a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

ID:7288247

大小:1.07 MB

页数:70页

时间:2018-02-10

a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets_第1页
a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets_第2页
a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets_第3页
a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets_第4页
a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets_第5页
资源描述:

《a supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在工程资料-天天文库

1、ASUPPLYANDDEMANDFRAMEWORKFORTWO-SIDEDMATCHINGMARKETSEDUARDOM.AZEVEDOANDJACOBD.LESHNOAbstract.Weproposeanewmodeloftwo-sidedmatchingmarkets,whichallowsforcomplexheterogeneouspreferences,butismoretractablethanthestandardmodel,yieldingrichcomparativestaticsandnewresultsonlargematchingmark

2、ets.WesimplifythestandardGaleandShapley(1962)modelintwoways.First,followingAumann(1964)weconsiderasettingwhereafinitenumberofagentsononeside(collegesorfirms)arematchedtoacontinuummassofagentsontheotherside(studentsorworkers).Second,weshowthat,inboththediscreteandcontinuummodel,stablemat

3、chingshaveaverysimplestructure,withcollegesacceptingstudentsrankedaboveathreshold,andstudentsdemandingtheirfavoritecollegethatwillacceptthem.Moreover,stablematchingsmaybefoundbysolvingforthresholdsthatbalancesupplyanddemandforcolleges.Wegivegeneralconditionsunderwhichthecontinuummodel

4、admitsauniquestablematching,incontrasttothestandarddiscretemodel.Thisstablematchingvariescontinuouslywiththeparametersofthemodel,andcomparativestaticsmaybederivedasincompetitiveequilibriumtheory,throughthemarketclearingequations.Moreover,givenasequenceoflargediscreteeconomiesconvergin

5、gtoalimiteconomy,thesetofstablematchingsofthediscreteeconomiesconvergestothestablematchingofthelimiteconomy.Weboundtherateofconvergenceofthesetofstablematchingsoflargediscreteeconomiestothecontinuumapproximation,andshowthatcomparativestaticsregard-ingtheuniquestablematchingofthecontin

6、uummodelextendtostrongsetorderingofthesetsofstablematchingsofapproximatingdiscreteeconomies.Wemodelthetransferrableutilitycase,asinBecker(1973).Wecharacterizethelimitofschoolchoicemechanismsusedinpractice,generalizingpreviousresultsofCheandKojima(2010).Finally,weillustratethemodel’sap

7、plicabilitybyquantifyinghowcompeti-tioninducedbyschoolchoicegivesschoolsincentivestoinvestinquality.Specifically,weshowthatschoolshavemuted,andpossiblyevennegativeincentivestoinvestinqualitydimensionsthatbenefitlowerrankedstudents.Date:February24,2012.Azevedo:Correspondingauthor,Harvard

8、Unive

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。