Skocpol and Goodwin - Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World

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ExplainingRevolutionsintheContemporaryThirdWorldJEFFGOODWINandTHEDASKOCPOLFRONTIERSofresearchmovewithhistory,althoughoftenwithalag.Twodecadesago,mostcomparativeresearchonrevolutionsremainedfocusedontheclassicalgreatrevolutionsoftheWest:thoseofEngland,France,andRussia.Occasionally,aboldscholarincludednon-Europeanrevolutions(particularlytheChineseandMexican)inbroadercomparativestudies.Itwasnotuntilthemid-1970s,however,thatcomparativescholarsbegantofocusonthefeaturesdistinctivetoThirdWorldsocialrevolutions-thesocialandpoliticalupheavalsinsmaller,dependentstatesoutsideofEurope.Atfirst,perhaps,scholarssup-posedthatsuchsocialrevolutionswouldhappenonlyoccasionallyduringde-colonizationsuchasthosethatplayedthemselvesoutafterWorldWarII.Yetmodemworldhistoryhascontinuedtobepunctuatedbysocialrevolutions,notonlyinpost-colonialSoutheastAsia,Algeria,andPortugueseAfrica,butalsoinformallyindependentstatessuchasCuba,Ethiopia,Iran,andNicaragua.Asnewsocialrevolutionshavecontinuedtooccur,scholarshavebeenchallengedtobroadentheirscopeofcomparativestudiesbeyondtheclassicalrevolutionsofEurope,andtheyhaveentertainedmodelsofcausationapplicableacrossmanysmallernon-Westernnationsinthetwentieth-centuryworldcontext.Inthisarticle,wepointtowhatweconsiderthemostpromisingavenuesforcomparativeanalysesofcontemporaryThirdWorldrevolutions.Inparticular,weshalloffersomeworkinghypothesesaboutthedistinctivelypoliticalconditionsthathaveencouragedrevolutionarymovementsandtransfersofpowerinsome,butnotall,ThirdWorldcountries. 490SOMEPROBLEMSWITHEXISTINGEXPLANATIONSTwomythshavelongcoloredpopularviewsaboutrevolutionsintheThirdWorld:thatdestitution,professionalrevolutionaries,orperhapsbotharesufficienttoprecipitaterevolutions;andthatlocaleventsinThirdWorldcountriesareeasilymanipulatedbyimperialistGreatPowers.Thus,inattemptingtoexplainThirdWorldinsurgencies,manypeoplepointtotheincrediblepovertyfoundinlargepartsofLatinAmerica,Africa,andAsia-thesortofsheermiserythatcapitalistindustrializationandredistributivewelfarestateshavelargelyeliminated,con-trarytoKarlMarx’sexpectations,intheadvancedcapitalistcountries.Othershaveemphasizedtherolethatprofessionalrevolutionaries,oftenbackedbyforeignpowers,haveplayedin&dquo;subverting&dquo;ThirdWorldregimeswiththe&dquo;organizationalweapon&dquo;ofthedisciplinedrevolutionaryparty.Indeed,manyseethehandofMoscow(orBeijing,Havana,orTeheran)behindThirdWorldinsurgencies,exploitingthesocialproblemsofthesesocietiesfortheirownnefariouspurposes.StillothersseetheprimeforeigninfluencesonThirdWorldnationsasemanatingfromcapitalistpowers,especiallytheUnitedStates.Whenrevolutionsdonotoccurinpoornations,itisoftensuggested,itisbecausetheUnitedStateshasartificiallyproppeduplocalagentsofcapitalistimperialism.Theseideas,however,donottakeusveryfartowardanexplanationofjustwhyandwhererevolutionshaveoccurredinsomecountriesofthecontemporaryThirdWorld,butnotinothers.VerymanyThirdWorldcountriesarepoor,forexample,butrevolutionshaveoccurredinonlyafewofthem,andnotnecessarilyinthepoorest.WhydidChinaandVietnamhavesocialrevolutions,butnotIndiaorIndonesia?WhyCuba,oneofthemoredevelopedLatinAmericancountrieswhenCastroseizedpower,butnotHaitiortheDominicanRepublic?WhyNicaragua,butnotHonduras?Oneneedmerelyraisethesequestionsinordertorealizethatthe&dquo;miserybreedsrevolt&dquo;hypothesisdoesnotexplainverymuch.LeonTrotskyoncewrotethat&dquo;themereexistenceofprivationsisnotenoughtocauseaninsurrection;ifitwere,themasseswouldbealwaysinrevolt.&dquo;2Hispointisstillrelevantformuchoftoday’sThirdWorld.Similarly,althoughprofessionalrevolutionarieshavecertainlyhelpedtoorganizeandleadmanyThirdWorldinsurgencies,revolutionarygroupsinmany,perhapsmost,countriesremainsmallandrelativelyinsignificantsects.TheThirdWorldmaybetheprincipaltheatreofrevolutionaryconflictinthiscentury,butmuchofitremainsquiescent.Andwhenpoliticalpassionshaveflaredindevelop-ingcountries,theyhavemoreoftentakentheformofethnicorsubnationalistmovementsthanrevolutions.Would-berevolutionaries,Tillyhaswritten,&dquo;arealmostalwayswithusintheformofmillenariancults,radicalcells,orrejectsfrompositionsofpower.Therealquestion,&dquo;heemphasizes,&dquo;iswhensuchcontendersproliferateand/ormobilize.&dquo;3AsGoldfrankargues,explanationsofrevolutionthatfocusonhumanmiseryandprofessionalrevolutionaries&dquo;arenot 491whollyillusory,butastheorytheydonottakeusveryfar.Bothwidespreadoppressionandinflammatoryagitationoccurwithfargreaterfrequencythanrevolution,orevenrebellion.&dquo;4Thegreatcapitalistpowers,furthermore,obviouslycannotprevent--orre-verse-allThirdWorldrevolutions,asseeninthedifficultiesconfrontedbyFranceinVietnamandAlgeriaandbytheUnitedStatesinVietnam,Cuba,Nicaragua,andIran.Imperialistinterestscertainlyexist,buttheymustoperatethroughlocalregimesorthroughprivateagentswhoseactivitiesareunderwrittenandstronglyshapedbythelocalregimes.AndparticulartypesofregimesintheThirdWorlddo’notalwaysreliablyproducethesortofantirevolutionarystabilitydesiredinParisorWashington,D.C.-anymorethanlocalrevolutionariescanalwaysproducethechangesdesiredbyMoscow,Havana,orTeheran.RecentacademicanalysesofThirdWorldinsurgencieshavehelpedtodispelmythssuchastheoneswehavejustcriticized,yettheacademicanalyseshavenotreplacedthemythswithcompletelyadequatearguments.MuchoftherecentcomparativeandtheoreticalliteratureonThirdWorldrevolutions-includingtheimportantworkofWolf,Paige,Migdal,Scott,andPopkin-investigatestheroleofpeasantsintheseupheavals.Thisbodyofworkexaminesthespecificgrievan-cesandmotivationsforpeasantrebellionorpeasantsupportforavowedlyrevolutionaryguerrillamovements,emphasizingthatmuchmorethanpovertyortheactivitiesofprofessionalrevolutionariesaloneisinvolved.Thesewritingsarguethatcertainsortsofpeasants-notusuallythepoorest-aremorewillingorabletorebelthanothers.Tobesure,thescholarswhohaverecentlyanalyzedThirdWorldrevolutionsaspeasant-basedconflictshavetheirdisagreements.Atleasttwoimportantandongoingdebateshavecomeoutofthiswork:theWolf-Paigedebateaboutjustwhatsortofpeasantsarerevolutionary,andtheScott-Popkindebateontherelativeweightofeconomic,organizational,andculturaldeterminantsofpeasantbehavior,andonthenatureofpeasants’psychologicalmotivationsforrebelling.Wedonotproposetorehashthesedebateshere,however,becausewebelievethattheyhaveoveremphasizedthesituationofthepeasantryalone.Althoughthedebatesaboutpeasantsandrevolutionhaveenrichedourunderstandingofagrar-iansocioeconomicrelationsandpeasantpoliticalbehavior,thesedebateshavefocusedinsufficientanalyticattentionontwootherissues-themselvescloselyrelated-whichcantakeusfurthertowardanunderstandingofrevolutionarymovementsandtransfersofpowerinthecontemporaryThirdWorld.Thefirstissueistheformationofrevolutionarycoalitionsthatinvariablyextendwellbeyondpeasantsalone.Thesecondissueistherelativevulnerabilityofdifferentsortsofpoliticalregimestotheformationofbroadrevolutionarycoalitionsand,perhaps,toactualoverthrowbyrevolutionaryforces.Drawingfromourownrecentcomparativestudies,aswellasfrompoliticalanalysesbyotherscholars, 