Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers

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DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00312.xCompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers:TheMetaphysicsofMitleidDavidE.CartwrightWilliamJamessketchedathoughtexperimentthathecouldnotrefrainfromansweringforus:[I]fthehypothesiswereofferedtousofaworldinwhichMessrs.Fourier’sandBellamy’sandMorris’utopiasshouldbeoutdone,andmillionskeptpermanentlyhappyontheonesimpleconditionthatacertainlostsoulonthefar-offedgesofthingsshouldleadalifeoflonelytorture,whatexceptaspecificialandindependentsortofemotioncanitbewhichwouldmakeusimmediatelyfeel,eventhoughanimpulsewithinustoclutchatthehappinesssooffered,howhideousathingwouldbeitsenjoymentwhendeliberatelyacceptedasthefruitofsuchabargain?(James1956:188)TheAmericanpragmatistassumedthathisreaderswouldsharethesame‘specificialandindependentsortofemotion’thatwouldhaveledthemtofindhideousanyenjoymentboughtbysuchabargain.Hemusthavealsothoughtthatutilitarianswouldnotreadapragmatist,sincethepurchaseofaheaven-on-earthattheexpenseofasingleindividualisinestimablyworthmorethanthecost.JamesalsocapturedArthurSchopenhauer’sresponsetothishideousbargain.Schopenhaueradvancedananalogousanti-utilitarianstance,andhedroveittoapessimisticconclusion:[T]hatthousandshadlivedinhappinessandjoywouldneverdoawaywiththeanguishanddeath-agonyofoneindividual;andjustalittledoesmypresentwell-beingundomyprevioussuffering.Therefore,weretheevilinthisworldevenahundredtimeslessthanitis,itsmereexistencewouldstillbesufficienttoestablishatruththatmaybeexpressedinvariousways,althoughonlysomewhatindirectly,namelythatwehavenottobepleasedbutsorryabouttheworld;thatitsnonexistencewouldbepreferabletoitsexistence;thatitissomethingthatoughtnottobe,andsoon.(WWRII576/661)ButwhywouldSchopenhauershareJames’sentiments,andwhatunderlieshisownvariationofJames’theme?Howwouldthephilosopherofwill,whoclaimedthategoismwasthe‘naturalstandpoint’(WWRI332/392)andthat‘egoismiscolossal;ittowersabovetheworld;forifeveryindividualweregivenEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy16:2ISSN0966-8373pp.292–310r2008TheAuthor.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008,9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UKand350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA. CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers293thechoicebetweenhisowndestructionandtherestoftheworld,Ineednotsayhowthedecisionwouldgointhevastmajorityofcases’(BM132/197),explaintheminorityviewthatwouldfindJames’bargainreprehensible?Howwouldheexplainthe‘specificialandindependentsortofemotion’thatwouldfindthehappinesspromisedbythelonelytortureofthelostsoulrepugnant?MotivationalPluralismSchopenhauerheldthatthewill,anunconscious,goalless,strivingtobe,is‘theinnercontent[derinnereGehalt]’(WWRI275,286/324,337),‘theessenceoftheworld[dasWesentlichederWelt]’(WWRI275/324),‘thekerneloftheworld[KernderRealita¨t](WWRII494/566),‘theultimatesubstrate[letzteSubstrat]ofeveryappearance’(WN47/34),‘theinneressenceofnature[innereWesenNatur]’(PPII94/100)andthe‘commonsubstance[dergemeinsameStoff]ofallbeing’(PPII599/643).Thewillishisensrealissimumandineverything‘thewilltolifeexistswholeandundivided’(PPII221/236),and‘theworldisonlythemirrorofthewilling;andallfiniteness,allsuffering,allmiseriesthatitcontains,belongtotheexpressionofwhatthewillwills,areastheyarebecausethewillsowills’(WWRI351/415).ThewillissingularforSchopenhauer,moreprecisely,nonplural,andheiscommittedtometaphysicalmonism,sinceallappearancesdevolveintothewill.Withthisstance,itappearsthatSchopenhauershouldhavebeenamotivationalmonistinsomesenseofthatterm,recognizingthattherewassomesinglemotivethatultimatelyaccountsforallhumanactions.AndgiventhecaricatureofSchopenhauer’stemperamentandthesingularityofthewill,itiseasytoimaginethathewouldhavebeenapsychologicalegoist,holdingthatallhumanactionsaimatthewell-beingoftheactor.Schopenhauer,however,rejectedanytypeofmotivationalmonism,andheexplicitlyrejectedpsychologicalegoismjustashehaditscorrelate,theoreticalegoism,thethesisthatthereisbutonerealbeing,everythingelsebeingmererepresentation.Theoreticalegoism,heheld,couldneverberefutedbyproofs,andhedismisseditasamere‘skepticalsophism’whoseadvocateneeded‘notsomucharefutationasacure’(WWRI104/124).Practicalegoism,however,wassomethinghetookmoreseriously.Inhisnot-awarded-a-prizeessay,OntheBasisofMorality,andpriortohisattemptingtoestablishhisownfoundationformoralsinthatessay,heconfrontedmoralskepticism,theviewthat‘thereisnonaturalmoralityatallthatisindependentofhumaninstitutions’,andthatmoralitycannotbefoundedonanappealtothenatureofthings,includinghumannature(BM121/186).WorkingfromacommitmenttotheKantianthesisthatself-interestedactionsarevoidofmoralworth,heregardedthemoralskepticasanadvocateofpsychologicalegoism,claimingthatactionslike‘voluntaryjustice,’‘purelovingkindness’,and‘realmagnanimity’,actionstowhichweascribemoralworth,altruisticactionsperse,aremotivatedbyagents’desiresfortheirownwell-being.Ifthemoralskepticiscorrect,hereasoned,moralswouldbeasciencewithoutanyobject,likealchemyandastrology.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 294DavidE.CartwrightSchopenhauerwaswillingtoconcedethatmuchofwhatpassesasmorallyworthwhileconductisegoistic,motivatedbyfearoflegalpunishment,lossofreputation,divineretribution,orthedesireforeternalreward.Nevertheless,hethoughttherewere‘indubitablecases’,althoughrelativelyrare,inwhichnonreligiouspeopleactmorallyinsituationsinwhichtheywouldbebeyondsuspicionandhaveconfidencetheywouldnotbedetectediftheyweretoactimmorally.Thushementionstheexamplesofapoormanreturninglostpropertytoarichman,anotherreturninganunrecordeddeposittoanestate,andanotherreturningmoneytoafugitive.