a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks

a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks

ID:7286745

大小:479.15 KB

页数:14页

时间:2018-02-10

a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks_第1页
a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks_第2页
a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks_第3页
a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks_第4页
a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks_第5页
资源描述:

《a collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在工程资料-天天文库

1、582IEEE/ACMTRANSACTIONSONNETWORKING,VOL.18,NO.2,APRIL2010ACollusion-ResistantRoutingSchemeforNoncooperativeWirelessAdHocNetworksShengZhong,AssociateMember,IEEE,andFanWu,Member,IEEEAbstract—Inwirelessadhocnetworks,routingneedscoopera-aVCG-basedpaymentsc

2、heme[2]tostimulateintermediatetionofnodes.Sincenodesoftenbelongtodifferentusers,itishighlynodestoforwardpackets.DuetothepropertyofVCGpay-importanttoprovideincentivesforthemtocooperate.However,ment,anindividualnodecannotbenefitfromcheatinginthemostexisti

3、ngstudiesoftheincentive-compatibleroutingproblemroutingprotocol.However,whentwoormorenodescollabora-focusonindividualnodesincentives,assumingthatnosubsetofthemwouldcollude.Clearly,thisassumptionisnotalwaysvalid.tivelycheat,theycanbenefitfromcheating.Hen

4、ce,theresultInthispaper,wepresentasystematicstudyofcollusion-resistantmaybethatsomecolludingnodesgetmoreutilitieswhiletheroutinginnoncooperativewirelessadhocnetworks.Inparticular,overallsystemperformancedegrades.Therefore,itiscrucialtoweconsidertwostan

5、dardsolutionconceptsforcollusionresistancestudyhowtoachievecollusionresistanceinincentive-compat-ingametheory,namelyGroupStrategyproofnessandStrongNashiblerouting.Equilibrium.WeshowthatachievingGroupStrategyproofnessisimpossible,whileachievingStrongNas

6、hEquilibriumispossible.AnelegantresultoncollusionresistancewasobtainedbyMorespecifically,wedesignaschemethatisguaranteedtocon-WangandLiin[33].TheyshowedthatstrategyproofnesscannotvergetoaStrongNashEquilibriumandprovethatthetotalpay-beachievedwhenprofitca

7、nbetransferredbetweencolludingmentneededisbounded.Inaddition,weproposeacryptographicnodes.Whilethisresultiselegantandcrucial,therearefun-methodthatpreventsprofittransferamongcolludingnodes,asdamentalquestionsaboutcollusionresistanceremainingunan-longast

8、heydonotfullytrusteachotherunconditionally.Thismethodmakesourschemewidelyapplicableinpractice.Experi-swered.Forexample,inclassicgametheory,therearestandardmentsshowthatoursolutioniscollusion-resistantandhasgoodsolutionconceptsforcollusi

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。