Central Bank Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation

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1、WP/12/101CentralBankIndependenceandMacro-prudentialRegulationKenichiUedaandFabiánValencia©2012InternationalMonetaryFundWP/12/101IMFWorkingPaperResearchDepartmentCentralBankIndependenceandMacro-prudentialRegulationPreparedbyKenichiUedaandFabiánValencia1AuthorizedfordistributionbyStijnCl

2、aessensApril2012ThisWorkingPapershouldnotbereportedasrepresentingtheviewsoftheIMF.TheviewsexpressedinthisWorkingPaperarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseoftheIMForIMFpolicy.WorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtofurth

3、erdebate.AbstractWeconsidertheoptimalityofvariousinstitutionalarrangementsforagenciesthatconductmacro-prudentialregulationandmonetarypolicy.Whenacentralbankisinchargeofpriceandfinancialstability,anewtimeinconsistencyproblemmayarise.Ex-ante,thecentralbankchoosesthesociallyoptimallevelof

4、inflation.Ex-post,however,thecentralbankchoosesinflationabovethesocialoptimumtoreducetherealvalueofprivatedebt.Thisinefficientoutcomeariseswhenmacro-prudentialpoliciescannotbeadjustedasfrequentlyasmonetary.Importantly,thisresultarisesevenwhenthecentralbankispoliticallyindependent.Wethe

5、nconsidertheroleofpoliticalpressuresinthespiritofBarroandGordon(1983).Weshowthatifeitherthemacro-prudentialregulatororthecentralbank(orboth)arenotpoliticallyindependent,separationofpriceandfinancialstabilityobjectivesdoesnotdeliverthesocialoptimum.JELClassificationNumbers:C61,E21,G13Ke

6、ywords:MonetaryPolicy,Macro-prudentialRegulation,CentralBankIndependence,Time-inconsistencyAuthors’E-MailAddresses:kueda@imf.org,fvalencia@imf.org1TheauthorsthankLarryBall,OlivierBlanchard,StijnClaessens,GiovanniDell’Ariccia,andLucLaevenforcommentsanddiscussions.2ContentsPageIIntroduct

7、ion.........................................3IIModelSetup.........................................4IIISocialPlannerBenchmark.................................7IVTimeinconsistencyinadual-mandatecentralbank....................8VSeparationofObjectivesAchievesSocialOptimum................