资源描述：
《China’s Oil Diplomacy is it a global threat.pdf》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。
ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol.28,No.3,2007,pp519–537China’sOilDiplomacy:isitaglobalsecuritythreat?HONGYIHARRYLAIABSTRACTChinaisnowtheworld’ssecondlargestoilconsumingnation.China’sexternalquestforoilhasthusgeneratedmuchattentionandisbelievedbymanytodestabilisetheworldorder.ThisarticleattemptstoprovideanoverviewofChina’sexternalinitiativesforsatisfyingdomesticoildemandsandtoexaminetheimplicationsofChina’soildiplomacyonregionalandglobalpoliticalstability.ThearticlesuggeststhatChinahastakenthreestepstosatisfyitsgrowingdomesticdemandforoil—expandingoverseasoilsuppliesfromtheMiddleEast,diversifyingitsimportingsourcesbyreachingouttoAfrica,Russia,CentralAsiaandtheAmericas,andsecuringoiltransportroutes.ThisarticlearguesthatChina’soildiplomacystrengthensitstieswithoil-producingnationsandcomplicatesthosewithoil-importingnations.Nevertheless,contrarytopessimisticpredictions,China’soildiplomacyhasneitherupsettheUSA’sfundamentalpoliciestowardsIraqandIran,norhasitgeneratedarmedclashesintheSouthChinaSea.ChinahaslargelyaccommodatedtheUSAintheseareasandhasforgedjointeffortsinenergyexplorationwithitsAsianneighbours,exceptforJapan.China’sbenignoildiplomacycanbeexplainedbytheminorroleofoilimportsinitsenergyconsumptionand,moreimportantly,byChina’speaceful-risestrategy.Oilhaslongbeenviewedasastrategicresourcefornations.Chinaisnowtheworld’ssecondlargestoil-consumingnation.ItsglobaleffortstosecureoilimportshaveprofoundimplicationsforinternationalrelationsintheAsia–Pacific.China’srisingoildemandanditsexternalquestforoilhavethusgeneratedmuchattention.Itisbelievedthat,asChina’soverseasoilquestintensifies,thepotentialforittoclashwithotherAsianoilconsumersanddisruptUSforeignpolicyandtheworldorderwillalsoincrease.ThisarticleattemptstoprovideanoverviewofChina’sexternalinitiativesforsatisfyingdomesticoildemandsandthentodiscusstheimplicationsofChina’soildiplomacyonregionalandglobalpoliticalstability.ThearticleexaminesmeasuresthatChinahastakeninordertosatisfyitsgrowingdomesticdemandforoil.ItarguesthatChina’soildiplomacystrengthensitstieswithoil-producingnationsandcomplicatesthosewithoil-importingHongyiHarryLaiisattheEastAsianInstitute,NationalUniversityofSingapore,Level4,ArtsLink,117571Singapore.Email:eailaihy@nus.edu.sg.ISSN0143-6597print/ISSN1360-2241online/07/030519–19Ó2007ThirdWorldQuarterlyDOI:10.1080/01436590701192645519 HONGYIHARRYLAInations.Nevertheless,contrarytomanypessimisticpredictions,ChinahaslargelyaccommodatedtheUSAandhasforgedjointeffortsinenergyexplorationwithitsAsianneighbours,exceptforJapan.ArgumentsaboutthethreatofChina’soilquestInrecentyearsChina’sdemandsforimportedoilhaveincreasedrapidly.Manyobservers,scholarsandpoliticianstakenoteofthisdevelopment.Someofthemhavesuggestedthat,inordertoquenchitsoilthirst,Chinawillresorttoallmeanstoextractallavailableoilandgasresources,therebydestabilisingtheregionalandevenglobalorder.OneofthemostsweepingargumentsisthatChinamayenterwarsoverstrategicresources,includingoil,gasandwater,aroundtheworld.KlareboldlypredictsthatoverlappingclaimsoveroilandgasresourcesintheSouthChinaSeacouldtriggerarmedconflictbetweenChinaandotherclaimantstates.ThiswouldalsoimplicatetheUSAsinceithascommittedtodefendingthePhilippinesandsea-lanesinthatarea.Inaddition,conflictingclaimsintheEast1ChinaSeabyChinaandJapanmayeruptintonavalclashes.Anotheranalysthasdeclaredthat‘China’swillingnesstopromotecooperativeregionalsolutions2toAsia’senergysecurityconcernshasbeenverylimited’.Somehaveeven3proclaimedthatChina’squestforoilmayendangerinternationalsecurity.Moreover,severalanalystsarguethatChina’seffortstogainoverseasoilsuppliescouldundermineUSnationalsecurity.Forexample,China’seffortstoincreaseoilimportsfromtheMiddleEastcouldundercutUSeffortstostabilisetheregionandreformregimesthereandcouldevenreduceUSoil4imports.InJuly2005theUSCongressblockedChina’sstateoilgiantChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation’s(CNOOC)bidtotakeoverUS-based5UnocalCorponthegroundsthatthisbidunderminednationalsecurity.ItisthusnecessarytosortoutthefactsfromtheallegationsoverChina’squestforenergysecurity.NeedforathoroughassessmentandmyargumentThereisasmallandgrowingliteratureonChina’soildiplomacyandenergysecurity.Itfocusesandshedsbrightlightonthefollowingissues—China’scurrentandprojectedenergydemandsandsupplies;itsenergystructure;itseffortstoexploredomesticsources,expandproductionandincreaseenergyefficiency;andtheimplicationsofChina’senergydemandsandimportson6globalenergymarkets.SeveralstudiesalsodiscussChina’sefforts,especiallythosebyitsstateoilcorporationstoexpandintooverseasoilmarketsand7acquireoilfieldsabroad.OtherstudiesdiscussChina’smovestosecuresea-lanesandbuildoilstockpilesandrefineries,aswellasactorsinitsenergy8policiesuntilthelate1990s.Whilethesestudiesareinformative,theyalsohavetheirlimits.First,analysesinmostofthesestudiesappearedtobedated.Thesestudiesarelargelybasedondatauptothelate1990s.Intothe2000smanysignificantchangeshavetakenplace.Theoilpricehasshotupdrastically,fromanaverageof$13520 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYperbarrelfrom1950–2002toover$50in2004–06.Chinahasadoptedmanynewinitiativesinitsoilquest,includingsecuringitsoiltransportroutes.Someoftheconclusionsinthestudieswerebasedonalowoilpriceandappeartobeinvalid.Second,wehaveyettohaveabroadoverviewandabalancedassessmentofChina’soildiplomacy,whichsystematicallyreviewsChina’songoingexternalendeavoursandcompetitionoveroil,andevaluatespredictionsofthedestabilisingeffectsofChina’soilendeavours.TworecentinformativestudiesemphasiseeithertheproblematicaspectsinChina’soildiplomacy,especiallyitscourtingofroguestatessuchasSudanandMyanmar,9ortheincreasingtensionintheSouthandEastChinaSeaoveroilresources.Thesestudiesoverlookotherencouragingdevelopmentsinrecentyears.Addressingtheseissues,thisarticlefirstchartsChina’sgrowingdemandsforoilimports,thenexaminesitsoildiplomacysincethe1990s,andfinallyassessesitsimplicationsforglobalsecurity.Itmakesthefollowingargument:inthewakeofitsgrowingoilimportssincethelate1990sChinahasintensifieditseffortstosecuresuppliesfrommajoroil-producingcountriesandprotectitsmainoilroutes.Overall,ChinahasnotonlyavoidedclashingwiththeUSA,buthasalsoinitiatedoilco-operationwithitsAsianneighbours.TheonlycautionarycasesareChina’stieswithJapanandSudan.China’sgrowingoildemandsChina’srapidlygrowingeconomyhasdrivenupitsconsumptionofcrudeoil,fromalow88milliontonsin1980to252millionin2003,andto293million10tonsin2004.Itisnowtheworld’ssecondlargestoilconsumer,accountingforone-thirdoftheincreasein2003.China’soilimportsarealsokeepingpacewithitsrapidincreaseinoildemand.In2004Chinaimported12311milliontonsofcrudeoil,upby35%from2003.Chinawasstillself-sufficientinoilaslateas1997.ButasChina’sdomesticoilproductionstagnatedandconsumptionsoared,itsdependenceonnetimportsofoil(importsminusexports)reached40%in2004(seeTable1).TABLE1.China’sproduction,consumptionandimportsofcrudeoil(milliontons)YearProductionConsumptionImportsExportsSelf-sufficiencyratio(%)1980106.087.60.413.3113.91985124.991.70.731.2132.31990138.3114.92.824.9119.01995149.0160.717.118.8101.22000162.6230.170.310.373.02001164.8232.260.37.675.82002168.9245.769.47.273.12003169.325291.08.167.12004175.5292.7122.75.560.0Sources:ChinaStatisticalYearbook,2003;2005;YearbookofChina’sEconomicForeignRelationsandTrade2003;BritishPetroleumStatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy,June2003;and‘China’scrudeimportsexceededthethresholdof100milliontons’,athttp://www.XINHUANET.com,25January2005.521 HONGYIHARRYLAIAndasChina’sautoandaviationmarketscontinuetoexpand,China’sfueldemandsandneedsforimportswillalsosoar.Currentlyone-thirdofitsoilisconsumedbycarsinChina.Thisshareisprojectedtogrowto50%in2020asthegovernmentispromotingthecarmarketasapillarindustryforeconomicgrowth.MostoftheincreaseinChina’soildemandwillonlybesatisfied12throughimports.HenceChinahasbeenproactiveinsecuringgrowingoilimportsinrecentyears.InNovember2003ChinesePresidentHuJintaodeclaredthatoilandfinanceconstitutedtwocomponentsofChina’snationaleconomicsecurity.AsoilisbecominganincreasinglyrelevantfactorinChina’seconomicgrowth,ithasassumedimportanceinChina’sdiplomaticendeavours.China’soildiplomacy:focusingontheMiddleEastInresponsetogrowingoildemands,China’sfirstinitiativeistoincreaseimportsfromthelargestoilproducingcountries,startingfromtheMiddleEast.Backin1995SoutheastAsiaandtheMiddleEastwerethetwodominantsourcesofoilimportsforChina.By2000,however,theMiddleEast’ssharehadincreasedtoawhopping54%,whereastheshareofSoutheastAsiathatconstitutedmostoftheAsia–PacificinTable2free-fellto15%(seeTable2).RisingoildemandinSoutheastAsiahasalsoledtoadeclineinitsoilexports.GrowingoilimportsfromtheMiddleEastsincethemid-1990scanbepartlyattributedtoChina’sactiveoildiplomacyoftargetinglargeoilproducers.Aslateas1995China’soilimportsfromtheMiddleEastprimarilyreliedonsmalleroilproducers,suchasOmanandYemen.By2003thelargeproducersSaudiArabiaandIranhadsurpassedOmanandYementobecomeChina’stoptwooilsuppliersin2003(seeTable3andFigure1).ChinaandSaudiArabiaestablishedformaldiplomaticrelationsinJuly1990.Since1995leadershipexchangesregardingoilhavebecomefrequent.Saudiministersoverseeingtheoilsector,finance,ortradevisitedChinaeachyearfrom1995to1998andin2004.In1999China’sthenpresident,JiangZemin,visitedthekingdomandoversawthesigningofamemorandumonTABLE2.China’sregionalsourcesofimportedcrudeoil,1995–2003(%)Regions199520002003MiddleEast45.453.651.3Africa10.824.024.4Asia–Pacific42.315.015.3CIS(RussiaandKazakhstan)0.23.17.2Europe2.13.61.8SouthAmerica000.4Sources:YearbookofChina’sEconomicForeignRelationsandTrade,2002,2003;FeeidunFesharaki,‘EnergysecurityinAsiaPacific’,publiclectureattheInstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore,8June2004.522 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYTABLE3.PrimarysourcesofcrudeoilimportsforChina,1995–2003(%)Country199520002003Rank,2003SaudiArabia28.216.81Iran5.410.013.82Oman21.422.310.34Angola5.912.311.23Yemen14.55.17.85Sudan04.76.96Congo0.12.14.18Russia0.22.15.87Kazakhstan01.01.314Vietnam4.44.53.99Indonesia30.96.53.710Malaysia3.51.12.211Australia0.41.62.012Brunei00.41.713Norway02.11.115Note:CountriesinboldhaveseenadramaticincreaseintheirshareofChina’soilimports;countrieswhichareunderlinedarecountrieswhichhaveexperiencedasignificantdropinshares.Sources:YearbookofChina’sEconomicForeignRelationsandTrade,1996/97,1998,2002,2003.13petroleumco-operation.Asaresultofstrongerpoliticaltiesandeconomicexchange,SaudiArabia’sshareinChina’soilimportsincreasedfrom2%in1995to17%in2003,toppingthelist(seeTable3).AsSaudi–UStiesbecamestrainedinthewakeof9/11,SaudioilshipmentstotheUSAdeclinedin2004.Incontrast,SaudioilexportstoChinaincreasedandChina–Saudienergyco-operationhasdeepened.China’soilgiant,Sinopec,hasobtainedtherighttoextractnaturalgasin14SaudiArabia’sal-KhaliBasin.InJanuary2006KingAbdullahbinAbdul-AzizvisitedChina,signinganagreementoneconomicco-operation.ThekingdomwouldhelpChinatobuildastrategicoilstockpileof100milliontonsinHainanIslandandbuildanewrefineryinGuangzhou,involving15investmentofupto$8billion.IranisthesecondlargestoilproducerintheMiddleEast.SincetheendingoftheIran–Iraqwarin1988mutualvisitsbyseniorleaders(vicepresidentorvicepremierandabove)ofChinaandIranhavebeentakingplaceatleastonceeveryotheryear.ThemostnoticeablevisitsincludetheIranianpresident’svisittoChinain1992and2000andavisitbythechairmanofChina’slegislature,QiaoShi,in1996.Theleadersdiscussedenergyandoilco-operationatsomeofthesehigh-profilevisits.DuringPresidentJiang’svisitin2002bothnationsalsosigned16aframeworkagreementonoilandgasco-operation.InOctober2004SinopecsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwithIran.Thecompanywillbuy250milliontonsofliquefiednaturalgasover30yearsfromIrananddeveloptheYadavaranfield.IranwillexporttoChina150000barrelsofcrudeoilperdayfor25yearsatmarketpricesaftercommissioningof17thefield.523 HONGYIHARRYLAIZhongguo:‘AnillustrationofChina’spetroleumtransportroutes’,Source(China’sNationalGeography),December2004,pp56–57andauthor’sresearch.1.China’scurrentandprospectiveoilroutes.IGUREFGuojiaDili524 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYAsaresultofimprovedties,China’soilimportsfromIransoaredafter1995.China’simportsfromIranfurthergrewfromsevenmilliontonsin2000to11milliontonsin2002.In2003IranwasthesecondlargestoilexportertoChina,afterSaudiArabia.Finally,ChinaandIranhavehadmilitaryco-operation,drawingirefromWashington.By2005theGeorgeWBushadministrationhadimposed62sanctionsonChinesefirmsforviolatingcontrolsonthetransferofweapons18technologytostates,probablyincludingmissiletechnologytoIran.However,unlikeRussia,ChinaisnotreportedtobeengaginginsalesofsensitivemilitarytechnologytoIran.AmoreimportantissueisIran’snuclearprogramme,whichwillbediscussedbelow.ChinaalsohassmoothtieswithotherWestAsianoilproducers.Ithasmaintainedregularforeign,tradeandpetrochemicalministerialvisitswithOmanandministerialvisitswithYemen,itsfourthandfifthlargestoil19suppliers,respectively.ThepresidentofYemenvisitedChinain1998.Chinahassignedtradeandinvestmentagreementswithbothcountries.InSeptember2004Chinaandthe15-memberArabLeaguejointlypromulgatedanactionplanandmadeajointannouncement.Theyhaveestablishedabiennialforumonpoliticsandeconomyandhavepledgedmutualmarket20accessandtradeandinvestmentco-operation,especiallyoveroilandgas.Diversifyingimportssources:gettingoilfromAfricaChina’ssuccessinexpandingoilimportsfromtheMiddleEastisnotwithoutitsproblems.Importsfromtheregionaccountedfor54%ofChina’scrudeoilimportsin2000(seeTable2).ChinaisconcernedaboutpoliticalinstabilityaswellasUSdominanceintheMiddleEast,especiallyafter9/11.Inresponse,ithastriedtoputitseggsinmorethanonebasket.ChinathereforesetitseyesonAfrica,especiallyAngola,Sudan,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)andGabon.UnlikeintheMiddleEast,theAfricanoilindustryisopentoforeigninvestment.Furthermore,theUSAandEUhavedistancedthemselvesfromtheseAfricanstatesbecauseofconcernsoverhumanrightsviolationsandviolencethere.Incontrast,China’stieswiththeregionarefreeofideologicalorsecurityobstacles,aswellasofhistoricalhostilitiesbetweentheWestandthesecountries.ChinaestablisheddiplomatictieswithAngolain1983.Theirtieshavebeen21steady.Sincethemid1990shigh-levelleadershipvisitshavebeenfrequent.ChinaassistedAngolainbuildinginexpensiveresidentialhousing;italso22exempteditfromalldebtsdueby1999.Angola’sshareinChina’soilimportsnearlydoubledbetween1995and2003,makingitthethirdlargestexternalsourceforChinain2003(seeTable3).InOctober2004Chinawon23thepurchaseofanoilfieldfromShellinAngola.Sudan’srelationswithSaudiArabia,itslargedonor,andEgyptsouredbetween1989and1991.ItstieswiththeUSAandtheEUarealsostrainedbythekillingsofciviliansbyarmedgroupsandrebelsinthecountry.Chinathusbecameamuch-neededdiplomaticlifebuoyforSudan.SudanesePresidentBashirandtheMinisterofEnergyandMineralsvisitedChinain1995.525 HONGYIHARRYLAISincethenatleastoneveryseniorofficialfromSudanhasbeenvisitingChinaeveryyear.In2000China’sVicePremierWuBangguoreturnedavisitand24signedapactforeconomicandtechnologicalco-operation.ClosepoliticaltieshavehelpedChina’smajoroilcompanies,suchasSinopecandChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC),thestate-ownedcompany,toinvestheavilyinSudan’soilindustry.Bilateraltrade,especiallyinoil,alsotookoff.In2003ChinawasSudan’sindisputabletoptradingpartner,accountingfor20%–25%ofSudan’simportsandexports.Sudan’sshareinChina’scrudeimportsgrewfromnon-existentin1997toasixthrankin2003(seeTable3).ChinahasmaintaineditstieswiththeDRCthroughtop-levelofficialvisits.AfterthecivilwarthereChinaresumeditsaidbyhelpingwithconstructionprojectsandsendingmedicalteams.ThissupportisaimedatrebuildingtheDRC.TheDRC’sshareofChina’soilimportsincreasedfromnearlyzeroin1997to4.1%in2003(seeTable3).Finally,ChinaisalsoforgingtieswithotherAfricanoil-producingstates.In2004,onhisreturntriptoFrance,PresidentHuJintaostoppedinGabon,AlgeriaandEgypttodiscussdealsinvolvingpetroleumandnaturalgas.InthesameyearasubsidiaryofSinopecsignedanagreementwiththeFrench25oilcorporationTotalGabontoimportGabon’scrudeoil.Tappingalargenewsource:RussiaEventhoughChinahassucceededinincreasingimportsfromtheMiddleEastandAfrica,ithasoneconcern.Over75%ofChina’soilimports(fromtheMiddleEastandAfrica)gothroughtheStraitsofMalacca(seeFigure1andTable2).AsChinalacksablue-waternavy,hostilemovesbyexternalpowers,orasevereterroristattackwouldacutelydisruptitsoilroutes.Sincethe2000sthereforeChina’soildiplomacyhasturnedtoRussiaandCentralAsia.IthasalsoexploredoiltransportroutestobypasstheStraitsofMalacca.Since1999ChinaandRussiahavealsobeenedgingtowardastrategicpartnership,holdingannualbilateralenergyco-operationtalksaspartofregularChinese–Russianmeetings.China’soilimportsfromRussiahaveincreasedsharplyinrecentyears,asthelatter’sshareinChina’scrudeoilimportssoaredfrom0.2%in1995toanoticeable5.8%in2003.RussiawasChina’sseventhlargestoilsupplierin2003(seeTable3).Chinahasintensifieditsdiplomaticeffortstoincreaseoilimportsbyrailandthroughaprospectivetrans-Siberianoilpipeline.PremierWenJiabaovisitedMoscowinSeptember2004andpledgedtoinvest$12billioninRussia’sinfrastructureandenergysectorby2020.HealsodeclaredsupportforRussia’sWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)bid.Inreturn,WenwonclearpledgesfromRussiatoexpandoilexportstoChinato10milliontonsin2005and15milliontonsin2006.ChinaalsowarmlywelcomedRussianPresidentVladimirPutininBeijinginOctober2004,creatingafavourableatmosphere26forprogressinthetrans-Siberianpipeline.China’seffortstoobtainthetrans-Siberiapipeline,however,arecomplicatedbyJapan’scompetitionforapreferredrouteforthepipeline.InJanuary2005Russiaannouncedthe526 