international trade law

international trade law

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INTERNATIONALTRADELAWByZengErxiu,BA,LLB,LLM,PhDLawprofessor,attorney-at-law PREFACELearningalanguageisnotamatterofacquiringasetofrulesandbuildingupalargevocabulary,butamatterofusingit.Thus,astudent’scommandofalanguageisjudgednotbyhowmuchheknows,buthowwellhecanperforminpublic.conductedinEnglishwillnotonlyjudgehowwellyoucanuseyourlong-learnedEnglish,butwillalsoimproveyouruseofEnglish.Beconfidentinyourself!Youwillmakeit!Don’tgrudgeyourtimeafteryouhavespentalmosttenyearsinlearningEnglish! TextbookRayAugust,InternationalBusinessLaw:Text,Cases,andReadings,4thEdition,PearsonEducationInternational,2004 CONTENTSI.IntroductiontoInternationalandComparativeLaw国际法与比较法概论II. DisputeSettlement争议解决III. TradeinGoods货物贸易IV. Sales买卖V.  Transportation运输VI.  Financing支付 REQUIREMENTSI.Previewtherelevantpartofthereadingmaterial,especiallytherelevantcases,preparingfordiscussionintheclassroom.[groupwork]II.Intheclassroom,listen,takenotes[nocopyofpptpermitted]andspeakoutyourunderstandingofwhatwehavestudied.III.Enhancethroughreadingrelevantarticles. I.IntroductiontoInternationalandComparativeLawA.Whatisinternationallaw?什么是国际法B.Themakingofinternationallaw国际法的制定C.Sourcesofinternationallaw国际法的渊源D.Thescopeofinternationallawinactualpractice国际法的范围E.Internationalpersons国际法主体F.Therightsofindividualsunderinternationallaw个人在国际法上的权利G.Comparisonofmunicipallegalsystems国内法律制度比较 A.WHATISINTERNATIONALLAW?Thebodyofrulesandnormsthatregulatesactivitiescarriedonoutsidethelegalboundariesofnations.Itregulatesthreeinternationalrelationships:1)Thosebetweenstatesandstates.2)Thosebetweenstatesandpersons.3)Thosebetweenpersonsandpersons.Publicinternationallaw;privateinternationallaw;internationaleconomiclaw,etc.? IsInternationalLawReallyLaw?Internationallawislaw,becausenationsandindividualsregarditaslaw.Itisdifferentfromcomity.Comity:Thepractice,orcourtesy,betweennationsoftreatingeachotherwithgoodwillandcivility.Comityisnotlawbecausecountriesdonotregarditassomethingtheyarerequiredtorespect. B.THEMAKINGOFTERNATIONALLAW1.NoFormalLaw-makingMachinery2.BasicMechanismforCreatingInternationalLaw:Consensusoftheinternationalcommunity.GeneralconsentoftheinternationalcommunityParticularconsentofastate C.SOURCESOFINTERNATIONALLAW1.Definition:Thosethingswhichinternationaltribunalsrelyuponindeterminingthecontentofinternationallaw.2.AuthorizedSources:Article38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)liststhesourceswhichthatcourtispermittedtouse.a.ICJlooksto:1)Internationalconventions;2)Internationalcustom;3)Generalprinciplesoflaw.b.Ininterpretingthese,theICJmayalsolookto:1)Judicialdecisions.2)Teachingsofpublicists. 3.TreatiesandConventionsa.Definitions:1)Treatiesareagreementsbetweenoneormorenations.2)Conventionsareagreementssponsoredbyinternationalorganizations.b.Reasonsforbindingeffect:1)Sharedsenseofcommitment.2)Becauseonecountryfearsthatifitdoesnotrespectitspromises,othercountrieswillnotrespecttheirpromises.c.Rulesgoverningtreaties:1)Traditionallycustomary.2)NowcodifiedintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(inforcesince1980). Case1-1.LEGALSTATUSOFEASTERNGREENLANDCASE(Denmarkv.Norway)PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,1933.FACTS:InformaldiscussionsleadinguptotheParisPeaceTalks,Denmark’sAmbassadortoldNorway’sForeignMinisterthatDenmarkwouldnotobjecttoNorway’sclaimtoSpitzbergenifNorwaydidnotopposeDenmark’sclaimtothewholeofGreenlandattheParisPeaceTalks.Afterconsultingwithhisgovernment,theNorwegianForeignMinistertoldtheDanishAmbassador“thattheNorwegianGovernmentwouldnotmakeanydifficultyinsettlingthequestion.”ISSUE:WastheoralcommitmentmadebytheForeignMinisterbindingonNorway? 