‘Indeed’,hewrote,‘therearereallyhonestpeoplejustasthereareactuallyfour-leavedclovers;butHamletdoesnotexaggeratewhenhesays,‘‘tobehonest,asthisworldgoes,istobeonemanpick’doutoftenthousand’’’(BM126/191).Then,ofcourse,thereishisparadigmcaseofanonegoisticaction,thesacrificialdeathoftheSwissfolk-hero,ArnoldvonWinkelried,whohurledhimselfagainstthespearsoftheenemyAustriansoldiers,allowinghiscountrymentoescapeslaughterandtoultimatelyprevailin1386atthebattleofSempach.Yet,Schopenhauersensedthathis‘indubitablecases’werenotimmunetodoubt,eventheWinkelriedcase,andalthoughheconfessedthathecouldnotimagineaselfishmotivebehindtheSwisshero’sconduct,healsorecognizedthatothersmightbemoreimaginative.Withthese,however,hewillhavenotruck,andheaddresses‘...myselftothosewhoadmittherealityofthematter’(BM139/203).Nevertheless,Schopenhauerwaswiseforignoringfurtherdebatewiththepsychologicalegoistandstickingtotheassumptionthatthereismorethanoneultimatemotiveforhumanconduct.Psychologicalegoismhasnotbeenestablishedconclusivelybyeitherphilosophyorpsychology,anditmaywellbethecasethatanevolutionaryperspectivefavorssometypeofmotivationalpluralism,whichincludesaltruisticmotives,overmotivationalmonismofan1egoisticstripe.Still,Schopenhauerhimselfwasill-at-easewithhiscommitmenttomotivationalpluralism,andhesensedthetensionbetweenhismetaphysicalmonismandmotivationalpluralism.TwoyearspriortothepublicationofOntheWillinNature(1836),aworkinwhichhestrovetoprovideametaphysicalbasisforscience,herecognizedthathiscommitmenttomotivationalpluralism,whichentailedethicaldiversityofbehavior,wasproblematic:‘Butethicaldiversityseemstoproceeddirectlyfromthewill,otherwiseitwouldnotbeaboveandbeyondtime,foronlyintheindividualareintellectandotherwiseunited.Thewillisaboveandbeyondtimeandiseternalandthecharacterisinnateandhassprungfromthateternity,andconsequentlyitcannotbeexplainedbyanythingimmanent’(MRIV222).Thisledhimtowishthatsomeoneelsewouldcastsomelightintothisabyss.BythesecondeditionofTheWorldasWillandRepresentation(1844),herecognizedthatthequestionconcerninghowfartherootsofindividualitygoin‘thebeinginitselfoftheworld’wasbeyondthepaleofphilosophyandthatitsanswerwouldbe2transcendent(WII641/737).ItistoSchopenhauer’screditthatheresistedmovingtoaformofmotivationalmonismtodevelopanethicsingreaterconformitytohismetaphysics.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers295Schopenhauer’sderivationofhisultimateincentivesforhumanactions3isstraightforward.Itisalsologicallyincomplete.Allhumanactionsareafunctionofaperson’scharacterandasufficientmotive,heargued,andeachactionisintentional,havingasitsfinalendsomething‘inagreementwithorcontrarytoabeing’swill’(BM141/205).Byidentifyingthingsinagreementwithaperson’swill,withaperson’swealorwell-being(Wohl),andthingscontrarytoaperson’swillwithaperson’swoeormisfortune(Wehe),heclaimedthatallhumanactionshaveastheirfinalendsomeone’swealandwoe.Becauseheheldthatmoralitydealtwithrelationshipsbetweenindividuals,heclaimedthattherearefourultimateendsforhumanaction;namely,one’sownweal,one’sownwoe,another’sweal,andanother’swoe.Thecognitionoftheseendsforactionsbecomemotivesthatcanstimulatefourbasicincentives(Triebfedern):egoism,whichdesiresaperson’sownweal;anunnamedincentive,whichdesiresaperson’sownwoe;compassion,whichdesiresanother’sweal;4andmalice,whichdesiresanother’swoe.Everyhumanaction,heheld,‘mustbeattributedtooneoftheseincentives,althoughtwocanactincombi-nation’(BM145/205),andheheldthateachoneofuspossesstheseincentivestosomedegree.Hethusthoughtofthehumancharacterasanamalgamoftheseincentives,andheheldthat‘theprevalenceofoneortheother[incentive]...givesustheprincipallineintheethicalclassificationofcharacter’5(BM136/201).Itiswell-knownthatSchopenhauerrejectedanyprescriptiveethicaltheoryandhisdescriptiveethicssoughttoexaminehumanbehaviorfromamoralpointofview,settingthefoundationformoralsonempiricalgrounds.Toaccomplishthistask,herecognizedthreeclassesofactions;viz.,thosethataremorallyreprehensible(moralischverwerfliche),thosethataremorallyindifferent(moralisch6indifferente),andthosethatpossessmoralworth(moralischerWert).ForthevoluntaristicSchopenhauer,themoralpointofview,whichservesasthegroundsfortheclassificationofactions,isafunctionoftheaffectiveresponsestoadeed7bytheactorandanimpartialwitness.Morallyreprehensibleactionsprovokethedisapprobationofboththeactorandwitness;morallyindifferentactionsdrawneithertheapprobationnordisapprobationoftheactorandwitness;andactionspossessingmoralworthdrawtheapprobationofbothparties.Afterdevelopinghisaccountofhisfundamentalincentives,hearguesthatmaliceistheincentiveformorallyreprehensibleactions,egoismformorallyindifferentactions,andcompassionforactionspossessingmoralworth.Toshowthatcompassionisthesourceforallactionspossessingmoralworth,hemountsanargumentbyeliminationinwhichheclaimsneitheregoismnormalicecanbethemotiveforthesetypesofactions,whichleavescompassionastheirsource.Herealizesthatargumentsbyeliminationarenotintellectuallysatisfying,however.Thushearguesthatthevirtuesofjusticeandlovingkindness(Menschenliebe)arebasedoncompassion,andsinceheholdsthatthesearethecardinalvirtues,thevirtuesfromwhichallothervirtuesarederived,andbydemonstratingthatjusticeandlovingkindnessfollowfromcompassion,heclaimstohaveproventhatcompassionisthebasisofallvirtue.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 296DavidE.CartwrightCompassionSchopenhauerbelieveshehasdemonstratedthat‘onlyinsofarasanactionhassprungfromcompassiondoesithavemoralworth;andeveryactionresultingfromanyothermotivehasnone’(BM144/208f).Hedescribescompassionitselfas’...theimmediateparticipation[unmittelbareTeilnahme],independentofallulteriorconsiderations,primarilyinthesufferingofanother,andthusinthepreventionoreliminationofit;forallsatisfactionandwell-beingandhappinessconsistsinthis...Assoonasthiscompassionisaroused,thewealandwoeofanotherarenearesttomyheartinexactlythesameway,althoughnotalwaysinexactlythesamedegree,asotherwiseonlymyownare.Hencethedifferencebetweenhimandmeisnownolongerabsolute’(ibid.).Thisphenomenonrequires,heargues,thattheothers’wealandwoebecomethemotiveformyactionjustasifitweremyownwealandwoe.Thisisonlypossible,heholds,thatinthecaseofanother’ssuffering‘Isufferdirectlywithhim[ichbeiseinemWehealssolchemgeradezumitleide],IfeelhiswoejustasIordinarilyfeelonlymyown;and,likewise,IdirectlydesirehiswealinthesamewayIotherwisedesireonlymyown’(BM143/208).Incompassionatinganother,Schopenhauerholds,Itreatanother’ssufferingasnormallyItreatmyown—Iacttopreventorrelieveit.Sinceheholdstheoddthesisherethatallsatisfaction,well-being,andhappinessconsistsinthepreventionoreliminationofsuffering,Schopenhauerimmediately8connectscompassiontothepursuitofanother’swell-being.Fromtheaboveremarks,Schopenhauer’sconceptionofcompassioncanbedetailedasfollows:AhascompassionforB,ifandonlyif(i)AandBaresentientbeings;(ii)AcognizesthatBwillbeorissuffering;(iii)AparticipatesimmediatelyinB’ssuffering;(iv)AfeelssorrowforB;(v)AdesiresB’swell-being;and(vi)AisdisposedtopreventoreliminateB’ssuffering,andotherthingsbeingequal,AwillacttopreventoreliminateB’ssuffering.Ibelieveandhavearguedelsewhere(Cartwright1982:60