外文文献及翻译:corporate governance and financial distress evidence from chinese listed companies

外文文献及翻译:corporate governance and financial distress evidence from chinese listed companies

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公司治理和财务困境—实证材料来自中国上市公司/董事会结构/会计学外文翻译公司治理和财务困境——实证材料来自中国上市公司摘要:我们调查了在中国经济转型的背景下,公司治理的特点和财务困境风险之间的关系中。抽样了96家财务困难的公司和96家财务状况健康的公司,我们发现,大股东的所有权,国有制,和独立董事的比重是财务困境发生的概率呈负相关的关系。此外,管理代理成本是极不利于公司财务状况的。不过,一定程度的平衡所有权,管理层持股,董事会规模,首席执行官兼任董事长的职务重叠对这种财务困境的发生并没有太大影响。此外,我们还测试了从国有企业重组到国有和非国有所有制控股企业的影响。结果表明,公司治理结构不同对这两种形式的公司财务危机状况的影响也不同了。自20世纪80年代起,公司治理已成为财务困境研究的实证课题。以往的研究中验证公司治理和公司失败的关系。Chaganti,Mahajan,和Sharma(1985)调查了21家匹配对零售公司。结果表明,董事会比较大的企业更不容易失败。Dailyand和Dalton(1994a)研究了五十家破产企业,发现首席执行官职务兼任董事长和较低的董事会独立性与高企业破产率有关系。米勒和巴克(1997)用抽样的33匹配的美国公司研究报告说,公司首席执行官兼任董事长和外部人员百分比与周转率成正相关。辛普森和格里森(1999)调查287家银行,他们的调查结果显示,首席执行官兼任董事长与较低的财务困境可能性相关。elloumi和gueyie(2001)研究了46家财务状况正常和46家财务困难的加拿大公司,发现该外部董事和股东的比例与财务困境的发生呈负相关。他们的研究结果还显示,公司外部董事所有权对财政窘迫的概率有负面影响,但外部董事的董事职位,对它有积极的影响。帕克和霍华德(2002)调查了公司治理对企业财务困窘的影响,他们的研究结果表明,那些股东及内部人员持股较高的财务困难企业较容易生存,并且公司总裁的轮换对财务困境公司的生存率有负影响。 Lee和Yeh(2004)以台湾的上市公司为样本,研究控股股东挪用公司财物的风险与企业财务困境发生率之间的关系,他们证实财务困境的发生与这种挪用直径存在着正相关的关系。转型经济背景下公司治理对企业经营失败的影响仍然还在研究中。在转轨经济中,公司治理在中国上市公司中展现了一些典型特征,如不平衡的所有制结构,政府的政治干预,内部人控制,不成熟的管理激励与约束机制,缺乏公司控制权的市场等等。血多中国国内研究者从财务角度研究了中国上市公司的财务困境,但是很少有人系统的研究在中国新兴股票市场中公司治理特征和公司财务困境之间的关系。这些公司治理特征是否包含了一些有关企业财务困境风险的重要信息呢?这些特征能否引入模型中用作解释和预测呢?本次研究的目的在于找出公司治理属性,如所有权结构,董事会组成和管理机构的成本等对公司财务困境发生的影响。我们的文章有两个方面的贡献。第一,我们尝试着对公司治理属性对公司财务困境的作用进行解释和预测。为达到此目的,我们使用了一些以往的研究中很少注意的变数。举例来说,所有制平衡的程度这个指标,是用来衡量最大股东施加给其他大股东压力。管理费用的比例是用来衡量管理代理成本的。第二,我们将样本企业划分为国家控股的公司和非国家控股两种,用来考察国家控制权的作用,然后比较这些属性对这两种形式的上市公司的影响。中国上市公司的公司治理在本世纪90年代,随着世界范围内改进公司治理的潮流,中国越来越清楚地认识到公司治理的重要性。中国资本市场,但仍是一个新兴市场,在一个转轨经济的国情中,公司治理在我国上市公司仍处于起步阶段。我国上市公司公司治理呈现了一些鲜明的特点。其中一个突出的特点就是一股独大和极不均衡的所有制结构。中国公众上市公司股份可分为两类:流通股和非流通股。流通股可以再市场上自由转让,而非流通股不能。流通股进一步分类为国家法人股、社会法人股、外资股、职工股、发行前首次发行的境内个人股。流通股也可以分为A股、B股和H股。非流通股通常占较大比例的股份。几乎所有的大股东都是非流通股东。截至2002年底,非流通股平均占60.6% 。平均而言,最大的和前五大股东分别拥有43.5%和58.8%的公司的股票,而前十名股东只占公司的在外流通股比例的61.4%。在进40%的公司中,第一大股东控制了50%以上的在外流通股。在大约75%的公司,前五大股东拥有的至少有50%的公司股份。一股独大和失衡的股权结构,可能造成一些问题,如大股东架空和降低董事会的独立性。在另一方面,可交易A股,持有过于分散。截至2002年底,A股账户总计6700万美元,其中99.5%是属于个人投资者,只有0.5%属于机构投资者。压倒一切优势的绝大多数非流通股,使少数可交易的股东难以积极参与公司治理。他们往往一走了之。平均来说,在2002年,可交易的A股在中国股市的交易率是2.076;换句话说,可交易A股的平均持有期大约只有5.78个月。第二个特点是,国有股权招致一些主要国家机构间的矛盾。截至2002年底,70.5%的上市公司仍保留国有制。国有股权占所有公司股权的32.8%。对于国有股,最终的股东是人民对中国人民共和国。虽然政府机构持有国有股的控制权,但是分红或收益分配却应提交财政部门。这些政府机构无法从该经公司治理和公司表现中受益。此外,国有企业的风险最终由公共部门和国家承担。在这些条件下,国有控股公司遇到低效的监管机制和道德风险问题就不足为奇了。此外,高层管理人员往往是由党的组织和政府的人事部门事先选定的。随后,董事会就毫无顾忌的比准这项任命。根据这些官僚选拔措施,这些国有企业的管理自然也要追求与政府官员的政治关系,而不是改善性能。第三个特点是内部人员控制。有几个原因造成这个现象。首先,大比例和过分集中的非流通股阻碍市场对企业的控制。缺乏敌意收购和代理竞赛是其管理固步自封。第二,由于可交易股东过于分散,外部人员对公司治理缺乏关心而采取吃白食的做法。监管不足,外部股东往往会产生内幕交易。第三,任人和管理的评价往往是取决于控股股东,因而可能造成寻租行为以及控股股东和管理层之间相互勾结。第四,在中国的公司中经理层持股是非常低的。在2002年经理、董事和监事的平均持股比例是0.000794%,在2001年和0.00251%。既没有长远的,公平为基础的方案也没有以表现为基础的补偿方案被广泛付诸实践。奖励对准股东和管理是不够的,这样会导致一些不道德和机会主义行为。最后,但并非最不重要的,新兴市场缺乏退出机制。破产法滞后, 债权人的权利和利益没有得到妥善的保障。甚至没有已不适合于上市公司破产的法律。到现在为止,在中国没有一个上市公司已经破产,虽然一些上市公司的财务状况已是毫无指望。此外,为了避免造成投资者心理的巨大冲击和市场参与者各方面的利益,监管当局在建立退市法律方面一直持审慎态度。样本的选取和理论基础样本的选取上海证券交易所(上交所)和深圳证券交易所(深交所)在股票上市规则(2001)中是这样定义财务困境的:异常的财务状况.在1998年,中国证券监督管理委员会(证监会)开始对上市公司存在"不正常的财务状况"或"其他情况异常"实施"特殊待遇"(St)。ST公司的每日股票价格波动局限在5%以内。股票上市规则明确规定,如果有下列情形之一,认为上市公司存在"异常的财务情况":1)在过去两年中公司纯利润均为负的。2)在过去一年中每股的资产净值低于每股面值的股票;3)最后一年事务所审计对财务报告提交了一份否定意见或保留意见;4)在过去一年中,由审计师和有关部门认定的股权公允价值低于注册资本;5)由证监会、上交所或者深交所认定的其他财务状况异常的情况。我们专注于"异常的财务状况"的标准,而不是说拖欠债务的义务,因为在中国信贷和债券市场中,债权人权利并没有给予很好的保护并且债务人被债权人的软预算约束所遮蔽。在此背景下,我们使用由证监会制定的财务困境的定义与标准。在我们的研究中包含的的样本是那些在2002和2003年遇到财务困境的公司及其配套公司。数据都是来自于中国研究中心经济学研究所(ccer)的数据库。按一下两点要求选怎配对样本:(1)选择那些与前一年发生了财务困难的标准产业分类四位代码一样的公司。(2)在满足第一个条件的前提下,找一家公司排名最接近该财务困难公司近3年平均总资产的公司。漏报一个其销售额相当于零的困境公司,(有些独立变量是无法计算,如果销售为零),最后样本由97家财务状况困窘公司连同97财务健全的公司组成。理论基础 我们用二元逻辑分析测试企业管治对财务困境风险的影响。采用变量1代表财务困难公司,0代表财务健全公司。收集到一年前发生财务困境的数据。在换句话说,回归模型是建立在一个落后的独立变数上的。为了验证分类结果,我们运用"刀切"的方法。要素与假设所有权结构股权集中度学术界对股权集中度有两种不同的观点:限制吃白食和挪用。格罗斯曼和哈特(1980)认为,广泛分散的所有权激励经理人采取吃白食的方式。Shleifer和vishny(1986)指出,当大股东们有足够的所有权来控制监察经理人时,大股东是有利于吃白食问题的。在另一方面,Shleifer和vishny(1997)也指出如果股权集中度超过某一值时,大股东倾向于追求私人利益,无视小股东的利益。LaPorta(2000)andClaessens(2002)等人支持征用的观点。已有证据实证股权集中度对公司的失败的影响。Elloumi和Gueyie(2001)、Parker和Howard(2002)发现,有大股东的公司更有可能摆脱财政困难。