现金流量表中信息披露质量的优点和不足之处【外文翻译】

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外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：DisclosureQualityandtheMispricingofAccrualsandCashFlowInthispaper,weinvestigatetherolethatdisclosurequalityplaysintheaccuratevaluationofaccrualsandcashflow.Wepredictthatstockpricesoffirmswithhigher-qualitydisclosuresmoreaccuratelyreflectthepersistenceofaccrualsandcashflow.WetestourpredictionsusinganalystratingsofdisclosurepublishedintheannualAssociationforInvestmentManagementandResearch(AIMR)CorporateInformationCommitteeReportsfortheyears1982through1996.Theresultsprovidestrongevidenceofmispricingforthesubsetoffirmswithlowerqualitydisclosuresandofasignificantreductioninmispricingforthesubsetoffirmswithhigher-qualitydisclosures.WeconfirmtheresultsofourMishkintestsusingreturnsregressionsthatalsocontrolforinvestorsophistication,analystfollowing,andfirmlife-cyclestage.Overall,ourresultsdemonstratethemitigatingeffectthathigher-qualitydisclosurehasonmispricing.Keywords:Disclosurequality,mispricing,accrualanomaly,cashflowmispricing1.IntroductionSloan(1996)providesevidencethatinvestorsoverestimatethepersistenceofaccrualsandunderestimatethepersistenceofcashflow.Thisresultsinmispricing—labeledtheaccrualanomaly—whereatradingstrategydesignedtoexploitinvestors’misunderstandingofthepersistenceofearningscomponentsearnssignificantabnormalreturns.LiteratureextendingSloan(1996)primarilyfocusesonaccrualovervaluation(e.g.,Xie[2001];ThomasandZhang[2002];Collins,Gong,andHribar[2003]).However,recentresearchsuggeststhatresearchfocusingonaccrualmispricingwithoutalsoconsideringcashflowmispricingisincomplete(Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007];BaroneandMagilke[2008]).Thus,inthispaper,weinvestigatetherolethatdisclosurequalityplaysintheaccuratevaluationofbothaccrualsandcashflow. Specifically,weexaminewhetherinvestorspricesecuritiesasiftheybetterunderstandtheinformationinaccrualsandcashflowforfutureearningsforfirmswithhighdisclosurequalityrelativetofirmswithlowdisclosurequality.Investigatingtheassociationbetweendisclosurequalityandthemispricingofaccrualsandcashflowisimportantbecauseithighlightstherolethatdisclosurequalityplaysinhelpinginvestorstoefficientlyimpoundaccountinginformationintoprices,thusestablishingalinkbetweendisclosurequalityandmarketefficiency.Assuch,thisstudytestsaconjectureinThomas(2000)thatthemispricingofearningsinformationmayresultfromlow-qualitydisclosures.Ourresultscontributetotheliteraturebyprovidingevidencethattheexistenceofatleastsomemarketanomaliesmaybereducedbyhigh-qualitydisclosure.Moreover,ourresearchmayprovideevidencetopolicymakersastheyweighthecostsandbenefitsofmandatingimproveddisclosures.Recentresearchprovidesevidencethattemporaryaccountingdistortionsarisingfromaccrualestimationerrorsplaysasignificantroleinthelowerearningspersistenceofaccrualsrelativetocashflow(Richardson,Sloan,Soliman,andTuna[2006]).Theseaccrualestimationerrorscouldbearesultofbothunintentionalerrorsinforecastingthefutureeconomicbenefitsofaccrualsandintentionalmanagerialmanipulation(Xie[2001];Richardsonetal.