivecorrelationbetween

7、theproportionofmajorityshareholderandthedegreeofearningsmanagementandanegativecorrelationbetweenthesumproportionof2-5shareholders;ifthelistedcompanieshavethestate-ownedmajorshareholders,theymayhavemoreopportunitiesandconditionsforimplementationofearningsmanagement,compa

8、ring晰tllnon-statecompanies,theyIIItakeadeeperlevelofearningsmanagement;lastly,theearningsmanagementintheproces

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