不过,LeeandYeh(2004)发现,财务困境的风险与控股股东的征用是呈正相关。至于中国的股份公司,徐和王(1997)报告中指出,产权集中与一家公司的业绩之间的关系是显正相关的。不过,目前还不清楚股权集中度是如何影响我国上市公司的财务困境的。在这里,我们使用比值来衡量股权集中度:最大的股东所持股份(%)作为衡量最大的股东持有的股份的百分比和前五大股东所持股份(%)作为衡量由前五大股东股份总和的百分比。此外,基于上述论点,我们可以推断,在多数情况下,公司主要是由最大的股东控制,因为他们有庞大股权(平均近44%)。同时一些研究表明,从其他大股东能产生制衡权力监管控股股东。衡量限制大股东中,我们使用公司前五股东持股比例除以最大股东持股比例的比率作为衡量所有权平衡的程度。国有制一些研究表明,国家控股将给企业带来效率。比如,Shleifer和Vishny(1994),Boycko,,Shleifer,和Vishny(1996) 都表示政客们为了达到政治目标利用补贴和受贿将会给公司经营带来不利影响。而私有化会增加他们的成本,从而导致出现有效率的公司。LaPorta和Lopez-de-Silanes(1999)表示民营化可以改善盈利能力,虽然它可能造成社会的损失。然而,Anderson,Lee,和Murrell(2000)发现蒙古的新私有化企业中,那些保留了国有制的企业比其他的更有效率,因为政府正致力于提高办事效率。对于中国上市公司而言,我们猜想政府机构间的问题,导致了有关国企业绩下滑。Xu和Wang(1997)、Wei和Varela(2003)的实证表明国有股的比例与这家公司的业绩是负相关的。但是,国家控股公司往往背负的公共责任,如促进就业和保留经济稳定。由于财务危机的不利影响可能会损害国企的公共职能,政府是不可能无视这些公司困难的。他们就会执行一些行政手段和政治干预以阻止这些问题国企出现财务危机。此外,那些委派的国企管理者为了抱住他们的政治前途,将会与这种困难作斗争。亏损企业仍能生存,这在中国国有和国有控股企业中并不是一个奇怪现象。综上述,我们认为国有制与财务危发生的概率是负相关的。国家所有制(%),是衡量国家所有股份的比例的。经理层持股治理—收益假说(Jensen和Meckling1976),中立假说(Demsetz1983),守旧假说(Shleifer和Vishny1989)代表了目前经理层持股对公司治理的影响的几种观点。一些实证调查还显示了,经理层持股和企业经营失败的风险之间不和谐的关系的结论(比如,ParkerandHoward2002;SimpsonandGleason1999;Teall1993).我国公司法规定,董事,监事,经理人在其任职期间是禁止转让其股份的。因此,对公司持有股份的管理层来说,是不容易提前退出公司财务危机的。但它仍然不能确定经理层持股是如何对财务困境产生影响的。经理层持股,是衡量经理人,董事,及监事持有股份比例的。董事会的组成和结构董事会规模从董事会监督职能的角度来看,Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)表示规模较大的董事会更难协调,这样会给让经理人更多的回旋余地追求其个人目标。yermack(1996),也提供证据 表明董事会规模较小的公司在财务方面执行得更有效,以及在这些公司中的CEO由于补偿和被解雇的威胁,工作更有干劲。一些研究者研究董事会的战略功能。JudgeandZeithaml(1992)报告显示,董事会规模和多样性与其参与公司战略决策负相关,另外,董事会的参与良好的财务有一定的影响。Goodstein,Gautam,andBoeker(1994)却争辩说但公司所处环境改变时,一个大且复杂多样的董事会将会限制公司战略转变的效力。但是,资源依赖理论认为,增加董事会规模和多样化,可以有利于企业扩大与之相关的外部环境,并提供更多的急需资源(PearceandZahra1992;Pfeffer1972)。我们用董事会成员衡量董事会规模。考虑到董事会的监察和战略功能,我们认为一个大的董事会更容易导致财务危机。董事长兼任首席执行官一些研究者认为,公司首席执行官的职务应该与董事长分离开来,因为这两个职务重叠将会降低董事会的独立性,削弱董事会的监察效力,增加了首席执行官的自我包庇能力(BaysingerandHoskisson1990;RechnerandDalton1991;Jensen1993)。在另一方面,倡议者认为到首席执行官职务重叠将加强内部领导,实现指挥系统的统一,并避免行政总裁及董事局主席的冲突(Davis,Schoorman,andDonaldson1997;DonaldsonandDavis1991)。在这个问题上的实证结果意见不一。DailyandDalton(1994b)用证据表明首席执行官职务重叠与企业破产呈正相关。SimpsonandGleason(1999)却认为CEO与董事会主席有同一个人担任会减小财务危机的发生概率。然而,又Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)认为CEO职务重叠与公司破产没关系。考虑到CEO的决策和风险承担职能,我们假定其职务与董事长分离将有利于减低公司发生财务危机的风险。独立董事根据监事会的规定,独立董事不得在他们人之的上市公司担任任何行政职务。同时,为了维护他们行事的独立性和客观性,他们也不能与公司有任何业务往来或者与公司主要股东有任何关系。此外,独立董事不得直接或间接持有超过上市公司总数的1%的股份。代理理论认为从管理中独立开来是董事会监督职能的一个关键点(Fama1980;FamaandJensen1983;Jensen1993).。 独立董事承担着监督和评价公司管理活动的职责(JensenandMeckling1976)。反过来说,管理霸权理论认为,由于管理被统治,非执行董事在公司决策中的作用是有限的(WestphalandFredrickson2001)。其他研究人员指出,外部董事不具备公司和行业专门知识或经验,以履行好其职责(BaysingerandHoskisson1990;Estes1980)。现有的观点不统一。Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)andSimpsonandGleason(1999)认为内部和外部董事的比例与公司经营失败没关系。elloumi和gueyie(2001年)的结果表明那些发生财务危机的公司的董事会只有少量的外部人员。由于独立董事代表着或大或小的管理约束,在这里,我们假定独立董事的比重与财务困境呈负相关。管理代理成本根据JensenandMeckling(1976)的代理理论,管理代理成本随着公司所有权和经营权的分离而增加。作为股东的管理代理人更倾向于浪费公司资源来满足他的盈利目的。现有文献中使用销售费用,一般性及行政的开支作为直接代理成本。在这里我们将管理费用作为代理成本。在中国一般会计准则中费用支出,包括管理,销售,财务费用。管理费用包括管理层的工资、日常行政开支、差旅费、接待费、会议开支、福利开支及其他在公司经营中管理层的支出。人们普遍认为,在中国的公司中管理团队管理费用甚至其中汽车,聚餐,旅游,奢侈办公设施,和娱乐。因此,管理费用可以被认为是一个隐蔽的分配公司资源的行为。为了控制企业的规模和产出,我们用销售来规范管理费用。我们认为,管理代理成本增加了财务困境的可能性,因为首先,就业福利导致公司资源的减缩;第二,更高的管理决策权,在相当大的程度上,增加了与更多机构间的冲突(SinghandDavidson2003),以及足监督的难度(Ang,Cole,andLin2000).。研究模型我们使用下列Logistic回归模型来检验假设关系:LogitPi=α0+α1Financialleveragei+α2Liquidityi+α3AnnualCARsi+α4Governanceattributei+εi假设pi=p(i=1)表示第i个公司发生财务危机的概率。Governanceattributei则是描述第i个公司一个治理变数,在模型 中,我们使用财务杠杆,流动性,及每年累积异常报酬作为控制变量。财务杠杆是公司总负债与总资产的比例,流动资金比率是流动资产与流动负债的比例。它们被用来控制一个公司的财务状况。我们还利用每年累积异常报酬,以反映一些具体的资料,涉及可反映在市场上的评价与期待的公司的战略决策或工作表现。年累计异常报酬:ARi,t=Ri,t–Rm,t,Ri,t=第i个公司在第t天的股票收益率Rm,t=第t天上证股指/深证股指;N是一年中总的交易天数。结论至今很少有研究公司治理特征和中国的企业财务困境的关系。这篇文章就是其中的第一个调查在中国的过渡经济的背景下,治理结构和管理代理成本属性是否有助于解释财务困境的发生。我们的研究结果显示,大股东的所有权和国家所有权财务危机的概率有负面影响。经理层持股似乎与财务危机无关。独立董事的比重是一个重要因素,较高比例的独立董事,可能会导致以低概率的财务困境。不过,其他两个董事会组成变数——董事会规模和首席执行官职务重叠就不那么重要了。我们特别调查管理代理成本对财务困境的风险的影响。管理费用率作为衡量管理代理成本的指标,与财务危机发生的概率正相关,就是说管理代理问题确实在损害公司的财务状况。此外,我们还调查国家控股和非国有控股的公司治理的不同。我们发现,这两种所有制形式下的公司所有制结构,董事会构成,管理代理成本等属性对公司治理影响不同。现在正当中国在大力倡导公司治理改革,我们的研究在公司治理对公司财务健康的作用提供了一些启示。然而,有些问题仍需进一步研究。比如,中国上市公司的大股东利用各种隐秘技术侵吞公司资金。在许多情况下,他们与上市公司进行不公平的价格的关联方交易。他们还经常持有公司资产质押贷款。 进一步的研究,要着重征用土地的行为对企业财务的困扰影响。译文原文出处:TheChineseEconomy,vol.39,no.5,September–October2006,pp.5–27.