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ID:31934509
大小:2.53 MB
页数:55页
时间:2019-01-29
《代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响-研究》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在应用文档-天天文库。
1、代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响研究AbstractDividendpolicyisnotonlyoneofthethreemajorfinancialfields,butalsoanimportantcomponentofthecorporategovernancemechanism.Theoretically,accordingtotheagencymodelofdividends,wecandeducethatthedividendsreducemoralhazardandadverseselection
2、,therebyinhibitingtheposition.relatedconsumptionandover-investmentbehaviorofmanagement.Whileintherealenvironment,onthestockmarketofChina,theproblemofasymmetricinformationbetweenshareholdersandmanagementinthelistedcompaniesisveryprominent,andtheagencyproblemisseriou
3、s,asmoreandmoreattentionarepaidtocashdividendsfromregulators,thedividendpolicyisbecomeoneofthemeanstosolvetheseproblems.Thispaperstudiesthedividends’inhibitionofagencycosts,atthesametime,focusesonwhetherthefunctionischangedindifferentpropertyrightsoflistedcompanies
4、,andtriestoprovideempiricalevidencefordividendpolicyinChinaBasedontheabovebackground,thefreecashflowhypothesisasthebasis,paperusestheprincipal-agenttheoryandwefindthattheagencycostbetweenshareholdersandbusinessmanagementmainlybodiesontheposition-relatedconsumptiona
5、ndover-investmentbehavior.Atthesametime,onthedividendagencytheoryandpropertyrighttheory,analysisofcorporatedividendsgovernanceeffectsofthetwokindsofagentcost,andunderthepremiseofthedifferentpropertyrightenterprise,explorewhethercashdividendsinhibitionofposition.rel
6、atedconsumptionandexcessiveinvestmentisdifferent.ChoosingtheA-sharefirmsfrom2010-2012asthetestsamples,weanalyzeitseffectfromthepointviewofagentcost.TheconclusionsshowthatcashdividendsandthetwokindsofagentcostiSsignificantlynegativelycorrelated,further,thestate-owne
7、dpropertycompaniesweakenstheeffectofagencycostgovernancemechanism.Accordingtotheresearchconclusionofthearticle,weproposetosomesuggestions,suchasimprovingthestrengthofcashdividends,enhancingthesupervisionandcontrolofposition.relatedconsumption,marketingexecutives’sh
8、areholdingincentivesandusingthefunctionofdebtpolicies.KeyWords:Agentcost;Cashdividends;Position-relatedconsumption;Over-investment;Propertyrights
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