–69)thatconditions(i),(ii),(iv),(v),and(vi)arerelativelyuncontroversial,andSchopenhauer’sanalysisof(iii),thatAparticipatesimmediatelyinB’ssuffering,ishighlyproblematic.Itisalsothefeatureofcompassionforwhichhesoughtametaphysicalfoundation.TheFirstMetaphysicsofMitleidSchopenhauer’sclaimthatcompassionateagentsparticipateimmediatelyinanother’ssufferingisthecenterpieceofhisconceptionofcompassion,anditisthatforwhichhismetaphysicsprovidedagroundingexplanation.HisfirstrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers297accountofthemetaphysicsofcompassionisfound,notunexpectedly,inthefourth,the‘ethicalbook’ofTheWorldasWillandRepresentation,andhistreatmentofcompassionremainedvirtuallyunchangedineachofitsthreeeditions.Itisremarkable,however,thatSchopenhauersaidrelativelylittleaboutcompassioninhismainwork,evenwhenoneincludesthesupplementaryessaysofitssecondedition.Still,sincethefourthbookcompleteswhatGerardMannionaptlycalledthe‘soteriologicalgrandnarrative’ofhisphilosophyandthat‘thedenialofthewillisitscentralthem’,asRudolfMalterhasnoted,itisnotsurprisingthat9Schopenhauerdidnotdwelloncompassion.Hehad,obviously,biggerfishtofry,andhisentiretreatmentofhumanactionsfromamoralpointofviewisbutapassingstagealongtheroutetothedenialofthewill.Insteadofkeenlyanalyzingcompassion,hewasdriventodemonstratethat‘...fromthesamesourcefromwhichallgoodness,affection,virtue,andnobilityofcharacterspring,thereultimatelyarisesalsowhatIcallthedenialofthewilltolife’(WWRI378/447).Thissamesourceofbothvirtueandthedenialofthewillisacognitioninwhichthe‘veilofmayahasbecometransparent(WWRI373/441)andwhosecontentisdescribedbyoneofthemahavakyasorgreatpronouncementsfromtheChandogyaUpanishad,‘tattvamasi[thisartthou]’(WWRI374/442).Schopenhauerclaimedthatanindividualpossessingagoodcharacterseesthrough(durchschauen)theprincipiumindividuationis,spaceandtime,and‘cognizesimmediately[erkenntunmittelbar],andwithoutinferences,thatthebeinginitselfofhisownappearanceisalsothatofothers,namely,thatwilltolifewhichconstitutestheinnernatureofeverything,andlivesinall;indeed,herecognizesthatthisextendseventoanimalsandtothewholeofnature;hewillthereforenotcausesufferingeventoanimals’(WWRI572/440).Schopenhauerholdsthatthiscognitionadmitsofdegreesofclarity;thatis,thismetaphysicalunityisperceivedmoredimlybyapersondisplayingthevirtueofjusticethanitisbyapersondisplayingthevirtueoflovingkindness.Itappearsthattheveilofmayabecomesfullytransparenttotheascetic;thatthispersonhastheclearestcognitionofthemetaphysicalunityofwill,andthis‘...cognitionofthewhole,oftheinnernatureofthethinginitself...becomesthequieterofallandeverywilling.Thewillnowturnsawayfromlife;itshuddersatthepleasuresinwhichitrecognizestheaffirmationoflife.Thispersonattainstothestateofvoluntaryrenunciation,resignation,truecomposure,andcompletewill-lessness’(WWRI379/448).Schopenhauerholdsthatajustpersonperceivesthisunitytotheextentofnotcausingotherssuffering,thelovinglykindpersontorelievingothers’suffering,andtheasceticresigns—perhapsoutofasenseofthefruitlessnessofattemptingtheimpossible—eliminatingsufferinginaworldthatisdoomedtosufferfromitsverynatureaswill.Thisfirstmetaphysicalexplanationofcompassionappearstoclaimthatcompassionateagentsparticipateimmediatelyinanother’ssuffering,becausetheyrealizethatothersaremetaphysicallyidenticaltothemselves.Consequently,theyaremovedtopreventorrelieveothers’miserybecausetheyperceiveothers’woesaretheirown.Therefore,justastheyarenaturallyinclinedtoavoidorrelievetheirownsuffering,theyaremovedtodosoforthemiseriesofothers.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 298DavidE.CartwrightThistypeofanalysis,however,hasledcommentators,suchasEduardvonHartmann,FriedrichNietzsche,MaxScheler,PatrickGardiner,andD.W.HamlyntosuggestthatSchopenhauerreducedcompassiontosomeformof10egoism.Recently,JulianYounghasarguedthat:...Schopenhauerasserts,first,thatthedifferencebetweentheegoistandthealtruististhatwhiletheformeractsforhisownintereststhelatteractsforthesakeofanother’s...Asthediscussionproceeds,however,itbecomesclearthat,afterall,thealtruistdoesactforthesakeofhisowninterests,theonlydifferencebetweenhimandtheegoistbeingthatheactsforthesakeoftheinterestsofhismetaphysicalratherthanhisempiricalself,so,aswemightputit,theempiricalaltruistturnsouttobeametaphysicalegoist.(Young2005:182f.)Schopenhauer’sfirstmetaphysicsofcompassioncertainlyprovokesthechargethathereducedhissolemoralincentiveintosomeformofmetaphysicalegoism.ItdidprovokeJohannAugustBecker,whomSchopenhauerregardedashismostastute‘apostle’,tolevelthiscriticismagainstthephilosopher.InhisreplytoBecker,Schopenhauerwrotethathemightsaythat‘...compassion,alongwithallofthevirtuesflowingfromit,isegoistical...becauseitdependsonthecognitionofmyownbeinginanother.Butthisargumentrestssolelyonyourwantingtotakethephrase,‘‘Ioncemore’’literally,whileitisjustafigurativeturnofexpression.For‘‘I’’inthepropersenseofthetermrefersexclusivelytotheindividualandnottothemetaphysicalthinginitselfwhichappearsinindividuals,butwhichisdirectlyunknowable...[W]ithregardtothis,therefore,theindividualceases,andbyegoismisunderstoodtheexclusiveinterestinone’s11ownindividuality’(Hu¨bscher1987:221).Schopenhauer,however,usedthephrase,‘Ioncemore’inawaythatinvitesaliteralinterpretation.InOntheBasisofMorality,heevenwrotethatwheneverapersonaidsanotherwithoutanyobjectotherthanlesseningtheother’swant,‘[it]ispossibleonlyinsofarasherecognizesthathisownself...nowappearsbeforehim...herecognizesagainhisowninnerbeinginitselfintheappearanceofanother’(BM212/273).If,however,heissimplyusingthisideametaphorically—perhapshewasattemptingtoadvanceourcognitivestockwithoutobviouslyviolatingtheboundsofmeaningfuldiscourse—thisseemstocontravenehisinsistencethatmeaningfuldiscoursemustultimatelybebasedonintuition(Anschauung).Yet,Schopenhauer’smetaphysicalwillisnonplural,whichmakesitdifficulttounderstand,moreover,howsomecognitionofthemetaphysicalwillinanotherwouldservetomotivateanagenttodosomethingforthatother.Indeed,itisdifficulttodeterminehowthiscognitionwouldpreservethedistinctionbetweentheagentandthepatient,sincethemetaphysicalwillisneithertheagentnorthepatient.Itiswhereindividualityceases.Moralityitself,Schopenhaueravers,isalwaysarelationshipbetweenindividuals,andthisgrandcognitionintotheunityofbeingabrogatesindividuality.