4.CustomDefinition:Rulesthathavebeenaroundforalongtimeorwhicharegenerallyaccepted.Customaryrulesareconstantlychanging.Establishingtheexistenceofacustomarylaw:Mustshowtwoelements—onebehavioralandonepsychological:1)theconsistentandrecurringaction(orlackofactionifthecustomisoneofnoninvolvement)bystates.2)Thecustommustberegardedbystatesobservingitasonethattheymustobligatorilyfollow.Persistentobjectionresultinacustomaryrulenotappliedtoastate.Case1-2 Case1-2.THEASYLUMCASE(Colombiav.Peru)InternationalCourtofJustice,1950.FACTS:ColombiagrantedpoliticalasyluminitsLima,PeruembassytoHayadelaTorre.PerurefusedtograntsafeconducttoHayadelaTorretoleavethecountry.ColombiasuedintheICJtoobtainanorderforthesafeconduct.ISSUE:IsPeruapartytoatreatygoverningasylum?Isthereacustomaryruleofinternationallawgoverningasylum?MustPeruobservethatrule? 5.GeneralPrinciplesGeneralprinciplesoflawthatarecommontoboth(orall)thestatepartiestoadispute. D.THESCOPEOFINTERNATIONALLAWINACTUALPRACTICE1.ThePracticeinInternationalTribunalsa.Municipallawisregardedasbeingsubservienttointernationallaw.b.Stateshaveageneralobligationtobringtheirmunicipallawintocompliancewithinternationalnorms.c.Procedurallymunicipallawistreatedas“merefact.” 2.ThePracticeinMunicipalCourtsInternationallawisgenerallytreatedascorrelative.-Onceacourtdeterminesthataparticularruleofinternationallawisapplicableinaparticularcase,thatlawwillbetreatedaslawandnotasafact.Thecourtmustdeterminewhetherornottheinternationallawhasbeenreceivedintothelocaljurisprudence.a)Asforcustomarylaw:Inmostcountries,customaryinternationallawisreceivedinaccordancewiththedoctrineofincorporation.b)Asfortreaties:Receptionrulesdependupontwofactors:(i)Thenatureofthetreaty;and(ii)Theconstitutionalstructureoftheratifyingstate. 1]Thenatureoftreaties—theymaybe:a]Self-executingtreaty:Onethatcontainsaprovisionthatsaysthetreatywillapplyintheparties’municipalcourtswithouttheirhavingtoadoptanydomesticenablinglegislation.b]Non-self-executingtreaty:Onethathasnosuchprovision.2]Thestructureofstates—constitutionsmayassigntooneormorestateorgans(orbranches)theresponsibilityforenteringintotreaties.Q:Howabouttheapplicationofcustomarylawandtreatiesinourmunicipalcourt??? Case1-3.SEIFUJIIv.STATEUnitedStates,SupremeCourtofCalifornia,1952.FACTS:ACalifornialawmadelandpurchasedbyaJapanesewhowasineligibleforcitizenshipescheattothestate.ISSUES:(1)DoesCalifornia’salienlandlawviolatetheUNCharter?(2)Ifitdoes,istheUNCharterautomaticallyapplicable?