492wecanexplorethesemattersandsuggestafruitfultheoreticalapproachtoexplainingwhyrevolutionshavehappenedinsomeThirdWorldcountriesbutnotinothers.6FROMPEASANTSTOREVOLUTIONARYCOALITIONSAlthoughpeasantshaveundoubtedlybeenascentraltomostThirdWorldinsurgenciesastheywerefortheclassicalsocialrevolutions,thecharacterizationofThirdWorldrevolutionsaspeasantwarsoragrarianrevolutions-acharac-terizationthatsometimescarriesanimplicationofhomogeneouspeasantcom-munitiesrebellingspontaneously-hasshiftedourattentionawayfromtheroleofotheractorsinrevolutionarydramas.Revolutionaryoutbreaksandseizuresofpowerareoftencarriedthroughbycoalitions,alliances,orconjuncturesofstrugglesthatcutacrossdividesbetweenurbanandruralareasandamongdifferentsocialclassesandethnicgroupings.(Ofcourse,suchrevolutionarycoalitionstendtobreakapartorrecomposeinnewwaysifandwhentheyactuallyseizestatepower,butthisisasubjectthatliesbeyondscopeofthisarticle.)Withsomenotableexceptions,theliteraturethatemphasizestheroleofpeasantsinrevolutionstendstoignoretheroleofprofessionalrevolutionaryorganizations,groupsthattendtobedisproportionatelymiddleclassinsocialcomposition.Thistendencyisunderstandableinpartasareactionagainstthemyththatrevolutionsaresimplytheworkofsmallconspiratorialgroupsofsubversives.Butevenifprofessionalrevolutionariescannotsimplymakerevolu-tionswheretheywill,theyhaveobviouslyplayedanimportantroleinorganizing,arming,andleadingmanyrevolutionarymovements.Thisrole,moreover,isoftenanecessaryone.Indeed,exceptforthosepeasantswhohappentoliveinrelativelyautonomousandsolitaryvillages,asdidthepeasantsofFrance,Russia,andcentralMexico,ruralcultivatorssimplydonothavetheorganizationalwhere-withaltorebelintheabsenceofoutsideleaders.Professionalrevolutionaries,furthermore,haveusuallybeensuccessfulpreciselytotheextentthattheyhavebeenabletoworkwithvarioussortsofruralfolk.Thisisanotherpointthattendstogetlostindebatesaboutjustwhatsortsofpeasantsaremostrebellious.Themostsuccessfulrevolutionaryorganizations-includingthoseinVietnam,Zim-babwe,andNicaragua-havewonthesupportnotjustofpoorormiddlepeasants,butalsooflandlessandmigrantlaborers,ruralartisans,richpeasants,andevenlandlords.Whatismore,asGuglerandDixhaverecentlyemphasized,urbangroupshavealsoplayedimportant,evencrucial,rolesinanumberofThirdWorldrevolutions.9Indeed,the1978-1979overthrowoftheShahofIranwasquintes-sentiallyanurbanrevolution.InCubaandNicaraguaaswellasinIran,students,professionals,clerics,andevenbusinesspeople,aswellasworkersandtheurbanpoor,joinedorsupportedbroad-basedcoalitionsagainstdictatorialregimes. 493GuglerandDixsuggestthattheparticipationofsuchpeoplemaybeessentialtothesuccessofrevolutionariesinallofthemoreurbanizedcountriesofthecontemporaryThirdWorld.Howcanprofessionalrevolutionariesputtogetherbroadlybasedcoalitions?Notsurprisingly,revolutionarycoalitionstendtoformaroundpreexistingnation-alist,populist,orreligiousdiscoursesthatlegitimizeresistancetotyrannyand,justasimportant,arecapableofaggregatingabroadarrayofsocialclassesandstrata.Nationalism,inparticular,hasproventobeamoreinclusiveandpowerfulforceforrevolutionarymobilizationthanclassstrugglealone.Revolutionarieshavefaredbestwherethey-andnotconservativeorreformistleaderships-havebeenabletoharnessnationalistsentiments.Ironicallythen,MarxistgroupsintheThirdWorldhavegenerallybeenmostsuccessfulwhentheyhavedeemphasizedclassstruggleandstressedthegoalofnationalliberationinstead-or,atleast,whentheyhaveattemptedtomobilizedifferenttypesofpeoplethroughtheselectiveuseofbothnationalistandclassappeals.Nevertheless,itshouldbeemphasizedthatrevolutionarymovementsaremuchmorethansimplyideologicalmovements.AsPopkinandWickham-Crowleyhaverecentlyargued,revolutionarymovementshavewonbroadpopularsupportwhentheyhavebeenwillingandabletodeliverstate-likecollectivegoodstotheirconstituent.Onesuchcollectivegoodistheestablishmentof&dquo;liberatedareas&dquo;securefromattackbytheincumbentregime,whoserepressiveactionscouldensurepopularacquiescencewithotherwiseunappealingarmedrevolu-tionariesabletoprovidelittlemorethanamodicumofprotection.Inaddition,thecollectivegoodsprovidedbyrevolutionariesmayalsoincludepubliceduca-tion,healthservices,lawandorder,andeconomicreformssuchastaxandinterestreductions,theeliminationofcorveelabor,andlandreform.Popkinnotesthatrevolutionarieshavebeenparticularlyeffectiveinwinningpopularsupportwhentheyhaveinitiallyfocusedon&dquo;localgoalsandgoodswithimmediatepayoffs&dquo;beforeattemptingtomobilizethepopulationformoredifficulttasks-including,ultimately,theoverthrowoftheincumbentregime.InVietnam,forexample,peasants&dquo;inthelate1960sstilllaughedabouttheearlyattemptsbyyoungTrotskyitesandCommuniststoorganizethemforanationalrevolution,forindustrialization,orevenforaworldrevolution!Onlylater,whenpeasants(andworkers)wereorganizedaroundsmallerandmoreimmediategoals,werelargerorganizationalattemptssuccessful.&dquo;11Duringthe1960s,anumberofLatinAmericanrevolutionarygroups,whichattemptedtoreplicatetheCubanRevolu-tion-includingtheSandinistasofNicaragua-failedtomakeheadway,largelybecausetheyweretooquicktoengageincumbentregimesinarmedstruggle,wellbeforetheyhadsolidifiedbroadpopularsupportthroughtheprovisionofcollec-tivegoods. 