theory of the firm managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure

theory of the firm managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure

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时间:2019-03-01

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1、TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructureMichaelC.JensenHarvardBusinessSchoolMJensen@hbs.eduAndWilliamH.MecklingUniversityofRochesterAbstractThispaperintegrateselementsfromthetheoryofagency,thetheoryofpropertyrightsandthetheoryoffinancetodevelopatheo

2、ryoftheownershipstructureofthefirm.Wedefinetheconceptofagencycosts,showitsrelationshiptothe‘separationandcontrol’issue,investigatethenatureoftheagencycostsgeneratedbytheexistenceofdebtandoutsideequity,demonstratewhobearscostsandwhy,andinvestigatetheParetooptimalityoftheirexis

3、tence.Wealsoprovideanewdefinitionofthefirm,andshowhowouranalysisofthefactorsinfluencingthecreationandissuanceofdebtandequityclaimsisaspecialcaseofthesupplysideofthecompletenessofmarketsproblem.Thedirectorsofsuch[joint-stock]companies,however,beingthemanagersratherofotherpeopl

4、e’smoneythanoftheirown,itcannotwellbeexpected,thattheyshouldwatchoveritwiththesameanxiousvigilancewithwhichthepartnersinaprivatecopartneryfrequentlywatchovertheirown.Likethestewardsofarichman,theyareapttoconsiderattentiontosmallmattersasnotfortheirmaster’shonour,andveryeasily

5、givethemselvesadispensationfromhavingit.Negligenceandprofusion,therefore,mustalwaysprevail,moreorless,inthemanagementoftheaffairsofsuchacompany.—AdamSmith(1776)Keywords:Agencycostsandtheory,internalcontrolsystems,conflictsofinterest,capitalstructure,internalequity,outsideequi

6、ty,demandforsecurityanalysis,completenessofmarkets,supplyofclaims,limitedliability©1976JensenandMecklingJournalofFinancialEconomics,October,1976,V.3,No.4,pp.305-360.ReprintedinMichaelC.Jensen,ATheoryoftheFirm:Governance,ResidualClaimsandOrganizationalForms(HarvardUniversityPr

7、ess,December2000)availableathttp://hupress.harvard.edu/catalog/JENTHF.htmlAlsopublishedinFoundationsofOrganizationalStrategy,MichaelC.Jensen,HarvardUniversityPress,1998.Youmayredistributethisdocumentfreely,butpleasedonotposttheelectronicfileontheweb.Iwelcomeweblinkstothisdocu

8、mentat:http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043.Irevisemypapersregularl

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