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYbuildingoftheTaisht-NakhodkapipelinefavouredbyJapan,aswellasthe27startofthedesignofabranchtoDaqinginChina(seeFigure1).Theselinesmaytransport50and30milliontonsofoileachyear,respectively.28Chinawouldhavetopledgetotakein30milliontonsayear.TheCNPChasallegedlybeenoffereda20%stakeinYukos,theprimaryRussianoilsuppliertoChinaandhasgivena$6billionloantotheRussianoilgiantRosneftfor29purchasingYugansk,Yukos’skeyunit.Forgingco-operationwithCentralAsiaCentralAsia,ortheregionaroundtheCaspianSeawhichisnowpartoftheConfederationofIndependentStates(CIS),isanothernewsourceofoilsupplyforChina.HereKazakhstanhasthegreatestpotentialforsupplyingoiltoChina.Energyco-operationbetweenthetwocountrieswasofficiallylaunchedin1997,whenVicePremierLiLanqingsignedanagreementon30energyco-operationonhisre-visittoKazakhstan.Therehavebeenthreeimportantdealsbetweenthetwocountries.Oneisanagreementbythetwogovernmentsin1997toinvest$2.5–3billioninbuildinga3088-kmpipelinefromAtyrauinwesternKazakhstantoDushangzhiinXinjiang(seeFigure1).ThesectionfromQandyaghashto31AtasuwascompletedinMarch2003.ConstructionofthesectionofthepipelinefromAtasuinKazakhstantoAlashankouinChinastartedinSeptember2004.Whencompleted,thepipelinewilldoubleKazakhstan’soil32exportingcapacityto20milliontonsayear.TheotheristheCNPC’sacquisitionofa60%stakeintheKazakhoilcompanyAktobemunaigazin331997anditspledgetoinvestalargesuminthelatterover20years.Thethirdisthetake-overofPetroKazakhstanbytheCNPCinAugust2005atapriceof$4.18billion.PetroKazakhstanisaCanadianoilcompanywithsubstantialreservesinKazakhstanandanannualproductioncapacityof34sevenmilliontons.InSeptember2004ChinaalsosignedacompendiumwithKyrgyzstan.Itcoveredco-operationprioritiesandprogrammesforthenextdecade,35includingco-operationincommunicationsandenergy.ExtractingLatinandNorthAmericanoilInrecentyearsChinahassteppedupitsoilco-operationwithLatinAmerica.ChinasignedfiveenergyagreementswithVenezuela,SouthAmerica’slargestoilproducerandtheworld’sfifth-largestoilexporter.TheCNPCwillsetupajointventurewithitsVenezuelancounterpart,PetroleosdeVenezuela,todevelop14oilfieldsintheZumanoarea,whichholdsreservesof400millionbarrelsofoilandthreebillioncubicfeetofnaturalgas.TheChinese36investmentmayamountto$4billion.ChinamayimportoilfromVenezuelathroughportsonthePacificinColombia.China’soilenterprisesarealsoinvestingandtakingupprojectsinoilexplorationinEcuadorandthecountrywasexpectedin2004tobecomethethird-leadingdestinationof37Braziliancrudeoilexports,withshipmentsofabout50000barrelsperday.527 HONGYIHARRYLAIIn2003Chinesestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)invested$1.04billioninLatinAmerica,accountingfor36.5%offoreigndirectinvestment(FDI)intheregion.Muchoftheinvestmentwasmadeinmines,energyexploration,andinfrastructure.InNovember2004,onhisvisittoChile,Brazil,ArgentinaandCuba,PresidentHupledgedtopump$100billionintheregioninthe38comingdecade.InJanuary2005ChinaandCanadasignedajointstatementonenergyco-operationduringCanadianPrimeMinisterPaulMartin’svisittoChina.ThestatementannouncedthatChinawouldextractCanada’soilsandsand39uraniumresources.SustainingimportsofoilproductsInadditiontocrudeoil,Chinaalsoimportsoilproducts,includinggasoline,dieseloil,kerosene,andfuel.Itstotalimports,however,gothroughcyclicalchange,decliningfrom23.8milliontonsin1997,to18.1milliontonsin2000,andrecoveringto20.3milliontonsin2002.SouthKorea,SingaporeandRussiaaretheprimaryexporters,eachaccountingforatleast14%ofChina’simportsfrom1997–2002.TheyarefollowedbyJapan,Malaysia,andthe40Philippines.AstheseimportsarenottransportedviatheStraitsofMalacca,Chinamayfeelslightlyrelieved.Chinaisalsoinvestinginrefineriesoverseas.InSeptember2004SinochemcompletedChina’sfirsttake-overofaforeignoil41company,InchonOil,aSouthKoreansmallrefiner,forabout$549million.ConsideringalternativeroutesinSouthandSoutheastAsiaCurrentlyover75%ofChina’scrudeoilimportshavetogothroughthe1100-km-longStraitsofMalacca.Naturally,therefore,China’ssecondmajorinitiativeinoildiplomacyistoavoidpossibledisruptiontotheroutebytheUSA,JapanorIndia,aswellasfromterroristattacks.Chinaisallegedlyfollowingtheso-called‘stringofpearls’strategy—buildingclosetiesalongthesea-lanesfromtheMiddleEasttotheSouthChinaSeainordertoprotectChina’senergyinterestsandsea-lanes.These‘pearls’includePakistan,42Bangladesh,Burma,Thailand,CambodiaandtheSouthChinaSea.Moreimportantly,ChinaisconsideringanalternativeoiltransportrouteinSouthandSoutheastAsiaincaseofemergencies.Fouralternativeshaveemerged,asdetailedinFigure1.ThefirstandthesafestforChinaisthetransportlinefromthePortofGwadarinPakistan,locatednearthemouthoftheStraitofHormuz,throughapipelineintoXinjiang.In2001Chinaagreedtobuildadeep-seaportthere,withtotalestimatedcostsof$1.16billion.BackedbystrongtieswithPakistan,Chinacanexerciseconsiderableinfluenceovertheport.ChinacanthentransportoilfromtheMiddleEast(egOman)toXinjiang,bypassingthePersianGulf,theIndianOcean,theStraitsofMalaccaandtheSouthChinaSea.ThemainobstacleisthebitterlycoldwinterweatherinXinjiang,whichmayposehazardsforthepipeline;thereisalsothepossibility43ofsabotagebyBalochnationalistsinPakistan.528 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYThesecondalternativetotheStraitsofMalaccaisa1700-kmpipelineconnectingKunminginChinatothedeep-waterportofSittwainwesternMyanmar,atanestimatedcostof$2billion.Alongthisrouteisthecritical44900-kmsegmentconnectingRuiliinChinawithMandalay.Inalikelyefforttobuttressthepipelineplan,CNOOC,China’slargestoffshoreoilproducer,aswellasSinopec,obtainedpermissionin2004toexploretwoblocks,45respectivelyinRakhineandRangoon.ThethirdistherailwayrouteacrossmainlandSoutheastAsia,runningfromsouthwestChinatoSingaporeorMyanmar.Threeroutesfortherailwayhavebeenproposed—eastern,centralandwestern.Theeasternrouteseemsthemostpromisingatpresentasitinvolvesminimumconstruction.ThefourthalternativetotheStraitsofMalaccaisarouteacrosstheKra46Isthmus.Theoriginalproposalsinvolveacanal.InJune2004theThaistateenergycompanyPTTandSinopecannouncedajointprojecttoexplorea47pipelinenorthtoPhuketwithacapacityof1.5millionbarrelsaday.ImplicationsfortheUSA,AsiaandothercountriesUnderstandablyChina’soildiplomacyanditsquestforoverseascrudeareaffectingitsrelationswithvariousnationsinthreedifferentways.First,Chinaisstrengtheningitsrelationswithoil-producingand-exportingnations.Second,Chinamaybothcompeteandco-operatewithnationsthathaveamoderaterelianceonimportedcrude,includingtheUSA,IndiaandanumberofSoutheastAsiannations.Third,Chinamaycompetefiercelywithnationsthatrelyheavilyonimportedoil,especiallyJapan.Nevertheless,theseeffectsalsodependlargelyonthestateofChina’srelationswiththesenations,theextentofitsrelianceonimportedoil,aswellastheeffortsbyChinaandthenationsconcernedtocontainconflict.InthissectiontheeffectsofChina’soildiplomacywillbediscussedandpredictionsthatChinawillcompromiseUSvitalinterestswillbecomparedwithactualdevelopments.Manyofthesepredictionsturnouttobefictions.China’scloserbondswithoil-producingstatesAsdetailedintheaboveanalyses,Chinahasstriventoexpanditsoverseasoilsupplies.Naturally,itwillstrengthenitstieswithoilproducingnationsthatarewillingtoco-operatewithit,orwhoseoilsuppliesarestillavailablefortapping.ThesenationsincludeSaudiArabia,Iran,OmenandYemenintheMiddleEast;Angola,SudanandGaboninAfrica;RussiaandKazakhstanamongtheformerSovietrepublics;VenezuelaandBrazilinLatinAmerica;andCanada.UnderstandablyChinamaysympathisewiththesenationsoverissuesthattheydeemvital,aslongasthisrequiresonlylimitedeffortsonitspartandimplieslittleorlimitedharmtoChina’sowninterests.Severalexamplesareillustrative.First,theMiddleEastandthePalestine–Israeliconflict.PartlyoutofitsneedtosustainoilsuppliesfromtheMiddleEast,ChinasympathiseswiththeArab’sworldstanceonPalestine.AttherequestofSaudiArabia,Chinacalledonallpartiesin2003tostoptheviciouscycle529 HONGYIHARRYLAIofviolenceagainstviolenceandtotackleoutstandingissuesinIsraelirelationswithPalestine,LebanonandSyriaontheprincipleoflandforpeace;italsosupportedanuclear-freeMiddleEast.ChinahasalsoforgedmultilateraltieswiththeArabworld.InSeptember2004theChina–ArabLeaguebiennialforumonpoliticsandeconomyaffirmedChina’s2003stance48ontheMiddleEast.Second,Sudan.ChinaprovidesvaluablediplomaticsupportforSudan,itssecondlargestAfricanoilsupplieroversensitiveissues.ChinamoderatesWesternpressuretoimposesanctionsagainstSudanasaresultofthegrowingatrocitiesinDarfur.Chinesesubtlesupporthasbroughtthe49Sudanesemuchrelief.China’saccommodationtoandminorfrictionswiththeUSAItistempting,giventheaboveanalysis,toassumethatChina,outofitsownneedtogetoilfromthesenations,willundermineUSoilsecurityorcontraveneUSpoliciestowardstheseoil-producingnations.ThemostnoticeableareasthatcriticsandpessimistshavesuggestedincludeIraq,Iran,Sudan,sea-lanes,andUSoilsecurity.However,China’sstancesinthesecaseshavesofarindicatedthatthesefearshavebeengreatlyexaggerated.First,Iraq.BeforetheUSinvasionofIraq,manybelievedthat,inordertosecureoilfromtheregionandshowsolidaritywithSaddamHussein,ChinamightblocktheUS-backedinitiativesoverIraqattheUN.However,ChinaactuallyvotedinfavourofUNSecurityCouncilResolution1441in2002thatheldIraqin‘materialbreach’ofdisarmamentobligations,whichopenedthewayfortheUS-ledwaragainstSaddamHussein.Second,Iran.In2004and2005,whenIranian–UStensionwasescalatingoverIran’snuclearprogramme,manyobserverspredictedthatChinawouldfullybackIraninthecrisisandopposetheUSeffortstorefertheissuetotheUN.OnecommentsumsuppopularsentimentaboutaChina–Iranoildealin2004:‘ForaUnitedStatesincreasinglypointingatChinaasthenextbiggestchallengetoPaxAmericana,theIran–Chinaenergycooperationcannotbutbeinterpretedasanominoussignofemergingnewtrendsinanarea50consideredvitaltoUSnationalinterests’.However,inearly2006ChinabackedaproposalinitiatedbytheUSAandEuropetoreferIran’snuclearprogrammetotheUNSecurityCouncilshouldIranfailtoco-operate.China51alsoagreedwiththeprinciplethatIranshouldnotdevelopnuclearweapons.Third,Sudan.InSeptember2004theUNSecurityCouncilwasdeliberatingaresolutionwhichthreatenedtohaltSudan’soilexportsifitdidnotstoptheatrocitiesbypro-governmentmilitiasintheDarfurregionthathaveledtothedeathsoftensofthousandsthroughstarvationorillness.InthiscaseChinadistanceditselffromthestanceledbytheEU,whichusedsanctionstoforceSudantotakeaction.However,Chinawasnotalone.Russia,PakistanandAlgeriaabstainedfromvotingontheresolution.ChinadidtrytofindacompromisebytalkingtheUSAintowateringdowntheUNresolutionbeforeallowingittopass,insteadofvetoingit.ManyobserversattributedtheChineseactiontothefactthatChinaobtained6.9%ofitsoilimportsfromthe530 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYAfricancountry.Astrongerreason,however,mightbeChina’s$3billioninvestmentinthecountry,thelargestithadmadeinanysinglecountryatthat52time.China’spositiononDarfurraisesconcernsamongadvocatesofhumanrights.ButtheDarfurissueisextremelycomplex.Darfurisabattle-fieldwhererebelsfightSudanesetroops,aimingtotopplethegovernment.Fighting,lawlessness,andpoorlypaidandequippedandcorruptpolicepermitcrimestoproliferate.Apracticalsolution,whichtheUSAandtheUNarepromoting,istosendinpeacekeepingtroopstoenforceaceasefireaswell53asmaintainlawandorder.Chinaseemsopentothissolution.Fourth,thesecurityofsea-lanes.IthasbeenfearedthatChinamightrapidlydevelopitscapabilitytosafeguarditssea-lanesfromthePersianGulfthroughtheStraitsofMalaccaandtheSouthChinaSeatoChinaandthatitcoulddisruptUSandJapanesesea-lanesinthecaseofwar.However,sofarChina’snavalcapabilitymainlycoverstheTaiwanStraitandcopeswithapossibleTaiwaneseprovocativedeclarationofindependence.Itsblue-waternavyisstillmoreofaconceptthanareality.Itsabilitytosafeguardand/ordisruptsea-lanesfromthePersianGulftotheSouthChinaSeahavebeenratherlimited.Anydisruptionofsea-lanesbyChinawouldinvitestrongcounter-movesbytheotherpartiesandcouldbehighlycounterproductive.ThereforemostofChina’seffortsatsecuringitsoilrouteshavebeentofindalternativelandpipelinesorrailwaylinks.Chinaalsoapparentlyfallsback54onUSprotectiontoensurethesafetyofitssea-lanesforoil.Fifth,USoilsecurity.IntensifiedconcerninthemediawithChina’soildiplomacyleavesanimpressionthatChina’squestforoilintheMiddleEast55couldreducetheoilavailabletotheUSAandundermineUSoilsecurity.Thisworryisnotbasedonfact.USAimportsfromArabOPECnations(presumablytheMiddleEast)onlyaccountedfor14.8%ofitsoilconsumptionin2005.ThetoptwoimportingsourcesfortheUSAareCanadaandMexico.USannualoilconsumptionin2004amountedto1011.656milliontonsanditsimportsto590.3milliontons.China’soilimportsfromtheMiddleEasttotalled51.7milliontons,takingup51.3%ofitsoilimportsin2003.However,thisaccountedfor20.5%ofitsoilconsumptionandonly574.7%ofitstotalenergyconsumption.Itwasequivalentto8.8%oftheUStotalimportsand5.1%ofitsoilconsumption.China’simportsarethusnotlargeenoughtoupsetUSoilimports.China’scompetitionforoilinAsiaAsiaisthefastest-growingoilmarketintheworld.China’srisingdemandsforoilinevitablyplacesitincompetitionwithothermajorAsianoilconsumers.ChiefoftheseisIndia,whosedemandsforoilarealsogrowingthankstoitssurgingeconomy.InOctober2004ChinabeatIndia’sbiggestoilcompany,thestate-ownedOil&NaturalGasCorp(ONGC)towinthe58purchaseofanoilfieldfromShellinAngola.In2005ChinaagaingotanedgeoverIndiainanefforttotakeoverPetroKazakhstan,aCanadianoil-59producerinKazakhstan.InJanuary2006CNOOCoutbidIndia’sONGCto60wina45%stakeinaNigerianoilfieldatapriceof$2.3billion.531 