494Inadditiontocollectivegoods,revolutionaryorganizationsmayalsoofferselectiveincentivestoencourageparticipationinvarioussortsofactivities,particularlydangerousoneslikeactualguerrillawarfare.Suchincentivesforactualorpotentialcadresandfighters,andtheirfamilies,mayincludeextrataxorrentreductionsoranadditionalincrementoflandbeyondthatallocatedtosupportersingeneral.Inanyevent,itistheongoingprovisionofsuchcollectiveandselectivegoods,notideologicalconversionintheabstract,thathasplayedtheprincipalroleinsolidifyingsocialsupportforguerrillaarmies.Theargumentwehavejustmadedoesnot,however,supportTilly’sclaimthatthesuddenwithdrawalofexpectedgovernmentservicesdrivespeopletorevolt.13InmanyThirdWorldcountries,fewgovernmentserviceshaveeverbeenprovidedtothebulkofthepopulation.Infact,theevidencesuggeststhatthosegovernmentsthatdonotdelivercollectivegoodstopeople,andthenrepressreformerswhotrytodosomethingabouttheabsenceofsuchservices,arethegovernmentsmostlikelytogeneratesupportforrevolutionaries.Thisanalysis,moreover,accordswithwhatwearebeginningtolearnaboutrulingrevolutionaryparties.Walderhasrecentlyshownthatsuchpartiesobtainpopularsupportorcompliancenotsimplythroughcoercionorthroughimpersonalideologicalappealstoatomizedindividuals(asthe&dquo;totalitarian&dquo;imagewouldhaveit),butthroughpatronageandthedevelopmentofnetworksofloyalclients.l4Revolu-tionarymovementsthathavetobuildsocialsupportoveralongperiodoftimeoperateinasimilarway.Intermsofwhattheyareactuallydoing(andnotsimplywhattheyaresaying),revolutionarymovementscanusefullybeviewedasproto-stateorganizations,orwhatWickham-Crowleycalls&dquo;guerrillagovern-ments.&dquo;15Thepresenceofrevolutionarymovementsofferingcollectiveservicesinterritoryclaimedbytheofficialstateimpliesasituationof&dquo;dualpower,&dquo;inTrotsky’sclassicphrase.Revolutionariesaremosteffectiveincreatingsuchsituationsofdualpowerwhentheyarewillingandabletoorganizepreciselythosesocialgroupingsthattheincumbentregimehasnotincorporatedintoitsownpoliticalsystem.Ofcourse,thoseactivistsintheThirdWorldwhohavebeenschooledinclassicalMarxisttheoryhaveoftenbeencontentwithorganizingtheurbanworkingclass,howeversmallitsranks,andhavesometimeseschewedastrategyofarmedstrugglealtogether,eveninthefaceofveryrepressiveregimes.Thefactorsthatmakerevolutionarycadreorganizationswillingtoappealtobroadcoalitions,aswellasthe(undoubtedlysomewhatdifferent)factorsthatpromptthemtochoosearmedstruggle,arenotsufficientlywellunderstood.Still,evenrevolutionarieswhohaveattemptedtomobilizebroadcoalitionsforarmedstrugglehavebeenpushedtothemarginsofpoliticswhenandwheretheregimestheyhavesoughttotopplehaveinsomewaypoliticallyincorporatedimportantsocialclassesandstratathatmightotherwisehavejoinedrevolutionarycoalitions.Thebreadthof 495revolutionarycoalitionsisdetermined,inshort,notjustbyhowmanygroupsthecadrestrytoorganize,butalsobythepoliticalspacetheincumbentpoliticalregimemakesavailabletorevolutionariesbecauseoftheregime’sstructuralcharacteristicsandstrategiesofrule.Otherthingsbeingequal,thenarrowertheregime,andthemorerepressive,thebroaderthecoalitionpotentiallyavailabletobemobilizedbyrevolutionaries.Thisbringsustothesecondissuelargelyneglectedinrecentworkonpeasantsandrevolutions,namely,therelativevulnerabilityofdifferentsortsofpoliticalregimestorevolutionarycoalitions.Revolutionarymovements,needlesstosay,donotforminapoliticalvacuum.Indeed,politicalcontextisabsolutelycrucialindeterminingwhethersuchmovementswillorwillnotprosper.RecentworkonThirdWorldrevolutionshasnotconvincinglydemonstratedthatanyoneclass,classfraction,orclassallianceisanymoreconsistentlyrevolutionarythantheindustrialproletariatwassupposedtohavebeen.Exactlywhobecomesrevolu-tionary,andwhen,isapreeminentlypoliticalquestion.Revolutionsareultimately&dquo;made&dquo;byrevolutionaries,butnotoftheirownfreewill-notwithinpoliticalcontextstheythemselveshavechosen,toparaphraseKarlMarx,butwithinveryspecificsortsofpoliticalcontextsthatarenotthesameforallwhowouldmakerevolutions.WHICHREGIMESAREVULNERABLETOTHEGROWTHOFREVOLUTIONARYCOALITIONS?Revolutionarymovements,historysuggests,typicallycoalesceinoppositiontoclosedorexclusionary,aswellasorganizationallyweak(orsuddenlyweak-ened),authoritarianregimes.Bycontrast,multipartydemocraciesorquasi-democracies,eventhoseinverypoorcountrieslikeIndia,Malaysia,theDominicanRepublic,andHonduras,havenotfacilitatedthegrowthofrevolu-tionarycoalitions.Theballotboxmaynotalwaysbe&dquo;thecoffinofclasscon-sciousness,&dquo;touseDawley’sevocativephrase,butithasproventobethecoffinofrevolutionarymovements.16Thusfar,infact,avowedlysocialistrevolutions-whichaccordingtoclassicalMarxismweresupposedtofollowafterandbuildupontheachievementsofbourgeois-democraticrevolutions-haveoccurredonlyincountriesthatneverestablishedliberal-democraticpoliticalsystemsinthefirstplace.Inadditiontoliberaldemocracies,so-called&dquo;inclusionary&dquo;authoritarianregimes-includingfascistandstate-socialistregimes,aswellasthesingle-partycorporatistregimesfoundinsomenationsofAfricaandAsia-havesofarbeenimmunefromrevolutionarytransformations.Althoughtheseregimeslackcivilrights,theyeithersponsormasspoliticalmobilizationorregulatetheofficialrepresentationof,andbargainingamong,varioussocialgroups,includingwork-ing-classandotherlower-stratagroups.Theyimposecontrolledformsofpolitical 496participationonkeysocialgroups,co-optingleadersandhandingoutcertainbenefitsintheprocess;thistendstoundercutpossibilitiesforpoliticalactionindependentoftheexistingregime.Manyauthoritarianregimesdonot,however,bothertomobilizesocialgroupsintopolitics,evenincontrolledways;theyleavetheprerogativesofthestateandthebenefitsofpoliticsentirelyinthehandsofrulersandnarrowcliques.Suchexclusionaryauthoritarianregimesareconducivetotheformationofbroadrevolutionarycoalitionsforanumberofrelatedreasons.First,theeconomicgrievancesofgroupsexcludedfromthepoliticalsystemtendtobequicklypoliticized.AsLipsethasargued:Theexclusionofworkersfromthefundamentalpoliticalrightsofcitizenshipeffectivelyfuse[s]thestruggleforpoliticalandeconomicequalityandcast[s]thatstruggleinaradicalmold....Wheretherighttocombineinthelabormarket[is]severelyrestricted,...thedecisiontoactinpoliticsisforcedontradeunions.Whetherthey[like]itornot,unions[mustbecome]politicalinstitutions;they[have]firsttochangethedistributionofpoliticalpowerwithinthestatebeforethey[can]effectivelyexertpowerinthemarket.Lipsetiswritingabouturbanworkers,andtrade-unionorganizationsinparticular,buthisanalysisalsoholdsforotherlower-classgroupsandtheirorganizationalvehicles.Closedauthoritarianregimesalsoprovideahighlyvisiblefocusofoppositionandacommonenemyforgroupsandclassesthatmaybenursingverydifferentsortsofeconomicandpoliticalgrievances(includinggrievancesaboutoneanother).Politicallegitimacyisusuallyveryproblematicforauthoritarianrulers,especiallywhenreligiousauthoritiesdistancethemselvesfrom,orevenoutrightoppose,suchregimes,afterhavingpreviouslyacceptedthem.Similarly,thepoliticallegitimacyofauthoritarianrulershassometimesbeenunderminedsimultaneouslyintheeyesofmanygroupswhentherulershaveorchestratedblatantlyfraudulentelectionsinanefforttojustifytheircontinuingpower.Mostimportantly,perhaps,exclusionaryregimestendtoradicalize,oratleastneutralize,moderateandreformistpoliticians,includingthosethatchoosetoparticipateinproformaelections.Suchmoderatesmightcompetewithrev-olutionariesforpopularsupport,orelseinitiateagradualtransitiontoamoreopenorinclusionarypoliticalsystem,typicallythroughallianceswiththearmedforces.Butexclusionaryregimestendtoattackandundermineexactlythesemoderateelements.Finally,closedauthoritarianregimes,withoutintendingtodoso,valorizethepotentialoppositionalroleofarmedrevolutionaries.Becausesuchregimesaresoclosed,theyreadilyturntoviciousrepressionwhenfacedwithdemandsforeventhemostmoderatepoliticaloreconomicadjustments.Thusclosedauthoritarianregimesplaceapremiumonthethingsarmedrevolutionariesarebestpreparedtodo-namely,provideopponentsofaregimewiththemeansofself-defense, 497suchasguns,clandestinenetworks,safehouses,andevenliberatedterritorywithinwhichtosurviveandcarryonoppositionalpolitics.Ofcourse,givenexclusionaryconditions,thegrowthofrevolutionarymove-mentsismadeeveneasierwhenrebelscanoperateinperipheralareasthattheauthoritarianregimestheyopposeareunabletocontrol.Thishappenswhenauthoritarianregimeshaveneverfullypenetratedcertainareas(asinCentralAmericaandLusophoneAfrica),whentheylosecontrolofareasduetowarorinvasion(asinSoutheastAsia),orwhentheyareunabletopreventneighboringcountriesfromharboringrevolutionaries.&dquo;[R]evolutionarywarfareanditscoun-tering,&dquo;Fairbairnhassuggested,&dquo;isbasicallycompetitioningovernment.Theaimoftherevolutionaryguerrillaistocreateakindofadministrativevacuumintowhichitcaninsertitsown’parallelhierarchies’or’alternativegovern-ment.&dquo;,18Ifakindofadministrativevacuumalreadyexistsontheexclusionaryregime’sterritory,orifitsuddenlyemerges,thenthetaskofthearmedrev-olutionarieswillbetheeasier.Ontheotherhand,authoritarianregimesthataremilitarilyandorganization-allystrongandhavesecurebordersgenerallydonotprovidesufficientleewayforarmedrevolutionariestomobilizemasssupport,eventhoughtheytootendtoradicalizetheiropponents.Likeitornot,then,someofthemostbrutalandrepugnantauthoritarianregimesintheThirdWorld,suchasthosefoundinLatinAmerica’ssoutherncone,invariousEastAsianandMiddleEasterncountries,andespeciallyinSouthAfrica,areprobablytoopowerfulandruthlesstobetoppledbyarmedstruggle.Fromtheviewpointofwould-berevolutionaries,theidealsituationistofaceanexclusionaryandrepressiveauthoritarianregimethatlacksstrongcontrolofitsentireterritoryorborders(orelsesuddenlylosessuchcontrol).DuringWorldWarII,partsofNazi-occupiedEuropefitthisformula.MoretothepointforthisanalysisofthecontemporaryThirdWorld,quiteafewstatesinSoutheastAsia,CentralAmerica,andAfricafallintothiscategory:theyare,simultaneously,politicallyexclusionary,repressive,andnotfullyincontroloftheirnominalterritories.Facingsuchregimes,revolutionariescanbuildbroadcoalitionsamongmanygroupsfundamentallyopposedtotheexistingpoliticalarrangementsandauthorities,becausemanygroupsinsocietyneedthecoercivemeansanduncom-promisingpoliticalformulasthattherevolutionarycadreshavetooffer.WHICHREGIMESAREVULNERABLETOACTUALOVERTHROW?Evenregimesthatconfrontformidablerevolutionarymovements,however,donotinvariablyfalltothoseforces.Indeed,whenspeakingofregimevul-nerability,adistinctionshouldbemadebetweenvulnerabilitytotheformationofamass-basedrevolutionarymovementwithintheterritoryaregimeclaimstorule,andvulnerabilitytoactualoverthrowbythatmovement.Weneedtounderstand 498whatmakesforthesecondtypeofvulnerabilityaswellasthefirst,withoutanalyticallycollapsingthetwo.Unfortunately,theexistingtheoreticalliteratureonrevolutionswillnotgiveustheanswersweneed.Johnsonhasarguedthat&dquo;flexible&dquo;politicalelitescanavertrevolutionarytakeoversbybringingabout&dquo;conservativechange.&dquo;19Thisviewmightseemtoaccountforthefailureofanumberofrevolutionarymove-ments,yetJohnsonremainsvague,tosaytheleast,aboutwhichsortsofpoliticalleaderships,operatinginwhichkindsofregimes,canactuallyaccomplishthisconservativechange.Meanwhile,Huntingtoniscertainlyrightabouttheveryspecificneedcertainstateshavetoincorporatenewlymobilizedgroupsintothepoliticalsystem,ifthosestatesaretostaveoffrevolutions.LikeJohnson,however,Huntingtondoesnotsufficientlyexplorewhysomeregimescandothisandnotothers.Huntingtonargues,forexample,thatthegreatrevolutionsofhistoryhavetakenplaceeitherinhighlycentralizedtraditionalmonarchies(suchasBourbonFrance,tsaristRussia,andimperialManchuChina)orinnarrowlybasedmilitarydictatorships(suchaspre-1911Mexico,pre-1952Bolivia,pre-1944Guatemala,andpre-1959Cuba),21orincolonialregimes(suchasVietnamandAlgeriaafterWorldWarII).Yet,historically,notallcentralizedmonarchiesprovedsusceptibletorevolutionaryoverthrow.Moreimportantforourpresentpurposes,notalltwentieth-centurymilitarydictatorshipsorcolonialregimeshavebeensweptawaybyrevolutions-notevenallofthosethathavefacedstrongrevolutionarymovements.Inourview,twospecifictypesofexclusionaryandrepressiveauthoritarianregimesareespeciallyvulnerabletoactualoverthrowbyrevolutionarymove-ments:neo-patrimonialorSultanisticdictatorshipsidentifiedwithaforeignpowerandcolonialregimesbasedonso-calleddirectrulebythecolonizingcountry.Theseregimesarenotonlymuchmorenarrowlybasedthanotherpoliticalorders,includingotherformsofauthoritarianism,buttheyarealsomorebrittleandunreformable.Theyareusuallyunabletobringaboutconservativechangeorthepoliticalincorporationofnewlymobilizedgroupsthatmightweakenexistingrevolutionarymovements.TheSusceptibilityofNeo-PatrimonialDictatorshipstoRevolutionaryTakeoversThevulnerabilitytorevolutionaryoverthrowofneo-partimonialism-and,inparticular,oftheextremesortofneo-patrimonialismoftencalledSultanism-hasbeenexploredinrecentworkbyEisenstadtandGoldstone.22Sultanisticneo-patrimonialregimesarecenteredinthepersonalmanipulationofindividualdictatorialrulers,whoallownostablegroupprerogativesinthepolity-notevencollectiveprerogativesformilitaryofficersoruppersocialandeconomicclasses.Examplesofsuccessfulrevolutionsagainstsuchpersonalistdictatorshipsinclude 