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1、BoardsocialcapitalandexcessCEOreturnsStrategicManagementJournalStrat.Mgmt.J.,37:498–5<#004699'>20(<#004699'>2016)PublishedonlineEarlyView17October<#004699'>2014inWileyOnlineLibrary(wileyonlinelibrary4>#ff66ff'>)DOI:10.100<#004699'>2/smj.<#004699'>2339Received<#004699'>20June<#004699'>2013;Fin
2、alrevisionreceived3September<#004699'>2014BOARDSOCIALCAPITALANDEXCESSCEORETURNSSTEVESAUERWALD,1*ZHIANG(JOHN)LIN,<#004699'>2andMIKEW.PENG<#004699'>21DepartmentofManagerialStudies,UniversityofIllinoisatChicago,Chicago,Illinois,U.S.A.<#004699'>2JindalSchoolofManagement,UniversityofTexasatDallas,
3、Richardson,Texas,U.S.A.ExcessCEOreturnsrefertoCEOfinancialreturnsinexcessofshareholderreturns.HowdoboardsreininexcessCEOreturns?Introducingasocialcapital6><#00aa00'>viewofboardmonitoring,wesuggestthatboardsfacetwocompetingnormativepressures—corporateelitenormsandmonitoringnorms.Howboardsconfo
4、rmtosuchnormativepressuresforcontrollingexcessCEOreturnsisaffectedbytheirexternalandinternalsocialcapital.Further,wesubstantiateourargumentsbyshowingthatpowerfulCEOsandinstitutionalinvestorsmayfacilitateorconstrainthenormativepressuresexistinginthesocialnetworkandaltertheeffectsofboardsocialc
5、apitalonexcessCEOreturns.DatafromasampleofU.S.corporationslistedontheStandardandPoor’s1,500indexfrom1999to<#004699'>2010largelysupportourframework.Copyright??<#004699'>2014JohnWiley&Sons,Ltd.INTRODUCTIONOfmanyissuesassociatedwithCEOcompensation(BarkemaandGomez-Mejia,1998;Deversetal.,<#004
6、699'>2007;Tosietal.,<#004699'>2000),excessCEOreturnsarelikelytobeamongthemostcontroversial.ExcessCEOreturnsrefertothefinancialreturnsfromtheCEO’sfirm-relatedwealthandcompensationthatexceedthefinancialreturnsofshareholders.Giventheimportanceofshareholdersasprincipalsinagencyrelationships,weadv
7、ancetheargumentthatCEOreturnsshouldbecomparabletoshare-holderreturnsbyfocusingonthephenomenonofexcessCEOreturns.Previousstudieshavecom-paredthewealthandincomeofCEOstothatofnon-shareholderstakeholderssuchasexecutives(Wade,O’Reilly,andPollock,<
