国企高管超额薪酬与薪酬操纵研究——基于管理层权力理论的实证分析

国企高管超额薪酬与薪酬操纵研究——基于管理层权力理论的实证分析

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时间:2018-11-09

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1、AbstractAsthebackboneofChineseeconomydevelopment,themanagementlevelofstate-ownedenterprisesdeterminesitseffectiveoperationtoalargeextent.Topexecutivesmaymanipulatetheperformanceoftheenterprisebyconductingearningstoobtainhighersalary,whichwoulddamagethestockholders'equityseriouslyandhasbeenfocuse

2、dbyresearcherswidely.Topexecutivecompensationofmonopolyindustriesandnon-monopolyindustrieshasbeenabigtopicinrecentyears.Principal-agenttheorybelievesthatbymakingthemostoptimalcompensationcontractscaneffectivelymotivateexecutivestoworeforthegoalofmaximizingtheshareholders’wealth.However,thephenom

3、enonofexecutivecompensationanomalieshasquestionedtheoptimalcontracttheoryinrecentyears.Thetheoryofmanagementpowerpartlyexplainswhytheoptimalcontractbetweenenterprisesandexecutiveisnotoptimal.HowdosethemanagementpowertheoryexplaintheexecutivecompensationofChina'sstate-ownedenterprises?howdoseanex

4、ecutiveusetheirpowertoinfluencetheirownpayofChina'sstate-ownedenterprises?Throughwhatwaycanreducetheirrationalityofexecutivepay?Thestudyoftheabovequestionshasimportantsignificancefortheconsummatingofourcountrystate-ownedenterprise'sexecutivecompensationandprotectinginvestorrights.Thispapercollec

5、tedthedataoflistedstate-ownedenterprisesfrom2006to2012,tookthelistedstate-ownedcompaniesinourcountryastheoriginalsampleandcomparedthewholesample,monopolyindustryandperfectcompetitionindustry.Bystudyingwethertheexecutives’powercouldmanipulatehispayandwhattheirpreferencesandmethodare,thispaperdraw

6、thefollowingconclusions:①thetopexecutivesofstate-ownedenterprisesinourcountrycangetextrapaybypoweronthewhole,andthebiggertheirpoweris,thegreatertheycangain.②Differenttypesofstate-ownedenterpriseshavedifferentpreferencesforexcessreturns.MonopolyindustryexecutivesprefertogetexcessConcealedon-jobco

7、nsumptionasalternativechoiceofmonetarycompensation.Executivesofotherindustryprefertogetmonetarycompensation.③Completelycompetitiveenterprisedidnotusetheirpowertomanipulatecompensation,butthesensitivitybetweenpayandperformanc

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