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ID:23617346
大小:2.08 MB
页数:52页
时间:2018-11-09
《国企高管超额薪酬与薪酬操纵研究——基于管理层权力理论的实证分析》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。
1、AbstractAsthebackboneofChineseeconomydevelopment,themanagementlevelofstate-ownedenterprisesdeterminesitseffectiveoperationtoalargeextent.Topexecutivesmaymanipulatetheperformanceoftheenterprisebyconductingearningstoobtainhighersalary,whichwoulddamagethestockholders'equityseriouslyandhasbeenfocuse
2、dbyresearcherswidely.Topexecutivecompensationofmonopolyindustriesandnon-monopolyindustrieshasbeenabigtopicinrecentyears.Principal-agenttheorybelievesthatbymakingthemostoptimalcompensationcontractscaneffectivelymotivateexecutivestoworeforthegoalofmaximizingtheshareholders’wealth.However,thephenom
3、enonofexecutivecompensationanomalieshasquestionedtheoptimalcontracttheoryinrecentyears.Thetheoryofmanagementpowerpartlyexplainswhytheoptimalcontractbetweenenterprisesandexecutiveisnotoptimal.HowdosethemanagementpowertheoryexplaintheexecutivecompensationofChina'sstate-ownedenterprises?howdoseanex
4、ecutiveusetheirpowertoinfluencetheirownpayofChina'sstate-ownedenterprises?Throughwhatwaycanreducetheirrationalityofexecutivepay?Thestudyoftheabovequestionshasimportantsignificancefortheconsummatingofourcountrystate-ownedenterprise'sexecutivecompensationandprotectinginvestorrights.Thispapercollec
5、tedthedataoflistedstate-ownedenterprisesfrom2006to2012,tookthelistedstate-ownedcompaniesinourcountryastheoriginalsampleandcomparedthewholesample,monopolyindustryandperfectcompetitionindustry.Bystudyingwethertheexecutives’powercouldmanipulatehispayandwhattheirpreferencesandmethodare,thispaperdraw
6、thefollowingconclusions:①thetopexecutivesofstate-ownedenterprisesinourcountrycangetextrapaybypoweronthewhole,andthebiggertheirpoweris,thegreatertheycangain.②Differenttypesofstate-ownedenterpriseshavedifferentpreferencesforexcessreturns.MonopolyindustryexecutivesprefertogetexcessConcealedon-jobco
7、nsumptionasalternativechoiceofmonetarycompensation.Executivesofotherindustryprefertogetmonetarycompensation.③Completelycompetitiveenterprisedidnotusetheirpowertomanipulatecompensation,butthesensitivitybetweenpayandperformanc
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