499the1911MexicanRevolutionagainsttheregimeofPorfirioDiaz,the1959CubanRevolutionagainsttheregimeofFulgencioBatista,the1979NicaraguanRevolu-tionagainsttheregimeofAnastazioSomoza,andthe1979IranianRevolutionagainsttheneo-patrimonialmonarchyofthePahlaviShahs.Sultanisticneo-patrimonialregimesareespeciallyvulnerabletoactualover-throwbyrevolutionarymovementsforseveralrelatedreasons.First,comparedtomoreimpersonalandbureaucraticformsofauthoritarianrule,personalistdictatorsaremorelikelytogenerateeliteandmiddle-classopposition.Landlords,businesspeople,clerics,andprofessionals,forexample,oftencometoresenttheblatantcorruptionofsuchdictatorsandtheirinnercircle;theirtendencytomonopolizesignificantsectorsofeconomy;theirheavy-handedcontroloftheflowofideasandinformationinschoolsandinthepress;theiruseoffamilyconnectionstomonopolizegovernmentpositions,contracts,andotherbusinessandprofessionalopportunities;andtheirpenchantforgrantingspecialprivilegestoforeigncapitalistsandblindlyservingthegeopoliticalinterestsofgreatpowersinexchangeforforeignaid.Second,whenelitesandthemiddleclassjointhepoliticalopposition,foreignbackingforpersonalistdictatorsismorelikelytobewithdrawn,evenifthosedictatorswerelongsupportedasthebestguarantorsofstability.TheUnitedStates,significantly,wasultimatelyunwillingtosupportoldallieslikeDiaz,Batista,Somoza,ortheShahinthefaceofthebroad,multiclassoppositionmovementstothosedictators-evenastheUnitedStatesfailedtofindorcreatethatelusive,democratic&dquo;thirdforce&dquo;thatcouldstaveoffrevolutionbyprovidinganattractivealternativetobothrevolutionandthestatusquo.Finally,thearmedforcesofSultanisticneo-patrimonialregimestendtobeespeciallycorruptandincompetent,inpartbecausethedictatorismoreconcernedwithpreventinghisownpersonaloverthrowbymilitarycoupthanwithestab-lishinganeffectivefightingforce.Coalitionsbetweenofficersandciviliansthatmightthreatenthedictatorarediscouraged,andreform-mindedofficersareincessantlypurgedtopreventsuchcoalitionsfromcomingtogetherthroughcoups.Thuswhenpersonalistdictatorsfinallydecidetostepdownafterthegrowthofbroadoppositionalmovementsandthewithdrawalofforeignsponsor-ship,theirarmies,whichhavebeenbredandwinnowedforsycophanticloyaltytotheleader,tendtodisintegrate,openingthewayforguerrillaarmiesorirregularforcestoseizepower.Despitethesespecialvulnerabilities,however,evenlong-standingneo-patri-monialdictatorshipsarenotinvariablysweptawaybyrevolutionaries,andtheymaynotevenhavetoconfrontsignificantrevolutionarymovements.Aswesuggestedearlier,radicalgroupsmaysimplyeschewastrategyofarmedstruggle,evenunderveryrepressiveconditions.Inaddition,thearmedforcesofneo-patrimonialdictatorship-theirlackofprofessionalismnotwithstanding-may 500stillmanagetocontroldissidenceontheirterritoryandpolicetheirborders,leavinglittlespaceforrevolutionariestomobilize.Elitesandmiddleclassesarenotalwaysdrivenintoacoalitionwithrevolutionaries,furthermore,especiallyifthedictatordispensespatronageaccordingtomoreorlessrationalandimpersonalcriteriaanddoesnotrepressthemoderateoppositionintooheavy-handedafashion.Also,ethnicdivisionsamongthepopulacemayprovetoodurableandfractiousforrevolutionariestobridge,eveninthepresenceofadictatordespisedbyall.Eisenstadt,infact,hasarguedthatneo-patrimonialsocietiesmakethingsdifficultforrevolutionaries,becausesuchsocietiestendtobecharacterizedbyascriptive,especiallyethnicandreligious,formsoforganizationandbythecirculationoftheelitecliques.24CombinationsofmanyoftheconditionslistedinthisparagraphseemtoexplainwhythedictatorshipofMobutuSeseSekoofZairehassurvivedforsolong,andmayaccountfortherecentdisplacementofAlfredoStroessnerofParaguaybyarivalelitefaction.Ifneo-patrimonialdictatorsgrantcivilianandmilitarymoderatessomeminimalbreathingroom,furthermore,thethreatposedbyanemerging(orevenpotential)revolutionarymovementmayhelpforgeacivilian-militaryalliancecapableofremovingthedictator.Thisalliancemay,inturn,broadenpoliticalparticipationbeforerevolutionariesbecomesufficientlypowerfultobidforpower.FerdinandMarcosofthePhilippinesandFrancoisDuvalierofHaitiwererecentlyoustedinthismanner,althoughtheciviliancomponentofthetransitioninHaitihasbeenrelativelyweak.AndinthePhilippines,itistoosoontotellwhetherthedemocraticopeningengineeredbyCorazonAquinoandherfollowerswillovercometendenciestowardreactionandrevolution.Itbearsemphasizing,too,thatallofthecounterrevolutionarytasksdescribedabove-territorialcontrol,theco-optationoraccommodationofelitesandthemiddleclass,theremovalofanunpopularleader,andthetransitiontoamoreopenpoliticalregime-aremoreeasilyaccomplishedbybureaucratic-(asop-posedtoneo-patrimonial)authoritarianregimes.Indeed,bureaucratic-authori-tarianregimesgivepowerandprerogativestocollectives-suchascohortsofmilitaryofficers-whocanbargainwith,orevendisplace,oneanotherwithoutunravelingtheregime.ButSultanisticneo-patrimonialregimespitpersonaldictatorsagainstelites,andelitesagainstoneanother,renderingpoliticalstabilityhighlydependentontheunrelentingwilinessandvigilanceoftheindividualruler.Soonerorlater,however,individualsultansfalterordie;andsons,suchasthesecondIranianShahorHaiti’s&dquo;BabyDoc,&dquo;oftenprovelessstrong-willedthantheirfathers.Theanalysisinthissection,wemightnote,raisesquestionsaboutTilly’sargumentthatrevolutionarymovementsaremorelikelytosucceedwhentheycanforgeallianceswith&dquo;politymembers.