[2006]).Sloan(1996)arguesthatinvestorsfailtofullyunderstandthedifferentialpersistenceofaccrualsbecausetheydonotunderstandthegreatersubjectivityinvolvedinestimatingaccrualsrelativetocashflow.Recentresearchalsosuggeststhatinvestorsunderestimatethepersistenceofcashflowandthus,failtofullyunderstandthefutureeconomicbenefitsofcashflow(Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007];BaroneandMagilke[2008]).Theorysuggeststhatincreaseddisclosureplaysaroleinequitymarketsbyreducinginformationasymmetries,increasingliquidity,andreducingthecostofcapital(DiamondandVerrecchia[1991];KimandVerrecchia[1994]).However,veryfewpapersinvestigatetherolethatdisclosureplaysinefficientpricing.Ourfocusondisclosureisbasedontheideathatmoreinformativedisclosuresallowinvestorstomorefullyunderstandtheinformationinaccrualsandcashflowforfutureearnings.Weconjecturethat,allthingsequal,investorscanbetterunderstandthemanagerialassumptionsusedto recordaccrualsandtherefore,canbetterforecastthefutureeconomicbenefitsandvaluationimplicationsofaccrualswhendisclosurequalityishigher.Wealsoconjecturethat,allthingsequal,investorscanbetterunderstandtheinformationincashflowforfutureearnings,andthuscanmoreaccuratelyvaluecashflow,whendisclosurequalityishigher.Morespecifically,wepredictthatstockpricesoffirmswithhigher-qualitydisclosuresmoreaccuratelyreflectthelower(higher)earningspersistenceofaccruals(cashflow)relativetofirmswithlower-qualitydisclosures.WetestourpredictionsusinganalystratingsofdisclosurequalitypublishedintheannualAssociationforInvestmentManagementandResearch(AIMR)CorporateInformationCommitteeReportsfortheyears1982to1996inclusive.Wefollowastringofaccountingliterature,beginningwithLangandLundholm(1993),whichusestheAIMRoveralldisclosurescoresasanempiricalmeasureofoveralldisclosurequality.1WediscusstheAIMRscoresinfurtherdetailinSection2.FollowingSloan(1996),weusetheMishkin(1983)rationalexpectationsframework(hereafterreferredtoasthe‘‘Mishkintest’’)toexaminewhethertheearningsexpectationsembeddedinstockpricesaccuratelyreflectthedifferentialpersistenceofthecomponentsofearnings(i.e.,accrualsandcashflow).WefirstconfirmthatthemispricingphenomenondocumentedbySloan(1996)occursinourfullsampleoffirms.Thatis,wefindthatinvestorsbehaveasiftheyoverestimatethepersistenceofaccrualsandunderestimatethepersistenceofcashflow.WethenrepeattheMishkintestusingtwosubsamplesoffirms:High-QualityDisclosers(i.e.,firmsinthetopquintileofdisclosurequality)andLow-QualityDisclosers(i.e.,firmsinthebottomquintileofdisclosurequality).2Theresultsofthesubsampleanalysisrevealthatthemarketpricesaccrualsandcashflowdifferentlyforthedifferentsubsamples.Specifically,wefindsignificantoverpricingofaccrualsandunderpricingofcashflowforLow-QualityDisclosers.However,thereisnoevidenceofmispricingofaccrualsandcashflowforHigh-QualityDisclosers.Thisresultimpliesthatinvestorsbetterunderstandtheinformationinaccrualsandcashflowforfutureearningswhendisclosurequalityishigh.Followingpriorliterature(e.g.,Collins,Gong,andHribar[2003];Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Mashruwala,Rajgopal,andShevlin[2006];Baroneand