(3)DoestheCalifornialawviolatetheUSConstitution? E.INTERNATIONALPERSONS1.Statesa.Definition:Politicalentitieswhichhaveallofthefollowing:1)Aterritory.2)Apopulation.3)Agovernmentcapableofenteringintointernationalrelations.4)Agovernmentcapableofcontrollingitsterritoryandpeoples.b.Kindsofstates:1)Independentstatesarefreefromthepoliticalcontrolofotherstates,andfreetoenterintoagreementswithotherinternationalpersons.2)Dependentstateshaveformallysurrenderedsomeaspectoftheirpoliticalandgovernmentalfunctionstoanotherstate.3)Inchoatestateslacksomeattributerequiredtobetreatedasafullyindependentstate;mostcommonlytheylackterritoryorpopulation. c.Recognition:Aunilateraldeclarationeitherexplicit(express)orimplicit(tacit)byotherstates.1)Effect:Impliesthattherecognizedstateorgovernmentisentitledtotherightsandprivilegesgrantedbyinternationallaw.2)Twokindsofrecognition:a)Recognitionofastate:Usuallygrantedwhenanidentifiablegovernment,people,andterritoryfirstcomeintoexistence.b)Recognitionofagovernment:Maybedeniedevenifrecognitionofthestatecontinues. Whengovernmentshouldberecognized?1]Theoriesaboutwhengovernmentsshouldberecognized:a]Declaratorydoctrine:Thelegalexistenceofagovernmenthappensautomaticallybyoperationoflawwheneveragovernmentiscapableofcontrollingaterritoryanditspeople.b]Constitutivedoctrine:Agovernmentdoesnottrulycomeintoexistenceuntilsuchtimeasitisrecognizedbyotherstatesandparticipatesintheinternationalarena. Case1-4.MATIMAKTRADINGCO.v.KHALILYandD.A.Y.KIDSSPORTSWEARINC.UnitedStates,SecondCircuitCourtofAppeals,1997.FACTS:Plaintiff,Matimak,aHongKongcompany,seekstosueKhalilyandD.A.Y.,twoNewYorkcorporations,inaUSfederalcourt.Matimakseekstoinvokethefederalcourt’sdiversityjurisdictioninUSCode§1332(A)(2)tohearcivildisputesbetween“citizensofaStateandcitizensofaforeignstate.”Thedistrictcourtdismissedplaintiff’ssuitonthegroundsthatitwasnotthecitizenofaforeignState,becauseHongKongwasnotatthetimerecognizedasbeingaforeignstatebytheUnitedStatesgovernment.ISSUES:(1)IsHongKongastate?(2)IsMatimakacitizenoftheUnitedKingdom?(3)Does§1332(A)(2)allowstatelesspersonstosueinaUSfederalcourt? 2]Practicalconsiderationsconcerningtherecognitionofgovernments.a]EstradaDoctrine:Toavoidanypossibleconnotationthatrecognitionalsomeansapproval,manygovernmentshaveadoptedapolicyofneverformallyrecognizingothergovernments.ThispolicyisnamedaftertheMexicanForeignMinisterwhofirststatedit. d.TerritorialSovereignty:Therighttoexercisethefunctionsofastatewithinaterritory.1)Notanabsoluteright?Otherstatesmayobtainservitudes,eitherbytreatyorpractice,toalimiteduseofcertainterritory.a)Positiveservitude:Theexerciseofaright-of-way.b)Negativeservitude:Preventsonestatefromdoingsomethingwithinitsterritorythatcausesinjurytoasecondstate.2)Acquiringterritory:Thisisdoneeitherby:a)Occupyinglandnotclaimedbyanothersovereign.b)Thetransferofterritoryfromonesovereigntoanother. Case1-5.THETRAILSMELTERARBITRATION(UnitedStatesv.Canada)Canadian-UnitedStatesInternationalJointCommission,ArbitralTribunal,1938and1941.FACTS:ACanadianleadandzincsmelteratTrail,BritishColumbia,waspollutingthewatersoftheColumbiaRiverthatthenranintothestateofWashington.AfternegotiationsbetweentheUSandCanada,thelatteragreedtoreferthemattertoanInternationalJointCommission.TheCommission’sArbitralTribunalawardedtheUS$350,000indamages,butdidnotorderthesmeltertoceaseoperating.In1941,theUSsoughttohavetheoperationofthesmelterenjoined.ISSUE:CanCanadabeenjoinedfromcausingharmtoaUSriver? e.ChangesinTerritorialSovereignty.1)Consequencesastotreatyrightsandobligations:Successorstatesmustobserve:a)Treatieswhichimplementgeneralrulesofinternationallaw.b)“Dispositive”treaties:Treatiesconcernedwithrightsoverterritory,suchasboundariesandservitudes.2)Nationalsofaterritorythatisacquiredbyasuccessorstatewillkeepthenationalityofthepredecessorstateunlessadifferentresultisagreedtoinatreatyofcessionorbymunicipallegislation.3)Publicpropertylocatedwithinaterritorybecomesthepropertyofthesuccessorstate,whilepropertylocatedinthirdstatesbelongstowhichevergovernmentthethirdstaterecognizes. Case1-6.ARABREPUBLICOFSYRIAv.ARABREPUBLICOFEGYPTBrazil,SupremeCourt,1992.FACTS:AfterSyriaandEgyptmergedtoformtheUnitedArabRepublic(UAR)in1958,SyriaturnedoveritsembassyinBraziltotheUAR.FollowingthedissolutionoftheUARin1961,theEgyptiandiplomatwhohadbeentheUAR’slastambassadortoBrazilrefusedtoreturntheembassytoSyria.In1981,theSyrianambassadorinBrazilbroughtsuitintheBrazilianSupremeCourtseekinganordertorequireEgypttoturnovertheembassypropertytoSyria.ISSUES:(1)Doesthisdisputeinvolvestatesuccession?(2)Ifso,isitamatterforamunicipalcourttodecide? 4)Privatepropertyrightsofindividualsdonotlapsebecauseofachangeingovernment.5)Asuccessorstateisboundbytheprivatecontractualobligationsofitspredecessors.6)Asuccessorthatacquirespartorallofaterritoryisproportionatelyresponsiblefortheterritory’snationaldebt. 2.InternationalOrganizationsa.IntergovernmentalOrganizations(IGOs).1)Defined:Permanentorganizationssetupbytwoormorestatestocarryonactivitiesofcommoninterest.2)CharacteristicscommontoIGOs:a)Theyarecreatedbytwoormorestates.b)Theyaremeanttopursueinterestscommontotheircreators.c)Theyfunctionautonomouslyasindependentinternationalpersons. 3)Creation:Createdmuchinthefashionofacorporation.a)Charterorconstituentinstrument,setsoutitsaimsandobjectives,internalstructure,resources,andexpresspowers.Example:UnitedNationsCharter.4)Legalcapacity:Includesthecapacitytocarryondiplomaticrelationswithastateortosueorbesuedinaninternationalormunicipalcourt.a)Acquiredbyrecognition1]fromitsownstatemembers:automatically.2]fromnon-memberstates:specificallycertified. Case1-7.ARABMONETARYFUNDv.HASHIMandothers(No.3)England,HighCourt,ChanceryDivision,1990.FACTS:TheArabMonetaryFundwascreatedbyagroupofArabstatesasanintergovernmentalorganizationwithan“independentjuridicalpersonalityand...inparticular,therightto...litigate.”AdecreeissuedintheUnitedArabEmiratesgavetheAgreementtheforceoflawthroughtheUAE.TheAMFsuedthedefendantsallegingthattheyhadmisappropriatedAMFfunds.Thedefendantsaskedtohavethesuitdismissed,arguingthattheAMF hadnolegalpersonalityinEnglandand,therefore,couldnotbringsuitthere.EnglandhadnotformallyrecognizedtheAMF.ISSUES:(1)IfthegovernmentsthatcreatedanIGOarerecognized,musttheIGObeseparatelyrecognized?(2)Mayanentity,whichisnotrecognizedasanIGO,betreatedasanordinaryjuridicalentity(andthereforebesubjecttothejurisdictionofaforeigncourt)? 5)Examples:a)TheUnitedNations(UN).(http://www.un.org/english/)b)TheEuropeanUnion(EU).