financial intermediaries and liquidity creation reputation formation in early bank note markets

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1、2FinancialIntermediariesandLiquidityCreationGARYB.GORTONANDGEORGEPENNACCHI*Awidelyheldviewisthattheinvestorofmodestmeansisatadisadvantagerelativetolargeinvestors.Thispopularperception,datingfromatleasttheearly19thcentury,hasitthatthesmall,unsophisticatedinvestorthefarmer,mechanic,andthelaborer

2、isleastequippedtoacquireinformationandismostoftenvictimizedbyhavingtotradewithbetterinformedagents.U.S.historyisrepeatedlymarkedbyincidentsofrealorimaginedinsidershenani-gansandresultingpopularinitiativesagainstthemoneytrustsandtherobberbarons.Thisviewisresponsibleformanyinstitutions,e.g.,theSE

3、Cantitrustleg-islation,andvariousformsoftaxation.Thisargumenthasalsoinfluencedbankregulationwhereithasbeenusedtojustifygovernmentprovisionofdepositinsuranceasamatterofpublicpolicy.ThenotionthatinformedagentscanexploituninformedagentshasreceivedsomesupportfromKyle(1985)andGrinblattandRoss(1985).T

4、heyshowthatinsiderscansystematicallybenefitattheexpenseofuninformedtraderswhenpricesarenotfullyrevealing.However,inthesemodelstheuninformedtraders,callednoisetraders,arenonoptimizingagents;theysimplytradeand*BothauthorsfromFinanceDepartment,TheWhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsylvania.Apreviousvers

5、ionofthispaperwasentitledTransactionsContracts.Thecommentsandsugges-tionsofMarkFlannery,JeffLacker,ChrisJames,DickJefferis,BruceSmith,ChesterSpatt,ananonymousreferee,membersoftheUniversityofPennsylvaniaMacroLunchGroup,especiallyRandyWrightandHenningBohn,andparticipantsinthe1988NBERSummerInstitu

6、te,the1988GarnInstituteConferenceonFederalDepositInsuranceandtheStructureofFinancialMarkets,the1988WinterEconometricSocietyMeetings,andtheFederalReserveBankofRichmondweregreatlyappreciated.ThefirstauthorthankstheNSFforfinancialsupportthrough#SES-8618130.Errorsremaintheauthors.44BANKDEBTlosemoney.

7、Ifinformedagentscan,somehow,systematicallytakeadvantageofuninformedagents,thenitseemsclearthattheuninformedagentswouldbemotivatedtorespond,possiblycreatingalternativemechanisms.Inthisessayweinvestigatewhetherfinancialinstitutionsan