The Relevance of Equal Splits On a Behavioral Discontinuity in Ultimatum Games

The Relevance of Equal Splits On a Behavioral Discontinuity in Ultimatum Games

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时间:2019-05-27

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1、TherelevanceofequalsplitsOnabehavioraldiscontinuityinultimatumgamesWernerG?th,SteenHuckandWielandM?llerHumboldtUniversityJanuary23,1998AbstractThendingsontheultimatumgameareconsideredasbelongingtothemostrobustexperimentalresults.Inthispaperwepresen

2、taslightlyalteredversionoftheminiultimatumgameofBoltonandZwick(1995).Whereasinthelatterexactlyequalsplitswerefeasibleinourgamesthesewerereplacedbynearlyequalsplitsfavoring(slightly)theproposerinoneversionandtheresponderinasecondversion.Suchaminorchanges

3、houldnotmatterifbehaviorwasrobust.Wefound,however,abehavioraldiscontinuityinthesensethatfairoersoccurlessoftenwhenequalsplitsarereplacedbynearlyequalsplits.Thishasimplicationsfortheoriesincorporatingfairnessintoeconomics.InstituteforEconomicTheoryII,S

4、pandauerStrasse1,10178Berlin,Germany,Fax+493020935706,emailhuck@wiwi.huberlin.deorwmueller@wiwi.huberlin.de.1.IntroductionThendingsontheultimatumgame(seeRoth(1995)forasurvey)areconsideredasbelongingtothemostrobustexperimentalresults.BoltonandZwick(19

5、95),forexample,haveshownthatessentialbehavioralregularitieslikeresponders'willingnesstorejectunfairoersandproposers'propensitytooerequalsplitspertaininultimatumgamesinwhichonlytwooers,afaironeandaunfairone,arefeasible.Hereweinvestigatesuch`miniultima

6、tumgames'inwhichthe`fairoer'canbeslightlyunfair.Ifbehaviorwasrobust,suchsmallpayochangesshouldnotmatter.But,infact,theydo.Replacingtheequalsplitbya`nearlyequalsplit'dramaticallychangesbehavior.Inparticular,thefairoutcomeischosenlessfrequently.Tobemore

7、specic,weinvestigatedthreeminiultimatumgames,oneinthefashionofBoltonandZwickandtwoothersinwhichwereplacedtheequalsplitbyoersonceslightlyfavoringtheproposerandonceslightlyfavoringtheresponder.Moreover,weimplementeda2by2factorialdesignconcerningthemet

8、hodsofelicitingbehavior.Thenaturalwayofimplementingagamewithsequentialmovesis,ofcourse,toletsubjectsplayitsequentially.Then,however,someinformationsetsmaybeseldomlyreachedwhatmakesitdiculttogetasucientdatabase.Toeconomizeonsubj

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