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers299ThethinnessofSchopenhauer’streatmentofcompassioninTheWorldasWillandRepresentationisduenotsimplytohistreatmentofitasatransitionarysteptowardsthedenialofthewill.Inhismainwork,hisanalysisofcompassionpresupposedhismetaphysicsofthewill.Hisunsuccessfulprize-essay,however,operateswithoutthispresupposition.Therefore,hehastoarguefrommoralphenomenatotheirprimaryphenomena(Urpha¨nomene),andthenhehasto12provideametaphysicalexplanationofthosephenomena.Consequently,heprovidesamorerobustdescriptionofcompassionthanthatfoundinhismainwork;onethatsetsthestageforhismetaphysics.Indoingso,heneedstoshowspecificallyhowindividualsaremovedtofeelcompassionforothers,andthereSchopenhauerprovidesanalternativeexplanationofcompassionthatrequiresultimatelyametaphysicalexplanation,sinceherejectsapsychologicalexplana-tionofcondition(iii).Inparticular,hearguesagainsttheItalianphilosopherUbaldoCassina’sclaimthatcompassionateagentsareimmediatelymotivatedbyanother’ssuffering,sincetheyimaginethemselvesinthepositionofthesuffererandhavetheideathattheyweresufferingthatperson’smiseryintheirown13person.Schopenhauerclaims‘Thisisbynomeansthecase;onthecontrary,ateverymomentweremainclearlyconsciousthatheisthesufferer,notwe;anditispreciselyinhisperson,notinours,thatwefeelthesuffering,tooursorrow.Wesufferwithhimandhenceinhim[wirleidenmitihm,alsoinihm];wefeelhispainashis,anddonotimaginethatitisours’(BM147/211f.).Thisextraordinaryexperienceofanother’spaininanother’sbodycannotbeexplainedpsycholo-gically,Schopenhauercontinues;itcanonlybeexplainedmetaphysically,whichhepromisestodointhelastchapterofhisprizeessayonmorality.Healsoprovidesnoevidenceorargumentfortheexistenceofthisextraordinaryexperience.TheSecondMetaphysicsofMitleidThefirstmetaphysicalexplanationofcompassionfocusedontheagent’sintuitionofmetaphysicalunitywiththepatient.Schopenhauerwarns,however,thatwearenottotakeliterallytheideathatcompassionateindividualsviewothersasthemselvesandthatthisiswhatmovesthemtoparticipateimmediatelyinanother’swoe.InOntheBasisofMorality,whichcontainsSchopenhauer’smostrobustanalysisofcompassion,heclaimsthatitinvolvesthetrulyextraordinaryexperienceofanother’ssuffering,anexperiencethatrequiresnotanaturalisticorpsychological,butametaphysicalexplanation.Heturnstothisintheessay’sclosingchapter,‘OntheMetaphysicalExplanationofthePrimaryEthicalPhenomenon’.Hereheclaimsthatametaphysicalexplanationofaprimaryphenomenoninvolves‘...thequestionofwhythatwhichexists,andisunderstood,isasitis,andnototherwise;andthequestionofhowtheexhibitedcharacterofthephenomenonresultsfromtheessenceinitselfofthings’(BM200/261).Ifthisiswhatisentailedbyametaphysicalexplanationofprimaryphenomena,onewouldexpectthatinadditiontocompassion,hewouldalsorTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 300DavidE.Cartwrightsupplyametaphysicalexplanationforegoismandmalice,sincebothoftheseincentivesarealsoprimaryphenomena,theformerformorallyindifferentactionsandthelatterformorallyreprehensibleactions.Moredeeply,ifthese,alongwiththedesireforone’sownwoe,constitutethefundamentalincentivesforhumanaction,onewouldalsoexpectthatSchopenhauerwouldgroundhismotivationalpluralisminhismonisticmetaphysics.Schopenhauer,however,doesnoneofthesethings.Instead,whenheturnstoSection22,‘MetaphysicalFoundation’,heexamineswhatheclaimedtobeessentialtothecharactersofgoodandevilpersons.Goodcharacters,thoseexpressingthevirtuesofjusticeandlovingkindness,makelessofadistinctionbetweenthemselvesandothersthandoevilcharacters,thosethatexpressextremeegoismormalice.Thegoodpersonwillgoasfarassacrificinghimorherselftosaveothers,whereastheegoistwillinflictgreatharmonothersforasmall,personalgain,whilethemaliciouspersondelightsinanother’smiserywithoutanyfurtherpersonaladvantage.Schopenhauersummarizesthisdifferencebetweengoodandevilcharactersbyclaimingthattheformertreatsotheregosliketheirown,whereasthelattertreatsothersasnonegos.Thisleadshimtoask‘...whether...therelationbetweenone’sownegoandanother’s,whichisthebasisoftheactionsofagoodcharacter,ismistakenandduetoadelusion,orwhethersuchisratherthecasewiththeoppositeconceptionon14whichegoismandmalicearebased’(BM205/266).Schopenhauercontendsthattheevilcharacter’sstandpointisstrictlyjustifiedfromanempiricalperspective,sinceaccordingtoexperience,spaceandtimeseparatesindividualsfromeachotherandfromeachother’swealandwoe.Thusitseemsasifthereisaninsuperableabyssbetweenindividuals,anditappearsthatevilcharactersarewarrantedinviewingothersasnonegos.Appearances,however,aremetaphysicallydeceiving.Fromaphenomenologicalstance,Schopenhauerargues,wecannotconcludethatothersareabsolutelynonegos.Throughtheoutersense,weexperienceourbodiesandthoseofothersasspatialandtemporalobjectsstandingincausalrelationships.Throughourinnersenseweareawareofourselvesasacontinuousseriesofactsofwill.But‘...thatwhichwillsandcognizesisnotaccessibletous.Weseeonlyoutward;withinitisdarkandobscure’(BM206/267).Forthisreason,heclaimed,welackcompleteandexhaustiveknowledgeofourselves;weremainriddlestoourselves.HethenevokesKant:‘AsKantputit,theego[Ich]knowsitselfonlyasappearance,notaccordingtowhatitmightbeinitself’(ibid.).Duetothisunknowndimensionofourselves,itispossible,Schopenhauerconcludes,thatthisunknowndimensionofeachindividualcouldbeoneandidenticalinall.Becauseofthispossibility,wecannotconcludethatothersareabsolutelynonegos.SchopenhauercontinuestorideKant’scoattailstorefutetheperspectiveoftheevilcharacter,somethinghehastodo,giventhestrictincognitorequiredforhisprizeessayandbecausehisownmetaphysicswasunknownbythemembersoftheRoyalDanishSocietyofScientificStudies,whowouldbeassessingtheessay’smerits.Spaceandtime,hecontinues,makepluralityandnumericaldiversitypossible,andKanthadconclusivelydemonstratedinhis‘TranscendentalrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers301Aesthetic’theidealityofspaceandtime,whichcannotbefeaturesofthingsinthemselvesbutonlyofappearancesofthings.Thisentails,hecontinues,thatpluralityitselfmustbeforeigntothethinginitself,‘...tothetrueessenceoftheworld...’