©2006M.E.Sharpe,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ISSN1097–1475/2006$9.50+0.00.DOI10.2753/CES1097-1475390501Zong-junWangisaprofessoroftheSchoolofManagement,HuazhongUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Wuhan,Hubei,China.Xiao-lanDengisaPh.D.studentattheSchoolofManagement,HuazhongUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Wuhan,Hubei,China,andalectureratFuzhouUniversity.CorporateGovernanceandFinancialDistressEvidencefromChineseListedCompaniesAbstract:WeinvestigatetherelationshipbetweencorporategovernancecharacteristicsandtheriskoffinancialdistressinthecontextoftheChinesetransitionaleconomy.Usingasampleofninety-sixfinanciallydistressedcompaniesandninetysixhealthycompanies,wefindthatlargeshareholderownership,stateownership,andtheproportionofindependentdirectorsarenegativelyassociatedwiththeprobabilityofdistress.Additionally,managerialagencycostsarebadlydetrimentaltoacompany’sfinancialstatus.However,thedegreeofbalancedownership,managerialownership,boardsize,andCEOdualitydonotsignificantlyaffecttheprobabilityofdefault.Furthermore,wetesttheinfluenceofstate-controllingrightbysubgroupingthesampleintostate-controlledandnon–state-controlledcompanies.Theresultsindicatethatcorporate-governanceattributesactdifferentlyonthestatusoffinancialdistressbetweenthetwosubsamples.Corporategovernancehasbeenanempiricaltopicinthestudyoffinancialdistress。Sincethe1980s.Previousstudiesvalidatetherelationshipbetweencorporategovernanceandcorporatefailure.Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)investigatedtwenty-onematchedpairsofretailcompanies.Theresultsshowedthatcompanieswithlargerboardsarelesslikelytofail.DailyandDalton(1994a)studiedfiftymatchedpairsofbankruptcompaniesandfoundthatCEOdualityandlowerindependenceofdirectorsareassociatedwithhigherprobabilityofbankruptcy.MuellerandBarker(1997)reportthatCEOdualityandthepercentageofoutsidersarepositivelyrelatedtoturnaroundsusingasampleofthirty-threematchedpairsofU.S.companies.SimpsonandGleason(1999)surveyed287bankingfirmsandtheirfindingsshowthatCEOdualityisassociatedwithlowerlikelihoodoffinancialdistress.ElloumiandGueyie(2001)examinedforty-sixhealthyandforty-sixdistressedCanadiancompaniesandfoundthattheproportionofoutsidedirectorsandblockholders’ownershipare negativelyrelatedtofinancialdistress.Theirfindingsalsosuggestthattheoutsidedirector’sownershiphasanegativeeffectontheprobabilityoffinancialdistress,buttheoutsidedirector’sdirectorshiphasapositiveaffect.ParkerandHoward(2002)investigatedtheimpactofcorporategovernanceattributesonthesurvivalofdistressedfirms.Theirfindingsshowthatdistressedfirmswhoseblockholderandinsiderownershiparehigheraremorelikelytosurvive,andCEOturnoverhasanegativeimpactonthelikelihoodofsurvival.LeeandYeh(2004)testtherelationshipbetweentheriskofwealthexpropriationbythecontrollingshareholdersandtheprobabilityoffinancialdistressusingasampleoffirmslistedinTaiwan.Theirevidencerevealsapositiverelationshipbetweentheriskoffinancialdistressandthistypeofexpropriation.Theimpactofcorporategovernanceoncorporatefailureinthecontextofthetransitionaleconomy,however,isstillunderexamined.Inthetransitionaleconomy,corporategovernanceinChineselistedcompaniesexhibitssometypicalfeaturessuchasexcessiveunevenownershipstructure,governmentpoliticalintervention,insidercontrol,immaturityofmanagerialincentivesandconstraints,lackofthemarketforcorporatecontrol,andsoon.ManyChinesedomesticresearchershavestudiedthefinancialdistressofChineselistedcompaniesfromfinancialperspectives,butfewstudiestestsystematicallytheassociationbetweencorporategovernancecharacteristicsandcorporatefinancialdistressintheemergingChinesestockmarket.Dothesecorporategovernancecharacteristicscontainsomeimportantinformationrelatedtotheriskoffinancialdistress?Cantheintroductionofthesecharacteristicsaddtotheexplanatoryandpredictivepowerofthemodels?TheaimofthisstudytofindouthowfinancialdistressinChineselistedcompaniesisinfluencedbygovernanceattributes,suchasownershipstructure,boardcomposition,andmanagerialagencycosts.Thecontributionofourarticlehastwoaspects.First,wetesttheexplanatoryandpredicativepowerofsomecorporategovernanceattributesforChineselistedcompanies’financialdistress.Forthispurpose,weusesomevariablestowhichpreviousstudiesgavelittleattention.Forexample,theindicatorofdegreeofownershipbalanceisdesignedtomeasurethecounterweighingpowerbeingimposedonthelargestshareholderbytheotherlargeshareholders.Also,theadministrativeexpenseratioisintroducedtoserveasthemeasureofmanagerialagencycosts.Second,weexaminetheroleofstatecontrollingrightbyclassifyingthesampleintostate-controlledcompaniesandnon–state-controlledcompanies,andthencomparingtheeffectsoftheseattributesbetweentwodifferentsubsamples.CorporateGovernanceinChineseListedCompaniesDuringthe1990s,alongwiththeworldwidetideofimprovementincorporategovernance,Chinaincreasinglyrecognizedtheimportanceofcorporategovernance.TheChinesecapitalmarket,however,isstillanemergingone,andundertheconditionsofatransitionaleconomy,corporategovernanceinChineselistedcompaniesisstillinitsinfancy.TherearesomedistinctivecharacteristicsinChineselistedcompanies’corporategovernance.Oneprominentcharacteristicistheseparateandextremelyunevenownershipstructure.SharesinChinesepublic-listedcompaniesareclassifiedintotwocategories:tradablesharesandnontradableshares.ThetradablesharescanbetradedontheChineseexchanges,whilethenontradablesharesarenotallowedtotransferinthestockmarkets.Thetradablesharesarefurthergroupedintostateshares,domesticfoundershares,foreignfoundershares,employeeshares,andlegalpersonshares issuedbeforeaninitialpublicoffering(IPO).TradablesharescanbeseparatedintoAshares,Bshares,andHshares.Nontradablesharestakeupalargeproportionofoutstandingshares.Almostallofthelargeshareholdersarenontradableshareholders.Attheendof2002,theaveragenontradablesharesaccountedfor60.6percent.Onaverage,thetoponeandtopfiveshareholdersowned43.5percentand58.8percentoftheircompany’sshares,respectively,whiletop-tenshareholdersjustowned61.4percentofthecompany’soutstandingshares.Innearly40percentofallthecompanies,thetopshareholdercontrolledabove50percentoftheoutstandingshares;inaround75percentofallthecompanies,thetopfiveshareholdersownedatleast50percentofthecompanies’shares.1Theseparateandunevenownershipstructuremaycausesomeproblems,suchaslargeshareholderexpropriationandlowerindependenceoftheboard.Ontheotherhand,thetradableAsharesheldareoverlydispersed.Attheendof2002,thenumberofA-shareaccountstotaled67million,ofwhich99.5percentbelongedtoindividualinvestorsandonly0.5percentbelongedtoinstitutionalinvestors.2Theoverwhelmingmajorityofnontradablesharesmakeitdifficultforminoritytradableshareholderstotakeanactivepartincorporategovernance.Theytendtovotewiththeirfeet.Onaverage,theturnoverrate3ofthetradableAstockslistedontheChineseexchangeswas2.076in2002;inotherwords,theaverageholdingperiodoftheatradablestockwasonlyabout5.78months.Asecondcharacteristicisthatstateshareholdingincurssomeprincipal-agencyproblems.Attheendof2002,70.5percentofallthelistedcompaniesstillretainedresidualstateownership.Theaveragepercentageofstateshareholdingforallthecompanieswas32.8percent.Forstateshares,theultimateshareholdersarethepeopleofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.Althoughthegovernmentagenciesholdthecontrolrightsofthestateshares,thedividendsorgainsdistributedtothesesharesshouldbesubmittedtofinancedepartments.Thegovernmentagenciescannotbenefitfromimprovementincorporategovernanceandthecompanies’performance.Moreover,theriskresidualofstatesharesisultimatelybornbythepublicorthestate.Undertheseconditions,itisnotsurprisingthatstate-ownedcompaniesshouldencounterinefficientmonitoringmechanismsandmoralhazardproblems(Lin2001).Moreover,topmanagementisoftenselectedbeforehandbythepartyorganizationandthegovernment’spersonneldepartment.Theboardthenrubber-stampstheappointment.Underthesebureaucraticselectionmeasures,themanagementofthestateshareholdingcompaniesnaturallypursuesapoliticalrelationshipwithgovernmentofficialsratherthanimprovementinperformance.Thethirdcharacteristicofcorporategovernanceistheproblemofinsidercontrol.Thereareafewcausesforthisphenomenon.First,alargeproportionandexcessiveconcentrationofnontradableshareholdingsimpedetheemergenceofthemarketforcorporatecontrol.Thelackofbothhostiletakeoverandproxycontestsfacilitatesmanagemententrenchment.Second,duetothewidelydispersedtradableshareholders,outsidetradableshareholdershaveanincentivetotakeafreeride.Insufficientmonitoringfromoutsideshareholderstendstoengenderinsiderdiscretion.Third,theappointmentandevaluationofmanagementareoftendeterminedbythecontrollingshareholders,whichmayresultinrent-seekingbehaviorandcollusionbetweenthecontrollingshareholdersandmanagement.Fourth,inChinesecompanies,managerialownershipisextraordinarilylow.Theaverageproportionofownershipinthehandsofmanagement,directors,andsupervisorswas0.000794percentin2001and0.00251percentin2002.Neitherlong-term,equity-basedprogramsnorperformance-basedcompensationprogramsarewidelyputinto