(http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm)1]Supernationalpowers:Withinitsscopeofapplicability,communitylawissuperiortothelawsofthememberstates.a]MemberstatesarerequiredtobringtheirinternallawsintocompliancewithEUlaws.b]EUlawisdirectlyeffectivewithinthememberstates. Case1-8.EUNOMIADIPORRO&CO.v.ITALIANMINISTRYOFEDUCATIONEuropeanCommunities,CourtofJustice,1971.FACTS:ItalycollectedanexporttaxonapaintingEunomiadePorroexportedfromItaly(anECmemberstate)toGermany(alsoanECmemberstate).PreviouslytheECCourtofJusticehadheldthatItalywasindefaultofitsobligationsunderArt.16oftheEECTreaty,whichrequiredittoabolishexportdutiesbetweenmemberstates.WhenEunomiadePorrosuedtogetitstaxpaymentback,theItaliantrialcourtreferredthemattertotheECCourt,askingittodetermineifArt.16weredirectlyeffectiveinItaly.ISSUE:IsArt.16directlyeffective? 2]EUinstitutions:a]EuropeanCommissionb]CounciloftheEuropeanUnionc]EuropeanParliamentd]EuropeanEconomicandSocialCouncile]Committeeofregionsf]EuropeanCourtofFirstInstanceg]EuropeanCourtofJusticeh]EuropeanCentralBank.i]EuropeanCourtofAuditors c)OtherIntergovernmentalOrganizations1]GeneralIntergovernmentalOrganizationsa]AfricanUnion(http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm)b]CouncilofEurope(http://www.coe.int/)c]OrganizationofAmericanStates(http://www.oas.org/main/english/)2]SpecializedIntergovernmentalOrganizationsa]CustomsUnions:e.g.,EuropeanUnionb]FreeTradeAreas:e.g.,NorthAmericanFreeTradeArea(NAFTA)c]EconomicConsultativeAssociations:e.g.,OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD) b.NongovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs).1)NonprofitNGOsserveascoordinatingagenciesforprivatenationalgroupsininternationalaffairs.2)For-profitNGOs(transnationalcorporations(TNCs)ormultinationalenterprises(MNEs))arebusinessesoperatingbranchesorsubsidiariesorjointventuresintwoormorecountries. 1.Traditionalview:Individualstraditionallyhavenorights—onlyduties—underinternationallaw.a.LawofStateResponsibilityallowsastatetoseekcompensationforoneofitsinjurednationals.F.THERIGHTSOFINDIVIDUALSUNDERINTERNATIONALLAW Case1-9.DESANCHEZv.BANCOCENTRALDENICARAGUAUnitedStates,CourtofAppeals,FifthCircuit,1985.FACTS:Mrs.Sanchez,thewifeofthethenforeignministeroftheSomozagovernmentinNicaragua,wasthepayeeonacheckissuedbytheCentralBankofNicaragua.FollowingthefalloftheSomozagovernment,Mrs.Sanchezwasunabletocashthecheckbecausethenewgovernmentputastop-paymentorderonit.Mrs.SanchezthanbroughtinsuittoforcetheBancoCentraltohonorthecheck(whichwasdrawnonaUSbank).WhenthetrialcourtdismissedMrs.Somoza’ssuit,sheappealed.ISSUE:Mayanindividualwhoisanationalofaforeignstatesueanagencyofthatforeignstateinanotherstate’scourtsforanallegedcontractualbreach? 2.Acontemporary—andstillevolving—view:Individualsdohavetheabilitytoexercisetherightsofaninternationalperson.a.Individualshavebasichumanrights.b.Individualsmaysuestatesinsomeinternationaltribunals. G.COMPARISONOFMUNICIPALLEGALSYSTEMS1.ComparativeLaw:Thestudyandanalysisofthedifferentmunicipallawsystems.a.Legal“families”:1)Romano-GermanicCivilLaw.2)Anglo-AmericanCommonLaw.3)IslamicLaw.b.Thesearedividedintosubfamilies.c.Therearealsohybrids.d.Therearealsosomepracticesthatareuniquetoaparticularcountry. 