(BM207/267).Ofcourse,Schopenhauertendednottobecriticalaboutviewsthatmatteredtohim,andimmediatelyhemovestotheclaimthatthisunknownessencewasoneandthesameinallappearancesand,employingoneofhisstandardmoves,heclaimsthatthisinsighthadbeenrecognizedintheUpanishads,andformedthebasisofthewisdomofPythagoras,theEleatics,theNeoplatonists,ScotusErigena,ChristianandSufimystics,Bruno,Spinoza,andSchelling.Hethensummarizeshisargument:‘...ifpluralityandseparatenessbelongonlytotheappearance,andifitisoneandthesameessencethatmanifestsitselfinalllivingthings,thenthatconceptionthatabolishesthedifferencebetweenegoandnonegoisnoterroneous;butonthecontrary,theopposite15conceptionmustbe’(BM209/270).Schopenhauer,however,doesnotreturntohisearlierclaimthatcompassio-nateagentsfeelanother’spainintheother’sbody.Onewouldimaginethathemighthavearguedthatthisextraordinaryexperienceispossiblebecauseeachindividualismetaphysicallyidentical—twangsofpainreverberatethroughtheconnectingmetaphysicalsubstrate.Instead,hereturnstoclaimsfoundinhisfirstmetaphysicsofcompassion:‘Themagnanimouspersonwhoforgiveshisenemyandreturnsgoodforevilissublime,andreceivesthehighestpraise,becausehestillrecognizedhisowntruenatureevenwhereitwasemphaticallydenied’(BM212/272).Likewise,heagainemploystheVedicphrase‘tattvamasi’,andheclaimsthatgoodpeopleviewothersas‘Ioncemore’(ibid.).Yethecounter-balancestheseclaimswithothersthatdonotsuggestthatcompassionateagentsactduetosomecognitionintotheunityofbeing.Instead,hewritesoftheiractionsexpressingthisknowledgeandthatit‘showsitself[zeigtsich]’intheirconduct,intheirgeneraldispositions,andintheirworldviews(BM211/272).Hecallstheirbehavior‘practicalwisdom’andclaimsthatitharmonizesperfectlywiththemostprofound‘theoreticalwisdom’,since‘thejust,righteous,beneficent,andmagnanimouspersonwouldexpressbydeed[spra¨chedurchdieThat...aus]thatknowledgeonlywhichistheresultofthegreatestintellectualdepthandthemostlaboriousinvestigationofthetheoreticalphilosopher’(BM210/270).Elsewhere,heclaimsthat...tobejust,noble,andbenevolentisnothingbuttotranslatemymetaphysicsintoactions’(WWRII600/690).Itis,asBryanMageehaspointedout,‘practicalmysticism,’expressinginconductwhat16isclearlycognizedbythemystic(Magee1983:189).AlthoughSchopenhauerlapsesintolanguagethatsuggestedthatcompassio-nateagentsviewothersashavingthesameessence,byclaimingthattheirconduct‘shows’or‘expresses’whathismetaphysicsdescribes—theunityofthewill—hedistanceshimselffromtheclaimthattheseagentsaremovedbyacognitionthatothersarethemselves.Instead,theirbehaviorshowswhathismetaphysicsexplained.Thebehaviorofevilcharacters,whichexpressesthatothersarenonegos,isnotmetaphysicallywarranted,sinceindividualityismerelyapparent.Goodcharacters,whoseconductexpressesthatothersareanrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 302DavidE.Cartwright‘Ioncemore’,engageinconductthatismetaphysicallywarranted.Certainly,oneofthedifficultieswithSchopenhauer’sanalysishereconcernsthestickyissueofhowconductexpressesorshowsametaphysics.ItwouldalmostseemasifwecouldviewcompassionateconductasexpressingadifferentmetaphysicsthanSchopenhauer’s.Wecould,forexample,viewacompassionateagentasexpressingsometypeofmetaphysicaldualism,insofarasthisagent’sconcernislimitedtosentientbeings.Suchapersoninpreventingorrelievingothers’sufferingmaytramplegrassandthoughtlesslykickstones,leavingthenonsentientworldinthelurch—plantsandrocksareabsolutelynonegos.Perhapsthisperson’sconductshowsaformofmetaphysicaldualism—sentientbeingandthenonsentientexhaustingthesignificantcategoriesofbeing—ego17andnonego.NaturalizingCompassionAlthoughthereissomethingtheoreticallysatisfyinginSchopenhauer’sattempttogroundcompassionmetaphysically,IdonotbelievethatanadequateaccountofcompassionrequiresthesortofmetaphysicalexplanationthatSchopenhauertriedtoprovide.Ifmyanalysisofhisconceptionofcompassioniscorrect,whatdroveSchopenhauertoprovideametaphysicalexplanationofcompassionwasconditioniii):compassionateagentsparticipateimmediatelyinanother’ssuffering.Hisfirstmetaphysicsofcompassionappearedtoattributethisimmediateparticipationinanother’swoetotheagent’sintuitivecognitionofhisorherselfintheother.Pressedbythechargeofarticulatingsomemetaphysicalformofegoism,Schopenhauerdistancedhimselffromthisviewbyclaimingthathedidnotmeanforthephrasethatotherswerean‘Ioncemore’tobetakenliterally.Inhisunsuccessfulprizeessay,heappearstoexplainthisimmediateparticipationinanother’swoetoinvolvetheextraordinaryexperienceofanother’spainintheother’sbody,butinsteadofprovidingametaphysicalexplanationofthisphenomenon,ashepromised,hemovestoconsiderwhetherthebehaviorofgoodorevilcharactersismetaphysicallywarranted.Hethenarguesthattheconductofgoodorcompassionatecharactersiswarranted,sincetheirconductexpresseswhatthephilosopherdemonstratedastheunityofbeing.Conversely,individualswhotreatothersasnonegosengageinconductinconsistentwiththemetaphysicalunityofthewilland,forthatreason,aresaidtoengageinadelusion;theveilofmayahasnotbeenliftedfromtheireyes.Schopenhauerismovedtoattributetheextraordinaryexperienceofanother’spainintheother’sbodyinreplytoCassina’s‘psychological’analysisofcompassion.HeviewsCassinaasclaimingthatcompassionarisesfromadeceptionoftheimagination;thatinfeelingcompassionforanotherwethinkofourselvesinthepositionofthesuffererandweimaginethatwesuffertheother’spaininourperson.SchopenhauerrejectsCassina’sclaimsthatthisfeelingofanother’spainisadeceptionandthatwefeelthispaininourbody,holdinginsteadthatweexperiencetheother’spainintheother’sbody.WhileIagreewithrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers303Schopenhauer’sintuitionthatCassina’sviewisdefective—thatitisadescriptionofemotionalidentificationorinfectionratherthancompassion—theproblemisthatheacceptstheclaimthatwefeelanother’spain.Inotherwords,whenBillClintontoldamemberofhisaudienceduringacampaignstopthathefeltherpain,Schopenhauerwouldhavetakenhimliterally.Indeed,ifcompassioninvolvesthisextraordinaryexperience,ImustalsoconfessthatIhaveneverfeltcompassionandthatIlacksuchClintonesquesensitivity.Ihave,however,feltcompassion,andsometimesthisdidinvolvemyfeelingsomethinglikeoranalogoustoothers’woe,butitwasnot,literally,theothers’woe.ItwouldseemthatitismyimmediateconsciousnessofpainthatmakesitmypainandthatIcannothaveanimmediateconsciousnessofanother’s.Certainly,IcouldthinkofwhatIwouldfeelifIwereintheother’ssituation.IcouldimaginewhatIwouldfeelifIweretheother,orifIknowtheotherpersonintimately,Imightevenexperiencesomethinganalogoustotheother’sexperiencewhenIimaginewhatthispersonfeels,butthisisadifferentphenomenonthanfeelingtheother’sdistressintheother’sbody.Inotherwords,IbelievethatweshouldreformulateSchopenhauer’sconceptionofcompassionbyunderstanding(iii)notasthatAparticipatesimmediatelyinB’ssufferingbutas(iii)n:AparticipatesimaginativelyinB’ssuffering.Moreover,Schopenhauerhimselfrecognizesthisphenomenon.Inhisanalysisofweeping[Weinen]which,likelaughing,heviewsasauniquelyhumantrait,heclaimsthatitresultsfrom‘compassionforoneself[Mitleidmitsichselbst]’(WWRI377/445).Weweep,heholds,