代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响-研究

代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响-研究

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时间:2019-01-29

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1、代理成本视角下现金股利对在职消费与过度投资影响研究AbstractDividendpolicyisnotonlyoneofthethreemajorfinancialfields,butalsoanimportantcomponentofthecorporategovernancemechanism.Theoretically,accordingtotheagencymodelofdividends,wecandeducethatthedividendsreducemoralhazardandadverseselection

2、,therebyinhibitingtheposition.relatedconsumptionandover-investmentbehaviorofmanagement.Whileintherealenvironment,onthestockmarketofChina,theproblemofasymmetricinformationbetweenshareholdersandmanagementinthelistedcompaniesisveryprominent,andtheagencyproblemisseriou

3、s,asmoreandmoreattentionarepaidtocashdividendsfromregulators,thedividendpolicyisbecomeoneofthemeanstosolvetheseproblems.Thispaperstudiesthedividends’inhibitionofagencycosts,atthesametime,focusesonwhetherthefunctionischangedindifferentpropertyrightsoflistedcompanies

4、,andtriestoprovideempiricalevidencefordividendpolicyinChinaBasedontheabovebackground,thefreecashflowhypothesisasthebasis,paperusestheprincipal-agenttheoryandwefindthattheagencycostbetweenshareholdersandbusinessmanagementmainlybodiesontheposition-relatedconsumptiona

5、ndover-investmentbehavior.Atthesametime,onthedividendagencytheoryandpropertyrighttheory,analysisofcorporatedividendsgovernanceeffectsofthetwokindsofagentcost,andunderthepremiseofthedifferentpropertyrightenterprise,explorewhethercashdividendsinhibitionofposition.rel

6、atedconsumptionandexcessiveinvestmentisdifferent.ChoosingtheA-sharefirmsfrom2010-2012asthetestsamples,weanalyzeitseffectfromthepointviewofagentcost.TheconclusionsshowthatcashdividendsandthetwokindsofagentcostiSsignificantlynegativelycorrelated,further,thestate-owne

7、dpropertycompaniesweakenstheeffectofagencycostgovernancemechanism.Accordingtotheresearchconclusionofthearticle,weproposetosomesuggestions,suchasimprovingthestrengthofcashdividends,enhancingthesupervisionandcontrolofposition.relatedconsumption,marketingexecutives’sh

8、areholdingincentivesandusingthefunctionofdebtpolicies.KeyWords:Agentcost;Cashdividends;Position-relatedconsumption;Over-investment;Propertyrights

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