[博弈论书籍].behavioral.game.theory,thinking,learning,and.teaching,colin f. camerer,teck-hua ho,juin kuan chong,november 14,2001

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1、BehavioralGameTheory:Thinking,Learning,andTeachingColinF.Camerer1CaliforniaInstituteofTechnologyPasadena,CA91125Teck-HuaHoWhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaPA19104JuinKuanChongNationalUniversityofSingaporeKentRidgeCrescentSingapore119260November14,20011Thisresearchwassupportedb

2、yNSFgrantsSBR9730364,SBR9730187andSES-0078911.Thankstomanypeopleforhelpfulcommentsonthisresearch,particularlyCaltechcolleagues(especiallyRichardMcKelvey,TomPalfrey,andCharlesPlott),M¶onicaCapra,VinceCrawford,JohnDu®y,DrewFuden-berg,JohnKagel,membersoftheMacArthurPreferencesNetwork,ourresearcha

3、ssistantsandcollabora-torsDanClendenning,GrahamFree,DavidHsia,MingHsu,HongjaiRhee,andXinWang,andseminaraudiencememberstoonumeroustomention.DanLevingavetheshooting-aheadmilitaryexample.DaveCooper,IdoErev,andBillFrechettewrotehelpfulemails.11IntroductionGametheoryisamathematicalsystemforanalyzin

4、gandpredictinghowhumansbehaveinstrategicsituations.Standardequilibriumanalysesassumeallplayers:1)formbeliefsbasedonanalysisofwhatothersmightdo(strategicthinking);2)chooseabestresponsegiventhosebeliefs(optimization);3)adjustbestresponsesandbeliefsuntiltheyaremutuallyconsistent(equilibrium).Itis

5、widely-acceptedthatnoteveryplayerbehavesrationallyincomplexsituations,soassumptions(1)and(2)aresometimesviolated.Forexplainingconsumerchoicesandotherdecisions,rationalitymaystillbeanadequateapproximationevenifamodestpercentageofplayersviolatethetheory.Butgametheoryisdi®erent.Players'fatesarein

6、tertwined.Thepresenceofplayerswhodonotthinkstrategicallyoroptimizecanthereforechangewhatrationalplayersshoulddo.Asaresult,whatapopulationofplayersislikelytodowhensomearenotthinkingstrategicallyandoptimizingcanonlybepredictedbyananalysiswhichusesthetoolsof(1)-(3)butaccountsforboundedrationality

7、aswell,preferablyinapreciseway.2Itisalsounlikelythatequilibrium(3)isreachedinstantaneouslyinone-shotgames.Theideaofinstantequilibrationissounnaturalthatperhapsanequilibriumshouldnotbethoughtofasapredictionwhichisvulnerabletofalsi¯cation