notbecauseofanimmediatelyexperiencedpain,butbecauseofitsidea(Vorstellung)inreflection,afterwehave‘imagineditasthatofanother[alsfremdesvorgestellt],sympathizedwithitassuch[alssolchesmitgefu¨hlt],andthensuddenlyperceiveditagainasdirectlyourown’(ibid.).Notonlydoweweepatourownsufferings,hecontinues,butalsoatothers,when‘eitherinimagination[Phantasie]weputourselvesvividlyinthesufferer’splace,orweseeinhisfatethewholeofhumanity,andconsequentlyaboveallourownfate.Thus,wealwaysweepforourselvesinaroundaboutway;wefeelcompassionforourselves’(WWRI377/446).Schopenhauerdoesnotattributemoralworthtoweepingitself,probablybecauseitisultimatelyself-regarding,evenwhenitwasevokedbyanother’swoe.Italsodoesnotdisposetheweepertorelievetheother’smisery:weeping,itself,comfortsthecrier.Still,heholdsthatweepersshowthattheyareneitherhardheartednorwithoutimagination,andheregardsweepingassignifyingthattheweeperpossessesacertaindegreeofagoodnessorcharacter,‘becauseitisfeltthatwhoeverisstillabletoweepmustnecessarilybecapableofaffection,i.e.ofcompassionforothers,sincethisentersinthewaydescribedintothemoodthat18leadsintoweeping’(WWRI377/445).Schopenhaueralsorecognizesthecapacitytoimagineanother’smiseryasameansforcompassiontomoveapersontorefrainfromactinginwaysthatwouldcauseotherstosuffer:‘Ifmydispositionissusceptibletocompassionuptothatdegree,itwillrestrainme,whereverandwheneverIfeelinclinedtouseanother’ssufferingasameanstotheattainmentofmyends;itisimmaterialwhetherthatsufferingisinstantaneousorcomeslater,whetheritisdirectorrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 304DavidE.Cartwrightindirect,oreffectedthroughintermediatelinks’(BM149/213).Hesummarizesthelineofconductflowingfromthevirtueofjusticeasneminemlaede,‘harmnoone’,andhearguesthatwhileprinciplesthemselvesarenottheoriginalsourceofmorality,theyareindispensableforamoralcourseoflife,forinmanycasesafeelingofcompassion‘wouldoftencometoolateforajustpersontodotherightthing’(BM150/213).Individualswithanobledisposition,hesays,havetheself-controltoobservemoralprinciples,inspiteofmotivesthatactagainstthem.Withjustpeople,hecontinues,compassionoperatesindirectlybymeansofprinciples,butwhenresolvefailstheseindividualsinspecificcauses,lifeisputbackintoresolvebyevokingcompassion;‘nothingwillbringusbacktothepathofjusticesoreadilyastheidea[Vorstellung]ofthetrouble,griefandlamentation19oftheloser’(BM152/216).Schopenhauer’sanalysisofthevirtueofjusticeitselfisbetterservedbyreformulatingcondition(iii)as(iii)n‘AparticipatesimaginativelyinB’s20suffering’.Hisaccountofthevirtueofjusticeemphasizeshowcompassionrestrainsindividuals’self-regardingbehavior,duetotherecognitionofthesufferingitwouldcauseothers.Thissuffering,however,doesnotexist,andthisiswhatcompassionseekstoprevent.But,sincethissufferingdoesnotexist,itisnot21possiblehereforanypersontofeelanother’spainintheother’sbody.Moreover,Schopenhauerrecognizedwhatcouldbecalled‘compassionatadistance’,compassionforindividualsbeyondimmediateperception,anonymousindivi-duals,understoodonlyasoccupyingundesirablesocialrolesorsufferingnaturaldisasters.Thushepraised‘...themagnanimousBritishnation...[for]givingtwentymillionpoundstopurchasethefreedomofblackslavesinitscolonies...’andheclaimedthat‘thisfineactiononagrandscaleistraceabletocompassion...’(BM166/230).But,ifcompassionfunctioneddirectlyinthisact,ratherthanindirectlythroughaprincipleofjustice,itwouldseemthatameansforunderstandingtheplightofslaveswouldnotresultfromfeelingslaves’painsinslaves’bodies,butbythinkingofoneselfinsuchconditions,orbyimaginingslaves’woes,orbyimaginingwhatpeoplesufferinsuchinhumanecircum-stances,orbyknowingthatinsuchcircumstanceshumanssuffer.Moreover,thisreformulationeliminatestheveryphenomenonthatleadsSchopenhauertocallcompassion‘thegreatmysteryofethics’andwhichledhimtoclaimthatcompassionrequiredametaphysicalratherthanapsychologicalexplanation.Byunderstandingcompassionasinvolvingtheimaginativeparticipationinanother’ssuffering,compassionisreturnedtotheprovinceofpsychologyand,intheory,tosociobiologyandevolutionarytheory.Inthiswaycompassioncouldbeexplainedbythenaturalsciences,whichseemstobeperfectlycompatiblewiththedescriptiveandempiricalnatureofSchopenhauer’sethics.TheSolidarityWithSufferersandDifferentWorldsOnthecentenaryofSchopenhauer’sdeath,MaxHorkheimerpraisedthephilosopherforconfrontingthewretchednessofexistencewithoutdelusionrTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers305andforarticulatinganethicsinwhichthesolidarityofthosewhoaresuffering22couldbecomedecisiveinhumanlife.Schopenhauer’sMitleids-Moralarticulatessolidaritywithsufferersandhismetaphysicsofthewillvalidatesthisunity,notsimplyofsufferersbut,moredeeply,ofallofnature.Yet,Ihavearguedthathisattemptstogroundcompassionmetaphysicallywereunsuccessful,andIhavesuggestedthatanaturalizedconceptionofcompassionissufficientforexplainingthissignificantfellow-feeling.Itisonlynatural,moreover,thatSchopenhauer’sempiricalanddescriptiveethicsbecomethedomainofthose‘impartialinvestigatorsofnaturewhopursuetheirspecialscience’,perhaps,these‘unprejudicedempiricists’mightcorroboratehisinsightsconcerningcompassionandtheroleofaltruismwithintheeconomyoflife(WN9,19/ix,1).But,haveIlostthesenseofunity,solidarity,andidentitythatundergirdsSchopenhauer’sconceptionofcompassionbyrejectingitsmetaphysicalsupport?Ithinknot—well,Ihopenot.Schopenhauer’sethicsofcompassionacknowledgessolidaritywiththosewhosufferwithoutresignationandthedenialofthewilltolife.AsChristopherJanawayhasobserved,Schopenhauer’sethicsrecognizeda23genuineintersubjectivityofthemorallygood,nonegoisticviewoflife.Thisintersubjectivityisexpressedbycompassionateagents’abilitytotranscendanegocentricstandpointbymakingthesufferingofanotheranobjectofconcernandbydisposingthemtotreatitastheirown.Thus,justasourownsufferinggenerallyprovidesasufficientmotivetoacttopreventorrelieveit,another’ssufferinggenerallyprovidesacompassionatepersonwithasufficientmotivetoacttopreventorrelieveanother’swoes.SinceSchopenhauerdefinedthegoodasthatwhichisinagreementwithone’swill,thewell-beingofanotherbecomesagoodforacompassionateperson.Conversely,ifthebadorevilisthatwhichiscontrarytothewill,compassionateagentsviewanother’swoeasaneviltopreventorrelieve.And,insofarascompassionleadstobeneficentactions,asSchopenhauersaid,‘SinceIdonotexistinsidetheotherperson’sskin,thenonlybymeansofthecognitionIhaveofhim,thatis,theidea[Vorstellung]inmyhead,canIidentifymyselfwithhimtosuchanextentthatmydeeddeclaresthedifferencesabolished’(BM144/208).Andasitissufferingthatmakesoneanobjectofcompassion,itisunconcernedwithabeing’sspecies,race,ethnicity,nationality,class,sex,andotherfactorsthatcouldseparateus.Compassionateagentspossessagoodcharacter,whichentails,fromaSchopenhauerianperspective,thattheyhaveagoodconscienceconcerningtheirconduct,enjoytheapprobationofimpartialwitnesses,andaredeemedgoodbythosewhosesufferingtheyseektopreventorrelieve.Theseattitudesbuildcommunity,anditwasthisthatledSchopenhauertoclaimthatthelivedworldsofagoodpersonwerefundamentallyandradicallydifferentfromthatofevilcharacters‘...inthewholenatureofconsciousnessanddisposition’(BM211/272).Thesolidaritywithsufferingexperiencedbygoodpeopleeludesthe‘moralisolation’experiencedbythewicked(BM212/272).Thelatterareestrangedfromothersandhavenoconfidencethatotherswouldaidthem,unlessbyfollyoraccidentally,byhavingotherspursueendsthattheyalsoshare.Theworlditselfappearshostiletosuchpeople.Alternatively,goodpeopleareathomeintherTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 306DavidE.Cartwrightworld,andtheirrelationswithothers,Schopenhauerheld,arefriendly.Wickedpeople,whowouldshownogratitudewhenothersacttopromotetheirinterests,alsolacktheconfidenceofagoodperson,whofeelsintimatelyakintoothers,and,bytakinganinterestinothers’well-being,‘...confidentlyassumethesamesympathy[Teilnahme]...’inothers(BM211/272).Duetothis,Schopenhauerwroteofthedeepinwardpeace,confident,calm,andcontentedmoodexpressedbygoodpeople‘invirtueofwhicheveryoneifhappywhentheyarenearathand’(BM212/272).Ifthesedescriptionsofcompassionateagentsaretrue,theydonotliveinaworldfromwhichtheywouldresign.Yet,despitethefactthatthesecharactersarelessmetaphysicallyinformedthantheworlddenyingascetic,Schopenhauerobliquelyrecognizedthatcompassionbindsustolifeandtoaworldwhere,perhaps,ourevolutionaryheritagehasendowedourspecieswithawilltoexist.AsHorkheimerremindsus,‘toaidthetemporalagainstmercilesseternitymeansmoralityinSchopenhauer’ssense’.Weliveastemporalbeings.Inclosing,however,IshouldnotforgettoreturntoJames’lostsoul.Ontheonehand,Schopenhauerwouldrejectthisbargainbecause,metaphysically,thesufferingofoneisthesufferingofall.AmetaphysicallyenlightenedpersonwouldnotbedeceivedbythisHobson’schoice.Onetheotherhand,wecouldalsoimagine,despitetheinitialattractivenessofthebargain,acompassionateSchopenhauerwouldalsorejectit,beingdeeplymovedtopreventthelostsoul’smisery.Buthereistherub.Whatofallthesufferingeveryoneelsewouldbesparedbyacceptingthisbargain?Acompassionatepersonshouldalsobesensitivetothealmostinfinitepainsuchasacrificewouldprevent.Thisisoneofthepointsatwhichwecanseewhycompassionneedstobedirectedbyasound24normativetheory.DavidE.CartwrightDepartmentofPhilosophy&ReligiousStudiesUniversityofWisconsinWhitewaterWT115.800WestMainStreetWhitewater,WI53190USAcartwrid@uww.eduNOTESIherebyexpressmygratitudetoGudrunvonTevenarforherkindandthoughtfulcommentstoanearlierversionofthispaper,whichwaspresentedon10July2007attheconference‘SchopenhauerandthePhilosophyofValue’,UniversityofSouthampton.Shepersuadedmetousetheterms,‘compassionandsolidaritywithsufferers’ratherthan‘compassionandsolidarityofsufferers’.Assheobserved,compassionateagentsaretypicallynotasneedyorsufferingasthosetheycompassionateand,quacompassionateagents,theyarenotwithinthecommunityofthepatientsofcompassion.Theirsolidaritywithsufferersisreflectedintheirfeelingsofbenevolenceforsufferersandintheirdispositiontotreatthissufferingastheirown,i.e.toacttorelieveit.CompassionaterTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers307agents,however,arealsofellowsufferersforSchopenhauer.They,likeall,areobjectificationsofwill,andtheyalsosufferfromtheirveryessence.Thisentailed,heargued,thatthereallyproperaddressbetweenonehumanandanothershouldbe,‘insteadofSir,Monsieur,andsoon,Leidensgefa¨hrte,sociimalorum,compagnondesmise`res,myfellowsufferer.Howeverstrangethismaysound,itaccordswiththefacts,putstheotherpersoninthemostcorrectlight,andremindsusofthatmostnecessarything;tolerance,patience,forbearance,andloveofourneighbors,whicheveryoneneedsandeachofus,therefore,owestoanother’(PPII304/323).1SoberandWilson(1998:296–328)makeacompellingcasethatmotivationalpluralism,includingaltruisticmotives,ismoreprobablethanpsychologicalegoismasanoutcomeoftheevolutionaryprocess.2IdonotmeantosuggestthatthisproblemissimplyduetoSchopenhauer’scommitmenttomotivationalpluralism.Indeed,hisrecognitionof‘intelligiblecharacters’introducesthesamedifficulty.3SeeBM145-6/209-10.SchopenhauerclaimedthathedidnotdiscusstheunnamedincentiveinOntheBasisofMoralitybecauseitwaswritteninthespiritofphilosophicalethicsprevailinginProtestantEuropeandbecausemembersoftheRoyalDanishSocietywouldnotunderstandit,seeWWRII607/697.InalettertoJohannAugustBecker,10December1844,heclaimedthatthedesireforone’sownwoepossessed‘asceticvalue’(Hu¨bscher1987:221).4Incentives(Triebfedern)arefeaturesofaperson’swilland,technically,egoism,theunnamedincentive,compassion,andmalicearenotmotives,whicharealwayscognitionsofperceivedobjectsorabstractmotives(thoughtsorconcepts).Schopenhauerdoesnottightlymaintainthedistinctionbetweenincentivesandmotivesinhisdiscussionofegoism,compassion,andmalice.5IdiscussSchopenhauer’sethicalclassificationofcharacterinCartwright1988:18–36;alsoseeKoler2002:91–110.6IamfollowingSchopenhauer’sdiscussioninBM,Section16.Inthisessay,hedidnotrecognizethefourth,unnamedincentive.7See,forexample,BM140/204andSchopenhauer’slettertoBecker,10December1844(Hu¨bscher1987:220).8Inanotefrom1815,SchopenhauerclaimedthattherewasnoMitfreudeasthereisMitleid,‘becausejoy,satisfactionandstrengtheningofthewillisalwaysfutileanddancesonunderminedground’(MRI324).Hedoesnot,however,saywhyMitfreudeisfutile.Perhapsitisduetowhathesawasstrengtheningthewilltolife.9See,respectively,Mannion2003:284andMalter1988:63.10SeevonHartmann2006:99f.;Nietzsche1982:133;Scheler1926:63;Gardiner1967:276f.;andHamlyn1980:145.11FromSchopenhauer’slettertoBecker,10December1844.12SchopenhauerdescribedthedifferencesbetweenhismethodsofthepresentationofhisethicsinTheWorldasWillandRepresentationandhisprizeessaysatBM3/V.13SchopenhauerrefersheretoCassina’sSaggioanalyticosullacompassione(1788).ItislikelythatSchopenhauerreadtheGermantranslationbyK.F.Pokkels,AnalytischerVersuchu¨berdasMitleid.Hannover:Ritscher,1790;seeHNV:26.14Onemightsaythatthepracticalegoistlivesaformoflifethatexpressesthestandpointofthetheoreticalegoist;thatis,livesasiftherearenootherrealbeings,becauseheorshehasnoconcernforthewealorwoeofothers.Amaliciousperson,however,isconcernedwithproducinganother’swoeand,therefore,hasastakeinrecognizingothers.