practice.Theincentivealignmentbetweentheshareholdersandmanagementisinadequate,whichconsequentlyinvitessomeimmoralandopportunisticbehavior.Last,butnotleast,theemergingmarketlacksanexitmechanism.LegislativeactionontheBankruptcyLawislaggingbehind.Creditors’rightsandinterestsarenotproperlysafeguarded.Thereisnotevenalawthatappliestothebankruptcyoflistedcompanies.Uptonow,noneofthelistedcompanieshasgonebankruptinChina,thoughthefinancialstatusofsomeofthelistedcompaniesistotallyhopeless.Inaddition,inordertoavoidcausingenormousshocktoinvestorpsychologyandtosheltertheinterestsofvariousmarketparticipants,theregulatoryauthoritieshavealwaysbeencautiousinestablishingdelistingconstitution.Asamatteroffact,thedefactodelistingmeasureswerenottakenuntilFebruary2001,4nearlytenyearsaftertheestablishmentofstockexchangesinChina.SampleSelectionandMethodologySampleSelectionThedefinitionoffinancialdistressis“abnormalityoffinancialsituation”asdefinedintheStockListingRule(2001)oftheShanghaiStockExchange(SHSE)andShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE).In1998,theChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)begantoexecute“specialtreatment”(ST)onlistedcompaniesthatsufferedfroman“abnormalfinancialsituation”or“othersituationabnormality.”Thedailystock-pricefluctuationofSTcompaniesisconfinedwithin5percent.TheStockListingRulespecifiedthatifoneofthefollowingsituationsoccurs,thelistedcompanyisclassifiedasencounteringan“abnormalityoffinancialsituation”:1)thenetprofitsinthelasttwoyearswerenegative;2)thevalueofthenetworthpersharewaslessthanthefacevalueofthestockinthelastyear;3)theauditorpresentedanadverseopinionoradisclaimeropiniononthefinancialreportofthelastyear;4)thevalueoftheequityownershiprecognizedbytheauditorandthedepartmentsconcernedwaslessthanthevalueofregisteredcapitalinthelastyear;and5)otherfinancialsituationabnormalityjudgedbyCSRC,orSHSEandSZSE.Wefocusonthestandardof“abnormalityoffinancialsituation”insteadofthatofdefaultondebtobligationbecauseintheChinesecreditandbondmarket,creditors’rightsarenotgivengoodprotectionandthedebtorsareoftenshieldedbythesoftbudgetconstraintofthecreditors.5Inthiscontext,weusethedefinitionoffinancialdistressconsistentwiththecriteriaformulatedbytheCSRC.Thesampleinourstudyconsistsofthecompaniesthatencounteredfinancialdistressin2002and2003,incombinationwiththeirmatchingcompanies.ThesourcesofthedatawerederivedfromtheChinaCenterforEconomicsResearch(CCER)Database.Thematchingsampleswerechoseninorderfollowingtworequirements:(1)selectingcompanieswhosefirsttwooftheprincipalfour-digitStandardIndustrialClassification(SIC)codeisthesameasthatofthedistressedcompanyfortheyearpriortofinancialdistress;and(2)undertheconditionthatthefirstrequirementissatisfied,findingacompanythatranksclosesttothedistressedcompanyinaveragetotalassetsofthelastthreeyearspriortofinancialdistress.Byomittingonedistressedcompanywhosesalesequaledzero(someindependentvariablesareunabletobecalculated,ifthesalesequalzero),thefinalsampleconsistedofninety-sevenfinanciallydistressedcompanies,togetherwithninety-sevenmatchinghealthycompanies. MethodologyWeusebinarylogisticanalysistotesttheimpactofcorporategovernanceattributesontheriskoffinancialdistress.Thedependantvariableequalsoneforthedistressedcompaniesandzeroforthehealthycompanies.Thedataarecollectedoneyearpriortotheoccurrenceoffinancialdistress.Inotherwords,theregressionmodelsareestablishedwithone-laggedindependentvariables.Inordertovalidatetheclassificationresults,weemploythe“jackknife”method.6ProxiesandHypothesisDevelopmentOwnershipStructureOwnershipConcentrationTherearetwodifferentviewsintheliteratureontherolesofownershipconcentration:restrictiononfreerideandexpropriation.GrossmanandHart(1980)arguethatwidelydispersedownershipmotivatesshareholderstotakeafreerideontheimprovementsgeneratedbytheraiders.ShleiferandVishny(1986)notethatlargeshareholderswillhaveincentivestomonitorthemanagerswhentheyhaveenoughownershipcontrol,andtheexistenceoflargeshareholdersishelpfulinalleviatingthefree-rideproblem.Ontheotherhand,ShleiferandVishny(1997)alsopointoutthatiftheownershipconcentrationexceedsacertainthreshold,largeshareholdersareinclinedtopursueprivatebenefitsdisregardingtheinterestofminorityshareholders.TheviewpointofexpropriationisalsosupportedbyLaPortaetal.