&dquo;25CoalitionsbetweenpolitymembersandwhatTillycalls&dquo;challengergroups&dquo;areoften,ifnotalways,antirevolutionaryin 501theirconsequences.Infact,suchcoalitionsmaybeformedpreciselyinordertopreventthefurthergrowthofmovementsledbyradicalpoliticalforces.ContrarytoTilly’shypothesis,social-revolutionarymovementsseemmorelikelytoseizepowerwhencivilian-militarycoalitionsareunabletoformandinitiateapoliticalopeningfromabove.TheVulnerabilityofDirectlyRuledColoniesTheconnectionbetweenrevolutionandparticulartypesofcolonialrulehasnotbeenexploredtothesameextentastheconnectionbetweenrevolutionandneo-patrimonialism.However,so-calleddirectcolonialrule-whichoccurswhenacolonyisgoverneddirectlybymetropolitanofficials,andindigenouselitesarenotallowedtosharepowernorreadiedtoacceptsovereigntyaftercolonialismends-sharesanumberofsimilaritieswithpersonalistdictatorships.Theresem-blancestoneo-patrimonialismrenderdirectcolonialismespeciallyvulnerabletorevolutionaryoverthrow.ExamplesofdirectlyruledcoloniesthatgavewaytobroadlybasedrevolutionarycoalitionsincludetheformerFrenchcoloniesofVietnamandAlgeriaandPortugal’sformerAfricancolonies,Guinea-Bissau,Angola,andMozambique.Currently,moreover,directcolonialruleoritsequiv-alentconfrontsbroadlybasednationalistmovementsofamoreorlessradicalcomplexioninanumberofterritories:theIsraeli-occupiedWestBankandGazaStrip;theWesternSahara,aformerSpanishcolonynowoccupiedbyMorocco;Eritrea,aformerItaliancolonythatwasabsorbedintoEthiopia;Namibia,aformerGermancolonynowoccupiedbySouthAfrica;EastTimor,aformerPortuguesecolonyabsorbedintoIndonesia;andNewCaledonia,aFrenchcolonyintheSouthPacific.Directcolonialrulecannoteasilygivewaytoastable,nonrevolutionarypoliticalsystemledbyeithermilitaryorcivilianelements,foranumberofinterrelatedreasons.Likeneo-patrimonialism,directcolonialrule-authoritarianbydefinitionandtypicallyquiterepressive-alsoradicalizesitspoliticalop-ponents.Directcolonialismunderminesactualorpotentialmoderateandrefor-mistleadershipssince,unlikeindirectcolonialism,itdoesnotattempttopreserveatraditionalindigenouseliteortocreateanewonesothatformalpoliticalpowermayonedaybe&dquo;safely&dquo;transferredtothecolonywithoutjeopardizingthecolonizer’seconomicinterests.Directcolonialrulealsotendstocreatemoreindigenouseliteandmiddle-classoppositionthanindirectcolonialrule.Importantbusinessandprofessionalopportunities,aswellasupper-leveladministrativepositions,arereservedbyandforthecolonialists.Thatexclusionfromsuchpositionsisbasedonanexplicitlyracialcriterion,andnotoneducationorabilitymoregenerally,canonlyheightenthealienationofindigenousupper-classandmiddle-classelementsfromthecolonialists. 502Thecolonialpower,likeapersonalistdictator,alsoprovidesacommonandhighlyvisiblefocusofoppositionforgroupsthatmayhaveverydifferentreasonsforseekingnationalindependence.Thearmedforcesinsuchcolonies,moreover,arenotlikelytobeaforceforreform.Directcolonialarmiesareledbyofficerswhoseprincipalloyaltiesaretothecolonialpowerandwhohavefewifanyconnectionstoindigenouspoliticalgroupswithaninterestindecolonization.Tobesure,officersandsoldierswithindirectcolonialarmiesmayendupcallingforaretreatfromcolonialwars(ashappenedinthePortuguesecolonialsituationatthebitterend).Butthesuddenwithdrawalofcolonialarmies-liketheflightofadictator-maysimplyopenthewayforrevolutionariestoseizepower.Inaddition,directlyruledcolonies,likeneo-patrimonialdictatorshipsiden-tifiedwithaforeignpower,createcontextsinwhichpoliticalsymbolsofnation-alismandculturalself-assertionmaybeharnessedbyrevolutionariesinadditiontotheforcesofclassstruggle.Inbothtypesofexclusionaryauthoritarianregimes,economicallyrootedgrievancescometobedirectedatpoliticalrulersbackedbyforeignpowers,aswellasatforeignlandlordsandbusinesspeople;asaresult,suchgrievancesoverlapwithandmaythereforebesubsumed,atleastinpart,withinmoreinclusivedemandsfornationalliberation.Ofcourse,revolutionarieswhoconfrontsuchregimestypicallystrugglewithbalancingclassandnationalistissues,butthisisablesseddilemmathattheircounterpartsinindirectlyruledcoloniesorinindependentauthoritarianregimeslesscloselytiedtoaforeignpowerdonothavetheopportunitytoconfront.Comparedtodirectcolonialism,indirectcolonialrule-aswellasmoreimpersonalandbureaucraticformsofauthoritarianisminindependentcoun-tries-tendstobebothmilitarilystrongerandmorecoherentaswellasmorecapableofatransitiontoanindependentandmoreinclusivepoliticalsystem,includingparliamentarydemocracy.Indirectcolonialrule,asnotedabove,pur-poselygroomsareliableelitetowhomformalpoliticalpowercanbetransferredwithoutjeopardizingtheeconomicinterestsofthecolonizer.Thearmedforcesinsuchcolonies,moreover,recruitofficersfromtheindigenouspopulationwhotendtohavestrongloyaltiestothelocalsociety-asopposedtothecolonizingpower-oratleaststrongcorporateloyalties,whichsetthemapartfromthecolonialists.Suchofficersoftenbecomelinkedtobroaderforcesinthelocalsocietythatfavorpoliticalreformandnationalindependence.Incontrast,officersindirectlyruledcoloniesandneo-patrimonialregimesarechosenandpromotedfortheirloyaltytothecolonizingpowerorfortheirpurelypersonalloyaltytothedictatorandthustheyeithercannotordonotformtiestoreformistpoliticalelites.Giventheseconsiderations,itisnotsurprisingthatanumberofindirectlyruledcoloniesdefeatedmass-basedrevolutionarymovementsduringthe1940sand1950s,throughacombinationofmilitarymightandtransitionstoindependentormoreopenpoliticalsystems.Examplesofthisphenomenonhappenedin 503Malaya,Kenya,andthePhilippines.Lessformidablerebellions,moreover,werealsodefeatedorcontainedinIndia,Indonesia,andBurma.Astheselistssuggest,theBritishwereparticularlyadeptatavoidingrevolutionsintheircoloniesthroughtheuseofindirectrule.Significantly,thewhitesettlercommunityinwhatwasthenknownasSouthernRhodesiaunilaterallydeclaredindependencefromBritainin1965,preciselyinordertoavoidasimilarprocessofdecolonization.Whiterule,however,undercutthepotentialinfluenceofblackmoderatesinZimbabweandensuredthatarmedrevolutionarieswoulddominatethenationalistcause.MorerecentpoliticaltransitionsintheformallyindependentcountriesofElSalvador,Guatemala,andPeru-allcountrieswherepowerfulleftistinsurgenciesarecurrentlyunderway-haveledtothepoliticalincorporationofcentristandevensomeleftistpartiesandorganizations.ThepoliticalopeninginPeruwasthemostextensive,anditsbreadthwasundoubtedlyrelatedtothefactthatitwasnotacalculatedresponsetoinsurgency,butoccurred,coincidentally,justastheinsurgencybeganinthatcountry.Whetherthepoliticalopeningsinanyofthesecountrieswillbesufficientlyextensivetothwartarmedleftistinsurgenciesremainsuncertain,however,particularlyinElSalvador,wherethearmedforcesarenotespeciallyprofessionalnortherecentpoliticalopeningespeciallybroad.However,theseopeningsdidremoveunpopulardictatorsandarelikelytoguaranteeacontinuedflowofforeignaid,particularlyfromtheUnitedStates.Analogoustotheempowermentofindigenouselitesinindirectlyruledcolonies,thesepoliticalopeningsinindependentandmorebureaucraticauthoritarianregimesexplainwhyguerrillascannoteasilycometopower.Ininstanceslikethese,prolongedandevenstalematedmilitarystrugglescangoonandon,whiletheproponentsofreform,revolution,andreactionfightitout.CONCLUSIONAssummarizedinFigure1andTable1,ouranalysissuggeststhatrev-olutionariesinthecontemporaryThirdWorldaremostlikelytosucceedwhencivilsocietyasawholecanbepoliticallymobilizedtoopposeanautonomousandnarrowlybaseddirectcolonialregimeoraSultanisticneo-patrimonialregime.InherrecentcomparativestudyoftheIranianandNicaraguanrevolu-tions,Farhisuggeststhatthe&dquo;mostimportantcharacteristicoftheIranianandNicaraguanpre-revolutionarystateswastheiralmosttotalautonomyfrominter-nalclasses.