尼科尔森微经练习题 (13).pdf

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1、Chapter15GameTheoryModelsofPricing217.Acommonassumptionabouttheplayersinagameisthata.neitherplayerknowsthepayoffmatrix.b.theplayershavedifferentinformationaboutthepayoffmatrix.c.onlyoneoftheplayerspursuesarationalstrategy.*d.thespecificidentityoftheplayersisirrel

2、evanttotheplayofthegame.218.Inazero-sumgame*a.whatoneplayerwins,theotherloses.b.thesumofeachplayer’swinningsifthegameisplayedmanytimesmustbezero.c.thegameisfair—eachpersonhasanequalchanceofwinning.d.long-runprofitsmustbezero.219.ThePrisoners’Dilemmaisnotaconstant

3、sumgamebecause*a.someoutcomesarebetterthanothersforbothplayers.b.theprisoners’sentencesarenecessarilynon-zero.c.thegamedoesnothaveaNashequilibrium.d.thesumoftheprisoners’sentencesisnon-zero.220.Thetwinnon-confessstrategychoiceinthePrisoners’dilemmacanbedescribeda

4、sa.non-Paretooptimalandunstable.*b.Paretooptimalandunstable.c.non-Paretooptimalandstable.d.Paretooptimalandstable.221.A“credible”threatisathreatofanactionthataplayera.makesinabelievableway.b.iscommittedtocarryout.c.cannotretract.*d.wouldbewillingtoundertakeifinap

5、ositiontodoso.222.AsubgameperfectequilibriumisaNashequilibriumthata.cannotpersistthroughseveralperiods.*b.involvesonlycrediblethreats.c.consistsonlyofdominantstrategies.d.isunique.223.Theprimaryreasonthattrigger-typestrategiesyieldsubgameperfectNashequilibriainin

6、finitelyrepeatedgames,butnotingameswithfinitereplication,isthata.discountfactorsarehigheringameswithfinitereplications.b.discountfactorsareloweringameswithfinitereplications.c.gameswithinfinitereplicationshavenonon-crediblethreats.*d.gameswithinfinitereplications

7、cannotbesolvedbybackwardsinduction.164Chapter15/GameTheoryModelsofPricing165224.WithtriggerstrategiesintheinfinitelyrepeatedgamesinChapter10,thethreattostopcooperationoncetheopponentcheatsiscrediblebecause*a.thisistheoptimalmoveagainsttheopponent’snoncooperatives

8、trategy.b.theplayerhasbuiltupareputationforsuchbehavior.c.thethreatisbelievedbytheotherplayerbecauseofthegame’shistory.d.thecooperativestrategychoiceisnotaNash