Agency Costs, Risk Management, and

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and

ID:39775106

大小:348.85 KB

页数:48页

时间:2019-07-11

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and_第1页
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and_第2页
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and_第3页
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and_第4页
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and_第5页
资源描述:

《Agency Costs, Risk Management, and》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库

1、AgencyCosts,RiskManagement,andCapitalStructureHayneE.Leland*April18,1998AbstractThejointdeterminationofcapitalstructureandinvestmentriskisexam-ined.Optimalcapitalstructurere ectsboththetaxadvantagesofdebtlessdefaultcosts(Modigliani-Miller),andtheagencycostsresultingfr

2、omassetsub-stitution(Jensen-Meckling).Agencycostsrestrictleverageanddebtmaturityandincreaseyieldspreads,buttheirimportanceisrelativelysmallfortherangeofenvironmentsconsidered.Riskmanagementisalsoexamined.Hedgingpermitsgreaterleverage.Evenwhena rmcannotprecommittohedgi

3、ng,itwillstilldoso.Surprisingly,hedgingbene tsoftenaregreaterwhenagencycostsarelow.1AgencyCosts,RiskManagement,andCapitalStructureHayneE.Leland*Thechoiceofinvestment nancing,anditslinkwithoptimalriskexposure,iscentraltotheeconomicperformanceofcorporations.Financialeco

4、nomicshasarichliteratureanalyzingthecapitalstructuredecisioninqualitativeterms.Butithasprovidedrelativelylittlespeci cguidance.Incontrastwiththeprecisiono eredbytheBlackandScholes(1973)optionpricingmodelanditsextensions,thetheoryaddressingcapitalstructureremainsdistre

5、ssinglyimprecise.Thishaslimiteditsapplicationtocorporatedecision-making.Twoinsightshaveprofoundlyshapedthedevelopmentofcapitalstructuretheory.ThearbitrageargumentofModiglianiandMiller(M-M)(1958,1963)showsthat,with xedinvestmentdecisions,non rmclaimantsmustbepresentfor

6、capitalstructuretoa ect rmvalue.Theoptimalamountofdebtbalancesthetaxdeductionsprovidedbyinterestpaymentsagainsttheexternalcostsofpotentialdefault.JensenandMeckling(J-M)(1976)challengetheM-Massumptionthatin-vestmentdecisionsareindependentofcapitalstructure.Equityholder

7、sofalevered rm,forexample,canpotentiallyextractvaluefromdebtholdersbyincreasinginvestmentriskafterdebtisinplace:theassetsubstitution"prob-lem.Suchpredatorybehaviorcreatesagencycostswhichthechoiceofcapitalstructuremustrecognizeandcontrol.Alargevolumeoftheoreticalandem

8、piricalworkhasbuiltuponthesein-1sights.Buttopractitionersandacademicsalike,pastresearchfallsshortintwocriticaldimensions.Fir

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。