information transmission, acquisition, and aggregation

information transmission, acquisition, and aggregation

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时间:2018-02-10

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1、12InformationTransmission,Acquisition,andAggregationWerevisitathemeofthelastfewchapterstheinterplayofprivateinfor-mationandstrategicbehavior.Someofthequestionsaddressedherewereexaminedearlier,inChapters5and6,butnotinasettingwithexplicitstrategicbehavior.InSec

2、tion12.1,theincentiveofanexperttotransmithisinformationtoanuninformeddecisionmakerisinvestigated.Theexpertcontrolstheamountofinformationrevealedinordertoinfluencetheactionoftheuninformedindividual.Westudiedtheproblemofinducinganexperttorevealinformationtruthfu

3、llyinSection5.3.1.Whatisdifferenthereisthatthepaymenttotheexpertcannotdependonthereportedinforma-tion.Thequestionofcostlyacquisitionofinformationisre-examinedinSection12.2.AsinSection6.3,inefficientacquisitionofinformationcanbetracedbacktoadivergencebetweenthe

4、privateandsocialvalueofinformation.Intherestofthechapter,weaskhowwellprivateinformationdispersedamongindividualscanbeaggregatedwhenindividualscommunicateonlythroughtheiractions.InSection12.3weinvestigateinformationaggre-gationwhenindividualstakeactionswhether

5、ornottoadoptacer-tainbehaviorinsequence.Privateinformationisconveyedonlythroughactions.Individualscareonlyabouttheinformationcontentofactionsoftheirpredecessors.Inthissettingthereisatendencytoherdonsimilaractions,whichblocksinformationtransmissionandmakesinfo

6、rmationaggregationveryinefficient.Weend,inSection12.4,withapoliticalscienceapplicationofinfor-mationaggregation:theCondorcetJuryTheorem.Herethequestioniswhetheramajorityiswiserthananindividualvoter.ThesettingdiffersfromtheherdingmodelofSection12.3inthatindivid

7、ualsactsimultaneouslyandeachintrinsicallycaresaboutthedecisions(i.e.,votingbehavior)ofothers.453454InformationTransmission,Acquisition,andAggregation12.1StrategicInformationTransmissionandDelegationWeconsiderinformationtransmissioninatwo-personsettingwherethe

8、reisdirectcommunicationbetweenindividuals.Oneofthetwoindividualsisendowedwithinformation.Thepayofftoeachindividualdependsonthetruestateofnature(whichisobservedbytheinformedindividual)ando

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