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Coercion,Culture,andContracts:LaborandDebtonHenequenHaciendasinYucatán,Mexico,1870–1915LEEJ.ALSTON,SHANNANMATTIACE,ANDTOMASNONNENMACHERThehenequenboomcoincidedwiththeruleofPorfirioDíaz(1876–1911).Duringtheboom,manyMayainYucatanlosttheirrightstolandandmovedtohenequenhaciendas.Aspartoftheimplicitcontractwithhacendados,peonsaccumulatedlargedebtsatthetimeofmarriage,mostofwhichwereneverrepaid.Wearguethatthedebtsboundworkerstothehaciendaaspartofasystemofpaternalismandthatmoreproductiveworkersincurredmoredebt.Weexaminetheinstitutionalsettinginwhichdebtoperatedandstresstheformalandinformalinstitutionalcontextswithinwhichhacendadosandworkersnegotiatedcontracts.“DebtandcontractslaveryistheprevailingsystemofproductionalloverthesouthofMexico...Debt,realorimagi-nary,isthenexusthatbindsthepeontohismaster...probably5,000,000people,orone-thirdoftheentirepopulation,aretodaylivinginastateofhelplesspeonage.”1JohnKennethTurnerJohnKennethTurner’saccountofdebtpeonageinYucatán—firstpublishedinthemuckrakingjournal,theAmericanMagazine—madeanimmediateimpactonAmericans’perceptionsoftheirsoutherlyneighbors,andbecamethetexttowhichallfuturescholarsofYucatán’slaborconditionsfirstturn.TurnerbuiltacompellingTheJournalofEconomicHistory,Vol.69,No.1(March2009).©TheEconomicHistoryAssociation.Allrightsreserved.ISSN0022-0507.LeeJ.AlstonisProfessor,DepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofColoradoatBoulder,256USB,Boulder,CO80309–0256.E-mail:Lee.Alston@colorado.edu.ShannanMattiaceisAssociateProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,AlleghenyCollege,520NorthMainStreet,Meadville,PA16335.E-mail:shannan.mattiace@allegheny.edu.TomasNonnenmacherisAssociateProfessor,DepartmentofEconomics,AlleghenyCollege,520NorthMainStreet,Meadville,PA16335.E-mail:tomas.nonnenmacher@allegheny.edu.ForcommentswethankDanBogart,SteveCasler,AlanDye,PaulEiss,StanleyEngerman,LuisMilletCámara,HerbertNickel,PiedadPeniche,AndrewSeltzer,AllenWells,twoanonym-ousreferees,participantsatthe2007AnnualMeetingoftheInternationalSocietyoftheNewInstitutionalEconomics,andparticipantsatthe2007YucatáninPennsylvaniaRoundtable.WekindlyacknowledgePedroBracamonteySosa,MaritzaArrigunaga,HerbertJ.Nickel,andtheChurchoftheLatterDaySaintsforsupplyingusdataandAbrahamMoralesforresearchassistance.1BarbarousMexico,pp.92–93.104 Coercion,Culture,andContracts105narrativeofslaveryandoppressiononYucatecanhaciendasandarguedthattheseconditionswereduetothepoliciesofMexico’slongtimepresident,PorfirioDíaz,whoseoverthrowheadvocated.SubsequentscholarshavemodifiedTurner’saccount,carefullydetailingtheinstitu-tionalandculturalcontextoflaborconditionsonPorfirianhenequenhaciendas.However,apaucityofdatahasmadeitdifficulttoheavilyreviseTurner’sinitialfindings,andnoonehasdirectlytiedthebroadersettingtothespecifictimingandfunctionofdebts.Inthisarticle,westrikeabalancebetweenthecriticsofdebtpeonagewhoseeitaspureexploitationandapologistswhoclaimthatdebtpeonageinYucatánwas2notasharshoraswidespreadascriticssuggest.Almostalllaborcontractshavemultiplemarginsinadditiontoawage.Whenmonitoringcostsloomlarge,astheyalwaysdidinpre-mechanizedagriculture,employersnegotiatedcontractsthatreducedthesecosts.Inordertoattractworkers,producersraisesalariesbutmay3alsoalterothermarginsofcontracts.OnhenequenhaciendasinYu-catán,themoststrikingaspectoflaborcontractsisthatworkersaccu-mulatedlargedebts“onthebooks”thathacendadosneverexpectedtoberepaid.Whilelargeupfronttransferswithnochanceofrepaymentmayatfirstglanceseemtobeaninefficientmeansofattractingandmo-tivatinglabor,wearguethatwithinYucatán’sinstitutionalandculturalsettingdebtservedbothofthesefunctions.Inthisarticle,weadvancethreelargerpointsconcerningdebtpeo-4nageinYucatán.First,wearguethateventhoughtheinstitutionalset-tingduringthisperiodwascoerciveanddesignedtofavorhacendadointerests,workersstillmadechoicesandrespondedtoincentives.Hadconditionsoutsidethehaciendabeenlesscoercive,bargainingpower5wouldcertainlyhaveshiftedinfavoroftheworkers.Second,thespecificformthatdebttookinYucatánwasshapedbyculturalandso-cialnorms.Therulingelitedrewonthesenorms,sharedbyMayaand2WefocusonthehenequenindustrybecauselaborcontractsinYucatándifferedfromcon-tractselsewhereinMexico,andbecauseTurner’spolemicalwritingsarestillinprintandtakenbysomescholarsasanauthenticrepresentationoflaborconditions.WeacknowledgethatthelackofgeneralizablehypothesesisalimitationofexaminingonlyYucatán.Ourstudymaypro-videaframeworkforcomparingcontractingacrossMexicoinareaswheretherearemoreavail-abledata.3Naturally,employerswouldpreferlowerwagesandemployeeswouldpreferhigherwages.Ourpointisthatmarginsoflaborcontractsotherthanwagesmaybemoreeffectiveandcheaperthanraisingwagestosecurelaborers.4OurargumentbuildsontheworkofWellsandJoseph(Summer)fortheirunderstandingoftheinstitutionalsetting,Peniche(LaDemografíaand“Gender”)forherworkontheimportanceofMayanritualsanddebt,andNickel(“Sklaverei,”LasDeudas,andHenequenPlantations)forhisresearchontheuseandsizeofdebts.5SeeSteinfeldandEngerman(Labor)foradiscussionofthevariousmeaningsofthewords“coercion”and“free.” 106Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherhacendadosalike,toincreasethedemandfordebtatayoungage,inparticularbyencouragingincreasesinthesizeandexpenseofmarriag-es.Finally,debtwaspartofasystemofpaternalismthatcompensatedworkersonmultiplemarginsandtiedworkerstohacendados.By“pa-ternalism”wedonotimplythattherelationshipbetweenthehacendadoandhisworkerswasoneofaffection,butratherthatusingothermar-ginsofalaborcontractwasmoreeffectivethanwagesinsecuringandretaininglabor.ThegeneralmechanismthatwehaveinmindisverysimilartothepaternalisticagriculturallaborcontractsusedintheU.S.Southfromthelatenineteenthcenturyuntilcottonwasmechanizedinthe1960s.LikeLeeAlstonandJosephFerrie,wedonotarguethecompensationonmarginsotherthanwagesinstilledtrueloyaltyonthepartofworkersbutrather“loyal-like”behavior,whichraisedthecosts6toworkersofleavingaparticularhacienda.Thehenequenboombeginswiththeinventionofthemechanicalrea-perintheUnitedStatesandthemechanicalrasperinYucatán.Ourstudyendswhentherevolution“cametoYucatán,”leadingtothecan-7cellationofworkers’debtsandtheestablishmentofaminimumwage.OurstudythereforeroughlycoincideswiththeruleofPorfirioDíazfrom1876to1911.WhiletherevolutionswepttherestofMexicobe-ginningin1910,elitesinYucatánheldoffitsarrivaluntil1915,whenGeneralCarranzasentinhis“constitutionalist”troops.TherevolutionbroughttoanendtheinstitutionalsettingwithinwhichlaborcontractingtookplaceduringthePorfiriato.Becauseofitsimportanceinshapingcontracts,webeginthenextsectionwithadiscussionoftheinstitutionalcontextatthefederallevelfollowedbytheinstitutionalspecificsofYucatán.Inthefollowingsec-tion,wediscusshowtheecologicalcharacteristicsofYucatánandthecultivationofhenequeninparticularinfluencedtheuseoflabor.Thesectionafterthatbeginswithadiscussionofthemultiplemarginsofla-borcompensationonhenequenhaciendas,includingadescriptionofoveralllaborconditions.Wethenreviewtheliteratureondebtpeonagefollowedbyourhypothesesconcerningdebtandcontractingthatstresstheimportanceofunderstandingtheformalandinformalcontextswith-inwhichcontractingtranspires.Finally,inthelastsection,wepresenta6ThisargumentdrawsontheworkofAlstonandFerrie(Paternalism).Moreover,arguingagainstaloyalrelationshipthatengenderedtruetiesofaffectionwastheallegedhighdegreeofabsenteeismamongstthehacendados.Wethankananonymousrefereeformakingthislastpointexplicit.7WhiledebtpeonagewasofficiallyoutlawedinMexicoin1914,Haber,Razo,andMauer(Politics,p.335)arguethattherevolutionhadlittleimmediateeffectonproductionlevels.Thenumberofdebtpeonshasbeenestimatedat20,767in1880;80,216in1900;and125,000in1910(Joseph,RediscoveringthePast,p.55). Coercion,Culture,andContracts107casestudyofahenequenhacienda,ItzincabCámara,fromwhichweprovideevidenceconsistentwiththesearguments.InstitutionalContext:FederalAfterdecadesofalmostconstantstrugglebetweenconservativesandliberals,PorfirioDíazcametopowerin1876determinedtobringstabil-itytoafracturednation.Whileconsistentlymaintaininghisoppositiontoreelection,heservedseveralconsecutivetermsinofficeuntilhewasoverthrownbyrevolutionaryforcesandforcedfromofficeonMay25,81911.Duringhistimeaspresident,DíazsoughttomodernizeMexicoandbrookedlittledissentfromthosewhoopposedhisvisionofprogress.DíazsoughttounifyMexico’sdistinctregionstocreateastrongcentralizednationbygreatlyconcentratingcontrolintheofficeofthePresidenct.Díazmeasuredprogressandmodernizationwithmetricssuchasthemilesofrailroadtrackslaidandthepercentageoflanddedicatedtoex-portcrops(e.g.,henequen,chicle,sugar,andcotton).Onthesemeas-ures,thecountryprogressedgreatly.MuchofthecapitalforMexico’seconomicexpansioncamefromforeigninvestors.U.S.investors,forexample,financedtherailroadsystemand,bytheendofthePorfiriato,ownedaconsiderableamountofMexicanland.ThelawofthelandduringthePorfiriatowasthe1857Constitution.Despiteviolatingitsprovisionswhennecessary,Díazdidnotseektoabrogateit;liberalsviewedthisconstitutionasthequintessentialsym-bolofMexicannationalism.Indeed,abloodycivilwarhadbeenfoughtoveritandliberalshadtriumphed.Theenumerationofindividualrightsinthisconstitutionwas,asoneprominentMexicanhistorianputit,9“practicallyexhaustive.”Intermsoflabor,theconstitutionprohibitedtherenderingofpersonalservicewithoutjustcompensationandfull10consent.The1856ReformLawshadabolishedallcorporateformsoflandownership;the1857Constitutionreiteratedthisprohibition,whichwasprimarilyaimedatthechurch.Thestrippingofcorporatepropertyrightsalsogreatlyfacilitatedtheprivatizationandtransferofcommunallandsfromindigenouscommunities,manyofwhichhadpreviouslyownedlandsaspueblos,orvillages.TheReformLawsrequiredvillageejidolandtobedividedamongheadsoffamilies,eachreceivingasmall8From1880–1884DíazsteppeddownaspresidentandwasreplacedbyManuelGonzález,ageneralandDíazloyalist.GivenDíaz’sextensivepowerbehindthescenes,thesefouryearsaretypicallynotplacedoutsidethe“Porfiriato.”9Guerra,México,p.33.10SlaverywasoutlawedinMexicoatIndependence. 108Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacher11parcel.Ineffect,the1857Constitutionsubstitutedgrouprightsandprivilegeswithindividualrights.Despiteitsloftyrhetoric,however,averagecitizenshadlittlerecoursetodefendthemselveswhenabusesoccurred.Politicalpartiesandelectionswereeliteaffairsandnotex-pressionsofpopularwill.DuringthePorfiriato,officialcandidateswerechosenforallregionalandlocalelections,withthepresidenthimselfof-12teninterveninginelectionsofnationalimportance.Electionswereso-lemnlyobservedinstrictaccordancewiththelaw,servingmainlytolegitimizeandstrengthenthepowerofthecentralgovernmenttoar-bitratedisputesamongthepoliticalelite.SupremeCourtjusticeswerealsoelectedforsix-yeartermsandweresimilarlyindebtedtothepresidentfortheirpositions.IftheDíazadministrationprivilegedforeigninvestors,attheotherendofthespectrumwereworkersandpeasants,whoprotestedmoreopenlyandwithgreaterfrequencyaftertheturnofthecentury.DíazdidnothesitateinusingthearmytoputdownstrikersandrebelIndians.In1901hesentthearmynorth,brutallysuppressingalong-simmeringre-bellionbytheYaqui,alargelynomadicpeoplewholivedinrelativeau-13tonomyfromthestate.Inthesameyear,DíazdispatchedGeneralIg-nacioBravototheYucatánpeninsulatoputanendtothedecades-oldCasteWarthathadbegunin1847,butwasstillverymuchaliveintheeasternregionofthestate.Afterthemostintenseyearsoffighting,from1847–1849,rebelMayanIndiansfledtotheforestedjunglesofsou-theasternYucatán,wheretheylivedinautonomouscommunitiesout-sidethestate’sreach.InMayof1901,Bravoandhistroopscapturedandoccupiedtherebels’mostimportanttown,declaringtheendofaconflictthathadbeenlongandbloody.InstitutionalContext:YucatánStateTheDíazyearsbroughtmorethanameasureofpoliticalstabilitytoYucatán,which,likemuchoftherestofMexicoduringtheearlytomid-nineteenthcentury,wascharacterizedbyfrequentchangesofgovernment.Between1848and1873,forexample,thestatehad2614governors,includingsevenin1873.Díazinstalledmilitarygovernors,setupapoliticalmachine,andstabilizedtherulesofthegamebywhichelitesinYucatáninteracted.SuccessionofpowerinYucatánduringthe11WellsandJoseph,Summer,p.151.12Guerra,México,p.39.13In1908YaquiwereimportedtoYucatánashenequenworkers.FederalauthoritiesbelievedthatthebestwaytosubduetheYaquiwastoseparatethemfromtheirhomelands,theMayoandYaquirivervalleysinSonora(Wells,Yucatán’sGildedAge,p.68).14WellsandJoseph,Summer,p.22. Coercion,Culture,andContracts109Díazyearswas“withoutbloodshedorunnecessaryemotions,”not15somethingthatcouldbetakenforgrantedbefore1876.Politicalandeconomicpoweroverlapped,andinYucatáneconomicpowerincreasinglybecametiedtoasingleexportcrop:henequen.Dur-ingthehenequenboomthestatewasdescribedas“onevastcleared16plantation.”Exportsofhenequenrosefromlessthan6millionkilosin1875to43millionin1885andto81millionin1900.Thepoliticalpowerofhacendadosincreasedconcomitantly.Perhapsthemostblatantexampleoftherelationshipbetweeneconomicandpoliticalpowerwasthe1902electionofOlegarioMolinaasgovernorofYucatán.Molinawastheownerofthestate’slargesthenequenexporthouseandin-creasedhiscontrolovertheindustrywhenhebecameInternational17Harvester’ssolesupplierin1902.Asaresultofthe“greengold,”Yucatánwentfrombeingoneofthepooreststatesintherepublictooneoftherichest.ThetransformationofthenorthwesternregionofthestateintoamonocropeconomyhappenedrelativelyquicklyandwasmovedalongsignificantlybytheCaste18War.Theearlyyearsoftheconflictshiftedthebulkofthestate’spop-ulationwestwardtowardMéridaandawayfromtherebelsinthesouth-east,makingadditionallaborersavailableforworkontheexpandinglandsdedicatedtohenequenproduction.Additionally,theheaviestfightingandcasualtiesofthewaroccurredinthesugar-producingre-gionaroundValladolidandTekax,destroyingmanysugarplantations19initswake.Betweendeathsanddisplacement,thefirstdecadeoftheconflictclaimedbetweenone-thirdandone-halfofYucatán’s20populationof600,000.From1750to1850,cattleandcornhaciendasdominatedtherurallandscapeofYucatán.Asthesehaciendasexpanded,ownersusedtheirpoliticalpowertoappropriatecommunallandsfromnearbyvillages.15Reed,CasteWar,p.230.16Ibid.,p.220.17ThepactbetweenInternationalHarvesterandMolinaandCo.channeledloancapitalthroughthegovernor’sson-in-law,Montesandfriends(somethirtyinterconnectedplanterfami-lies,aka“TheDivineCaste”)totheplanters,securingliensonfuturefiberproductionandoftenmortgagesontheplantationsthemselves,whichenabledthetrusttodictatethefuturepriceatwhichtheproducerswouldbeforcedtoselltothem(Joseph,Revolution).18ThehenequenzoneringedthecityofMéridaanditwasherewhereweseemonocroppro-duction.Batt(“Rise,”p.205)arguesthathaciendasoutsidethehenequenzonemaintainedamorediversifiedproductivebase.Intheeasternregion,bothhenequenandsugarcanewerecul-tivatedandprocessedforregionalandinternationalmarkets,whileinthesouthandeastofthestate,maize,cattle,andyuccawereraisedforsaleandforlocalconsumption.19Reed,CasteWar,p.147.BrannonandBaklanoff(AgrarianReform,p.30)arguethattheCasteWar“basicallydestroyedthesugarindustry”andseriouslyreducedcattlegrazing.20Joseph,Revolution;Reed,CasteWar,p.122;andRugeley,Yucatán’sMayaPeasantry,p.xii. 110Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherAntonioBetancourtreportsanestimatethat,inthethreedecadesafter1878,hacendadosgainedcontrolofsome134,000hectaresofejidoland,whichtheyacquiredthroughavarietyofmechanisms.Atthestatelevel,lawswerepassedin1843and1882thatlegitimizedtheuseof21debtpeonageasabondingmechanism.Somedisplacedpeasantswerepushedontohaciendaswhencommunallandswerebrokenup;otherswerepressuredthroughtheaccumulationofdebt.PaulEissnotesthatby1841inthetownofHunucmá,adistrictonthewesternedgeofthehenequenzone,some24percentofthetotalpopulationresidedonha-ciendasandranches.However,overthecourseofthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyinthesametownofHunucmá,thepercentageof22peasantslivingonhaciendasrosetoapproximately50percent.Thelawalsorestrictedworkermobilitybygrantinganexemption23frommilitaryservicetoallpermanentlaborersattachedtohaciendas.Statelawobligedallmalesbetweentheagesof15and60toserveinthemilitia.Theeasiestandleastexpensivewaythatpeasantscouldavoidtheleva,whichwaswidelyfearedandhated,wastoattachthem-24selvestoahaciendaasfull-time,indebtedworkers.Beingapeononahaciendaalsoexemptedpeasantsfromlabordraftsforroadbuildingorpublicworks,which,thoughillegalaccordingtoMexicanlaw,wascommonpracticeinYucatán.Whilethe1857Constitutionguaranteedmalecitizenstherighttovoteandbevotedintopublicoffice,inpractice,polltaxesandotherbarrierspreventedmanyindividuals,includingmostMayanpeasants,fromexercisingtheirrights.WritingaboutHunucmá,Eissarguesthatlocalnotablesandlandowners“rotatedinpowerinlocalgovernmentpositions,usingpoliticalofficetosupporttheenforcementofforcedlabor,indebtedservitude,andtheirexpropriationoflandandlabormoregenerally.”Closetiesbetweenlocaljusticesofthepeaceanddistrict-leveljefespolíticosmadeitverydifficultforpoorpeopletofindreliefinthecourtsystem.AllenWellsandGilbertJosephassertthat“inmanycases,collaborationwascementedbykinshiptiesbetweenhacendados25andstateofficials.”21Betancourt,Revoluciones,p.52.AccordingtoWellsandJoseph(Summer,pp.157–58):“An1882statelaw,LeyAgrícolaIndustrialdelEstadodeYucatán,reiteratedearlierpeonagelaws,stipulatingthatthepeonwholeftworkwithoutpayingthesumsheowedmightbelegallyprosecuted...Ifanindebtedservantescapedandtookrefugeonanotherestate,thelandownerwhohidtheservantcouldbearrested.”22Eiss,“ElPuebloMestizo.”23TheselawsbearastrikingresemblancetotheagriculturaldefermentsfromtheU.S.draftduringWorldWarII.AlstonandFerrie(Paternalism)arguethatSouthernplantationowners,throughtheirpoliticalagents,wereinstrumentalinestablishingthedeferments.24SeeWellsandJoseph,Summer,p.154;andWells,Yucatán’sGildedAge,p.160.25Eiss,“ElPuebloMestizo”;andWellsandJoseph,Summer,p.158. Coercion,Culture,andContracts111Insum,liberallandpolicies,thelackofenforcementofconstitutionalguarantees,andstatelawsthatobligedMayatoserveasconscriptsandworkonroadgangswithoutpaygenerallyreducedMayanautonomy.Theinstitutionalsettingraisedthecostoflivingindependentlyinapuebloandmaderesidingandworkingonahaciendamoreattractive.Besidestheinstitutionalforcesthatkeptworkerstiedtothehaciendas,ecologicalfactorsalsoplayedacrucialroleinimmobilizinglabor.ECOLOGICALCONTEXT:YUCATÁNTheYucatánpeninsulaconsistsofalargeblockoflimestonecoveredbyaverythinlayeroftopsoil,makingslashandburn—witha12-yearcycleoflandrotation—thestandardmethodofagriculture.Thedefaultvegetationisalow-lyingtropicalforest.DuringthePorfiriato,waterwaspumpedfromwellsusingwindmillsoraccessedthroughcenotes,water-filledsinkholesthatdotthelandscape.Controlofthesecenoteslayinthehandsofhaciendas,whosecentralhousesoftenwerelocatednearorontopofthem.Weatheralsoplayedacrucialroleinthelifeofthehacienda.Thehightemperaturesaverageabove90degreesFahren-heitfromMarchthroughSeptember,makingtravelandworkdifficult.KeithHartmanreportsthatdroughts—suchastheonefrom1903to1904—increasedthevarianceofagriculturaloutput.Finally,thepenin-sulaispronetolocustplagues.Thesehitthepeninsulafrom1881to1886andledtowidespreaddestructionofthemaizecrops.ChristopherGillarguesthattheplaguesofthe1880scontributedtoanincreaseinthepopulationonhaciendasfrom21,000to26,000inthoseyears.Ac-cordingtoWellsandJoseph,locustplaguesfrom1907to1911in-creasedthebargainingpowerofhenequenerosandledtoincreasedvi-26olencebetweenworkersandbosses.Droughtsandlocustplaguesleftpeasantswiththechoiceofstarvationormovingtoahacienda.HENEQUENThehenequenplant,Agavefourcroydes,isamemberoftheagavefamilyandiswellsuitedtoYucatán’sclimate,particularlytherelativelydrier,rockiernorthwesternregionofthestate.Henequenhasbeengrownsincepre-Columbiantimesforthelong,toughfibersthatcanbeharvestedfromitsleaves.Forcenturies,Mayamanuallyharvested,rasped,andtreatedthesefiberstomakeropeandbaskets.Priortothehenequenboom,themosttimeconsumingsegmentoftheproduction26Hartman,“HenequenEmpire,”p.193;Gill,“CampesinoPatriarchy,”p.41;andWellsandJoseph,Summer,pp.174–75. 112Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherprocesswastheremovalofthefibersfromthehenequenleaf.Cultiva-tion,mostlyfordomesticuse,continuedthroughtheColonialperiod;anysurpluswasmadeintoropesandshippedtoVeracruzorCuba27throughtheYucatecanportofSisal.Itwasnotuntiltheinventionofthemechanicalrasper(desfibradora)inthelate1850sthatproduction28ofthecropbecamecommerciallyviable.Demandforunskilledlaborrosedramaticallyasproductionlevelsincreased.Duetotheinventionofthemechanicalrasper,thebottleneckinproductionswitchedfromrasp-ingtoweedingthehenequenfieldsandcuttingtheleaves,whichneededtobedoneyear-round.Daily,atypicalworkerweeded1–2mecatesor29cutroughly2,500leaves.Theseleavesneededtobeprocessedwithinacoupleofdaysortheybecamedryandunusable.Therefore,thehene-quenplantationtookonsomeaspectsofindustrialproduction,withthe30machineroomandraspingmachinesattheheartofproduction.Henequenplantstakefivetosevenyearstoreachmaturityandpro-ducetheirfirstharvest.Afterthat,eightleaves(pencas)arecutthreetimesayear.Sinceplantsmatureatdifferingtimes,workersarekeptbusyharvestingalmosttheentireyear.Harvestinginvolvessixdistinctoperations:cuttingtheleafitself;removingtheendspine;shearingoffthesidespines;gatheringtheleaves;tyingtheleavesinbundlesof50;31andtransportingthebundlestothetramway.Inadditiontoperiodicharvesting,overthecourseofits25-yearlifespanhenequenplantsre-quireperiodicweeding.Giventhelongleadtimebeforeplantscanbeharvested,theneedforplantstogrowbetweenharvests,andthecontinuousneedforfirewoodtofuelthemachinery,henequenproduc-tionrequiredworkerstobedispersedthroughoutthehacienda,raisingmonitoringcosts.ComparedtohaciendasinotherregionsofMexicoduringthePorfiriato,Yucatecanhaciendasweresmall.RolandChardonnotesthatmany,ifnotmost,werebetween1,000and2,000hectaresinsize.27Millet,“TheSearch,”p.85.28TheraspingmachinewasinventedbyaYucatecan,JoséEstebanSolís,inacompetitionsponsoredbythestategovernment.Themechanicalrasperwasakintothecottonginintermsofdecreasingthecostsofprocessingtheplant.29Roughly25mecatesareinahectare.30Thegrowingandharvestingofhenequendiffersfromsugarinthathenequencanbehar-vestedyear-round,leadingtoaconstantlabordemand.Henequenprocessingissimilartotheprocessingofsugarinthatonceharvested,bothplantsneedtobeprocessedwithinacertainpe-riodoftimetoobtaintheoptimalyieldsfromtheplant.SeeDye(CubanSugar)foradiscussionofthecontractsthataroseinCubatoreduceholdupinsugarprocessing.31Peniche,“Gender,”p.77.Wethankananonymousrefereeforunderscoringthepointthatthenumberofleavescutandthenumberofcuttingswouldvaryfromyeartoyearwithclimac-ticconditions.Itisalsoimportanttokeepinmindthattheharvestwasgreaterduringthefirstcut—perhapsreaching12leavesandthendecliningtoasteadystateofapproximatelyeightleavesformatureplants. Coercion,Culture,andContracts113HerbertNickelprovidesmapsofYucatán’smostextensivehaciendain1907,SanGerónimoYaxcopoil,whichconsistedofabout11,000hec-tares,whichpalesincomparisontothelargesthaciendasinthenorthof32Mexico.In1878thehenequenboom,orauge,wasspurredbythein-ventionofthetwine-bindingharvesterintheUnitedStates(McCormickreaper).Thereaperrequiredabiodegradabletwinewhosesupplywascertain.Henequen’sthreetofour-footlongfibersandgeneralimper-viousnesstodiseaseandpestilencefulfilledthatneedperfectly.Throughouttheauge,YucatánexportedvirtuallyallthehenequenitproducedtotheUnitedStates,largelyforuseastwine.Theheightoftheboomcameinthe1910s,whenhenequenwasbyfarthemostim-portantMexicanexportcroptotheUnitedStates,averaging$24million33ayearforthedecade.In1916,1,100haciendascultivated790thou-sandacresofhenequenand850raspingmillsprocessedthefiberfor34export.MULTIPLEMARGINSOFLABORCOMPENSATIONArangeofcontractualoptionswasavailabletomanagersofhene-35quenhaciendasinYucatán.AccordingtoGonzaloCámara,fourgeneralcategoriesofworkersexistedinthepre-boomera,buttherewas36substantialmixingandinnovation.Rentersandsharecropperslivedei-theronthehaciendaorinanearbypueblo.Theypaideitherafixedquantityorashareofoutputtothelandowner.Indebtedresidentwork-ers,orpeones,workedandlivedontheestate.Theyweretiedtothees-tateviathedebttheyowedthehacendado.Luneroswereaninterme-diateclass.Theyworkedonedayaweek(Monday)forthehacendado,32Chardon,“GeographicAspects,”p.64;andNickel,“LasDeudas,”p.87.Joseph(Redisco-vering,p.57)notesthattheextendedTerrazas-CreelfamilyinChihuahuastateownedmorethan5millionacres.33Thiscomparestoaveragesof$5millionforcoffee,$2millionforixtle(hemp),and$2mil-lionforsugar.SeeHaber,Razo,andMauer,Politics,pp.327,332,and336.34Fox,“Henequen,”p.221.35Informationconcerningdebtpeonageonhenequenhaciendasisavailablefromtravelers’diaries,interviewswithworkersandhacendadosortheirdescendants,governmentandchurchcensuses,courtandnotarydocuments,contemporarynewspaperreports,andhaciendarecords.Thedataaregenerallyscattered,andfindingadetailedsetofinformationconcerningahaciendaisdifficult.SeveralfactorshaveledtothescarcityofdatainYucatán.First,theclimatemakespreservingpaperrecordsdifficult.Second,therevolutionmayhaveinducedmanyownerstode-stroyanyrecordsofdebtpeonage.Third,destructionofpapersmayhavebeenduetospacecon-straints.Finally,thosedatathatstillexistareofteninprivatecollectionsandaredifficultforre-searcherstoaccess.36Cámara,ReseñaHistórica. 114Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacher37eitherincompensationforaloanorforhousingandwater.Finally,wageearnerslivedinthepuebloandworkedonacasualbasisforemployers.Duringthehenequenboom,thelunerocontractwaslargelyaban-donedinthecentralhenequenzone,astheworkersoperatingunderthiscontractbecamemoreindebtedtothehaciendaandbecamefull-time38employees.Peonswerethepermanent,indebtedworkforceoftheha-39cienda.Threeothertypesofworkerscontinuedtoworkonthehacien-das.Salariedworkerssuchasforemenandmachinistsearnedaflatweeklyormonthlysalary.Casuallaborersworkedintermittentlyonthehaciendaforapiece-ratewageduringperiodsofhighlabordemand.Lesscommonly,debt-freesharecropperscontinuedtoexistinsome40areas,particularlyoutsideofthemainhenequenzone.Haciendasdrewtheirlaborfromavarietyofsources:local,national,andinternational.Themostobviouslaborsourcewasthelocalpueblo.TheMayaweretiedhistoricallytotheirancestrallandsandhadapreferenceforstaying41intheregion.ThispreferenceshapedthemarginsofthecontractsthathacendadosusedwiththeirMayanworkers.Despiteapreferenceby“locals”forstayinginthearea,duringtheboomtimesofhenequenMayanlaborersalsowereimportedfromotherregionsoftheYucatánpeninsula,forinstancefromregionshitbylocustplaguesordroughts.LaborersweredrawnfromotherregionsofMexico,mostnotablyfrom42thenorth—theYaquis—andfromthecentralhighlands.Finally,expe-rimentsindrawingworkersfromabroadincludedKoreans,Cubans,Chinese,andItalians.Theexacttermsofthelaborcontractsbetweenpeonsandhacendadosvariedwidelyandaredifficulttogeneralize.Travelers’accountsgener-allyagreethattheworkdaybeganearlyinthemorning,probablyaround37Thelunerosystemhaditshistoricalrootsinthecolonialera,whenhacendadosadvancedMayanmoneysothattheycouldpaytheirtributesandtaxes.Inexchange,theMayawouldworkonedayaweekonthehacienda(Chardon,“GeographicAspects,”p.36).38Indeed,thetermlunerobecamesynonymousinmostcaseswithafull-timeemployee.39Peonswererecordedintheaccountingbooksofthehaciendainseveralways.First,theywereinthecuentascorrientes,therunningaccountbooksofthehacienda.Thesebookslistedthereasonforincurringdebt,itsamount,andthedateoftheloan.Thenóminawasalistofem-ployeesthatincludedtitlesandjobdescriptions.Thesemanarios,ortheweeklyworkledger,generallylistedthename,thedailyactivityandoutputoftheworker,thedailywage,andtheweeklywage.Somealsolistedtherationsgiventotheworkers.Acartacuentawasrecordedifaworker’sdebtwasboughtfromorsoldtoanotherhacienda.Finally,workerscouldbelistedintheprobaterecordsofahacendado.Theirdebtswerelistedeitherindividuallyormorecom-monlyasagroup.40MeyersandCarlson,“Peonage,”p.230.41Baerlein,Mexico,p.155.42SincetheYaquisweresenttoYucatánasprisonersofwar,workingconditionswereveryharshforthem.SeeWellsandJoseph,Summer,pp.164and206. Coercion,Culture,andContracts1153:00a.m.Turnerreportsthatpeonsworkedfrom3:45a.m.untildarkandrequiredthehelpoffamilymemberstofulfilltheirdailytasks.Hen-ryBaerleinnotesthathacendadostransformedthetraditionalcommunallabor,thefajina,intoseveral“unpaid”hoursofworkperday.RosemaryBattstatesthatintheeasternEspitaregion,thefajinalastedfor4–5hoursandtheworkdayendedat7:00p.m.VenancioNarváez,however,reportsfromaninterviewwithanex-peonthattheworkdaystartedat3:00a.m.andendedatnoonforthemajorityoftheworkers.Onlythoseworkersassignedtoraspingordryingworkedthroughtheafternoon.Hartmangeneralizesthattheworkdaycommencedat4:00a.m.,beganwith20minutestotwohoursworthoffajina,andgenerallyendedat432:00to3:00p.m.Whileitisclearthatworkingconditionswereharshduringtheboom,thelackofclearevidenceonthestructureoftheworkdayandthedutiesoftheworkersmakesquantifyingthedegreeofharshnessdifficult.Forinstance,whilesemanarios(weeklyreports)indicatethatworkersdur-ingtheboomtypicallycutaround2,500leavesperdayorclearedbe-tweenoneandtwomecateofland,Chardonreportsthatworkersonha-ciendasandejidosin1950harvestedbetween2,000and2,500leavesperdayorweededbetweenthreeandfourmecateofland,moreifthey44wereassistedbytheirsons.Comparingproductivitybetweenperiodsisdifficultduetotheother“unpaid”dutiesthatworkersneededtoperformduringthecourseoftheday.OnHaciendaTabi,asugarplantationontheperipheryofthehene-quenzone,LourdesRejónreportsthateighthectaresofvegetableswerecultivatedwithfemalelabor,forwhichthewomenwerepaidasalaryof50–70centavosperday.Whilefemalesmayhaveearnedasalaryontheperipheryofthehenequenzone,PiedadPenicheandGillbothnotethatwithinthehenequenzone,women’slaborwasconsideredpartoftheunpaidinformalhouseholdeconomyandthatthehaciendasystemex-ploitedthispractice.Penichearguesthatwhentemporaryworkerswereneededtocutleavesintheharvestingprocess,marriedcuttersoftenemployedtheirwivesandchildren.Womenneverwenttoworkinthefieldsalone,butratheraccompaniedtheirhusbands.Inadditiontotheseunpaidagriculturalchores,womenperformedunpaiddomesticservices45inthehousesofthehacendados.43Turner,BarbarousMexico,p.20;Baerlein,Mexico,p.155;Batt,“RiseandFall”;Narváez,SanAntonioToo;andHartman,“HenequenEmpire,”pp.115–16.44Chardon,“GeographicAspects,”p.104.45Réjon,HaciendaTabi;Peniche,“Gender”;andGill,“CampesinoPatriarchy.”TheMayancustomofwomennotworkingindependentlygavehacendadosanadvantageinusingdebtbe-causeitwouldnothavebeenconsideredproperforspousestoworkoffthedebtoftheirhus-bands. 116Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherCompensationforworkoccurredonmultiplemargins.Peonswerepaidfortheirweeklyworkeitherincashorinfichas,hacienda-46issuedcoins.Somehaciendasgavearationofcorntoeachworker.Haciendasprovidedsomefoodandwaterduringtheworkday.Tyingthemselvestoahaciendaalsogavemanyworkersmilpa,aplotofland47usedforsubsistenceagriculture.ThemilpawasveryimportanttotheMayasincemanylosttheirpropertyrightstolandaftertheliberaliza-tionoflandlawsin1856.Haciendasofferedresidentpeonshousing,medicalcare,and,insomecases,educationfortheyoung.Thehaciendastoresoldstaplessuchascornandclothing.Thereismixedevidenceastowhetherpricesathaciendastoresweremuchhigherthanthosepre-vailingelsewhereorifpriceswereactuallysubsidizedduringcertain48periodsinordertomaintainsocialstabilityonthehacienda.Asnotedearlier,classificationasaresidentofahaciendaexemptedworkersfromconscription,eitherintothearmyorintoroadcorvées.Finally,ownersprovidedloanstoworkersforavarietyofpurposes.DEBTPEONAGEINPERSPECTIVEAlanKnightprovidesanoverviewofthescholarshiponpre-Revolutionarydebtpeonageandcategorizestheuseofdebtintothreetypes:freelaborwithcashadvances;“traditional”peonageinwhichaworkervoluntarilytieshimselftoahacienda;and“classic”debtservitude(i.e.,coercedwageslavery).ScholarshavereinterpretedlaborrelationsforanumberofperiodsandinanumberofregionsofMexico,arguingthattypes1and2weremuchmorecommonthanpreviouslythoughtandthattype3wasonlyprevalentinthesouthandinthenor-theasternregionofOaxacaState(theValleNacional).Knightsumma-rizesthecolonialandearlynineteenthcenturyMexicanexperiencebystatingthatingeneral“peonageresteduponnoncoercivefoundations.”Forinstance,JeremyBaskesarguesthatduringthecolonialperiodin46SeeLeslieandPradeau(HenequenPlantationTokens)foradescriptionandillustrationsofthesecoinsfromalargesampleofhaciendas.47Baerlein(Mexico,p.166)reportsthatthecontinuedgrantingofmilpainthelateboomerawasmorecommoninareasfurtherfromMérida,buthadnearlydisappearedinthehenequenzonebythetimeofhiswriting.Describingtheimportanceofthemilpa,hereportsthat,“InhisgunandinhismilpaliestheIndian’shappiness.”ConsistentwithBaerlein’sobservations,WellsandJoseph(Summer,p.163)arguethatworkersonhaciendasinthehenequenzonelosttheirrighttomilpaovertime,andBatt(“RiseandFall”)arguesthatinEspita,anoutlyingre-gion,accesstomilpacontinuedtobeanimportantformofcompensation.Contradictingthisviewofdecliningmilpainthehenequenzone,Gill(“IntimateLife,”pp.342–54)arguesthatsufficientlandwasavailableformilpaonmosthaciendas,eveninthecentralhenequenzone.48Forevidenceofhighprices,seeArnoldandFrost,AmericanEgypt,p.325;Turner,Bar-barousMexico,p.18;andJoseph,Rediscovering,p.68.Forevidenceofsubsidizedprices,seeGill,“CampesinoPatriarchy,”p.142;andPeniche,“Gender,”p.84. Coercion,Culture,andContracts117Oaxaca,debtwasused,butwaseagerlysoughtbyIndians.Highinterestratesreflectedtherelativeriskinessoftheinvestment,andtheCrownuseditscomparativeadvantageincontractenforcementtoensurecom-pliance.HarryCrossfindsthatonacentralMexicanhaciendafrom1820–1880,“ofthoseemployeesindebt,itwastheadministrativestaffratherthancommonlaborerswhoweresubstantiallyindebtedtothe49landlord.”TurningtothePorfiriato,Knightarguesthatcashadvancescontinuedtobeusedinthenorth,butthatallformsofdebtdeclinedinimpor-50tance.Knight’sstudyofapulquehacienda,SanAntonioTochatlacointhestateofHidalgo,findsthatdebtswerenotusedtotieworkers:“Theywereminutelyrecorded;theyusuallyroseovertime(i.e.,theydidnotfigureasinitialadvances,designedtotieaworker);theysome-timesfell(asalaborerclearedhisdebt);andtheycorrelatedwiththesenior,better-paidworkers”(49).Whilehistoriansarevirtuallyun-animousinviewingsouthernMexicanplantationsas“greatbastionsofserviledebtpeonage,”KnightarguesthatsufficientlaborwasavailableinsouthernMexicoaspotentiallabor,butthattheselaborerswerere-calcitrant.Theypreferredtostayontheirownlandsandplantsubsis-tencecrops.Southernplanters,Knightsays,hadtocoaxorcoercelaborfromthesubsistencesector.EveninYucatán,Knightarguesthat“peonagedidnotdependonsimplecoercion”(66).TheexactcontractualrolethatdebtplayedinYucatánduringthehe-nequenboomisoftendescribedintheliteratureinvagueterms.Travel-ers’accountsgenerallynotethatdebtexistedandthatlaborersbecameenslavedonceindebt.WalterWeylprovidesoneoftheearlierandclearerdescriptionsofthedebtmechanism:Uponreachingearlymanhood,at18or20yearsofage,theyoungYucatecan,inordertobeenabledtomarry,borrowsfrom$100to$200fromhispatron.Itisnotexpectedthathewilleverrepaythisdebt,andnoeffortismadeeithertore-payorreduceit.Onthecontrary,itisusuallyincreasedfromtimetotimethroughoccasionalmisfortuneswhichbefallthepeonorhisfamily,orthroughadditionaladvancesmadebytheplanter.Theamountofdebtthusrepresentsthecostofemancipation,whichisnotdesiredorattempted,especiallyasitmay51representthegrosswagesofseveralyears.ChanningArnoldandFrederickFrostviewedhacendadosasessen-tiallymotivatedbyeconomicinterests:“AsaruleitmaybesaidthattheYucatecanisabenevolentmaster.Itpayshimtobeso,andevery49Knight,“MexicanPeonage,”pp.45–47;Baskes,“ColonialInstitutions”;andCross,“DebtPeonage,”p.474.50Knight,“MexicanPeonage,”p.48.51Weyl,“LaborConditions,”p.43. 118Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherYucatecan’soneruleinlifeistodowhatpayshim.Indeedthereisreal-lynoreasonforhimtobeharsh.TheaverageIndianisassubmissiveasawell-whippedhound,creepingupafterathrashingtokisshismaster’s52hand.”Theyhighlighttheuseofdebttotieworkerstothehacienda,andclaimthatthebooksofthehacendadoswerecookedtoinflatethedebtiftheworkertriedtoleave.Josephbreakstherevolutionaryandpostrevolutionaryliteratureondebtpeonageintocriticsandapologists.Criticsgenerallyportrayedthesystemasoppressiveandexploitative,whileapologistshighlightedthepaternalisticrelationshipbetweenhacendadosandpeones.BothgroupscharacterizedMayanworkersasdocile:thecriticstohighlightthecom-pletesubjugationoftheworkforceandtheapologistsasevidenceofthe53consensualnatureofemployment.WellsandJosephstronglycritiquethisnarrativeofdocility,hig-hlightinginsteadworkers’agencyandtheirabilitytoresistthehacen-dadosinmyriadways.Theyarguethatthreeforcesledworkerstochoosetostayonthehaciendas.First,bothlegalandecologicalfactorsservedtoisolatethehaciendafromtheoutsideworld.Second,hacenda-dosusedcoercionintheformofdebtpeonageandcorporalpunishmenttocontroltheworkers.Finally,hacendadosofferedsecurityintheform54ofasteadysupplyoffoodanda“tepidbrandofpaternalism.”NickelhasbeenmostcriticalofthestandardinterpretationofdebtpeonageinYucatán,arguingthattheeyewitnessaccountsofTurner,ArnoldandFrost,andBaerlein,combinedwiththerevolutionarynarra-tivesseekingjustificationforDíaz’soverthrow,aretheprimarysources55forcritiquesofthehaciendasystem.Whilenotdenyingthatcondi-tionscouldbeharshonthehaciendas,hefindsthatfortheperiod1893to1912,forwhichhehasgeneratedasampleof1542observationsonindividual’sdebts,workersheldamedianof133.40pesosworthofdebt,equivalent,accordingtoNickel,tothedebtheldbyworkersinotherregionsofMexicowhenadjustedforhighersalariesinYucatán.Penichearguesthatacquiringdebtwasawayforworkersbothtomeettheirphysicalneedsaswellastofulfillsocialobligations.Physicalneedsincludedmedicalcareorlargepurchasesfromthehaciendastore,whilesocialobligationsincludedbaptisms,marriages,andfiestas.AccordingtoPeniche,onlytheselargedebts,orthenohochcuenta,52ArnoldandFrost,AmericanEgypt,p.333.Theyofferthreeargumentsforwhytherewasnoexitorrevolt:thechurchbrainwashedtheMayaintothinkingthiswastheirproperlotinlife;theMayawerebeatenintosubmissionasarace;andhacendadoscontrolledallofthewaterbyowningthecenotes,soleavingthehaciendawasalmostimpossible.53Joseph,Rediscovering.54WellsandJoseph,Summer.55Nickel,“LasDeudas.” Coercion,Culture,andContracts119wererecordedinthedebtbooksofthehacienda,andwerenotrepaya-56ble.Smallerloanswererecordedseparatelyandwererepaid.Penichearguesthathaciendaownerssawthenohochcuentaasawayofmain-tainingastableworkforcewhilealsoestablishingrelativepeaceontheirhaciendasbyprovidingfundingforsocialfunctionsthatthework-57ersvaluedhighly.Hacendadosandpeonsusedloanstogenerateare-ciprocalrelationship.Theservantsviewedtheloansaspartoftheha-cendado’sresponsibilities—workersofferedlaborandhacendadosofferedloans.Penichearguesthatthissocialpactwasbasedonasharedsenseofsocialobligationsbetweenhacendadosandtheirservants,whichwasrootedintheCatholicChurchanditsreligiouscelebrations58andsacraments.Penichealsonotesthatnon-Mayanworkers,thosefromoutsideYucatánwhocametoworkonthehenequenhaciendas,didnotincurlargedebtstopayforreligiousceremonies.AccordingtoPeniche,loanswerenotofferedtotheseworkersbecausereligiousce-remoniesmeantlesstothem,andbecausehacendadosbelievedthatnon-Mayawouldnothonortheirdebts(personalcommunication).COERCION,CULTURE,ANDCONTRACTINGAsnotedintheintroduction,wemakethreepointsconcerningdebtpeonageinYucatán.Theserelatetothechoicesmadeinacoercivein-stitutionalenvironment,theimportanceofcultureinshapingprefe-rences,andtheuseofpaternalismasthecontractualchoicetoattract,motivate,andretainlabor.ThechoicetobecomeapeónacasilladowasmadewithinaninstitutionalcontextthatgaveMayanpeasantsverylit-tlepower.Theircommunallandshadbeenrestricted,theirrightstovotewerelimited,andtheirrecoursetothecourtsystemwasminimal.As56Peniche,“Gender,”pp.82–83.Thereissomeevidencethatthelargedebtswerepaidoff.Peniche(“ElImpacto”)findsthatofthe102peonesonthehaciendasofJoséMaríaPeón,19paidofftheirdebtsand15transferredtoanotherhaciendanotownedbyPeón,mostlikelyafterthedebtwaspaidbythenewhacendado.57Penichearguesthatwithinthehenequenzone,thehacendadosolidifiedhisowncentralroleintheMayancommunitybyadoptingtheroleofthecasamentero(marriagemaker),andsupplyingthemu’huul(bridewealth),therebyusurpingtheroleofthegroom’sfamily.58Peniche,“LaComunidadDoméstica.”SincethetimeoftheConquest,nativecustomsandpracticesevolved,formingasyncreticblendofHispanic(Spanish)andnativeMayan“tradi-tions.”Farriss(MayaSociety)suggeststhatMayanbeliefsandpracticesoccupiedaprivate,clandestinespherewhileChristianriteswereprofessedandpracticedpublicly.CatholicismhasalsoprovidedacohesivesetofsocialandculturalnormsforbothMayanandnon-MayanYuca-tecos.WhileCatholicritualshavenevercompletelyreplacedMayancustomsandreligiousbe-liefs,localdevotiontoCatholicsaintsandiconsformthebackboneofpuebloreligiosity.Bra-camonteySosa(LaMemoriaEnclaustrada,p.106)notesthatonhenequenhaciendasinthenineteenthcentury,“eachplantationerectedachapeldedicatedtothepatronsainttowhichtheMayarendereddevotion;atthesametime,MayarecreatedmanyaspectsofMayanChristianity[ontheplantations].” 120Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherwasnotedpreviously,alistofecologicalfactorscanbeaddedtothein-stitutionalones.Theclimatewasahardoneinwhichtotravel,waterwasrestrictedtowellsorcenotes,andplagueordroughtoftenreducedagriculturaloutput.Giventherisks,beingtiedtoahaciendawasoftenthebestofasetofbadchoices.Inthissection,wefirstdescribetheoptionsavailabletoMayanworkersandthenanalyzethetimingandfunctionofdebt.Broadlyspeaking,oncetiedtoahaciendathroughdebt,Mayanpea-santshadthreepathstheycouldtake.First,theycouldaccepttheircir-cumstancesandcontinuetoworkonthehaciendawithinthegeneralframeworkcreatedbythehacendado.Second,theycouldstayonthehacienda,butattempttoresistthehacendado’spowerusingexplicitformsofresistanceandwhatJamesScotthasdubbedthe“weapons59oftheweak.”Third,theycouldattempttoexitthehacienda,eitherbyfleeingorbydemandingtheircartacuentaandseekinganotherhacendadotopurchasetheirdebt.Agreatdealofvariabilityhasbeendocumentedinthemanagementstylesofhaciendas.Giventheirpositionasthedefactogovernment,ha-cendadosandtheiradministratorshadtremendousleewayinhowtheytreatedtheirworkers.Whilesomeweremoreliberalintheirpolicies,otheradministratorswereverycruel,leadingtoworkersbeingbeaten.Oralhis-tories,eyewitnessaccounts,newspaperreports,andarichjudicialrecord60allprovideconsistentevidenceontheuseofphysicalcoercion.Theevi-denceindicatesthatmanagersofhaciendasadministeredbeatingsmainlyfordrunkenness,theft,adultery,orfailuretomeetaspecifiedlevelof61productivity.BeatingsforthesepurposesseemtohavebeentoleratedbytheMaya,oratleastdidnotleadtowidespreadsocialunrest.WhenJoséCruz,whowasbornin1886andlivedonasugarhaciendaonthefringeofthehenequenzone,wasaskedwhetherhewaseverbeaten,heresponded:“Never,becausemyfamilyandIalwaysfollowedtherules,weneverfought.Inanotheroralhistory,NicolásDzulreportsbeatingsforunex-cusedabsencesfromwork,drunkenness,stealing,andadultery.Hismain62recollections,however,werethebeatingsfordrunkenness.59Scott,Weapons.60SeeEiss,“ElPuebloMestizo”;andWellsandJoseph,Summer,pp.156–60.61Theissueofphysicalcoercionisproblematic,becausewedonotknowhowoftenworkerswerebeatennorforwhatinfractions.Inaddition,beatingsmostlikelyvariedconsiderablyacrosshaciendas.ThesamesetofissueshasbeendealtwithextensivelyinthedebatesoverthecrueltyofslaveryintheUnitedStates.Wesuspectthatbeatingswerenotrandomandmayhavebeendonemoretoensuresocialnormsthantoenforceworkeffort.Moreover,evenifbeatingswererelativelyuncommon,thethreatofabeatingmayhavebeensufficienttoenforce“appro-priate”behavior.62SeeRejón,HaciendaTabi,pp.92–93,forCruz’sinterview;andNarváez,SanAntonioToo,forDzul’sinterview. Coercion,Culture,andContracts121Manyinstancesofpeasantuprisingsagainsthaciendaauthority,bothfromwithinthehaciendaandfromtheneighboringpueblos,havebeenreported.Documentedcasesofprotestincludepeasantdemonstrationsagainstwagecuts,arson,andrustling.WellsandJosephreportthatonHaciendaCatmís,asugarplantationsouthofthehenequenzonewhoseadministrationhadareputationforbeing“notoriouslybrutal,”the“peonsdestroyedmachineryandcarvedupthehacendadoandmembersofhisfamilyandstaff.”Henequenisalong-livedasset,withalifespanofabout25years,sohacendadoshadreasontofearsabotageiftheymi-streatedtheirworkers.GillreportsthedestructionbyarsonofHaciendaChablé’shenequenfieldsin1890andofHaciendaSinkehuel’sdye-woodstandsin1892.Withlong-livedassetsofthesesorts,peasantun-resthadavaluabletarget.Indeed,Hartmanquotesan1890articlefromLaRevistadeMéridaarguingthatit“madeverylittlesensetomistreat63menuponwhomtheharvestingofveryexpensivecropsdepended.”Thesedocumentedcasesofpeasantprotestweremostlikelyonlythetipoftheicebergofinformalpeasantbargainingpower,whichincludedworkslowdowns,feignedillness,pettytheft,andcarelessnesswithplantsandmachinery.Thefinalpathdownwhichindebtedpeasantscouldtravelwasexit.Onsomehaciendas,evidenceexistsofthesaleandpurchaseofpea-sants’debtthroughthecartacuenta.Legally,anypeoncouldapproachthehacendadoanddemandhiscartacuenta.Thiscartacuentacouldthenbetakentoanotherhacienda.Ifthenewhacendadowantedtheworker,hecouldpayofftheoriginaldebt.Theabilitytofindanotherhacendadotopurchasethecartacuentawasgreaterinthecentralhene-quenzone,wherehaciendaswerecloselylocated.Workerscouldalsoflee,andifnotcapturedbyabountyhunter,theytypicallytookrefugeinurbancentersandvillages.Bythelatterpartofthehenequenboom,transportation(railroad)andcommunication(telegraph)hadimproved64theabilityofauthoritiestoapprehendfugitives.Laborrelationsonahaciendafellbetweentwoendpointsonaspectrum.Thefirst,andrelativelymorehumane,wasoneinwhichmarket-basedincentivescontinuedtobeusedastheprimarymeansofmotivatingworkers,withbeatingsusedforpunishmentofhacendado-defined“crimes”orunacceptableworkeffort.Theotherisoneinwhichhacendadoviolenceandworkerprotestfedononeanotherandledto63WellsandJoseph,Summer,p.175;Gill,“CampesinoPatriarchy,”p.66and74;andHart-man,“HenequenEmpire,”p.121.64Gill,“CampesinoPatriarchy.”AnanonymousrefereenotedthattheMayancampesinoswouldhavefoundescapetothetropicalforestsinhabitedbyrebelMayaasunattractivebecauseoftheiracculturationtoladino[non-Mayan]society. 122Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherworkingconditionsspiralingdowntoahighlyoppressivestate.Evi-denceoftheformertypearefoundintheexistingrecordsofthehacien-dasandtheaccountsby“apologists,”whileevidenceofthelatterarefoundintheeyewitnessreports,oppositionnewspapers,andthecourtrecords.Offeringapackageofpaternalismtoworkersmayhavebeenmorecosteffectivethaneitherusingviolenceorraisingthesalarymarginofthecontracttoincreaseworkeffort.Wearguethatloanswerepartofthispackageandservedthreepurposes.First,theywerebonuses,usual-lyintheformofahouseholditemorsmallluxury,forhighjobperfor-mance.Second,theyservedaninsurancefunction,helpingtheworkersthroughtoughstretches,particularlyepisodesofillness.Finally,whengivenformarriages,baptisms,andfunerals,theywereanimportantpartofthesocialfabricofahacienda,elevatingthesocialstatusoftheha-cendadoamongtheMayanworkers.Inallthreecases,thehacendadogavecompensationinkindratherthancash,whichengenderedreciproc-65ityintheformof“loyal-like”behavior.Analternativewouldhavebeentoraisesalaries,butdoingsomostlikelywouldhavebeenmoreexpensive.Theuseofin-kindbenefitsmayhavehadagreaterpsycho-logicaleffectontheperceivedstatusofthehacendadointermsofhowheviewedhisownbehaviororhisstatusamonghispeers.Loansforeventssuchasweddingsandcommunityfiestastiedlocals66morecloselytootherworkersonthehaciendaandtothehacendado.Itisnotsurprisingthatmostloansweretargetedatsettlingtheworkeronthehacienda.Duringourtimeperiod,boththehacendadosandthe67churchencouragedworkerstomarryearly.WithinMayancommuni-ties,hostingweddingceremoniesinwhichtheentirecommunitywasinvitedwasafundamentalelementofsocialcohesion.WhiletheChris-tianformsoftheseritualizedcelebrations(baptisms,weddings,andfunerals)wereintroducedbytheCatholicChurchduringthecolonial65Westress,asdidAlstonandFerrie(Paternalism),thatthecompensationin-kindwasnota“giftexchange”intheAkerlof(“LaborContracts”)sensethoughitmayhavemanifestedsimilarobservablebehavior.Ourargumentisconsistentwiththeuseof“efficiencywages”inlaboreconomics.66TakingondebtatthetimeofmarriagemayhaverootsinwidespreadMayanculturalprac-ticesthroughoutsoutheasternMexico.Werecognizethatsomeofthematerialontheculturalrootsoftheuseofmarriagesisinterpretativeonourpart.Juárez(“FourGenerations,”p.137)statesthatintheearly-twentieth-centuryhighlandChiapas,“young[Mayan]menbecomein-debtedtotheirrelativesinordertoobtainthebridegiftsneededtomarry.”Juárez(Ibid.,p.133)alsonotestheuseofhaancab(brideservice)inpartsofQuintanaRoo,wherethegroom“livesandworkswiththebride’sfamily”foranumberofyearsaftermarriage.67Thehacendadopaidforitemssuchasthecivilandreligiousfees,giftstothebride’sfamilysuchas“clothes,rings,andalongnecklace,”andmoneytocovertheweddingfiestaandgifts”(Peniche,“Gender,”p.85).Penicheestimatestheseoutlaystobe25pesosforthecivilceremo-nyandcelebration,17pesosforthereligiousceremony,andatleast8pesosforthebridewealth. Coercion,Culture,andContracts123period,theritualsperformedonthehaciendaswereahybridofbothtraditions.Thesocialcapitalgeneratedfromhostingaweddingwaslo-cationspecifictothecommunityinwhichitwasheld.Investinginaweddingwasasignalofacommitmenttothecommunityandtheentryofthecoupleintoadulthood.Havingastrongsocialnetworkes-tablishedbondsandgeneratedgreaterlevelsoftrustwithinthecommu-nity.Beingacommunityinsiderloweredtransactioncostsandallowedforrisksharingwithothermembersofthenetwork.Mostimportantlyfromacontractualstandpoint,itgaveamplebargainingpowertothehacendado,thecentralcontractualagentonthehacienda.Loanswerepartofalargersetofpaternalisticgoodsofferedbyha-cendadostoworkers,includinglandformilpa,cornrationswhenpriceswerehigh,accesstowater,medicalcare,and,onsomehaciendas,schoolingforchildren.“Paternalism”reducedriskforbothparties.Forhacendados,offeringpaternalismhelpedensureasteadyyear-roundla-borforce.Paternalismprotectedworkersfromthevagariesofagricul-turallife,periodiclocustplagues,militaryandcorvéeservice,andotherunforeseencatastrophes.Workers,however,hadtoweighthesebenefitsagainstthecostsoflivingonahacienda:lossofautonomy,backbreak-ingyear-roundlabor,separationfromtraditionalpueblolifecenteredonthemilpa,andtheuncertaintyofhacendadobenevolence.Thesecostsmadeitnecessaryforhacendadostoofferincentivestoattract,moti-vate,andretainworkers,evenwhiletheinstitutionalcontextwastiltedheavilyintheirfavor.ThewaydebtfunctionedonhenequenhaciendasinYucatánbearstwosimilaritiestothepaternalisticagriculturallaborsystemusedinthepostbellumU.S.Southpriortothemechanizationofcotton.IntheU.S.South,landlordsandworkersimplicitlyexchangedgoodsinkindforloyal68laborservices.Thein-kindgoodsvaluedmostbyworkersintheSouthwerethosethatcouldnotbepurchasedinthemarket,forexample,protectionfromcivilrightsabuses.Marriagesonhenequenha-ciendasinYucatánweresimilarinthattheworkersdidnothavesufficientfundstopayforaweddingandfiesta,orthenecessaryhouseholdgoodsneededtoestablishlivingindependentlyofone’sparents.ThedebttiedworkerstoahaciendaandwasapreferredoutcomeformanyMayagiventheimportanceoftheseeventsinMayancultureandthelackofoutside69options.Thefollowingsectionexpandsonthisdiscussionoftheuseofdebtbyfocusingonasinglehaciendaforwhichwehavedetailedrecords.68AlstonandFerrie,Paternalism.69Notallworkerswereequallydependentonhacendadostoprovidefundsforritualceremo-nies,fiestas,andlargerpurchases.Narváez(SanAntonioToo)providestestimoniesfrom 124Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherCASESTUDY:HACIENDAITZINCABCÁMARAItzincabCámaraislocatedinthemunicipalityofTecoh,roughly35kilometersfromMéridaandwaspurchasedaround1860byCamiloG.70Cámara.Cámarawasabusinessmanwhocamefromafamilyofhe-nequenhacendados;in1890CámarahadbeenelectedManager-DirectorofYucatán’sUnionofHenequenHacendados(basedinMérida).WhileItzincabCámaraservedasaplaceofrestandrelaxationfortheCámarafamily,itsprincipalpurposewascommercial.Atitsheight,haciendalandsencompassed3,903hectares,ofwhich1,30071werededicatedtohenequen.Recordsfromtheearlytwentiethcenturyindicatethatthehacienda72hadastandardorganizationalhierarchy.Amongthesalariedworkers,thefirstandhighestrankingisthemayordomo,oradministrator,whorepresentedtheownerinhisabsence.(ThiswasnotasmuchofanissueatItzincabCámaraastheownerskeptaclosewatchontheplace.)Thecentralfunctionofthemayordomowastomanagetheworkforce,tomaintainstrictcontroloftheaccountsandproduction,andtoprocureandadministerallthematerialresourcesofthehacienda.Underthemayordomowasthepersonero,inchargeofhumanresourcesonthehacienda,followedbythemaquinista,whowasinchargeofallmattersrelatedtotheoperationoftheraspingmachine.Twoadditionalmayor-domos,ofcampo(agriculture)andofrasping,appearedonthelistandwereresponsibleforallworkersintheirarea.Thehaciendaalsohiredateacher,listedaslaprofesorainsomeyearsandelprofesordemúsicainothers.Theweeklyreportslistedthesalaries(butnotthenames)ofex-peonswhosaythatthey(orpeopletheyknew)paidfortheirownweddingsfromfundstheyhadsaved,thusnotgoingintodebt.70Dataconcerningthishaciendacomefromahostofcivilandparishrecordsdatingfrom1880to1920,thedebtbookfrom1906to1912,weeklyactivityreportsfromselectyearsfrom1897to1914,entriesfromthehacienda’sstorefrom1908and1910,andrecordsofpaymentstooutsideworkersfrom1908and1913.TheChurchoftheLatterDaySaints(LDS)providedaccesstothecivilandparishrecords.AllcitationstothesedatarefertoLDSmicrofilmreelnumbers.AllinformationfromthedebtbookistakenfromNickel(ElPeonajeand“Sklave-rei”).Allremainingrecordsarefromthehacienda’sarchive,housedatCIESAS-Peninsular(Mérida).MuchofthedescriptiveinformationfromthissectionisdrawnfromParedes(“Itzin-cabCámara”).InformationconcerningtheoriginaldateofpurchaseisfromLuisMilletCámara(personalcommunication).71AccordingtoParedes(“ItzincabCámara”),theownershipofItzincabCámarastayedintheCámarafamilyuntil1996,whenitwassoldtoagroupofprivateinvestors(GrupoPlan).How-ever,evenbythe1930s,thelandsownedbythefamilyhadbeendrasticallyreduced,owingmostlytotheagrarianreformpoliciesofpost-revolutionarygovernments.In1934thehaciendawasreducedto211hectares,to14hectaresby1981,andtofourby1996.72OurterminologyforemployeescomesdirectlyfromtherecordsoftheHaciendaItzincabCámara. Coercion,Culture,andContracts125thehacienda’sadministrators.Thepersoneromadeabout25pesos,whilethemanagersofthefieldmadeabouthalfthat.Theweeklyreportsbreakdowntheotherworkersonthehaciendain-toseveralcategories.Thelargestgroupwastheluneros.Bythistime,thetermluneroswasusedtorefertothefull-time,indebtedemployeesofthehacienda.Muchachos,youngerworkersonthehacienda,didabouthalftheworkofadultworkers.Whileworkerswerenotassignedtosubcategoriesin1905,by1912othergroupslistedontheweeklyre-portswerethemáquinaoperators,whoworkedtheraspingmachine,aprensadores,whoworkedthepress,plataformeros,whoworkedtherailsystem,diversos,whomostlyworkedintheorchard,mayocoles,whowereMayanbosses,andmasons,carpenters,andcowboys.Theseadditionalcategoriesseemtoindicateadditionallevelsofspecializationonthehaciendaovertime.Fromthebeginningofitsoperationasahenequenhacienda,ItzincabCámaraimportedworkersfromoutsidethestate.Cubanswerebroughttothehaciendaasearlyas1898.Onthe1905weeklyreports,22Ko-reansarelistedstartinginMay,andYaquiIndiansarelistedasagroup.Workersfrequentlydesertedthehacienda.In1905,11Mayanworkersarelistedontheweeklyreportsasprófugos,orfugitives.Themostcon-sistentlyreportedinformationonfugitivesisinrelationtotheKoreansandtheYaqui.In1907,forexample,therewere20Koreansreportedasbeingonthehacienda.Laterinthatsameyear,thenumberdiminished73to13whiletherestwerereportedasfugitives.Theevidenceofnon-MayabeingmorelikelytofleeisconsistentwithourargumentthatitwasmucheasiertotielocalMayatothehaciendathanoutsiders.Thetotalemploymentonthehaciendaseemsfairlystableoverthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury.Theweeklyreportslist108Mayanworkersand26muchachosin1897;83Mayanworkers,approximately12Yaqui,22Koreans,and16muchachosin1905;and104Mayan74workersand16muchachosin1912.Theseworkerswerefulltime.Thehaciendarecordsalsolistweedingandotherworkdonebycontractworkers,mostlikelydrawnfromtheneighboringpueblos.Theirworkislistedbothintheweeklyreportsandinrecordbookstitled,Pagospor73Parades,“ItzincabCámara.”TheKoreanscamein1905underafour-yearcontract.Thesecondattemptatcontractingwiththemfailed.Notwithstandingthenotablepresenceoffo-reignersworkingonthehacienda,Paredesarguesthatwhenevertheownerscould,theysubsti-tutedMayaforimmigrants.Forexample,commissionswereofferedfornativeMayafromthenearbyvillageofTimucuy,amongothers.Upto1919,66immigrantscontinuedtoworkindi-versejobsonthehacienda.74TheYaquiarelistedasagroup,withtheirtotalworkoutputnoted.Weestimatedtheirnumbers,assumingthattheydidanequivalentamountofworkperdayasaMayanworker. 126Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherTrabajos(paymentsforwork).Theiroutputindicatesthat30additionalworkerscouldhavebeenonthehaciendaatpeaktimes.Comparedtootherhacendadosoftheirtime,thehistoricalrecordsuggeststhatmembersoftheCámarafamilyweremorepaternalisticthanmany.GonzaloCámaraZavala,thesonoftheoriginalownerofthehacienda,wasfounderandpresidentofMérida’sLeagueofSocialAc-tion(LigadeAcciónSocial).Thisorganizationcollaboratedwiththestategovernmentafter1910tobringruralschoolstothestate.Indeed,ItzincabCámarawashometooneofthe16ruralschoolsestablishedat75thistime.SowhileItzincabCámarashouldnotbeviewedasatypicalhacienda,itprobablydoesreflectonemanagementpatterncommoninYucatán.Thehaciendarecordsindicatearichandvariedinteractionbetweenthehacendadoandhisworkers.Beforeturningtothepatternsofloans,itisusefultopaintabroaderpictureofpaternalismonthehacienda.Evidenceincludescarefortheelderlyandthesick.IntherecordbooktitledRecibosdeTiendadeRaya(receiptsofthehaciendastore),week-76lygrantsof1pesotoeveryviuda(widow)arelisted.Onthe1905weeklyreports,thesewidowsarealsolistedasreceivingaweeklyra-77tionofcorn.Alsolistedinthisbookarebreakfastsforallworkers,78consistingofbiscuits,coffee,andsugar.Permanentworkersonthehaciendawerepaidmorefortheirworkthancontractworkers.Forin-stance,residentworkerswerepaid37.50whilecontractworkerswerepaid25centavospermecateforweeding.Whiletherateforcontractworkersoccasionallyincreased(mostlikelyduetomarketpressures),theresidentworkerswerepaidthesameratein1905and1912.ThedebtledgerofItzincabCámaraoffersseveralinsightsintolaborpracticesonthehacienda.Theledgerincludesentriesforapproximately172workers.TheopeningdateisDecember31,1906andtheclosing79dateisDecember31,1912.Afinaltallyofdebtsprovidedonthelastpagebreaksdownthedebtsintocontinuingandnon-continuingem-ployees.Thenon-continuingemployeesincludedthedeceasedandnon-Maya,suchasKoreans,centralMexicans,andYaqui.Allofthesenon-continuingdebtswerewrittenoffthebooksin1912,totaling2,895.7875Thefamilyhadateacheronstaffaswellasapriestwhocameregularlytoperformsacra-mentsandcelebratemass.HaciendaItzincabCámaraiseasilyconfusedwithHaciendaItzincab,whichisinthemunicipalityofUmán,andwasownedbyJoséPalomeque,knownasanabusivehacendado(personalcommunication,PaulEiss).76WhiletheMayanwidowsarenamed,twonamelessYaquiwidowsalsoreceived1peso.77OldermaleMayamayalsohavebeengivenreducedworkloadsandallowedmoretimetoworkontheirmilpa.78In1908breakfastforallworkersforatypicalweekconsistedofapproximately4,000bis-cuits,40poundsofsugar,and9poundsofgroundcoffee.79Someentriesarepriorto1906andafter1912. Coercion,Culture,andContracts127pesos.Themajorityofthissum,2,400.55pesos,wasfordeceasedMayanemployees,whiletheamountwrittenoffforimportedlaborerswasquitesmall,astheytendedtohavedebtsaveraginglessthan20pe-sos.Forinstance,the11Koreanslistedinthedebtbookashavingar-80rivedin1905hadanaveragedebtof14.50pesos.Ofthe21workerswhosedeathsarerecordedinthedebtledger,theaveragedebtwas81139.64pesos.Workerswhofledthehaciendacontinuedtobelistedinthedebtbooks.Thesedebtssummedto589.96pesosin1912.DebtsforcontinuingMayanworkersweresignificantlyhigherthanfornon-Mayancontractworkers.Forthose64workerswhoopenedthedebtbookin1906andwerestilllistedintheweeklyactivityreportfrom1914,debtsaveraged125.38pesosin1912,withalowof28.15pesosandahigh82of239.36pesos.Stillfocusingonthese64workers,weseethatinthenextsixyearsafter1906,eightworkersincurrednoadditionaldebt,29workersaddedlessthan10pesosworthofdebt,16workersaddedbe-tween10and20pesosworthofadditionaldebt,andnineworkersaddeddebtsofbetween20and170pesos.Soforthemajorityofcontinuingworkers,addeddebtwasrelativelyminor:2pesosforafuneral,2.50pe-83sosforclothes,or1.50pesosforahoe.Thedebtbookrecordstenworkerswhosecartascuentaswerepur-chasedbythehaciendabetween1908and1910.Theavailableinformationindicatesthattheybeganwithanaveragedebtofabout197pesos—considerablymorethantheaverageworker—andtookonapproximately22pesosmoredebtby1912.Basedonthedateoftheentry,thelastnamesoftheworkers,andthesizeoftheinitialdebt,wewouldestimatethatthedebtsofatleastanotherfourworkerswerepurchasedinordertobringthemtothehacienda.Thisestimatewouldbringthetotalnumberoftrans-ferredworkerstoover10percentofthehacienda’sadultworkforce.Ifourestimateofthetotalnumberoftransferworkersiscorrect,thenatotalofseventransferworkerswerestillonthehaciendain1914,fourofwhomwereperforminghigherpayingjobs:acarpenter,andpressandrailopera-tors.Theseworkerswerebroughttothehaciendaafterthelargelyunsuc-cessfulexperimentswiththeYaquisandKoreans.Theymayhavebeen80NorecordismadeoftheKoreanworkers’debtfromtheirindenturecontract.81Whilethebooksofficiallyclosedin1912,someadditionalentriesaremadein1913,in-cludingnotesofdeath.82Thehighestrecordeddebtwas367.15pesosforMartínPérez,whodiedinlate1913.In-deed,atleastfouroftheeighthighestdebtholdersdiedpriorto1914.Fortworecords,thefinalentriesareillegible.83Theserelativelyminorincreasesindebtraisesthequestionastowhetherworkersmostlywerepayingfortheirownbaptismsandotherceremonies,andwhetherall“gifts”fromtheha-cendadowererecordedinthebooks. 128Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherTABLE1LOANSTOSECUNDINOMAY,1910/1111/28/1910Hisfathertookmoneyfromhisaccountforhismarriage.Tomósu25.00padreásucuentaefectivoparasumatrimonio.12/12/1910Hisfathertook$25.00incashforhismarriageand$15.00for40.00weddingattire.Tomósupadreparasumatrimonio,enefectivo$25.00yenlaropadeboda$15.00.4/17/1911Thecostoffurnitureforhishouse.Ásucuentavalormuebles14.00parasucasa.Source:Weeklyreports,1910and1911.moreskilledworkers,orthemarketfornewworkersmayhavebeensothinthatthehacendadowasforcedtopaytoppricetorecruitnewlocallabor.Noefforttorecordinterestonthedebtwasmade,indicatingthatthehacendado,atleastexplicitly,wasnotattemptingtokeepworkerstiedtothehaciendathroughhighinterestpayments.Ifdebtweresolelyabindingmechanism,onewouldexpectahighinterestratetobeusedtoinflatethedebt.AtypicalworkerwhoaddedsignificantdebtwasSe-cundinoMay,whosemarriageloansareprovidedinTable1.Fromthecivilrecordsofbirthsandparishrecordsofbaptisms,weknowthathewasbornonthehaciendaonJuly1,1893andwasthesonofNorbertoMayandDamianaChim,bothresidentsonthehacienda.In1906,atage13,heopensthedebtbookswithabalanceof13.51pesos.In1910hemarriesMaríaAnaRamos,age14,daughterofPedroRamosandYsa-84belLlanes.Atthispoint,hetakesonsubstantiallymoredebt.Severalmonthslater,hetakesoutmoredebttopurchasefurniture.Thispatternofworkingonthehacienda—inMay’scaseasamuchachowithlowdebt—followedbyalargeissuanceofdebtforamarriageseemstosignalacommitmentonboththepartoftheworkerandthehacendadotoacontinuingemploymentrelationshipafteraninitialperiodonthehacienda.Thesedebtsindicateanongoingrelationshipbetweenthehacendadoandfamiliesthatwerelongstandingresidentsofthehacienda.In1914ofthe128menlistedonthehacienda’spayroll,23hadthesurname85MayandfivehadthesurnameRamos.Thedebtscanbeseenasa“gift,”notjusttotherecipient,butalsotothefamiliesofthebrideandgroomand,toalesserextent,toeveryonewhoattendedthemarriage84SeeCivilRegister,1893,reel0796192.ParishRegister,1893,reel0655046forbirthrecords;Nickel(“Sklaverei”)forthedebtbookinformation;andCivilRegister1910and1911,reel0796147andParishRegister1910,reel0764193forthemarriagerecords.Boththecivilandparishrecordsrecordedthismarriagetwice.85Otherprominentfamilynamesin1914wereChim(16),Chan(13),andCeh(6). Coercion,Culture,andContracts129TABLE2LOANSTOCONTINUINGMAYANWORKERS,1905–191219051907191019111912TotalNumberofentries146131355028390Totaldebtissued$841.39$655.60$505.09$382.38$316.25$2700.71Weddings(%)183876567848Toolsandclothing(%)3121721620Furniture(%)0132424Funeralsandbaptism(%)071343Medical(%)050122Cash,miscellaneous,untitled(%)51161315924Note:Mostentriesin1905providenodetailsoftheloans’purpose.Source:Weeklyreportsfromspecifiedyears.ceremonyandcelebration.Underscoringthecommunalnatureoftheseloans,theweeklyreportsindicateexplicitlythatMay’sfatherwasgrantedthemoneyforhisson’swedding.Onthehacienda,thegiftsfromthehacendadotothegroupincludedmarriagecelebrations,leniencytowardsworkers,orgreaterautonomy.Thedebtsmayhavehadalong-runimpactonthemoraleofworkersbyengenderingareciprocalsenseofloyaltyonthepartofworkersortheymoresimplymayhaveengendered“loyal-like”behavior.Eitherway,trueloyaltyor“loyal-like”behaviorisespeciallyimportantgiventhefrequencyofworkerslaboringwithoutsupervision.Westressthat,giv-enthesocialrelationsofthetime,debtwasusefulintyingworkerstothehaciendabothpriortoincurringthedebtaswellasafterthedebtwasgiven.Priortoincurringthedebt,workerswouldstrivetoshowloyaltysoastobeallowedtoborrow.Afterincurringthedebts,workerswoulddisplayloyalor“loyal-like”behavioreitheroutofgratitude,asenseofobligation,orassimplytheirbestoptiongiventhepooralternativesdiscussedearlier.AggregatingthedebtrecordsofhaciendaItzincabCámarashowsthatloansweremostlygivenforlocation-specificculturalevents,particularlyweddings.Thetimingoflargeloansforaweddinghadtheadvantageforhacendadosoftyingworkerstoahaciendaatatimewhenmaleswereap-proachingthepeakoftheirlaborproductivity.Table2showsthebreak-downinloansbytypeforthoseyearsforwhichwehavelocatedtheweeklyreports.TheloansonlyincludethosegrantedtocontinuingMayanworkers.Thefinalcolumnaggregatestheloansoverfiveyears.Whilethepercentagevariedfromyeartoyear,48percentoftheloansweregranted 130Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherTABLE3MAYANWEDDINGLOANS,1905–191219051907191019111912NumberofMayareceivingweddingloans43534Totalweddingloans$149.00$248.00$342.56$214.00$248.00Average37.2582.6768.5171.3362Minimum1040303030Maximum75108133.5011483Notes:Oneworker,CasianoNarvaez,receivedweddingloansinboth1905($54)and1907($40).Loansin1905areunderstatedsincemostentriesprovidenodetailsoftheloan’spurpose.Source:Weeklyreportsfromspecifiedyears.86directlyforweddings.Overtime,agreaterpercentageofloansweredevotedtofundingmarriages,duelargelytoareductioninloansforotheritems.Besidestheexplicitloansformarriages,someentrieslistedas“cash”wererecordedaroundthetimeofawedding,andcouldbe87countedinthatcategory.Furthermore,thetimingoffurniturepur-chasesoftencoincidedwithweddingsandsettledworkersontheha-cienda.Therefore,thecostsofmarryingandestablishingahouseholdcouldhaveeasilyaccountedforover60percentoftheloansissuedtocontinuingresidentsandinsomeyearsreachedashighas80percent.