2.TheRomano-GermanicCivilLawSystema.Oldestandmostinfluentialofthelegalfamilies.b.Sourcesinclude:1)CorpusJurisCivilis(“TheBodyofCivilLaw”)ofRomanEmperorJustiniancompletedaround534AD.2)Canonlaw:thechurchlawofthemedievalRomanCatholicChurch.3)Juscommune:lawsbasedonRomanlaw,canonlaw,andtheinterpretationsofglossatorsandcommentators,andcommontoEuropeatthebeginningoftheRenaissance.4)Lexmercatoria:commoncommercialrulesandproceduresusedthroughoutEuropeintheRenaissance.5)Nationalcodes:seventeenthcenturynationalismledtothewritingofnationallegalcodesinEurope. c.Mostinfluentialnationalcodes:1)FrenchCivilCode(CodeNapoleon)of1804.a)Firstmoderncode.b)UnderlyingprinciplestakenfromtheFrenchRevolution:1]Therighttopossessprivateproperty.2]Thefreedomtocontract.3]Theautonomyofthepatriarchalfamily.c)OrganizedstructurallyinmuchthesamefashionastheJustinianCode.1]Manyofitsprovisionsweretakenfrom:a]Juscommune.b]Frenchroyalordinances.c]Academicwritings.d]Customarylaw. d)DifferencesfromtheGermanCode:1]Writteninashortperiodoftime.2]Itsstyleandformareonethatisstraightforward,easytoread,andunderstandabletoeveryone.e)Itcontainsflexiblegeneralrulesratherthandetailedprovisions. 2)GermanCivilCodeof1896.a)Reasonitwasnotenacteduntil1896:1]Germanyfirsthadtobecomeanation.2]Scholarsknownas“Pandectists”spentyearsdoingpreliminarystudiesanddraftingthecode.b)CharacteristicsoftheGermanCode:1]Incrediblypreciseandtechnical.2]Specialterminologyisused.c)DifferencesfromtheFrenchCode:Itismeantexclusivelyfortheuseoftrainedexperts(notlayreaders). d.CountrieswithCivilLawsystemsdistinguishbetweenthecivillawandpubliclaw.1)Publiclawevolvedseparatelyfromthemovementforcodificationofcivilorprivatelaw.a)Civillaw(forcivilianlawyers)isonlythelawcontainedinthecodesanditsauxiliarystatutes(thatis,thelawofpersons,familylaw,propertylaw,successionlaw,thelawofobligations,commerciallaw,laborlaw,andcriminallaw).b)Publiclawisconstitutionalandadministrativelaw 2)Publiclawistreatedinavarietyofwaysinthecivillawcountries.a)Manycivilianlawyersregardconstitutionallawasaformofpoliticalscience.b)Germanyhasabranchofadministrativecourtstoreviewtheactsofitsgovernmentagencies.c)FrancecreatedaCouncilofStatetoprotectindividualrightsandsupervisetheadministrativeprocessesofgovernment. e.Changesinthetwentiethcentury.1)Amovementawayfromrelyingonlyonthecivilcode.2)Speciallegislationandjudicialinterpretationshavebecomemoreinfluential.3)WiththeadventofEuropeanUnion,thereisnowamovementtowardharmonizingthelawsoftheUnion’smemberstates. Case1-10.RAULINv.FISCHEREngland,King'sBench,1911.FACTS:Ms.Fischer,whilerecklesslyridingahorseinParis,collidedwithMonsieurRaulin,seriouslyinjuringhim.AFrenchtrialcourtheardacriminalcomplaintbroughtbyaprocurator.Atthatproceeding,Raulin,thevictim,intervenedintheproceedingashewasallowedtodobytheFrenchCodeofCivilProcedure,andaskedfordamages.ThecourtconvictedFischerofcriminalnegligenceandimposedasentenceofonemonthinprisonandafineof100francs.Followingexperttestimony,thecourtalsoawardedRaulin15,000francsindamagesand917francsincosts.RaulinlaterbroughtsuitinEnglandtoenforcehisFrenchjudgment.ISSUE:Shouldacommonlawcourtrefusetorecognizeanawardofcivildamageshandeddownbyacivillawcriminalcourt? 3.TheAnglo-AmericanCommonLawSystema.Historicalorigins:1)In1066,theNormansconqueredEnglandandWilliamtheConquerorbegantocentralizethegovernmentaladministrationofhisnewkingdom.2)Thename“commonlaw”isderivedfromthetheorythattheking’scourtsrepresentedthecommoncustomoftherealm,asopposedtothelocalcustomarylawpracticedinthecountyandmanorialcourts. 