资源描述：
《mechanism design theory .pdf》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。
1、15October2007ScientificbackgroundontheSverigesRiksbankPrizeinEconomicSciencesinMemoryofAlfredNobel2007MechanismDesignTheoryCompiledbythePrizeCommitteeoftheRoyalSwedishAcademyofSciences______________________________________________________________________
2、______________________________InformationDepartment,Box50005,SE-10405Stockholm,SwedenPhone:+4686739500,Fax:+468155670,E-mail:info@kva.se,Website:www.kva.se1IntroductionEconomictransactionstakeplaceinmarkets,withinfirmsandunderahostofotherinstitutionalarra
3、ngements.Somemarketsarefreeofgovernmentinterventionwhileothersareregulated.Withinfirms,sometransactionsareguidedbymarketprices,somearenegotiated,andyetothersaredictatedbymanagement.Mechanismdesigntheoryprovidesacoherentframeworkforanalyzingthisgreatvariet
4、yofinstitutions,or“allocationmechanisms”,withafocusontheproblemsassociatedwithincentivesandprivateinformation.Markets,ormarket-likeinstitutions,oftenallocategoodsandservicesefficiently.Longago,economiststheoreticallyprovedthisefficiencyunderfairlystringentas
5、sump-tionsconcerning,amongotherthings,thenatureofthegoodstobeproducedandtraded,participants’informationaboutthese,andthedegreeofcompetition.Mecha-nismdesigntheoryallowsresearcherstosystematicallyanalyzeandcompareabroadvarietyofinstitutionsunderlessstring
6、entassumptions.Byusinggametheory,mech-anismdesigncangobeyondtheclassicalapproach,and,forexample,explicitlymodelhowpricesareset.Insomecases,thegame-theoreticapproachhasledtoanewappre-ciationofthemarketmechanism.Thetheoryshows,forexample,thatso-calleddoubl
7、eauctions(wherebuyersandsellersposttheirbid-andask-prices)canbeefficienttrad-inginstitutionswheneachtraderhasprivateinformationabouthisorhervaluationsofthegoodstraded.Asthenumberoftradersincreases,thedouble-auctionmechanismwillmoreandmoreefficientlyaggregate
8、privatelyheldinformation,andeventuallyallinformationisreflectedbytheequilibriumprices(Wilson,1985).TheseresultssupportFriedrichHayek’s(1945)argumentthatmarketsefficientlyaggregaterelevantprivateinformation.Mechanismdesigntheo
