attack and flee game-theory-based analysis on interactions among nodes in manets

attack and flee game-theory-based analysis on interactions among nodes in manets

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时间:2018-02-10

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1、612IEEETRANSACTIONSONSYSTEMS,MAN,ANDCYBERNETICSPARTB:CYBERNETICS,VOL.40,NO.3,JUNE2010AttackandFlee:Game-Theory-BasedAnalysisonInteractionsAmongNodesinMANETsFengLi,Member,IEEE,YinyingYang,StudentMember,IEEE,andJieWu,Fellow,IEEEAbstractInmobileadhocnetwork

2、s,nodeshavetheinherentInordertominimizetheimpactofmaliciousnodesandabilitytomove.Asidefromconductingattackstomaximizetheirstimulatecooperation,regularnodesmonitorandcontinuouslyutilityandcooperatingwithregularnodestodeceivethem,ma-evaluatetheirneighbors.

3、Certaincriteriaaresettodistinguishaliciousnodesgetbetterpayoffswiththeabilitytomove.Inthisnodestrustleveltowardothers.Regularnodeswillfocustheirpaper,weproposeagametheoreticframeworktoanalyzethestrategyprofilesforregularandmaliciousnodes.Wemodeltheresourc

4、esoncooperatingwithneighborsthattheytrust,declinesituationasadynamicBayesiansignalinggameandanalyzeandrequestsfromsuspiciousneighbors,andreportwhenaneighborpresenttheunderliningconnectionbetweennodesbestcombina-isconsideredtobemalicious.However,inthiscas

5、e,intelligenttionofactionsandthecostandgainoftheindividualstrategy.maliciousnodeswouldelaboratelychooseafrequencyatwhichRegularnodesconsistentlyupdatetheirbeliefsbasedontheoppo-theycooperatetodeceiveregularnodes.nentsbehavior,whilemaliciousnodesevaluatet

6、heirriskofbeingcaughttodecidewhentoflee.SomepossiblecountermeasuresforMoreover,maliciousnodeshavethestrategyoffleeingtoregularnodesthatcanimpactmaliciousnodesdecisionsarepre-avoidpunishmentinMANETs.Therefore,amaliciousnodecansentedaswell.Anextensiveanalysi

7、sandsimulationstudyshowsstartitsmaliciousbehavioralloveragainwithacleanhistorythattheproposedequilibriumstrategyprofileoutperformsotherinanewlocationbyfleeingbeforebeingcaught.However,thispureormixedstrategiesandprovestheimportanceofrestrictingadditionalst

8、rategydoesnotimplythatmaliciousnodesshouldmaliciousnodesadvantagesbroughtbythefleeoption.continuouslyattackandrunsincefleeingisalsoassociatedIndexTermsBayesiansignalinggame,gametheory,mobileadwithacost(e.g.,theenergyspenttom

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