evolutionary stable strategy for postdisaster insurance game theory approach

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1、EvolutionaryStableStrategyforPostdisasterInsuranceGameTheoryApproachEvolutionaryStableStrategyforPostdisasterInsurance:GameTheoryApproachMohamedS.Eid1;IslamH.El-adaway,M.ASCE2;andKalynT.Coatney3Abstract:Mitigationofthefinancialimpactsassociatedwithnaturaldisastersisbecominganurgentob

2、jectiveatboththenationalandinternationallevels,astherateandmagnitudeofnaturaldisastersarecontinuingtoincrease.Usinganevolutionarygametheoryapproach,thispaperaimstofindanequilibriumprofileofpostdisasterinsuranceplanspurchasedbyresidentfamiliesandsoldbyinsurancecompanies,aswellasex-pos

3、tdisasterreliefimplementedbyagovernmentagency.Thisdynamicintegratedassessmentminimizesthetotallossesforthethreeaforementionedassociatedstakeholders,thusmaximizingwelfarewithinnaturaldisasterhostcommunitysystems.Tothisend,theauthorsdeterminedaplausiblesetofactionsandutilityfunctionsfo

4、rtheassociatedstakeholders.Also,theycreatedahypotheticalsampleof1,000residentfamiliesaccountingforheterogeneousincomelevels,threeinsurancecompaniesofferingthreeuniqueinsuranceplanspercompany—eachwithdifferentpremiumandcoverage—andtwodifferenttypesofgovernmentcompensationplansforpostd

5、isasterdamagemitigation.TheproposedmodelwasimplementedontheNetBeansIDE7.4platformusingtheJavaprogramminglanguageforahypotheticalcasestudy.Theresultsindicatethat(1)residentfamiliestendtopreferinsuranceplanswiththelowestpremiumvalueandcoverage;(2)insuranceplanswiththemostcomprehensivec

6、overageexperiencedtheleastdemand;and(3)theevolutionarystablestrategyisanoscillatinglineofchosenplansandinsurersasaresultofthestochasticanddynamicsnatureofthefactorsassociatedwithdisasterman-agement.Currently,theauthorsareworkingtodevelopthemodelfurthertobetteraccountforsimultaneousac

7、tionsbyallstakeholders(notonlyresidentfamilies),populationgrowth,changesinfinancialandincomestandards,integratinginputfromavailablenaturalhazardpredictionsoftwaresystems(e.g.,HAZUS-MH),andcontinuousdata.Ultimately,thisevolutionarygametheorymodelwillbetestedonpost–HurricaneKatrinadata

8、representing