CEO权力、环境不确定性与公司税收规避.pdf

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1、3.4.4权变理论··············································································204CEO权力、环境不确定性与公司税收规避的理论分析与假设提出··············224.1CEO权力与公司税收规避的理论关系与研究假设·······························224.2环境不确定性与公司税收规避关系的理论分析与研究假设···················234.3CEO权力和环境不确定性对公司税收规避的交互影响·········

2、················245CEO权力、环境不确定性与公司税收规避关系的实证检验·······················265.1样本选择与数据来源····································································265.2研究模型与变量··········································································275.2.1研究模型·······························

3、···············································285.2.2变量设计··············································································285.3实证结果分析·············································································345.3.1描述性统计与相关性分析····································

4、·····················355.3.2多元回归分析········································································415.4进一步检验：环境不确定性及其与CEO权力的互动作用·····················425.4.1主导因素分析········································································435.4.2环境不确定性对CEO权力影响分析·············

5、······························435.5稳健性测试················································································456结论及政策建议················································································486.1研究结论与政策建议······················································

6、··············486.1.1研究结论··············································································486.1.2政策建议··············································································506.2本文的研究局限性与进一步的研究方向············································516.2.1本文的研究局限性·····

7、·····························································516.2.2进一步的研究方向··································································52参考文献···························································································53IIContents1Introduction··············

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