Magilke[2008]),weuseacross-sectionalregressionapproachtoinvestigatewhetheraccrualsandcashflowareassociatedwithfuturereturnsaftercontrollingforvariablesknowntopredictfuturereturns(i.e.,sizeandbook-to-marketratio).Consistentwithrecentresearch,inourfullsample,wefindnoevidencethataccrualsareassociatedwithfuturereturnswhencashflowandthecontrolvariablesareincludedinthemodel(Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007];BaroneandMagilke[2008]).However,wedofindevidencethatisconsistentwiththeexistenceofcashflowmispricing(Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007];BaroneandMagilke[2008]).Wethenperformtheanalysesusingthehigher-andlower-qualitydisclosuresubsamples.WefindthatcashflowissignificantlyandpositivelyassociatedwithfuturereturnsfortheLow-QualityDisclosers,andwefindasignificantreductioninmispricingfortheHigh-QualityDisclosers.3Moreover,injointtests,wefindnoevidenceofasignificantassociationbetweencashflowandfuturereturnsfortheHigh-QualityDisclosers.Alsoconsistentwiththeanalysisusingthefullsample,wefindnoevidenceofanassociationbetweenaccrualsandfuturereturnsoncecashflowandcontrolvariablesareincludedinthemodelforeitherofthedisclosuresubsamples.Finally,weperformtheanalyseswhilecontrollingforvariablesthatareknowntobecorrelatedwithbothAIMRscoresandreturns.WecontrolforhighinstitutionalownershipbecausepriorliteraturedocumentsthatfirmswithhigherAIMRrankingshavegreaterinstitutionalinvestorownership(BusheeandNoe[2000])andthatfirmswithhighlevelsofinstitutionalinvestorownershiphavestockpricesthatmoreaccuratelyreflectaccrualpersistence(Collins,Gong,andHribar[2003]).Wealsocontrolforanalystfollowingbecausepriorresearchfindsthatfirmswithhigherdisclosurescoresarefollowedbymoreanalysts(LangandLundholm[1996]).Moreover,controllingforanalystfollowingrulesoutthealternativeexplanationthatourdisclosuremeasureismerelyproxyingforanalystfollowing.Finally,wecontrolforthecurrentlife-cyclestageofthefirm(i.e.,firmage)becausepriorliteraturefindsthataccrualsdifferwithchangesinafirm’slifecycle(AnthonyandRamesh[1992];Myers,Myers,andOmer[2003])andbecauseincreasedvoluntarydisclosureismorelikelyamongyoungerfirms(Chen,DeFond,andPark[2002]).Here,wefindthattheinferencesfromthistestareconsistent withtheinferencesdrawnfromourMishkintests.Overall,ourresultssuggestthathigher-qualitydisclosuremitigatesthemispricingofearningscomponents.Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollows.InSection2,wesummarizetheliteraturemostrelevanttothisstudyanddevelopourhypotheses.InSection3,wediscussthedataandsample.WepresentourresultsinSection4andconcludeinSection5.2.PriorLiteratureandDevelopmentofHypotheses2.1TheAccrualAnomalyLiteratureSloan(1996)firstdocumentedthatinvestorspricesecuritiesasiftheyovervalue(undervalue)theinformationinaccruals(cashflow)forfutureearnings.Hefindsthatsignificantfutureabnormalreturnscanbeearnedbytakinglongpositionsinfirmswithlowaccrualsandshortpositionsinfirmswithhighaccruals.Sloanalsostates.However,hedoesnotcontrolforcashflowinthehedgeportfoliotests.Sloan’s‘‘accrualanomaly’’hasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromacademicsoverthepastdecade,andanumberofsubsequentstudieshaverefinedourunderstandingoftheaccrualanomaly.ExtensionsofSloan(1996)findthattheaccrualanomalyisprimarilydrivenbythemispricingofabnormalordiscretionaryaccruals(Xie[2001])and,morespecifically,byinventorychanges(ThomasandZhang[2002]).Extantresearchalsoprovidesevidenceontheassociationbetweentheaccrualanomalyandthesophisticationoffinancialstatementusers.Collins,Gong,andHribar(2003)findthatlessaccrualmispricingisexhibitedbyfirmswithhighinstitutionalownershipthanbyfirmswithlowinstitutionalownership.Bradshaw,Richardson,andSloan(2001)findthatanalystearningsforecastsdonotreflectthepredictablenegativeassociationbetweenhighaccrualsandfutureearnings,andKangandYoo(2007)alsofindthatanalystsoverreacttocurrentaccrualstoagreaterdegreethaninvestors.Finally,recentresearchinvestigatesthepresenceoftheaccrualanomalyininternationalmarkets(LaFond[2005];Pincus,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2007])andprovidesevidencethattheaccrualanomalyisnotaphenomenonparticulartotheU.S.capitalmarkets.Severalrecentstudiestestalternativeexplanationsfortheaccrualanomaly.Forexample,CollinsandHribar(2000)documentthataccrualmispricingisdistinctfrompostearningsannouncementdrift,4andHirshleifer,Hou,andTeoh(2007)investigate whetherriskormispricingexplainstheaccrualanomaly.Theirresultscontradicttheideathatarationalpricingmodelcanexplaintheaccrualanomalyandthusprovideevidenceinfavorofmispricing.Recentresearchinvestigatesthepersistenceoftheaccrualanomaly.LevandNissim(2006)findthatthemagnitudeofthenegativerelationbetweenaccrualsandfutureabnormalreturnshasnotdeclinedovertime.Thisfindingisespeciallyinterestinggiventhefactthattheaccrualanomalyhasbeenwelldocumentedforadecade.LevandNissim(2006)provideevidencesuggestingthatalthoughinstitutionalinvestorsrecognizetheanomaly,theychoosenottoexploititbecauseoftheundesirablecharacteristicsoftheextreme-accrualsfirms(e.g.,smallsize,lowbook-to-marketratios).Moreover,theyshowthatindividualinvestorsdonotexploittheanomalybecauseofthehighinformationprocessingandtransactioncosts,particularlyrelatedtoshortsells,associatedwiththetradingstrategy.Mashruwala,Rajgopal,andShevlin(2006)alsoinvestigatewhytheaccrualanomalyisnotarbitragedawayandfindthatanarbitrageur’sabilitytoexploittheaccrualanomalyisconstrainedbytheriskyandcostlynatureoftheassociatedtrades.2.2TheAccrualAnomalyandCashFlowMorerecentresearchhasinvestigatedtheroleofcashflowinexplainingtheabilityofaccrualstopredictfuturereturns.Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam(2004)testBeaver’s(2002)conjecturethattheaccrualanomalymaybetheglamouranomalyindisguise.Theyfindthatoperatingcashflowcapturesthemispricingassociatedwithaccrualsaswellasthoseassociatedwithtraditionalvalueglamouranomalyproxies(e.g.,book-to-marketandearnings-to-priceratios).Moreprecisely,theexplanatorypowerofaccrualstopredictfuturereturnsiscompletelysubsumedbytheexplanatorypowerofthecashflowvariabletopredictfuturereturns.Yu(2007)providessimilarevidence,documentingthatcashflowcompletelysubsumestheabilityofaccrualstopredictfutureannualreturns.Finally,BaroneandMagilke(2008)alsoinvestigatetheaccrualanomalyaftercontrollingforcashflowandfindthatinvestorspricefirmswithlowlevelsofinstitutionalownershipasiftheyaccuratelyvalueaccruals,butundervaluecashflow.Theyalsofindthatinvestorspricefirmswithhighlevelsofinstitutionalownershipasiftheyaccuratelyvaluecashflowandovervalueaccruals. Source:MICHAELS.DRAKEJAMESN.MYERSLINDAA.MYERS：DisclosureQualityandtheMispricingofAccrualsandCashFlow[J].JournalofAccounting,AuditingandFinance.2008(8),P25-29二、翻译文章译文：现金流量表中信息披露质量的优点和不足之处本文主要研究信息披露质量在准确评估净利润和现金流量中的作用。我们预测,高质量公司的股票价格更准确地反映出持续的利润和现金流量。我们用1982年至1996年年度协会发表在进行投资管理及研究(AIMR)公司信息委员会披露研究比例资料上检测了我们的分析结果。该结果强有力的表明了子公司低质量披露和高质量披露在缺失价格上有很强的影响。用回归分析的方法分析投资者的复杂性和公司生命周期等方面更加确定了我们用Mishkin方法得到的结果。从总体上说，我们的结果证明了高质量披露在信息缺失方面有一些缓解作用。关键词:信息披露质量、利息、现金流量、信息缺失引言史隆(1996)提供了证据,投资者会高估稳定的净利润但低估净现金流量。在缺失信息的结果上，尤其是异常收益率，投资者对营业策划中稳定收入组成部分的认识对异常收益率有较大的影响。在文献方面史隆(1996)首先关注高估利息汇率(例如,谢[2001];托马斯和张[2002];柯林斯,红,Hribar[2003])。然而,最近的研究表明,只关注利息汇率信息缺失而不考虑现金流量信息缺失的研究室不全面的Rajgopal(Venkatachalam[2004],[2007],Magilke[2008年])。因此,在本文中,我们主要研究信息披露在准确评估利润和现金流量方面的作用。具体地说,我们检测了高披露信息公司和低披露信息公司的投资者对证券的定价是否收到他们对在得到公司未来收益对利润和现金流量信息理解的影响。调查信息披露质量关系和缺失利润和现金流量信息之间的关系是很重要的，调查信息披露质量的关系,这个问题就其优点和不足之处时的现金流是很重要.因为它突显了对于信息披露质量的角色,帮助投资者有效扣押会计信息和价格,从而构建信息披露质量和市场效率之间存在的某种联系。因此,该测试研究验证 了托马斯(2000)就盈利信息可能由于低质量的披露观点。我们的研究结果有助于提高依据至少一些市场异常可以降低高质量的披露的结论。此外,我们的研究为决策者和他们的成本与收益提高必修课程的披露提供了证据。最近的研究表明，临时性的会计信息失真误差在收益中起着重要的作用,在较低的收入相对于对应计利润持续的现金流量提供有力的证据。(Richardson,Sloan,Soliman,andTuna[2006])。这些收益估计错误可能是无意预测未来的经济效益和故意之管理操纵所导致的结果。(谢[2001],里查德森孙俐。[2006])。史隆(1996)认为投资者未能充分了解微分持续不断的盈余,因为他们不懂参与更大的主体性估计与现金流量。最近的研究也表明投资者低估了持续不断的现金流，从而造成未能完全了解未来的经济效益。《依据Rajgopal现金量,Venkatachalam[2004],[2007]，Magilke[2008年]的看法)。该理论表明,继续增加披露在股票市场中扮演的重要的角色,以减少信息的不对称,提高现金流动性,减少资金成本(DiamondandVerrecchia[1991];KimandVerrecchia[1994])。但是很少有论文探讨有效定价在信息披露中起到的作用。我们专注于披露是基于这样一种理念:更多的信息披露允许投资者更全面了解信息对未来现金流量的收入所表现出的优点和不足之处。我们推测,,所有的一切都是平等的,投资者可以更好地了解管理假设用来记录应计利润,因此,可以更好地预测未来的经济效益和评价信息披露质量较高时对利润的影响。我们也猜测,所有的一切都平等,当信息披露质量较高时，投资者可以更好地为未来收益现金流量去更好地了解信息,从而更准确地评估现金流。更确切地说,我们预测,更高质量披露公司的股票价格更为精确地反映收入低(较高)坚持应计利润(的现金流)相对于增长只能带来低品质公司披露。我们用发表早在一年一度的AIMR分析师信息披露在1982年到1996年度公司信息委员会报告质量评分证实了我们的预测。我们跟踪一系列的会计文献报告，从1993年的LangLundholm用AIMR整体披露分数作为标准衡量质量开始。