HONGYIHARRYLAIChinaisalsocompetingforoilwithothercountries,chieflyJapan.ChinaandJapanhavecompetedagainsteachothertowintheirfavouriterouteforRussia’strans-Siberiapipeline.TheyarealsoenteringaheateddisputeoverChina’sextractionofgasintheseabetweenthem.EventhoughtheyhaveheldroundsoftalksoverjointexplorationintheEastChinaSea,noagreementhasbeenreached.Chineseco-operationwithIndiaandSoutheastAsiaNevertheless,intothe2000sChinahasalsomadenoticeableprogressinoilandgasco-operationwithSoutheastAsianandSouthAsiannations.Therefore,theworst-casescenarioaboutclashesoveroilbetweenChinaandotherclaimantstatesintheSouthChinaSea,orbetweenChinaandIndia,orevenbetweenChinaandJapanhavenothappened.TheSouthChinaSeacontainsdepositsofoilandgas.TheUSGeologicalSurveyandothersestimatethatabout60%–70%oftheregion’shydrocarbonresourcesaregas.SouthChinaSeahasprovenoilreservesestimatedatabout7billionbarrels.Oilproductionintheregionisaround2.5millionbarrelsperdayandhasincreasedgraduallyoverthepastfewyears,asChina,MalaysiaandVietnamstepupproduction.ChinaandSoutheastAsiannationshaveoverlappingclaimsovertheSpratlyandParacelIslandsintheSouthChinaSea.Nevertheless,thesenationshaveworkedoutatemporarysolution.InNovember2002Chinaand10AssociationofSouthEastAsianNations(ASEAN)memberssignedaJointDeclarationontheConductoftheParties,pledgingto‘resolvetheirterritorialandjurisdictionaldisputesby61peacefulmeans’.InMarch2005threeoilcompaniesfromChina,VietnamandthePhilippinessignedalandmarktripartiteagreementinManilaonjointexplorationofoilandgasresourcesinthedisputedSouthChinaSea.Thethreepartiesstatedtheirwillingnesstoprospectthereserveofpetroleumresourceswithintheareaagreedbythem,withoutunderminingthebasic62positionsheldbytheirowngovernments.Chinahasalsofurthereditsco-operationwithIndonesiaingasexplorationandtrade.InSeptember2002Chinaawardeda$8.5billionliquefiednatural63gas(LNG)purchasecontracttoIndonesia.In2002,withapurchaseofafieldfromtheSpanishfirmRepsolYPFSA,CNOOCbecamethelargest64offshoreoilproducerinIndonesia.Despitecompetingattimesforcontrolofoilfieldsoverseas,ChinaandIndiahavealsoexpressedastrongdesiretoco-operateandhavetakenstepstowardsthis.ThetwocountrieshavealreadybeenworkingtogetherinextractingoilinIran.Atthebeginningof2005Indiasealeda$40billiondealwithIrantoimport7.5milliontonsofliquefiednaturalgasannuallyoverthecoming25years.IndiaalsoacquiredstakesinthedevelopmentofIran’slargestonshoreoilfield,YadavaranandtheJufeiroilfield.TheYadavaranoilfieldhasbecomeaSino–Indian–Iranianjointproject,withIndiaholding65a20%stake,China50%andIran30%.InDecember2005CNPCandIndia’sONGCjointlybidforPetro-Canada’sinterestinAlFuratPetroleum,ajointventurewithSyrianPetroleumand532 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACY66SyriaShellPetroleumDevelopment.InJanuary2006IndiaandChinasigneda‘MemorandumforEnhancingCooperationintheFieldofOilandNaturalGas’,pledgingtobidjointlyforenergyprojects.Thememorandumalsoencouragedco-operationinenergyexploration,production,storageandstockpiling,researchanddevelopmentandconservation.ChinaandIndiahopethatco-operationwillhelpbringdownpricesinAsia.Indiaisalsoopen67toapipelineprojectconnectingitandChina.SinceJanuary2004ChinahassuccessfullybeenpersuadingitsallyPakistantoimproveitstieswithIndia,itslong-timearchrival.Thisdevelopment,coupledwithhigheroilprices,hasraisedtheinterestofthetwocountriesintheIran–Pakistan–India‘peacepipeline’.Pakistanhaspledgedthatitwillnotswitchoffthegasflow,evenduringIndo-Pakistanitensionsor68hostilities.EventhoughChinahasafiercerivalrywithJapanoverRussianoilinSiberiaandovergasexplorationintheEastChinaSea,bothcountrieshavealsoembarkeduponco-operationoveroil.Itisnotuncommonforlargeoilcompaniesinthetwocountriestoworktogethertoreachtradedeals.TheMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustryhasreportedlyformedanenergygrouponChina,devotingtosupplyingthecountrywithtechnologyforoilstockpiling.TheJapanesegovernmentisalsoexpressingawillingnesstoassistAsiannations,Chinapresumablyincluded,withutilisingnon-oil69energyappropriatefortheirowngeography,suchaswindandsolarpower.China’slimitedimportsdependenceand‘peacefulrise’TworeasonshelptoaccountforChina’speacefuloildiplomacy.First,China’sdependenceonimportedoilformeetingitsconsumptionneedisstilllimited.In2004overtwo-thirds(67.7%tobeexact)ofChina’senergyconsumptioncamefromcoal,22.7%fromoil,7%fromhydro-powerand2.6%fromnaturalgas.Inthatyear40%ofChina’soilhadtobeimported,70accountingforonly9.1%ofChina’senergyconsumption.Therefore,importedoilplaysonlyaminorroleinChina’senergyconsumption.Domesticallyproducedcoalplaysacrucialroleanddomesticallyproducedoilandhydro-powerasecondaryrole.Largeoil-producingnationsmerelyprovidedasmallfractionofChina’senergyconsumption.Iran,forexample,suppliedonly1%ofChina’senergyconsumptionin2003.MuchofthefearandsuspicionofChina’spotentiallyaggressiveanddestabilisingoildiplomacyhasthusnotbeenbasedonarealisticappreciationofthecountry’sdomesticallybasedenergysource.EventhoughChina’soildependenceisslatedtoincrease,Chinahastakenmeasurestocurbthistrend.Inlate2005China’stopeconomicofficialsstatedthatthecountrywoulddeveloprenewableenergytominimisedependenceon71oilandoilimports.ForthispurposeChinawillalsomakealternativeenergysourcesaguidelineinitsenergypolicyintheEleventhFiveYearPlan72covering2006–10.ThispolicyhasapparentlystartedtoreduceChina’srelianceonoilandoilimports.AccordingtotheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC),China’sdependenceonoilimportsin2005was533 