林业上市公司股权集中度、高管激励与经营绩效关系的实证研究

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1、林业上市公司股权集中度、高管激励与经营绩效关系的实证研究羊照云林泓高鸿业陈彩虹张德春徐学荣福州外语外贸学院工商系福建农林大学管理学院福州外语外贸学院金融系福建农林大学经济学院选取2010^2015年的12家林业上市公司的财务数据为研宄样本，运用结构方程模型的研究方法探寻林业上市公司股权集中度、高管激励对经营绩效作用路径以及变量之间的效应关系。研宄结果表明:股权集中度对经营缋效具有直接的显著的正向影响，高管激励对经营绩效具有直接的显著的正向影响，且股权集屮度同时通过高管激励的中介作用间接地显著地影响经营缋效;股权集中度对经营绩效影响的直接效应为0.22，高管激励对经营绩效影响的直

2、接效应为0.28，股权集中度对经营绩效影响的间接中介效应为0.06。基于研究建议建立大股东股权制衡的股权集中度结构和提高高层管理者的收入水平。关键词：林业上市公司；股权集中度;高管激励;经营绩效;RelationshipbetweenExecutiveIncentive,CompaniesEquityConcentrationandBusinessPerformanceofForestryListedCompaniesYANGZhaoyunLINHongGAOHongyeCHENCaihongZHANGDechunXUXuerongFuzhouUniversityofInter

3、nationalStudiesandTrade，DepartmentofBusinessandAdministration，；FuzhouUniversityofInternationalStudiesandTrade，DepartmentofFinance;FujianAgricultureandForestryUniversity，CollegeofEconomics;Abstract：BackgroundForestrylistedcompanyisanimportantsymbolofChina’sforestryindustrializationandmoderniz

4、ation.Itisanimportantcarriertosolvethecontradictionbetweensmallfarmersandthebigmarketandtorealizeforestryindustrializationmanagement.Theexistingresearchabouttherelationshipamongequityconcentration，executivecompensationincentiveandfirmperformancelackofresearchmethodofstructuralequationmodel.M

5、ethodsThedatasourceofthispaperiscollectedfromTaiandatabase.Tnordertoprovideadegreeofreferenceforgovernancestructureoptimizationofforestrylistedcompaniesandimprovementofbusinessperformanceofforestrylistedcompanies,thispaperwouldusestructuralequationmodelforthepathanalysisamongequityconcentrat

6、ion,executiveincentiveandoperatingperformanceofforestrylistedcompanies,thenmeasuredthemutualeffectandtheinfluencingdirection.Moreover,correspondingresearchhypothesishasbeenputforwardattheend.ResultsInthemain,thestructuralequationmodelhadhighfittingdegreeandapplicabilitywithidentifiablemodela

7、ndponderableparameters.Throughanalyzingtheeffectspathofexecutiveincentiveonbusinessperformance,theresultsshowthattheoperatingperformanceofforestrylistedcompanieswouldbemorehighwhenthedegreeofexecutiveincentivebecomestronger,andtheestimatedresultisc