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1、12TheDesignofBankLoanContractsGARYB.GORTONANDJAMESKAHN*Empiricalworkstronglysuggeststhatbankloansaredifferentfromcorporatebonds.1Thisevidencehasspawnedanumberofhypothesesaboutexactlywhatbanksdotomakethemselvesvaluable.Thesetheorieshavestressedvariou
2、skindsofscreeningandmonitoringofborrowers.Inthischapterwearguethattheinterestingandvaluablefunctionsofbanksoccurbetweenthetimetheymakealoanandcollectrepayment.Wefocusonbanksabilitytorenegotiatecredittermswithborrowers,andonthetightlinkbetweenthatrene
3、gotiationandmon-itoring.Ourmodelshowshowtheuniquecharacteristicsofbankloansemergeendogenouslytoenhanceefficiency.Thesecharacteristicsincludeseniority(i.e.,thebankhasfirstclaimontheassetsoftheborrowerintheeventofdefault);anoptionforthebanktoliquidatethe
4、loanatanytime(perhapsintheformofvery*Thisisarevisedversionofapreviousarticlewithaslightlydifferenttitle.ThankstoMarkCarey,MathiasDewatripont,DouglasDiamond,OliverHart,PaulMilgrom,RaghuramRajan,andDavidWebbfordiscussionsandtoNilsGottfries,MichelHabib,
5、LeonardNakamura,ananonymousreferee,andseminarparticipantsattheUniversityofChicago,UniversityofIllinois,BoardofGovernors,JohnsHopkins,WayneState,ECARE,theCEPRMeetingatToulouse,theUniversityofStockholm,thePennMacroLunchGroupandthePennFinanceLunchGroup,
6、forsuggestions.TheviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkortheFederalReserveSystem.1.Forexample,James(1987)findsapositiveandsignificantabnormalstockresponsetofirmsannouncingthesigningofbankloan
7、agreements.AlsoseeLummerandMcConnell(1989).Hoshi,Kashyap,andScharfstein(1990)findthatJapanesefirmsinfinancialdistressthataremembersofamain-bankcoalitions(keiretsu)investandsellmoreaftertheonsetofdistressthandodistressedfirmsthatarenotmembersofabankcoalit
8、ion.OtherevidenceincludesGilson,John,andLang(1990)andSlovin,Sushka,andPolonchek(1993).318WHATDOBANKSDO?tightcovenants);andaninitialloanratesetnottopricetheriskofdefault,buttominimizesubsequentcostsassociatedwithmoralhazardandrenegotiation.Asaconseque