“Bonus”giftswerelargelyinkind,suchasgiftsofclothing,furniture,grindingstones,orhoes.Finally,loansthatcoveredemergenciessuchasmedicalexpenseswereimportantformsofinsuranceforMayanworkers.Totalsalarypaidtocontinuingworkerstotaledapproximately26,000pesosperyearfrom1905–1912,makingloanstoworkersapproximate-ly1to3percentoftotalsalary.Thedecreaseinthetotalvalueofloansovertimemayreflectanoveralldownturninthemarketforhenequen.Between1905and1912,theaveragepriceofhenequenfellfrom15.31to10.41centsperkilogram.Whilesalariesstayedconstantontheha-cienda,loanstoworkersfellbyover60percent.Sixty-sevenworkersreceivedatleastoneloanduring1905,whileonly19workersreceivedloansin1912.Ourconclusionisthatingoodtimesthehacendadocouldboosthisstatuswithrelativelyinexpensivegifts,whileintoughertimes,thesegiftscouldbemoreeasilyreducedthansalary.Table3providessomesummarystatisticsonthesizeofweddingloansovertime.Whilerecordedlevelsofloansforweddingsvariedin86Thedatafromtheweeklyreportsaregenerallyconsistentwiththedatafromthedebtledg-er,sampleentriesfromwhichareavailableinNickel(ElPeonaje).Minordifferencesexistbe-causeNickel’ssampleincludesallyearsfrom1906–1912andmaybehighlightingbig-ticketitems.87Theseentrieslistedascashcouldhaveactuallyhavebeenforcreditatthehaciendastore,furthertyingtheworkertothehacienda. Coercion,Culture,andContracts131size,therangewithinaparticularyearwasmuchgreaterthantheyear-to-yearaveragevariation.Oneexplanationforhigherweddingloansishigherproductivityworkersreceivedmoremoneyfromthehacendadoatthetimeofhiswedding.Higherproductivityworkersmayalsohavebeenassignedtomoreremunerativejobssuchasplataformeros.Bygrantingmoreloans,thehacendadowasabletokeephigherproductivi-tyworkersonthehaciendawhileatthesametimesolidifyingthesocialstatusoftheseworkersbyfinancingamoreexpensivewedding.Debt88andsalaryarethereforecomplementarymechanisms.Ofthe28maleswhosemarriagerecordswehavelocatedinthemu-nicipalrecordsfortheyears1895to1912,21werestillworkingonthehaciendain1914.Allofthese21workersincurreddebt,indicatingastronglinkbetweendebtandcontinuingemployment.Allworkersem-ployedin1914whosemarriagesarelistedinthemunicipalarchivesin-curreddebt.OnlythreemaleMayaweremarriedonthehacienda,didnotreceivealoanfortheirmarriage,anddidnotworkonthehacienda89in1914.Giventhestrongdemonstratedrelationshipbetweenem-ploymentanddebt,itislikelythateitherthesethreeworkersplannedonleavingthehacienda,orthehacendadodidnotwanttocommittotheseworkersbyofferingthemmarriageloans.Toexplainthevariationinthesizeofdebts,wearguethatdebtwasacheapermargintoadjustthansalary.Table4providessummarystatis-90ticsonsalaryanddebtin1914byclassofworker.Fortyofthe50workerslistedaslunerosperformedthesamejobsthroughoutthecourseoftheweekandearnedtheidenticalsalary(5.12or5.13pesosfortheweek).OnMondaythroughWednesday,theygatheredfirewood;onThursdayandFriday,theyspunrope;andonSaturday,theygathered2,500henequenleaves.Onlythoseworkerswhoweresickorhadadif-ferentjobdescription(e.g.,plataformero,aprensador,orjardinero)earnedadifferentsalary.Indeed,allworkersonthishaciendawerees-sentiallysalaried,withthejobdescriptiondeterminingthesalaryfortheday.Onlyinrarecasesdidtwoworkersassignedtothesamejobforthe88PaternalismintheU.S.Southoperatedinasimilarfashion:tenantsweremorehighlypaidthansharecroppersbutalsotypicallyreceivedmorepaternalismfromthelandlord(AlstonandFerrie,Paternalism).89Threeofthesefourworkersweremarriedafter1906,soanydebtshouldhavebeenlistedonthebooks.90Wedefine“class”astheactualjobperformedbytheworkerandnottheheadingunderwhichtheworkerislistedinthesemanario.Forinstance,PedroCehislistedasalunero,butheperformedthejobofaplataformeroeveryday.JuanPabloMaywaslistedasaplataformero,buthegatheredfirewoodfortwodays.Incaseswheretheworkersometimesdidtheworkofaluneroandsometimesdidsomethingelse,weassigntheworkertothejobatwhichheworkedthemostdays. 132Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherTABLE4AVERAGESALARY,DEBT,ANDAGEOFWORKERSLISTEDONJUNE8,1914WEEKLYREPORTAverageSalaryAverageDebtAverageAgeJobCategorySalaryRangeDebtRangeAgeRangeMayocol6.4183.77405.75–7.5062.06–101.2436–44(Supervisor)(3)(3)(2)Luneros5.07123.7237.454.00–5.2528.15–311.1420–53(Wageworker)(49)(50)(42)Diversos3.45139.6756.82.25–3.75112.61–173.6349–60(Diverse)(5)(5)(5)5.66151.4533Skilled3.45–7.500–262.6221–50(32)(19)(15)Muchachos1.5416.421.20–3.00——14–19(Children)(25)(7)Notes:Numberofobservationsinparentheses.Thecategory“skilled”ismadeupofallworkersnotassignedtooneoftheothercategories.Forthepurposesofthistableandtheregression,thewagesofthoseworkerswhoweresickduringpartoftheweekandhadreducedwageswerein-creasedtoa“fullhealth”levelbyextrapolatingtheirfullsalariesfromthedaystheyworked.Source:Nickel(“Sklaverei”)andweeklyreportfromJune8,1914.dayearndifferentwages.Ifweexcludetheold(diversos)andtheyoung(muchachos),therewereonlytwomajorjobcategories,skilledandun-skilled,yetwithinthesecategoriesdebtvariedmorethansalary.WecanvisuallyseetherelationshipbetweenageandsalaryinFigure1A,whichisstepwise,fromtheyoungtofulladults—withdifferencesinsalaryfor91unskilledandskilled—totheold.Consistentwithourobservationof“debtclearingthemarket,”weseeinFigure1Bmuchmorevariationinworkershavingmoreexpensiveweddings,gettingmorebonusgiftsinkindoverthecourseoftheyears,orhavingmoreunexpectedmedicalexpenses.GeneralizingtoomuchfromourresearchonhaciendaItzincabCáma-ramaybeamistakegiventhewidevarietyofreportedpracticesonhe-nequenhaciendas.Butourfindingssuggestpatternsofsalaryanddebtonthishaciendathatwereresponsiveinparttomarketforces.Salarygenerallytrackedthemarginalproductivityofworkers:olderandyoungerworkers,whoweregenerallylessproductive,earnedlowersal-aries.Butmostadultworkersearnedasalarywithinaverynarrowrange.Keepingsalaryrelativelyconstantandallowingdebttoclearthemarkethelpedthehacendadocasthimselfintheroleofbenevolentpa-tronandengenderedloyaltyandhighworkeffortinreciprocity.Ratherthanindicating,asTurnersuggests,that,“Theamountofthedebtdoes91Thedataonagesisoftenquiteinconsistent,withtherecordedagevaryingbyuptoadec-ade.Whenbirthrecordsareavailableandgenerallyconsistentwithlateragerecords,weusethebirthrecordtodeterminetheage.Inothercases,weaveragethevariousreportedages. Coercion,Culture,andContracts1338S76SSSMSSSSMSLLLLLLL5LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLSLLSS4LDDD3CWeeklySalaryin1914D2CCCCC1010203040506070Agein1914FIGURE1AAGEANDSALARYIN1914300.00S250.00SSLSL200.00SLLLSSLLLDSL150.00LLLDLLLLLSDLLSLLDebtin1912LLLLDLLS100.00SSMLSLLLLLLLLLLML50.00LL0.00102030450607Agein1912FIGURE1BAGEANDDEBTIN1912* 134Alston,Mattiace,andNonnenmacherFIGURES1AAND1B—continuedNotes:C=Child;L=Lunero;S=Skilled;M=Mayocol;andD=Diverso.WedidnotincludechildreninFigure1Bbecausetheydidnothaveanydebt.Sources:Nickel(“Sklaverei”),weeklyreportfromJune8,1914,andcivilandparishrecordsfromvariousyears,1888–1912.notmatter,solongasitisdebt,”ourevidencesuggeststhatthetimingandreasonsfordebtwerecarefullyconsideredandplayedimportantrolesinmotivatingandretainingtheworkforce.92CONCLUSIONAgreatdealofthehistoriographyonYucatecanhenequenhaciendassuggeststhatdebtservedmainlytocoercivelybindworkerstotheha-ciendasandhacendados.Whiledebtwascertainlyusedasoneofsever-alpowerfulmechanismstokeepworkersonthehaciendas,ourcasestudyindicatesthatdebtwasgrantedinasystematicmanner,consistentwitha“paternalistic”systemoflaborrelations.Weviewdebtaspartofalargerpackageofpaternalismusedonthehenequenhaciendas,whichincludedsmallpensions,communallandforplanting,moneyforhealthexpenses,andcreditatthehaciendastore.Whilewedonotarguethatthispaternalismalways—orevenoften—resultedinloyaltyonthepartoftheMayanworkers,wearguethatdebthelpedsolidify“loyal-like”behaviorandsomedegreeofreciprocity,particularlyonhaciendaslikeItzincabCámara,wherehacendadoswerenotknowntobeoverlyop-pressive.Ourviewofhowdebtfunctionedonthehaciendasdiffersfrommuchofthehistoriographyoftheregionthatsuggestsamuchweakerformofpaternalism.WellsandJoseph,forexample,arguethatpaternalism“didnoteverfosterstrongbondsofattachmentletaloneculturalunderstand-93ingbetweentheacculturatedMayaandtheirmasters.”Whilewedonothaveevidenceofstrongbondsofattachmentordeepculturalunder-standingbetweenservantsandhacendados,itisstrikingthatthemajori-tyofloansgiventoMayanservantswereforweddingceremoniesandfiestasandforsettlingworkersonthehacienda.WearguethattheseweddingsandfiestaswerecommunalaffairsandcementedsomebondbetweenhacendadosandworkerswithinthecontextofasharedsetofCatholicbeliefs.Wearguefurtherthattheinstitutionalcontext,while92Turner,BarbarousMexico,p.12.Weclearlyrecognizethatourempiricalevidencecomesfromonehacienda;nevertheless,otherevidenceisconsistentwithourinterpretation.Moreover,wehopethatourstudywillleadscholarstosearchformorearchivalrecordsforotherhaciendasinthehenequenzoneinordertotestmorerigorouslyourhypotheses.93WellsandJoseph,Summer,p.164. 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