(2000)andClaessensetal.(2002).Therehasbeenempiricalevidenceconcerningtheeffectofownershipconcentrationoncorporatefailure.ElloumiandGueyie(2001)andParkerandHoward(2002)findthatfirmswithlargerblockholderownershiparemorelikelytogetoverfinancialdifficulties.However,LeeandYeh(2004)findthattheriskoffinancialdistressispositivelyassociatedwithexpropriationbythecontrollingshareholders.AsforChinesestockcompanies,XuandWang(1997)reportthattherelationshipbetweenownershipconcentrationandafirm’sperformanceissignificantlypositive.However,itisstillunclearhowownershipconcentrationaffectsChineselistedcompanies’financialdistress.Hereweusetwoconcentrationratiostomeasureownershipconcentration:thelargestshareholders’ownership(percent)measuredasthepercentageofsharesheldbylargestshareholdersandthetopfiveshareholders’ownership(percent)measuredasthesumofpercentageofsharesheldbythetopfiveshareholders.Furthermore,basedontheabovearguments,weinferthatinmostcasesthecompaniesaredominatedbythelargestshareholdersbecauseoftheirexcessivelylargeshareholding(nearly44percentonaverage).Assomestudiessuggest,thecounterweightpowerfromotherlargeshareholderscangenerateamechanismtomonitorthecontrollingshareholderandmitigatediversion(LaPortaetal.2000;PaganoandRoel1998;BennedsenandWolfenzon2000).Tocapturetherestrictiononthelargestshareholder,weusethepercentageofsharesheldbythetopfiveshareholdersdividedbythepercentageofsharesheldbythelargestshareholdersasthemeasureofthedegreeofownershipbalance.StateOwnershipSomeresearchershaveproventhatwithdrawalofstatesharesbringsaboutefficiency.Forexample,ShleiferandVishny(1994)andBoycko,Shleifer,andVishny(1996)showthatpoliticiansusesubsidiesandbribestoinfluencestatefirmsinordertorealizepoliticalobjectivesthatmayconflictwiththefirms’operatingefficiency.Privatizationincreasestheircostforthisinfluenceandthenleadstoanefficientrestructuringofthesefirms.LaPortaandLopez-de-Silanes (1999)showthatprivatizationcanbringaboutimprovementofprofitability,althoughitmaycausesociallosses.Conversely,Anderson,Lee,andMurrell(2000)findthatamongMongolia’snewlyprivatizedenterprises,thosewithresidualstateownershipprovemoreefficientthantheothers,becausethegovernmentissubjecttothepressureofimprovingefficiency.RegardingChineselistedcompanies,weconjecturethattheprincipal-agencyproblemrelatedtostateshareholdingleadstoperformancedecline.XuandWang(1997)andWeiandVarela(2003)presentempiricalresultstoshowthattheproportionofstatesharesisnegativelyrelatedtoChinesefirms’performance.However,stateshareholdingcompaniesareoftenburdenedwithpublicresponsibilities,suchaspromotingemploymentandretainingeconomicstability.Astheadverseimpactsoffinancialdistressmayimpairthestateshareholdingcompanies’publicfunction,thegovernmentisunlikelytodisregardthesecompaniesundergoingdistress.Someadministrativecontrolandpoliticalinterventionmustbeexecutedtohindertheproblematiccompaniesfromgettingintodistress.Inaddition,themanagersofstateshareholdingcompanies,whowerepracticallyselectedinabureaucraticway,willstruggleagainstdistresssoastoprotecttheirpoliticalprospects.“Survivalwithpoorperformance”isnotapeculiarphenomenonamongChinesestate-ownedenterprises.Inthiscontext,wehypothesizethatstateownershipisnegativelyrelatedtotheprobabilityoffinancialdistress.Stateownership(percent)ismeasuredasthepercentageofsharesownedbythestate.ManagerialOwnershipTheconvergence-of-interesthypothesis(JensenandMeckling1976),theneutralityhypothesis(Demsetz1983),andtheentrenchmenthypothesis(ShleiferandVishny1989)presentdivergentperspectivesconcerningtheeffectofmanagerialownershiponcorporategovernance.Someempiricalinvestigationalsopresentsdiscordantconclusionsaboutrelationsbetweenmanagerialownershipandtheriskoffailure(forexample,ParkerandHoward2002;SimpsonandGleason1999;Teall1993).ChineseCorporateLawstipulatesthatdirectors,supervisors,andmanagersareforbiddentotransfertheirsharesduringtheirincumbentperiods.Thus,formanagerialowners,itisnoteasytoexitpriortotheeventoffinancialdistress.Itisstillnotcertainhowmanagerialownershipinfluencesfinancialdistress.Managerialownershipismeasuredasthepercentageofsharesheldbymanagers,directors,andsupervisors.BoardCompositionandStructureBoardSizeFromtheperspectiveoftheboard’smonitoringfunction,Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)showthatlargerboardshavemoredifficultycoordinating,whichgivesmanagersmorelatitudetopursuetheirpersonalgoals.Yermack(1996)alsoprovidestheevidencethatcompanieswithsmallerboardsexhibitmoreeffectivenessinfinancialperformance,andtheCEOinthesmallerboardhasstrongerincentivesduetocompensationandthethreatofdismissal.Someresearchersinvestigatetheboard’sstrategicfunction.JudgeandZeithaml(1992)reportthatboardsizeanddiversityarenegativelyrelatedtoboardinvolvementinstrategicdecisionsand,further,boardinvolvementhasafavorableimpactonfinancialperformance.Goodstein,Gautam,andBoeker(1994)arguethatalargeanddiverseboardwouldhavelimitedeffectivenessindirectingstrategicchangewhenthefirmfallsintoenvironmentalturbulence.However,resourcedependencetheoryholdsthatincreasedboardsizeanddiversificationmaybenefitfirmsbybroadeninglinkagetotheexternalenvironmentandofferinggreaterneededresources(PearceandZahra1992;Pfeffer1972). Wemeasureboardsizeasthenumberofboardmembers.Consideringtheboard’smonitoringandstrategicmechanism,itissuggestedthatafirmwithalargerboardwouldbemorelikelytoresultindistress.CEODualitySomeresearchersaguethatthepositionofCEOshouldbeseparatefromthepositionofboardchairmanbecausethedualityleadstolowerboardindependence,reductioninboardmonitoringeffectiveness,andCEOentrenchment(BaysingerandHoskisson1990;RechnerandDalton1991;Jensen1993).Ontheotherhand,proponentsnotethatCEOdualitywillstrengthendefiniteleadership,achieveunityofcommand,andavoidconflictbetweenCEOandboardchairman(Davis,Schoorman,andDonaldson1997;DonaldsonandDavis1991).Theempiricalresultsonthisissuearemixed.DailyandDalton(1994b)provideevidencethatCEOdualityispositivelyrelatedwithbankruptcy.SimpsonandGleason(1999)findthecombinationofCEOandchairmanintoonepositionreducestheprobabilityoffinancialdistress.However,Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)findnorelationshipbetweenthedualitystructureandbankruptcy.WithaviewtotheproblemsofCEOdiscretionandrisk-takingbehavior,weassumethatseparationfromthechairman’spositionwouldbeamorefeasiblemechanisminreducingtheriskofcompanydistress.IndependentDirectorsAccordingtotheCSRC,independentdirectorsarenotallowedtooccupyanyexecutivepositionsinthelistedcompanywheretheyareengaged.Alsotheyarenotallowedtobeinvolvedinanybusinessorotherrelationshipwiththecompaniesorthemajorshareholdersthatwillpreventthemfromactingindependentlyorobjectively.Inaddition,independentdirectorsareprohibitedfromdirectlyorindirectlyholdingmorethan1percentofthelistedcompany’stotalshares.Agencytheoristsconsiderindependencefrommanagementasacrucialboardattributeoftheboard’smonitoringrole(Fama1980;FamaandJensen1983;Jensen1993).Independentdirectorsassumetheresponsibilitiesofmonitoringandevaluatingmanagement(JensenandMeckling1976).Conversely,managerialhegemonytheoryholdsthatduetomanagerialdomination,theroleofnonexecutivedirectorsinstrategicdecisionmakingislimited(WestphalandFredrickson2001).Otherresearcherspointoutthatoutsidedirectorsdonothavetherequisitecompany-andindustry-specificknowledgeorexpertisetoimplementtheirdutieswell(BaysingerandHoskisson1990;Estes1980).Theexistingempiricalevidenceismixed.Chaganti,Mahajan,andSharma(1985)andSimpsonandGleason(1999)findnorelationshipbetweencorporatefailureandtheproportionofoutsidersorinsiders.EmpiricalresultsinElloumiandGueyie(2001)indicatethatboardsoffinanciallydistressedfirmshavefeweroutsidemembers.Sincetheindependentdirectorspresentagreaterorlesserconstraintonmanagement,herewehypothesizethattheproportionofindependentdirectorsisnegativelyrelatedtofinancialdistress.ManagerialAgencyCostsAccordingtotheagencytheoryinJensenandMeckling(1976),managerialagencycostsincreasewiththeseparationofownershipandcontrol.Management,astheagentofshareholders,isinclinedtowastecorporateresourcestosatisfyitsexploitativepurposes.Existingliteraturesuseoperatingexpenses(Ang,Cole,andLin2000)7orselling,general,andadministrative(SG&A)expenses(SinghandDavidson2003)8asthemeasuresofdirectagencycosts.Herewemeasureagencycostsbyadministrativeexpenses.InChina’sgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciple(GAAP)items,expensesincludeadministrative,selling,andfinancialexpenses.Administrative