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 308DavidE.Cartwright15Thereareacoupleofbig‘ifs’inthisquote.Evenifspaceandtimeareaprioriformsofhumancognition,itdoesnotlogicallyfollowthatthatwhichisbeyondhumancognitionisnonspatialandnontemporalandis,somehow,oneornonplural.16AlsoseeBM212/273.17IbelievethatSchopenhauerultimatelyrevealedhismetaphysicalhandinthesecondeditionofTheWorldasWillandRepresentation,whenheclassifiedcompassionasaformofsympathy[Sympathie],whichhedefined‘astheempiricalemergingofthewill’smetaphysicalidentity,throughthephysicalmultiplicityofitsappearance’(WWRII601/691f.).Hereheviewscompassionlikesexuallove,whichassertsthelifeofthespeciesovertheindividual,andmagic,suchphenomenaasanimalmagnetism,sympatheticcures,andactionatadistance.Todiscusssexualloveandmagicprofoundly,heheld,involvestranscendentclaimsandthatthebestthatcouldbesaidofthememploysmetaphoricallanguage.Theconnectionbetweentheunityofwillandthesephenomena,Schopenhauercontended,‘...isentirelydifferentfromthatwhichisbroughtabouttheformsofappearancesandthatwhichwecomprehendundertheprincipleofsufficientreason’(WWRI602/692).Also,seeBM212/272,whereSchopenhauerclaimedthataltruisticactionsspringfromthesamecognitionthatconstitutesthebasisofallmysticism.18Darwinalsorecognizedweepingasanexpressionofsympathywithourselves,occasioned,forexample,whenwethinkoflongpasthappytimes,whichwillneverreturn.UnlikeSchopenhauer,healsorecognizedsympathywiththehappinessofothers,suchasthatofaloverwhoachievessomesuccessaftermanyhardtrials,asexcitingourtears.Indeed,hethoughtthatthisemotionwas‘especiallyapttoexcitethelachrymalglandswhetherwegiveorreceivesympathy’.ContrarytoSchopenhauer,herecognizedweepinginnonhumananimals,suchasfemaleIndianElephantsweepingindistressfrombeingremovedfromtheiryoung;seeDarwin1965:215–17,165–67.19SchopenhauerseemsheretobedisplayingreverseKantiansensibilities.Kantclaimsthatwehaveanindirectdutytocultivateournaturalcompassionatefeelingsandtousethemasmeanstosympathybasedonmoralprinciples,seeKant1964:122.20Idonotbelieve,however,that(iii)nisnecessaryforcompassionperse,butthatitisaspecificiterationof(ii)AcognizesthatBisorwillbesuffering.Inthisregard,imagininganother’swoeseemstobeameansforagents’apprehendingthemiseryofsomeoneverydifferentorphysicallyremotefromthemselves.Insofaras(iii)nsuggests‘empathy(Einfu¨hlung)’,itissignificanttonotethatthismodeofcognizinganother’sdistressismorallyambivalent;thatis,maliciouspeoplecouldenhancetheirjoybyempathizingwithothers’woeandbecomefurtherdisposedtomakeitevenworse.21Manniontakesmyargumenttotaskbyclaimingthattheimmediateparticipationinanother’ssufferingisconnectedtothenoumenal,towhichtime,space,andcausalityare‘meaningless’,andthusitwouldbe‘meaninglesstoquestionhowanother’s‘‘future’’mentalstatecouldbeparticipatedinbytheagent,’andthat‘thewholenotionoftranscendenceoftheprincipleofindividuation,theremovalofthe‘‘wall’’whichegoismbuildsbetweendifferentpeople,issomethingofamysteryandisproperly...somethingwhichoccursnoumenally’(Mannion2003:209).AlthoughIamnotsureaboutnoumenaloccurrences—Iamasindifferenttothenoumenalasitistome—MannionismoresympathetictoSchopenhauer’sanalogicalandmetaphoricalattemptstoexpressorhintatthingsthanIam.IpreferitwhenSchopenhauerremainsfaithfultohiscommitmenttoanimmanentphilosophy.ForSchopenhauer’suseoftheterm‘will’asametaphor,alsoseeNeeley2003:64–71.22SeeHorkheimer1977:145–164.Thisessay,‘DieAktualita¨tSchopenhauers’,isfromalectureHorkheimerdeliveredon21September1960attheGoethe-Universita¨t(FrankfurtamMain).rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 CompassionandSolidaritywithSufferers30923SeeJanaway1989:282–3.JanawaypointsoutthatSchopenhauer’smetaphysicsprecludestheintersubjectivityinherentinhisethics.Bynaturalizingcompassion,weeludethisproblem—amove,ofcourse,thatwouldnotpleaseSchopenhauer.24Nussbaum2001:335–400arguesthatcompassionrequiresaplausiblenormativetheorytoarticulatepropersortofconcernforothers,desert,andresponsibility.Schopenhauerappearedtobeobliquelysensitivetotheseconcerns,andhedidrecognizethatapropermoralcourseofliferequiresprinciples,especiallyconcerningissuesofjustice(seeBM150/214).Healsorealizedthatsometimespreventingsufferingrequiresotherstosuffer.Forexample,heclaimedthathumanshavearightoverthepowersandlivesofnonhumananimalstominimizesuffering.Consequently,hearguedthatmeat-eatingandtheuseofanimallaborarejustifiedininstancesinwhich‘...thewilltolifeasawholeenduresmoresufferingthaniftheoppositewerethecase’(WWRI372n./440n.).REFERENCESSchopenhauer’sWorksIciteSchopenhauer’sbooksusingthefollowingacronyms,withthefirstsetofArabicnumeralsreferringtothepagenumberofthefollowingEnglish-languagetranslations,andthesecondsettocorrespondingpagenumbersofSchopenhauer:Sa¨mtlicheWerke,A.Hu¨bscher,ed.,7volumes.Mannheim:F.A.Brockhaus,1988).BMOntheBasisofMorality,trans.E.F.J.Payne.Oxford:BerghahnBooks,1995;Sa¨mtlicheWerke,Bd.4.FWPrizeEssayontheFreedomoftheWill,trans.E.F.J.Payne.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999;Sa¨mtlicheWerke,Bd.4.WWRI,IITheWorldasWillandRepresentation,VolumesIandII,trans.E.F.J.Payne.NewYork:Dover,1969;Sa¨mtlicheWerke,Bde.,2and3.MRI,IVManuscriptRemains,VolumesIandIV,trans.E.F.J.Payne.NewYork:Berg,1990.HNVDerhandschriftlicheNachlaß,VolumeV,A.Hu¨bscher,ed.Munich:DeutscherTaschenbuchVerlag,1985.WNOntheWillinNature,trans.E.F.J.Payne.NewYork:Berg,1992;Sa¨mtlicheWerke,Bd.4.PPI,IIParergaandParalipomena,VolumesIandII,trans.E.F.J.Payne.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1974,Sa¨mtlicheWerke,Bde.,5and6.BM,FW,andWNreceivefreshnumberinginvolume4oftheSa¨mtlicheWerke.IwillgenerallyfollowPayne’stranslation.OtherWorksCartwright,D.(1982),‘Compassion’,inW.Schirmacher(ed.),ZeitderErnte:Festschriftfu¨rArthurHu¨bscherzum85.Geburststag.StuttgartandBadCannstatt:Frommann-Holzboog.——(1988),‘Schopenhauer’sAxiologicalAnalysisofCharacter’,RevueInternationaledePhilosophie,164:18–36.Darwin,C.(1965),TheExpressionoftheEmotionsinManandAnimals.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Gardiner,P.(1967),Schopenhauer.Harmondsworth:Penguin.Hamlyn,D.W.(1980),Schopenhauer.LondonandNewYork:Routledge&KeganPaul.vonHartmann,E.(2006),DieGefu¨hlsmoral,ed.J-C.Wolf.Hamburg:FelixMeiner.rTheAuthor2008.JournalcompilationrBlackwellPublishingLtd.2008 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