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ID:33329387
大小:2.78 MB
页数:59页
时间:2019-02-24
《我国家族控股上市公司信息披露相关问题实证研究》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在教育资源-天天文库。
1、FamilyFirmCorporatedisclosurePositiveAccountingResearchinChinaFurthermore,thefamilyholdingcompanylistedonthefounderofthefn-mactivitiescallbemademoreawareoftheirreportedfiguresforamoredirectmanagement,SOthattheseactivitieshavebeenmonitoredatalltimes.Therefore,basedontheTypeAsurplusofqua
2、lityproblems,toagreaterextent,thenon-occurrenceoffamily—controlledenterprises.Atthesametime,thefamilyholdingcompanylistedonthefaceofmoreseriouscontrollingshareholderandnon—controllingshareholderproxyissuesbetween.Familymembersoftheboardofdirectorsoftheequityandcontrolofthefamilyholding
3、companywillbecometheboardofdirectorsofthelackofindependencebymembersofthefamily’Scontrol(AndersonandReeb,2003a;AndersonandReeb,2004).TypeB(thecontrollingshareholderandnon—controllingshareholderissuesbetweentheagent)willleadtotheissueofaccountingforearningsmanipulationtohidethenegativee
4、ffectsassociated、析mthetransactionortofamilymembersinmanagementholdsmoreseats.Second,theinformationinthisarticlefortheperformanceofinformationdisclosurenoticetheproblemthroughtheempiricalanalysisofthefamilyownedandnon—familyholdingintheperformanceoflistedcompaniestodiscloseinformationon
5、thenoticesignificantdifferences.Ingeneral,family-basedholdingcompanylistedexamplesofevidencethattheagenttheextentoftheproblemisthatwehaveobservedafamilyownedandfamily-ownedlistedcompaniestodiscloseinformationinadifferentpracticewhichmaybeafactor.Comparedtonon—familyfinns,familyfirmsfac
6、elesssevereagencyproblemsduetotheseparationofownershipandmanagement,butmoresevereagencyproblemsthatarisebetweencontrollingandnon-controllingshareholders。Thesecharacteristicsoffamilyfirmsaffecttheircorporatedisclosurepractices.ForHu-Shenstockmarketfirms,weshowthatfamilyfirmsreportbetter
7、qualityearnings,aremorelikelytowarnforagivenmagnitudeofbadnews,butmakefewerdisclosuresabouttheircorporategovemancepractices.Foundingfamiliesbeingmoreeffectivemo.nitorsofmanagementcanrewardtheirmanagersbasedoninformationaboutmanagers’effortobtainedthroughdirectmonitoring.Also,whenfami
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