information control on the principal-agent problem

information control on the principal-agent problem

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时间:2018-02-10

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1、EconomicsDepartmentoftheUniversityofPennsylvaniaInstituteofSocialandEconomicResearch--OsakaUniversityInformationControlinthePrincipal-AgentProblemAuthor(s):JoelSobelReviewedwork(s):Source:InternationalEconomicReview,Vol.34,No.2(May,1993),pp.259-269Publishedby:Wileyforthe

2、EconomicsDepartmentoftheUniversityofPennsylvaniaandInstituteofSocialandEconomicResearch--OsakaUniversityStableURL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526911.Accessed:02/12/201220:18YouruseoftheJSTORarchiveindicatesyouracceptanceoftheTerms&ConditionsofUse,availableat.http://www.

3、jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.JSTORisanot-for-profitservicethathelpsscholars,researchers,andstudentsdiscover,use,andbuilduponawiderangeofcontentinatrusteddigitalarchive.Weuseinformationtechnologyandtoolstoincreaseproductivityandfacilitatenewformsofscholars

4、hip.FormoreinformationaboutJSTOR,pleasecontactsupport@jstor.org..Wiley,EconomicsDepartmentoftheUniversityofPennsylvania,InstituteofSocialandEconomicResearch--OsakaUniversityarecollaboratingwithJSTORtodigitize,preserveandextendaccesstoInternationalEconomicReview.http://ww

5、w.jstor.orgThiscontentdownloadedbytheauthorizeduserfrom192.168.52.64onSun,2Dec201220:18:28PMAllusesubjecttoJSTORTermsandConditionsINTERNATIONALECONOMICMay1993REVIEWVol.34,No.2INFORMATIONCONTROLINTHEPRINCIPAL-AGENTPROBLEM*BYJOELSOBEL'Thispapercomparestheprincipal'spayoffi

6、nagencymodelunderdifferentassumptionsabouttheagent'saccesstoinformation.Theagentmaymakedecisionsbefore(isuninformed)orafter(isinformed)learningthestateofnature.Whentherearetwopossibleoutcomes,theprincipaltypicallyprefersinformedtouninformedagents,whethertheagentreceivest

7、heinformationbeforeoraftercontracting.Thisresultisfalsewhentherearemorethantwooutcomes.Conditionsunderwhichaprincipalprefersoneagenttoanother,whentheagentsdifferonlyintheirdisutilityofeffort,arealsogiven.1.INTRODUCTIONInprincipal-agentmodelsaprincipaldesignsapaymentsched

8、ulebasedonoutput,whichhecanobserve.Heisconstrainedtooffertheagentaminimumlevelofexpectedutility.Outputd

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