expensescovermanagerialsalaries,executiveexpenses,travelingexpenses,entertainmentexpenses,utilities,conferenceexpenditure,welfarepayments,andotherexpenditureincurredinorganizingandmanagingcorporateoperations.Itiscommonlyobservedthat,inChinesecompanies,amanagementteamdissipatesadministrativeexpensesamongautomobiles,banquets,travel,luxuryofficialfacilities,andevenrecreation.Thus,administrativeexpensescanberegardedasacloseproxyforperquisiteconsumptionandmanagerialdiscretioninallocatingcorporateresources.Tocontrolcorporatesizeandoutput,westandardizetheadministrativeexpensesbysales.Wehypothesizethatmanagerialagencycostsaddtothelikelihoodoffinancialdistressbecause,first,jobperkscauseshrinkageincompanyresources;second,highermanagementdiscretion,toalargeextent,suggestsgreateragencyconflicts(SinghandDavidson2003)aswellasinsufficientmonitoringtechnology(Ang,Cole,andLin2000).TestingtheHypothesesWeusethefollowinglogisticregressionmodelstotestthehypothesizedrelationships:LogitPi=α0+α1Financialleveragei+α2Liquidityi+α3AnnualCARsi+α4Governanceattributei+εiwherePi=p(Distressi=1)istheestimatedprobabilityoffinancialdistressfortheithcompany.Governanceattributeiisoneofgovernancevariablesdescribedaboveforithcompany.Inthemodel,weusefinancialleverage,liquidity,andannualcumulativeabnormalreturnsasthecontrolvariables.Financialleverageistheratiooftotalliabilitiestototalassets,andliquidityistheratioofcurrentassetstocurrentliabilities.Theyareusedtocontrolafirm’sfinancialconditions.Wealsouseannualcumulativeabnormalreturnstocapturesomeunspecifiedinformationrelatedtothefirm’sstrategicdecisionsorperformancethatcanbereflectedinthemarketevaluationandanticipation.AnnualCARsiscalculatedbywhereARi,t=Ri,t–Rm,t,Ri,t=stockreturnfortheithcompanyindayt,Rm,t=value-weighedSHSE/SZSEindexreturnofthetradableAsharesindayt,Nisthetotalnumberoftradingdaysduringtheyear.(部分略)ConclusionsFewstudiessofarhaveexploredtherelationbetweencorporategovernancecharacteristicsandChina’scorporatefinancialdistress.ThisarticleisoneofthefirsttoinvestigatewhethersomegovernancestructureandmanagerialagencycostattributescontributetoanexplanationoftheoccurrenceoffinancialdistressinthecontextofChina’stransitionaleconomy.Ourresultssuggestthatlargeshareholderownershipandstateownershiphavenegativeeffectsontheprobabilityofdistress.Managerialownershipappearstobeunrelatedtodistressstatus.Theproportionofindependentdirectorsisfoundtobeasignificantdeterminant.Ahigherproportionofindependentdirectorsmayleadtolowerprobabilityoffinancialdistress.However, theothertwoboardcompositionvariables—boardsizeandCEOduality—arenotsignificant.Weespeciallyinvestigatedtheimpactofmanagerialagencycostsontheriskoffinancialdistress.Administrativeexpenseratio,asthemeasureofmanagerialagencycosts,turnsouttobepositivelyassociatedwiththeprobabilityoffinancialdistress,implyingthatmanagerialagencyproblemsdoharmcorporatefinancialcondition.Additionally,weinvestigatedwhethergovernanceattributesaffectstate-controlledandnon–state-controlledcompaniesdifferently.Wefindthattherearedifferencesbetweenthetwosubsamplesintheeffectofownershipstructure,boardcomposition,andmanagerialagencycostattributes.AscorporategovernancereformsarevigorouslyadvocatedinChina,ourstudyprovidesinsightsintotheroleofcorporategovernanceinfinancialhealth.However,someissuesstilldeservefurtherstudy.Forexample,largeshareholdersinChina’slistedcompaniesappropriatecompanyfundsusingdiversetunnelingtechniques.Inmanycases,theyconductrelatedpartytransactionsatanunfairpricetothelistedcompanies.Theyalsofrequentlyholdcompanyassetsinpledgeforloans.Furtherresearchshouldbedevotedtotheeffectoftheirexpropriationbehaviorsoncorporatefinancialdistress.

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