Auctions and Bidding A Primer拍卖与投标:入门

Auctions and Bidding A Primer拍卖与投标:入门

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时间:2019-06-24

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1、JournalofEconomicPerspectives—Volume3,Number3—Summer1989—Pages3–22AuctionsandBidding:APrimerPaulMilgrompaintingcontractoroncecomplainedtomethatthejobsputupforcompeti-Ativebidsareunlikeotherpaintingjobs.IdomostofmyworkforafewbuildersthatI'veknownforyears.Myestimatesofwhatitwillcosttodoajobforo

2、neofthemcomeoutaboutright.Sometimesalittlehigh,sometimeslow,butaboutrightoverall.Occasionally,whenbusinessisslow,Ibidonabigjobforanotherbuilder,butthosejobsaredifferent:TheyalwaysrunmorethanIexpect.Maybethecontractorwasrighttothinkbidjobsaredifferent,butitismorelikelythathesufferedfromtoosimp

3、leaviewofwhatisinvolvedinpreparingacompetitivebid.Ouranalysiswillshowthatevenanexperiencedestimatorworkinginfamiliarterraincanlosemoneyifhedoesn'tunderstandthesubtletiesofcompetitivebidding.Thephenomenonexperiencedbythepaintingcontractor,knownasthe"Winner'sCurse,"isjustoneofthesurprisingandpu

4、zzlingconclusionsthathavebeenturnedupbymodernresearchintoauctions.Anotheristhetheoreticalproposition(supportedalsobysomeexperimentalevidence)that,forexample,asealed-bidTreasurybillauctioninwhicheachbuyerpaysapriceequaltothehighestrejectedbidwouldyieldmorerevenuetotheTreasurythanthecurrentproc

5、edureinwhichthewinningbidderpaystheseeminglyhigheramountequaltohisownbid.Therearealsosubtleresultsthatdemonstratetheequivalenceofsuchapparentlydifferentinstitutionsasthestandardsealed-bidauction,inwhichtheauctioneer/sellersellsthegoodstothehighestbidderforapriceequaltohisbid,andtheDutchauctio

6、n,inwhichtheauctioneer/sellerbeginsbyaskingahighpriceandgraduallylowersthepriceuntil•PaulMilgromisProfessorofEconomics,StanfordUniversity,Stanford,California.4JournalofEconomicPerspectivessomebiddershouts"Mine"toclaimtheitem.Otherresultsexplaintheuseofstandardauctionsasthesellingschemesthatma

7、ximizethewelfareofthebid–taker,orasschemesthatleadtoefficientallocations,minimizetransactioncosts,guardagainstcorruptionbythebid-taker'sagentsormitigatetheeffectsofcollusionamongthebidders.Finally,forsomeenvironments,thetheorymakessharp,testa

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