HONGYIHARRYLAI42.9%,2.2percentagepointslowerthanin2004;Chinaconsumed31873milliontonsofoilin2005,1.08milliontonslessthanin2004.Second,China’sleadershiphasbeentakinggreatcaretoeaseexternalfearsaboutitseconomicandpoliticalrise.UnderPresidentJiangZeminChinahasstriventoportrayitselfas‘aresponsiblegreatpower’whichhasenhancedpeace,prosperityandstabilityintheworld.Underthecurrentpresident,HuJintao,Chinahasproclaimedthatitispursuingapeacefulrise.Chinalaterrephrasedthisas‘peacefuldevelopment’inordertoallaysensitiveconcernswitharisingChinaaroundtheworld.ThustheChineseleadershipisawareofandsensitivetotheinternationalreactiontoChina’soildiplomacyandistryingtominimisenegativerepercussions.China’seventualacquiescencetotheUSstanceoverIraqandIrananditscompromisewiththeUSAoverSudan’shumandislocationillustrateitspragmaticandlow-keyapproachinsecuringimportedoilandmanagingissuesofvitalconcerntotheUSA.Inaddition,Chinahasalsodisplayedconsiderableinterestandenthusiasmforpeacefulresolutionofconflictandforconstructiveco-operationoveroilwithitsAsianneighbours.China’sco-operationwithIndiainjointoildevelop-mentandwithclaimantstatesintheSouthChinaSeaoffersthebest,albeitverysurprising,examples.ConclusionThisarticlesetouttoreviewandassessChina’soildiplomacyinrecentyears.Sincethe1990sChina’sdemandforimportedoilhasincreased.Inresponse,Chinahaslaunchedanumberofexternalinitiativestosecureoverseasoilsupplies.First,ithasstrengtheneditstieswithoilproducingnationsintheMiddleEast,Africa,CentralAsia,andLatinandNorthAmerica.China’sstateoilcompaniesarealsoactivelyseekingtoinvestinoverseasenergyventures.Second,ChinaisdevelopingalternateoillandroutestoreduceitsrelianceontheStraitsofMalacca.Apparently,ChinadoesnothavethecapacitytopreventtheUSAfromdisruptingitssea-lanes.DevelopinglandroutesforoiltransportappearstobeChina’sbestoption.ManypessimisticargumentsaboutChina’sconflict-proneoildiplomacyareinvalidatedbyactualdevelopments.Inparticular,whereIraq,Iran,theSouthChinaSea,andUSoilsecurityareconcerned,Chinahasnotprovedtobeadifficultplayer.ChinadidnotscuttletheUSdiplomaticeffortsoveritswarinIraqandtoapplypressuretoIranoveritsnuclearprogrammeattheUN.China’soilimportsarenotlargeenoughtodisruptUSoilsuppliesand,eventhoughChinaobjectedtotheimpositionofsanctionsonSudan,itreachedacompromisewiththeUSAinpassingtheUNresolutionpressuring74Sudantostopethnickillingsaswellasstarvationandillness.WhileChina’squestforoverseasoilintensifiesitscompetitionwithotherAsianoilconsumingnations,ChinahasjoinedhandswithIndiaandIndonesiaoveroilexploration.RatherthanfightingawaroverthedisputedSouthChinaSea,ChinahasreachedanagreementonjointenergyexplorationwithVietnamandthePhilippines.ThepredictedoilwarinAsia,especiallyintheSouthChinaSea,hasbeenafictionratherthanareality.534 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACYWhileChina’soildiplomacyhasnotbeenathreattotheworld,therearealsotroublespots.ThemainflashpointhasbeenChinese–JapanesedisputesovertheEastChinaSea.ChinaandJapanhaveoverlappingclaimsoverterritorialwater,islets(DiaoyutaiortheSenkakuIslandsbeingthemostprominent)andreefsinthatarea.Severalroundsoftalksonjointexplorationhavenotresultedinanagreement,andthedisputedterritorialwateramountsto300000squarekilometres.Obviouslythesedisputesdonotstandalone.Theyhavebeengreatlyfuelledbythetwocountries’historicalanimosity,asillustratedespeciallytheJapanesePrimeMinisterKoizumi’scontroversialvisittotheYasukuniShrine.Therearealsoencouragingsigns,however.InOctober2006thenewJapanesePrimeMinisterAbevisitedBeijing.TheleadersofJapanandChinametinoneoftheircapitalcitiesforthefirsttimesince2001.Bothnationsagreedtojointexplorationinprincipleandhavebeennegotiating.Bothalsofeelthatarmedclashesintheareawouldbedestructive.Thegatewayforpeacefulresolutionhasnotbeenclosed.NotesTheauthorthanksShahidQadirandanonymousreviewersfortheircomments,JohnWongforhissuggestionandhelpwithmyresearch,andElspethThomsonforherhelpwithdatainTables1and2.1MichaelKlare,ResourceWars:TheNewLandscapeofGlobalConflict,NewYork:HenryHolt,2001,ppxi–xii,109–137.2MikkalHerberg,‘Asia’senergyinsecurity:cooperationorconflict?’,inAshleyTellis&MichaelWills(eds),StrategicAsia2004–05,Washington,DC:NationalBureauofAsianResearch,2004,p353.3ChietigjBajpaee,‘ChinafuelsenergyColdWar’,AsianTimes,2March2005.4GalLuft,‘US,Chinaareoncollisioncourseoveroil’,LosAngelesTimes,2February2004.5PeterSGoodman,‘ChinatellsCongresstobackoffbusinesses:tensionsheightenedbybidtopurchaseUnocal’,WashingtonPost,5July2005,A01.6See,forexample,MehmetO¨gu¨tcu¨,‘China’senergyfutureandglobalimplications’,inWernerDraguhn&RobertAsh(eds),China’sEconomicSecurity,Richmond,UK:Curzon,1999,pp84–141;RobertManning,TheAsianEnergyFactor,NewYork:Palgrave,2000,pp85–118;andPCrompton&YRWu,‘EnergyconsumptioninChina’,EnergyEconomics,27(1),2005,pp195–298.7SeeJCalabrese,‘ChinaandthePersianGulf:energyandsecurity’,MiddleEastJournal,52(3),1998,pp351–366;GXJi,‘ChinaversusAsianPacificenergysecurity’,KoreanJournalofDefenseAnalysis,10(2),1998,pp109–141;DKerr,‘TheChineseandRussianenergysectors’,Post-CommunistEconomies,11(3),1999,pp337–372;JPDorian,UTAbbasovich,MSTonkopy,OAJumabekovich&DXQiu,‘EnergyinCentralAsiaandnorthwestChina’,EnergyPolicy,27(5),1999,pp281–297.8EricaDowns,China’sQuestforEnergySecurity,SantaMonica,CA:Rand,2000;AmyMyersJaffe&StevenLewis,‘Beijing’soildiplomacy’,Survival,44(1),2002,pp115–134;andPhilipAndrews-Speed,XuanliLiao&RolandDannreuther,TheStrategicImplicationsofChina’sEnergyNeeds,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPressforIISS,2002.9SeeDavidZweig&BiJianhai,‘China’sglobalhuntforenergy’,ForeignAffairs,84(5),pp25–38;PakKLee,‘China’squestforoilsecurity:oil(wars)inthepipeline?’,PacificReview,18(2),2005,pp265–301.10SeeTable1;and‘Energydemandgrowthratetoslowdown’,ChinaDaily,15December2004.11ChinaStatisticalYearbook,2005,p638;and‘Chinaimports120milliontonsofcrudein2004andenergyconstraintsareoutstanding’,athttp://www.XINHUANET.com,25January2005.12‘Chinamaybecomethethirdlargestauto-producingcountryintheworld’,LianheZaobao(UnitedMorningPost),5February2005.13SeevariousnewsreportsonChina–Saudirelations,athttp://www.chinaembassy.org.saandhttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn,accessed5October2004.14ChietigjBajpaee,‘ChinafuelsenergyColdWar’.15‘China,SaudiArabiaextendenergyties’,AsianTimes,25January2006;and‘SaudiArabiasignsimportantenergypactwithChina’,athttp://www.peacehall.com/news/,23January2006.16ZhongguoWaijiaoGailan(ASurveyofChina’sDiplomacy),1993,pp108–109;andZhongguoWaijiao(China’sDiplomacy),2002,p109;2003,p174.17‘China,Iransignbiggestoilandgasdeal’,ChinaDaily,31October2004.535 HONGYIHARRYLAI18ChietigjBajpaee,‘ChinafuelsenergyColdWar’;andDavidCortright&GeorgeALopez,‘Bombs,carrots,andsticks’,athttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Cortright.asp,March2005.19ZhongguoWaijiaoGailan,1993–95;andZhongguoWaijiao,1996–2003.20‘AnactionplanforChina–Arabstateleaguecooperationforum’;and‘AnannouncementforChina–Arabstateleaguecooperationforum’,athttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn,accessed5October2004.21ZhongguoWaijiao,1996,pp300–301;1999,pp235–236;2002,p215.22InformationonAngolafromhttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn,accessed2October2004.23‘InabattleoverWestAfricanoilfieldChinadefeatsIndiawith‘‘heavygold’’’,LianheZaobao,16October2004.24ZhongguoWaijiao,1996,pp154–155;2001,pp162–63,informationaccessedathttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn,2October2004.25‘HuJintaoarrivesinGabontolaunchpetroleumstrategy’,athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese,1February2004.26‘PremiersofChinaandRussiasettleforgoalsinoilandgascooperation’,athttp://www.mlr.gov.cn,accessed27September2004.27‘RussianoilpipelinetoJapanwillbranchouttoChina’,AgenceFrancePresse,28January2005.28‘Atacost,SiberiapipelinetosendoiltoPacific’,InternationalHeraldTribune,22–23January2005,p1;and‘RussianAngarsk–Nakhodkapipelineplanwillcompletenextyear—asubsidiarylinetoDaqingwillbeincluded’,athttp://www.chinanews.com.cn,accessed27November2003.29ChietigjBajpaee,‘ChinafuelsenergyColdWar’.30Informationfromhttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn,21August2003,accessed2October2004.31‘Backgroundmaterials:China–Kazakhoilpipeline’,athttp://www.XINHUANET.com,28September2004.32‘ConstructionoftheChina–KazakhoilpipelinestartedtodayandXinjiangwillbecomeChina’soilwarehouse’,athttp://www.XINHUANET.com,28September2004.33Informationfromhttp://www.eia.doe.gov,accessed2October2004.34‘CNPCtakesoverPetroKazakhstanwith$4.18billion’,athttp://www.XINHUANET.com,23August2005.35‘China,Kyrgyzstantapco-operationpotential’,ChinaDaily,23September2004.36‘OilaccordssignedwithVenezuela’,TheStandard,31January2005.37‘TransformationofChina’soverseasoilsearch’,GuojiXianquDaobao(InternationalHeraldLeader),31December2004,p4.38WillyLam,‘China’sencroachmentonAmerica’sbackyard’,ChinaBrief,4(23),2004(Washington,DC:JamestownFoundation).39‘InsearchofcrudeChinagoestotheAmericas’,athttp://www.iags.org/n0118041.htm,19January2006.40SeeYearbookofChina’sEconomicForeignRelationsandTrade,1998,2002,2003.41‘SinochemsignsdealtobuyailingrefinerInchon’,TheStandard,25September2004.42BoozAllenHamiltonreportforthePentagon,‘EnergyfuturesinAsia’,citedinSudhaRamachandran,‘China’spearlinPakistan’swaters’,AsiaTimes,4March2005.43‘Donotaskwheretheoilcomesfrom,aslongastheoilrouteisundercontrol’,GuojiXianquDaobao,31December2004,p4.44‘Searchingfortomorrow’spetroleum’,ZhongguoGuojiaDili(China’sNationalGeography),December2004,pp66–67.45‘ChinaeyesBurmaoildeal’,TheStandard,26October2004.46‘Searchingfortomorrow’spetroleum’,pp62–63.47‘ChinamullsoilpipelinesinMyanmar,Thailand’,AsianTimes,1October2004.48‘AnactionplanforChina–Arabstateleaguecooperationforum’;and‘AnannouncementforChina–Arabstateleaguecooperationforum’.49See‘UNputsSudansanctionsintoplay’,WashingtonPost,19September2004,A01;and‘ChinamayconvinceUSnottosanctionSudan’,athttp://www.smcsudan.net,accessed14October2004.50KavahLAfrasiabi,‘ChinarocksthegeopoliticalboatwithIranoil’,AsiaTimes,6November2004.51‘ChinaandRussiasupportsendingIrancasetoUN’,NewYorkTimes,31January2006.52ColumLynch,‘UNputsSudansanctionsintoplay:SecurityCounciladoptsresolution’,WashingtonPost,19September2004,A01;and‘China’soiltiestoSudanforceittoopposesanctions’,SudanTribune,20October2004.53OnthesituationinDarfur,see‘PolicingthepoliceinthechaosofDarfur’,NewYorkTimes,5February2006;and‘LargerDarfurforceneeded,Bush,Annansay’,WashingtonPost,14February2006,A12.54Downs,China’sQuestforEnergySecurity,pxii.55Onecomment,forexample,runsasfollows:‘Historyshowstheopposite:Superpowersfinditdifficulttocoexistwhilecompetingoverscarceresources’.SeeLuft,‘US,Chinaareoncollisioncourseoveroil’.536 CHINA’SOILDIPLOMACY56Thesedataarebasedonstatisticsprovidedathttp://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/quickfacts/quickoil.html.57SeeTables1and2;andChinaStatisticalYearbook,2005,p255.58‘InabattleoverWestAfricanoilfieldChinadefeatsIndiawith‘‘heavygold’’’.59‘Indiaiscastingawidenetinitshuntforenergy’,InternationalHeraldTribune,24January2005,p12.60‘India,Chinatosignpactoncooperation’,WashingtonPost,10January2006.61‘SouthChinaSearegion’,athttp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu,accessed3January2006.62‘China,VietnamagreetopromoteSouthChinaSeajointexploitation’,People’sDailyOnline,athttp://english.people.com.cn/,20July2005.63‘ChinaalsoengagesinenergytradewithSoutheastAsia’,People’sDaily,27September2002.64‘WithIraqdealdissolvedbywar,Beijinglookselsewhere’,WashingtonPost,13July2005,D01.65ChietigjBajpaee,‘India,Chinalockedinenergygame’,AsiaTimes,17March2005.66‘Indiaiscastingawidenetinitshuntforenergy’,InternationalHeraldTribune,24January,p12.67‘India,Chinatosignpactoncooperation’,WashingtonPost,10January2006.68ChietigjBajpaee,‘India,Chinalockedinenergygame’.69‘Japanhasagoodsolutiontotheoilissue’,LianheZaobao,15October2004.70SeeTables1and2;andChinaStatisticalYearbook,2005,p255.71‘Asenergybecomestopconcerns,leaderspushforthchangesinChina’senergypolicy’,athttp://www.phoenixtv.com/phoenixtv,28September2005,accessed28September2005.72‘Dependenceonoilneedstobecut,sayspanel’,ChinaDaily,13February2006.73See‘China’soilconsumption,importsdecreased’,ChinaDaily,3February2006.ThestatisticsfromtheNDRCapparentlydifferslightlyfromthoseinTable1,whicharebasedonBPandcustomsdata.74OnerecentstudyportraysChina’sstrategyregardingtheUSAasaccommodatingtoandhedgingtheUSunipolarworld,insteadofopposingit.SeeRosemaryFoot,‘ChinesestrategiesinaUS–hegemonicglobalorder:accommodatingandhedging’,InternationalAffairs,82(1),2006,pp77–94.537