&dquo;26Thishasbeenacharacteristic,infact,ofvirtuallyallThirdWorldstatesthathavebeentoppledbyrevolutions.Incontrast,whenradicalsconfrontastatewithsignificantsocialconnections--evenifthestateisauthoritariananditstiesarerestrictedtothemiddleandupperclasses-thenrevolutionarycoalitionbuildingbecomesverydifficult.Furthermore,ifastatetraditionallyalliedwitheconomicelitescanpoliticallyincorporateatleastsomepopularsectorsororga- 504Figure1.Agraphicrepresentationofstatesaccordingtodegreesof(1)penetrationofnationalterritory,(2)incorporationofsociallymobilizedgroups,and(3)bureaucratizationofthestateadministrationandarmedforcesnizations,thentheprospectsforrevolutionarysuccessbecomestillmoreremote.ItfollowsfromwhatwehavearguedthattheThirdWorldhasbeentheprincipalsiteofsocialrevolutionsinthiscentury,notsimplybecauseofthepovertyorsocioeconomicstructuresonefindsthere.TheThirdWorldisalsowhereonefindsmostoftheworld’sexclusionaryandrepressivepoliticalsystems,basedinadministrativeorganizationsandarmiesthatdonotfullypenetratecivilsocietyorcontroltheterritoriestheyclaimtorule.Bycontrast,democraticpolitiesintheFirstWorld,andacombinationofCommunistpartypatronageandcoerciverepressionintheSecondWorld,havepreventedtheemergenceofstrongrevolu-tionarymovements(orelse,asinPoland,havestavedoffoutrightseizuresofpowerbysuchmovements).TheunravelingofCommunistpatronagesystemsinportionsoftheSecondWorldmayallowthefuturegrowthofoppositionalmovementsthere.Thesewilloftenbeethnicseparatist,however,ratherthanrevolutionary;anditishardtoimaginethatthreatenedCommunistarmieswillcrumbleorretreataspatrimonialandcolonialarmieshavedone.OuranalysisoftheconditionsconducivetotheformationofrevolutionarycoalitionsandactualtransfersofpowerintheThirdWorldhasshiftedawayfromtheemphasesonthepeasantryandtheeffectsofcommercialcapitalismthatcharacterizedearliercomparativeapproaches.Instead,wehavefollowedinthe 505Table1SomeCharacteristicsofExclusionaryPolitiesfootstepsofsuchstate-orpolity-centeredanalysesofrevolutionsasSamuelHuntington’sPoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties,CharlesTilly’sFromMobil-izationtoRevolution,andThedaSkocpol’sStatesandSocialRevolutions-al-thoughthehypothesesofferedheregobeyondwhatanyofthesebookshadtooffer.Wehavesuggestedthatthestructuresofstatesandarmies,aswellasthepoliticalrelationsbetweenstatesandvarioussectorsofsociety,providethekeystoexplainingrevolutionsintheThirdWorld.Revolutionarycoalitionshaveformedandexpandedincountriesinwhichonefindsnotonlypoverty,im-perialism,professionalrevolutionaries,andpeasantsofacertainsort,butalsopoliticalexclusionandsevereandindiscriminate(whilenotoverwhelming)repression.Inturn,revolutionarymovementshaveactuallysucceededinover-throwingthoseregimesthathavebeenrenderedbrittleandunreformablebythestructuralfeaturesandstrategiesofrulecharacteristicofdirectcolonialismandSultanisticneo-patrimonialdictatorship.RevolutionarymovementswillundoubtedlycontinuetoemergeintheThirdWorld,wheremanystatesarenotonlyexclusionary,butalsofiscally,administra-tively,andmilitarilyweak.Andifthepastisanyguide,suchmovementswillbeespeciallylikelytotriumphwherethepoliticalregimestheyopposeremainnarrowaswellasrepressive. 506NOTES1.Forexample:SamuelP.Huntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,1968);BarringtonMoore,Jr.,SocialOriginsofDictatorshipandDemocracy:LordandPeasantintheMakingoftheModernWorld(Boston:BeaconPress,1967);andEricR.Wolf,PeasantWarsoftheTwentiethCentury(NewYork:HarperandRow,1969).2.LeonTrotsky,TheHistoryoftheRussianRevolution,trans.MaxEastman(NewYork:MonadPress,1961;originally1932),p.249.3.CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution(Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley,1978),p.202.4.WalterL.Goldfrank,"TheMexicanRevolution,"inRevolutions:Theoretical,Comparative,andHistoricalStudies,ed.JackA.Goldstone(SanDiego,Calif.:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1986),p.105.ThisarticleoriginallyappearedinTheoryandSocietyin1979.5.See:Wolf,PeasantWars;JefferyM.Paige,AgrarianRevolution:SocialMovementsandExportAgricultureintheUnderdevelopedWorld(NewYork:FreePress,1975);JoelMigdal,Peasants,Politics,andRevolution(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1974);JamesScott,TheMoralEconomyofthePeasant(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,1976);JamesScott,"HegemonyandthePeasantry,"Politics&Society7(1977):267-296;andSamuelL.Popkin,TheRationalPeasant(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1979).6.Inadditiontotheworksofotherscholarscitedbelow,wearedrawingupon:JeffGoodwin,"RevolutionaryMovementsinCentralAmerica:AComparativeAnalysis,"workingpaperNo.0007,WorkingPaperSeries,CenterforResearchonPoliticsandSocialOrganization(Cambridge,Mass.:DepartmentofSociology,HarvardUniversity,1988);JeffGoodwin,"RevolutionaryMovementsinSoutheastAsia,1940-1954:AComparativeAnalysis,"workingpaperNo.0008,WorkingPaperSeries,CenterforResearchonPoliticsandSocialOrganization(Cambridge,Mass.:DepartmentofSociology,HarvardUniver-sity,1988);JeffGoodwin,"StatesandRevolutionsintheThirdWorld:AComparativeAnalysis"(Ph.D.diss.,HarvardUniversity,November1988);ThedaSkocpol,"WhatMakesPeasantsRevolutionary?"ComparativePolitics14,no.3(April1982):351-375;andThedaSkocpol,"RentierStateandShi’aIslamintheIranianRevolution,"TheoryandSociety11,no.3(May1982):265-283.7.Onpeasantsintheclassicsocialrevolutions,seeThedaSkocpol,StatesandSocialRevolutions:AComparativeAnalysisofFrance,Russia,andChina(Cambridge,Eng.:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),chapter3.8.ExceptionstothisincludeMigdal,Peasants,Politics,andRevolution;andJohnDunn,ModernRevolutions(Cambridge,Eng.:CambridgeUniversityPress,1972).9.RobertH.Dix,"TheVarietiesofRevolution,"ComparativePolitics15(1983):281-294;RobertH.Dix,"WhyRevolutionsSucceedandFail,"Polity16(1984):423-446;andJosefGugler,"TheUrbanCharacterofContemporaryRevolutions,"StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment27(1982):60-73.10.Popkin,RationalPeasant;andTimothyP.Wickham-Crowley,"TheRise(andSometimesFall)ofGuerrillaGovernmentsinLatinAmerica,"SociologicalForum2(1987):473-499.11.Popkin,RationalPeasant,p.262. 