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1、PHYSICAELSEVIERPhysicaA246(1997)407~,18EmergenceofcooperationandorganizationinanevolutionarygameD.Challet,Y.-C.Zhang*InstitutdePhysiqueThOorique,POrolles,UniversitddeFribourg,1700Fribour9,SwitzerlandReceived8August1997AbstractAbinarygameisintroducedandanalysed.Nplayersh
2、avetochooseoneofthetwosidesindependentlyandthoseontheminoritysidewin.Playersuseafinitesetofadhocstrategiestomaketheirdecision,basedonthepastrecord.Theanalysingpowerislimitedandcanadaptwhennecessary.Interestingcooperationandcompetitionpatternsofthesocietyseemtoariseandto
3、beresponsivetothepayofffunction.Keywords:Evolution;Game;EmergenceoforganizationMostcurrenteconomicstheoriesaredeductiveinorigin.Oneassumesthateachparticipantknowswhatisbestforhimgiventhatallotherparticipantsareequallyintelligentinchoosingtheirbestactions.However,itisrec
4、entlyrealisedthatintherealworldtheactualplayersdonothavetheperfectforesightandhindsight,mostoftentheiractionsarebasedontrial-and-errorinductivethinking,ratherthanthede-ductiverationaleassumingthatthereareunderlyingfirstprinciples.Whetherdeductiveorinductivethinkingismor
5、erelevantisstillunderdebate[1].Evolutionarygameshavealsobeenstudiedwithinthestandardframeworkofgametheory[2].However,ithasbeenrecentlypointedoutthattheapproachtraditionallyusedineconomicsisnotconvenienttogeneralisetoincludeirrationality,andanalter-nativeLangevin-typeequ
6、ationisproposed[3].Asphysicists,wewouldliketoviewagamewithalargenumberofplayers,i.e.astatisticalsystem,weneedtoexplorenewapproachesinwhichtheemergingcollectivephenomenacanbebetterappreciated.Onerecentapproachusingboundedrationalityisparticularlyinspiring,putforwardbyB.A
7、rthurinhisElFarolbarproblem[4].Followingasimilarphilosophy,inthisworkweproposeandstudyasimpleevolutionarygame.*Correspondingauthor.0378-4371/97/$17.00Copyright@1997ElsevierScienceB.V.AllrightsreservedPIIS0378-4371(97)00419-6408D.Challet,Y.-C.Zhang/PhysicaA246(1997)407-4
8、18Table1SignalPrediction00010010010001111001101011011110LetusconsiderapopulationofN(odd)players,eachhassomefin
