An analysis of uncertainy and agency on acquirers of private firms

An analysis of uncertainy and agency on acquirers of private firms

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时间:2019-09-11

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1、ThedefinitiveversionofthispaperwaspublishedinJournalofBanking&Finance32(2008)892–905AnanalysisoftheimplicationsofuncertaintyandagencyproblemsqonthewealtheffectstoacquirersofprivatefirmsTomasMantecon*DepartmentofFinance,UniversityofNevada,LasVegas,4505MarylandParkway,LasV

2、egas,NV89154-6008,USAReceived17January2007;accepted11July2007Availableonline14September2007AbstractExtensiveempiricalworkshowsthatbiddersdonotgainfromtheacquisitionofpubliclytradedtargetsbutexperiencepositiveexcessreturnsintheacquisitionofprivatelyheldfirms.Thisstudyinv

3、estigateshowtwoimportantdifferencesbetweenprivateandpublicfirms,namely,informationaluncertaintyandownershipcharacteristics,impactthereturnstoacquirers.AsampleoftargetsthatwereacquiredshortlyafterfilingforanIPOwascollectedtocircumventthelackofinformationonprivatefirms.Inspi

4、teofthespecialcharacteristicsofthesetargets,thelistingeffectisstillprevalentinthissample.Theresultsoftheanalysisareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatacquir-ersgainintheacquisitionofprivatefirmsbecausethesetargetshavearelativelyweakerbargainingpositionduetoinformationalandag

5、encyproblemsandcostlyaccesstoexternalcapitalmarketstofinancegrowthopportunities.©2007ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.JELclassification:G34Keywords:Merger;IPO;Informationaluncertainties;Agencyproblems1.Introductionconjunctionwithempiricalevidencethatprivatefirmsaresoldatadis

6、countrelativetopublicfirmssuggeststhatpri-Anextensivebodyofempiricalworkshowsthatthereisvatetargetshavelessrelativebargainingpowerthanpublic14significantwealthcreationfromtakeovers.Thedistribu-targets(i.e.,Fulleretal.,2002).Whatarethefactorsthattionofgainsisdifferentifthe

7、targetispubliclylistedoraaffecttherelativebargainingpowerofacquirerandtargetprivatelyheldcorporation.Whenthetargetisapubliccor-firms?Theanswerisunlikelytorestindifferencesbetweenporation,acquirersexperiencesmallandstatisticallyinsig-acquirersofprivateandacquirersofpublicfi

8、rmsbecausenificantreturnswithallthegainstypicallyaccruingtotheFulleretal.(2002)foundthatthelistingeffectisstillpres-2ta

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