3)ThedevelopmentoftheprinciplesofthecommonlawwerelargelytheproductofthreecourtscreatedbyHenryII(1133-1189):a)CourtofExchequer,whichsettledtaxdisputes.b)CourtofCommonPleas,whichdealtwithmattersthatdidnotinvolveadirectinterestoftheking,suchastitletoland,enforcementofpromises,andpaymentofdebts.c)CourtofKing’sBenchwhichhandledcasesofadirectroyalinterest,suchastheissuanceof“writs”(writtendecrees)tocontrolunrulypublicofficials.Eventually,thejurisdictionoftheKing’sBenchwasusedtocontrolabusesofpowerbythekinghimself,establishingafundamentaldoctrineofthecommonlaw:thesupremacyofthelaw. 4)Thesecourtswereimportantindevelopingcaselaw—thecommonlawpracticeofusingthedecisionsofcourts(precedents)asasourceoflaw.a)ThisistheprincipalfactorthatdistinguishesthecommonlawfromtheRomano-Germaniccivillaw. b.The“commonlaw”mustbedistinguishedfromthelawwhichevolvedoutof:1)Equity:Aprincipleofjusticedevelopedbytheking’schaplain,orchancellor,toprovidepartieswitharemedywhennonewasavailableintheking’scourts.2)Admiralty(thelawsgoverningsailors)andotherspecializedjurisdictions. c.Thecommonlaw’sdistributionaroundtheworldisdifferentfromthewayinwhichthecivillawwasdistributed.1)Theprincipalnationsthatusethecommonlaw(Australia,Canada,India,Ireland,NewZealand,andtheUnitedStates)haveadirectpoliticalandhistoricallinkagetoEngland.a)Thecommonlawisnoteasilyreceivedbyothercountriesbecause:1]Itisbasedonamatrixofcaselawandstatutes.2]Itusesthejurysystemandthedoctrineofsupremacytolimittheactionsofthegovernment.3]Itusesacomplexterminology. 2)Thecivillawcountries(mostoftherestoftheWorld)arenotconnectedbyanypoliticalorhistoricalconnection.a)Thecivillawiswidespreadbecauseitistheeasierofthetwolegaltraditionsforacountrytoreceive.1]Itisencapsulatedinconvenientcodes.2]Itdealsprimarilywithprivatelawthatisoflittlethreattothelocalpoliticalsystem. 4.TheIslamicLawSystema.KnownasShari’a.b.Sourcesintheorderoftheirimportance:1)TheKoran.2)TheSunnahordecisionsandsayingsoftheProphetMuhammad.3)ThewritingsofIslamicscholarswhoderivedrulesbyanalogyfromtheprinciplesestablishedintheKoranandtheSunnah.4)Theconsensusofthelegalcommunity. c.History.1)InthetenthcenturyAD(thirdcenturyH),theIslamiclegalcommunitydecidedthatfurtherimprovementofthescholars’analysisofdivinelawwasimpossible.a)Thelegalcommunity“closedthedoorofijtihad”(independentreasoning).1]ThisfrozetheevolutionofIslamiclawintime.2]Shari’ajudgesandscholarsmayonlyapplythelawasitwassetdownbytheearlywriters.2)Recentlysomehaveadvocatedreopeningthedoorofijtihad,butthishasbeenvehementlyopposedbyIslamicfundamentalists. d.NotethattheShari’aisprimarilyamoralcode.1)Itisprincipallyconcernedwithethics.a)Inthisrespect,itcontainsmanyprinciplesincommonwiththecivillawandthecommonlaw.2)Itismuchlessconcernedwithpromotingcommerceandinternationalrelationsthanthesecularlegalsystems. Case1-11.-LIBYANAMERICANOILCOMPANY(LIAMCO)v.GOVERNMENTOFTHELIBYANARABREPUBLICDr.SobhiMahmassani,SoleArbitrator,1977.FACTS:TheLibyanAmericanOilCompany’s(LIAMCO’s)oilconcessionsinLibyawerenationalizedin1973.Whennocompensationwasreceived(despitepromises),LIAMCOtookthemattertoarbitration,seekingcompensationforitslostproperties.Libya,meanwhile,informedallitsconcessionairesthatitrejectedarbitrationasanaffronttoitssovereigntyanditrefusedtoparticipateinthisproceeding.ISSUE:Isasovereignboundbyitscontractualcommitments?

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