50712.RichardGott,GuerrillaMovementsinLatinAmerica(GardenCity,N.Y.:Double-day,1971).13.SeeTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution,pp.204-205.14.SeeAndrewWalder,CommunistNeo-Traditionalism:WorkandAuthorityinChineseIndustry(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1986).15.Wickham-Crowley,"GuerrillaGovernmentsinLatinAmerica."16.AlanDawley,ClassandCommunity:TheIndustrialRevolutioninLynn(Cam-bridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1976),p.70.17.SeymourMartinLipset,"RadicalismorReformism:TheSourcesofWorking-classPolitics,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview77(1983):7.18.GeoffreyFairbairn,RevolutionaryGuerrillaWarfare:TheCountrysideVersion(Harmondsworth,Eng.:PenguinBooks,1974),p.139.19.ChalmersJohnson,RevolutionaryChange,2ded.,rev.(PaloAlto,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1982),pp.95-109.20.Huntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties,especiallychapter5.21.Ibid.,p.275.ForGuatemala,Huntingtonseemstohaveinmindtheshort-liveddemocraticpoliticaltransitionof1944awayfromthedictatorshipofGeneralJorgeUbico.Mostanalysts,however,ourselvesincluded,donotconsiderthisasocialrevolutionor(inHuntington’sterms)a"greatrevolution."22.S.N.Eisenstadt,RevolutionandtheTransformationofSocieties(NewYork:FreePress,1978);andJackA.Goldstone,"RevolutionsandSuperpowers,"inSuperpowersandRevolutions,ed.JonathanP.Adelman(NewYork:Praeger,1986).Ofcourse,thesescholarsareelaboratingideasborrowedfromtheclassiccomparativepoliticalsociologyofMaxWeber.23.Inthisandthefollowingparagraphs,wehavedrawninsightsespeciallyfromRichardSnyder,"AComparativeAnalysisoftheVulnerabilityofSultanisticRegimestoRevolution,"unpublishedSeniorHonorsEssay,CommitteeonDegreesinSocialStudies,HarvardCollege,1989.SnyderexaminesindepththecasesofHaiti,Paraguay,thePhilippines,andZaire.24.Eisenstadt,RevolutionandtheTransformationofSocieties,especiallypp.282-285.25.Tilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution,pp.213-214.26.FaridehFarhi,"StateDisintegrationandUrban-BasedRevolutionaryCrisis:AComparativeAnalysisofIranandNicaragua,"ComparativePoliticalStudies21(1988):231-256.BIBLIOGRAPHYDawley,Alan,ClassandCommunity:TheIndustrialRevolutioninLynn.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1976.Dix,RobertH.,"TheVarietiesofRevolution,"ComparativePolitics15(1983)281-294.Dix,RobertH.,"WhyRevolutionsSucceedandFail,"Polity16(1984):423-446.Dunn,John,ModernRevolutions,Cambridge,Eng.:CambridgeUniversityPress,1972.Eisenstadt,S.N.,RevolutionandtheTransformationofSocieties.NewYork:FreePress1978. 508Fairbairn,Geoffrey,RevolutionaryGuerrillaWarfare:TheCountrysideVersion.Harmondsworth,Eng.:Penguin1974.Farhi,Farideh,"StateDisintegrationandUrban-BasedRevolutionaryCrisis:ACom-parativeAnalysisofIranandNicaragua,"ComparativePoliticalStudies21(1988):231-256.Goldfrank,WalterL.,"TheMexicanRevolution"inRevolutions:Theoretical,Com-parative,andHistoricalStudies,ed.JackA.Goldstone.SanDiego,Calif.:HarcourtBraceJovanovich1986,pp.104-117.Goldstone,Jack,"RevolutionsandSuperpowers"inSuperpowersandRevolutions,ed.JonathanR.Adelman.NewYork:Praeger1986,pp.38-48.Goodwin,Jeff,"RevolutionaryMovementsinCentralAmerica:AComparativeAnaly-sis,"workingpaperNo.0007,WorkingPaperSeries,CenterforResearchonPoliticsandSocialOrganization.DepartmentofSociology,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,Mass.1988.Goodwin,Jeff,"RevolutionaryMovementsinSoutheastAsia,1940-1954:ACom-parativeAnalysis,"workingpaperNo.0008,WorkingPaperSeries,CenterforResearchonPoliticsandSocialOrganization.DepartmentofSociology,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,Mass.,1988.Goodwin,Jeff,"StatesandRevolutionsintheThirdWorld:AComparativeAnalysis,"unpublishedPh.D.dissertation,DepartmentofSociology,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,Mass.,1988.Gott,Richard,GuerrillaMovementsinLatinAmerica.GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday1971.Gugler,Josef."TheUrbanCharacterofContemporaryRevolutions,"StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment27(1982):60-73.Huntington,SamuelP.,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties.NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress1968.Lipset,SeymourMartin,"RadicalismorReformism:TheSourcesofWorking-classPolitics,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview77(1983):1-18.Johson,Chalmers,RevolutionaryChange,2ded.,rev.PaloAlto,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress1982.Migdal,Joel.Peasants,Politics,andRevolution.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress1974.Moore,Barrington,Jr.,SocialOriginsofDictatorshipandDemocracy:LordandPeasantintheMakingoftheModernWorld.Boston:BeaconPress1967.Paige,JefferyM.,AgrarianRevolution:SocialMovementsandExportAgricultureintheUnderdevelopedWorld.NewYork:FreePress1975.Popkin,Samuel,TheRationalPeasant.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress1979.Scott,James,TheMoralEconomyofthePeasant.NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress1976.Scott,James,"HegemonyandthePeasantry."Politics&Society7(1977):267-296.Skocpol,Theda,StatesandSocialRevolutions:AComparativeAnalysisofFrance,Russia,andChina.Cambridge,Eng.:CambridgeUniversityPress1979.Skocpol,Theda,"RentierStateandShi’aIslamintheIranianRevolution."TheoryandSociety11(1982):265-283.Skocpol,Theda,"WhatMakesPeasantsRevolutionary?"ComparativePolitics14(1982):351-375. 509Snyder,Richard.1989."AComparativeAnalysisoftheVulnerabilityofSultanisticRegimestoRevolution,"seniorhonorsessay,CommitteeonDegreesinSocialStudies,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,Mass.Tilly,Charles,FromMobilizationtoRevolution.Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley1978.Trotsky,Leon,TheHistoryoftheRussianRevolution,trans.MaxEastman.NewYork:MonadPress1961.Walder,Andrew,CommunistNeo-Traditionalism:WorkandAuthorityinChineseIndustry.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress1986.Wickham-Crowley,TimothyP.,"TheRise(andSometimesFall)ofGuerrillaGovern-mentsinLatinAmerica."SociologicalForum2(1987):473-499.Wolf,EricR.,PeasantWarsoftheTwentiethCentury.NewYork:HarperandRow1969.