Game theory Analysis of Conflict英文电子资料

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1、GameTheoryGAMETHEORYAnalysisofConflictROGERB.MYERSONHARVARDUNIVERSITYPRESSCambridge,MassachusettsLondon,EnglandCopyright©1991bythePresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollegeAllrightsreservedPrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaFirstHarvardUniversityPresspaperbacked

2、ition,1997LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataMyerson,RogerB.Gametheory:analysisofconflict/RogerB.Myerson.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN0-674-34115-5(cloth)ISBN0-674-34116-3(pbk.)1.GameTheoryI.TitleH61.25.M941991519.3—dc20

3、90-42901ForGina,Daniel,andRebeccaWiththehopethatabetterunderstandingofconflictmayhelpcreateasaferandmorepeacefulworldContentsPrefacexi1Decision-TheoreticFoundations11.1GameTheory,Rationality,andIntelligence1.2BasicConceptsofDecisionTheory51.3Axioms91.4T

4、heExpected-UtilityMaximizationTheorem121.5EquivalentRepresentations181.6BayesianConditional-ProbabilitySystems211.7LimitationsoftheBayesianModel221.8Domination261.9ProofsoftheDominationTheorems31Exercises332BasicModels372.1GamesinExtensiveForm372.2Strat

5、egicFormandtheNormalRepresentation462.3EquivalenceofStrategic-FormGames512.4ReducedNormalRepresentations542.5EliminationofDominatedStrategies572.6MultiagentRepresentations612.7CommonKnowledge632.8BayesianGames672.9ModelingGameswithIncompleteInformation7

6、4Exercises833EquilibriaofStrategic-FormGames883.1DominationandRationalizability883.2NashEquilibrium91viiiContents3.3ComputingNashEquilibria993.4SignificanceofNashEquilibria1053.5TheFocal-PointEffect1083.6TheDecision-AnalyticApproachtoGames1143.7Evolutio

7、n,Resistance,andRiskDominance1173.8Two-PersonZero-SumGames1223.9BayesianEquilibria1273.10PurificationofRandomizedStrategiesinEquilibria1293.11Auctions1323.12ProofofExistenceofEquilibrium1363.13InfiniteStrategySets140Exercises1484SequentialEquilibriaofEx

8、tensive-FormGames1544.1MixedStrategiesandBehavioralStrategies1544.2EquilibriainBehavioralStrategies1614.3SequentialRationalityatInformationStateswithPositiveProbability1634.4ConsistentBeliefsandSequentialRationalityatAllInformati