the design of bank loan contracts universal banking and the performance of german firms

the design of bank loan contracts universal banking and the performance of german firms

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时间:2018-02-10

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1、12TheDesignofBankLoanContractsGARYB.GORTONANDJAMESKAHN*Empiricalworkstronglysuggeststhatbankloansaredifferentfromcorporatebonds.1Thisevidencehasspawnedanumberofhypothesesaboutexactlywhatbanksdotomakethemselvesvaluable.Thesetheorieshavestressedvariou

2、skindsofscreeningandmonitoringofborrowers.Inthischapterwearguethattheinterestingandvaluablefunctionsofbanksoccurbetweenthetimetheymakealoanandcollectrepayment.Wefocusonbanksabilitytorenegotiatecredittermswithborrowers,andonthetightlinkbetweenthatrene

3、gotiationandmon-itoring.Ourmodelshowshowtheuniquecharacteristicsofbankloansemergeendogenouslytoenhanceefficiency.Thesecharacteristicsincludeseniority(i.e.,thebankhasfirstclaimontheassetsoftheborrowerintheeventofdefault);anoptionforthebanktoliquidatethe

4、loanatanytime(perhapsintheformofvery*Thisisarevisedversionofapreviousarticlewithaslightlydifferenttitle.ThankstoMarkCarey,MathiasDewatripont,DouglasDiamond,OliverHart,PaulMilgrom,RaghuramRajan,andDavidWebbfordiscussionsandtoNilsGottfries,MichelHabib,

5、LeonardNakamura,ananonymousreferee,andseminarparticipantsattheUniversityofChicago,UniversityofIllinois,BoardofGovernors,JohnsHopkins,WayneState,ECARE,theCEPRMeetingatToulouse,theUniversityofStockholm,thePennMacroLunchGroupandthePennFinanceLunchGroup,

6、forsuggestions.TheviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkortheFederalReserveSystem.1.Forexample,James(1987)findsapositiveandsignificantabnormalstockresponsetofirmsannouncingthesigningofbankloan

7、agreements.AlsoseeLummerandMcConnell(1989).Hoshi,Kashyap,andScharfstein(1990)findthatJapanesefirmsinfinancialdistressthataremembersofamain-bankcoalitions(keiretsu)investandsellmoreaftertheonsetofdistressthandodistressedfirmsthatarenotmembersofabankcoalit

8、ion.OtherevidenceincludesGilson,John,andLang(1990)andSlovin,Sushka,andPolonchek(1993).318WHATDOBANKSDO?tightcovenants);andaninitialloanratesetnottopricetheriskofdefault,buttominimizesubsequentcostsassociatedwithmoralhazardandrenegotiation.Asaconseque

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