我们在第二部分对AIMR分数进行了详细的讨论分析。 在Sloan证明之后，我们用MiSkin理性预期框架来检测预期盈利是否准确地反映微小的组成部分（如收入现金流）其优点和不足之处。我们首先确认了Sloan中发生的错误定价现象在我们所有的样本信息中。也就是说，我们发现投资者行为比如过高的估计持续的利益或过低的预计现金流量。我们重复Mishkin测试二次抽样样本公司：高质量的公司和低质量的公司。对二次抽样的结果分析表示市场价格盈余和现金流量在不同的抽样样本中不一样。特别地，我们发现低质量公司有较为严重的过高估计收益和过低估计现金流量的现象。然而，没有明显的现象表明高质量公司错误估计收益和现金流量。这些结果表明高质量公司投资者从信息中获得收益和现金流量的较好估计。从之前的文献中，比如Collins,Gong,andHribar[2003]Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Mashruwala,Rajgopal,andShevlin[2006];BaroneandMagilke[2008]，我们用横截面分析法得出调查发现收益和现金流量和未来返还可以在分析可控制变量的方法下分析预期返还量，比如说大小和市面值比率。根据最近的研究，在我们的充分样本中，现金流和控制变量都在我们的模型中我们还没有找到证据与有关未来回报有关。Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007]。然而，我们发现与之一致的现金流量大涨。Desai,Rajgopal,andVenkatachalam[2004];Yu[2007];BaroneandMagilke[2008]然后执行的分析,采用高增长只能带来低品质披露的二次抽查样品。我们发现现金流量有显著正相关,与未来的回报,低质量的Disclosers,我们发现有轮状病毒显著意义减少的高质量Disclosers大涨，此外,在共同的测试中,我们发现没有任何证据之间有重大关连现金流和未来收益的高质量Disclosers。也符合充分样本进行分析,我们发现没有证据证明其优点和不足之处之间存在关联未来现金流量和回归一次包括控制变量的模型中披露中的任何一个二次抽查样品。最后,我们使用在控制分析变量,它被认为是两AIMR与分数并返回。我们控制了高学术拥有权因为先前的文献AIMR排名更高的公司,有更大的机构投资者所有权(Bushee和一个[2000])和公司,拥有高水平的机构投资者的价格都有存货利息比较准确地反映坚持(柯林斯,巩俐,和Hribar[2003])。我们也控制分析师证明因为先前的研究发现,公司以更高的披露分数紧随其后的是更多的分析师(朗和Lundholm[1996])。此外,控制分析师证明排除另一种解释,我们仅仅是的代理,披露测量分析证明。最后,我们对当前生命周期阶段的公司(即公司年龄)的调查发现,因为先前的文学之变化不同公司的生命周期(安东尼和监狱[1992]。迈尔斯, 迈尔斯,俄梅珥[2003]),由于自愿性信息披露更有可能增加尤其是在年轻的企业(陈,连静仙,民82和公园的[2002])。在这里,我们发现这个测试推断得到符合推论来自我们的缓慢测试。总的来说,我们的结果表明,高质量的披露大涨上的盈利的部件。本文的其余部分组织如下。在第二节中，我们总结了文学最紧密相关的研究和发展我们的假设。在第3节，我们讨论了数据和样品。我们目前在第4节我们的结果和结论第5节。2、文学与发展的前假设2.1、权责发生制异常文学斯隆（1996）第一次有记载的投资者价格高估的证券，如果他们（低估）在未来earnings.He预提费用（现金流）的信息认为，重要的超额报酬，可采取在企业预提费用低，短长仓赚取职位高预提企业。斯隆还指出。不过，他没有控制现金流量对冲投资组合的测试。斯隆的累积异常已收到来自全国各地的学者过去十年相当重视，以及随后的一些研究，改进我们的应计异常的理解。斯隆扩展（1996年）发现，应计异常主要是由不正常的错误定价或酌情应计（解[2001]）和库存变化（Thomas和张[2002]）。现存的研究也提供了异常之间的权责发生制和财务报表users.Collins，供复杂的相关证据，并Hribar（2003）发现，少计提的错误定价是由高比低的机构投资人持股的公司机构持股的公司展出。布拉德肖，理查德森，和斯隆（2001）发现，分析师盈利预测不反映应计款项及可预见的未来之间的高收入负相关，与康和Yoo（2007）也发现，分析师过度反应了投资者更大程度上比目前的应计项目。最后，最近的研究考察了权责发生制存在异常（拉方德[2005];平，Rajgopal和Venkatachalam[2007]）国际市场，并提供证据表明，应计异常现象并非特别是美国资本市场。最近几项研究测试替代的解释异常的收益例如,柯林斯和Hribar(2000)文件,利息问题可能是有别于宣布postearnings漂移和Hirshleifer侯,所以(2007)研究是否存在风险或问题可能解释权责发生制畸形。他们的研究结果与这个想法相矛盾——合理的定价模型能够解释权责发生制异常,从而支持大涨提供证据。 最近的研究调查持续的利息异常现象。列弗与Nissim(2006)发现负面的大小之间的关系和未来的股票异常报酬之没有拒绝。这一发现是特别有趣的事实是权责发生制异常很多嘘声了十年。列弗与Nissim(2006)提供证据表明虽然机构投资者识别异常,他们选择不利用它是因为不良过激的债权发生额公司的特点(例如,体积小,低账面值对市值比率)。此外,他们指出,个人投资者不利用异常因为高价的信息处理和交易成本，特别是相关的短期出售、有关的交易策略。Mashruwala,Rajgopal,Shevlin(2006)也探讨为何权责发生制异常不是套利呢,发现一arbitrageur的能力,能够利用权责发生制异常冒险和昂贵的约束条件下,自然的相关的行业。权责发生制异常和现金流最近的研究调查现金流的角色之解释能力来预测未来的回报。据说,Rajgopal,Venkatachalam(2004)测试海狸的(2002)推测,利息异常可能是魅力异常的伪装。他们发现营运现金流量捕捉之相关大涨以及与传统valueglamour异常有关代理人(如账面值对市值和earnings-to-price比率)。更确切的说,预计负载的解释力预测未来是完全被返回的解释力变量的现金流量预测未来的回报。玉(2007)提供类似的证据,开始收集证据现金流量的能力完全种包含预测未来之年度的回报。最后,同样Magilke(2008),研究权责发生制异常在控制现金流和发现投资者估量公司低水平的学术拥有权好像他们精确地值对应计利润,但低估了现金流。他们还发现,与企业投资者估量高水平的学术拥有权好像他们精确地价值现金流和过高估计盈余。资料来源：现金流量表中信息披露质量的优点和不足之处.大学会计和审计.2008(3),P25-29