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1、JournalofRiskandUncertainty,5:273-288,(1992)©1992KluwerAcademicPublishersAdverseSelectionandEquilibriuminLiabilityInsuranceMarketsLAWRENCEA.BERGERWhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsylvania,3641LocustWalk,Philadelphia,PA19104-6218J.DAVIDCUMMINS*WhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsy
2、lvania,3641LocustWalk,Philadelphia,PA19104-6218Keywords:liabilityinsurance,insurancecrises,adverseselection,asymmetricinformationAbstractModelsofasymmetricinformationininsurancemarketstypicallyconsiderinsurancebuyerswithBernoullilossdistributionsdifferinginexpectedloss.Th
3、isarticleanalyzesmarketswherebuyerlossdistributionsarecharac-terizedbymean-preservingspreadsandinsurerscanclassifyapplicantsintermsofexpectedvaluesbutnotbyrisk.Becauseliabilitylossesarecharacterizedbyskewedcontinuousprobabilitydistributions,bothdiscreteandcontinuouslossdi
4、stributionsareconsidered.IncontrasttothesingleseparatingequilibriumintheclassicRothschild-Stiglitzinsurancemarket,multipleseparatingequilibriaareidentifiedinthisarticle:threeinthediscretecaseandfourinthecontinuouscase.Thepossibilityofextremediscontinuitiesininsurerpolicyo
5、ffersprovidesanewexplanationforcrisesinliabilityinsurancemarkets.Duringliabilityinsurancecrises,policyholderscomplainofsharplyhigherpremiums,lowercoveragelimits,andinsomecasesunavailabilityofcoverageatanyprice(Har-rington,1988).Thepresenceofchangingpolicyoffersandmarketfa
6、iluresuggeststhatmodelsofasymmetricinformationandadverseselectionmayyieldimportantinsightsintoliabilitycrises.Theobjectiveofthisarticleistoprovidesuchananalysis.Theseminalcontributionstotheadverse-selectionliteraturearepapersbyAkerlof(1970),RothschildandStiglitz(1976),Wil
7、son(1977),andMiyasaki(1977).Almostwith-outexception,themodelspresentedinthesepapershavebeenbasedonverysimplelossprocessesandinsurancecontracts.MostmodelspositaBernoullilossprocess,withinsurancecontractsprovidingproportionalcoverage.Insurancebuyerstypicallydifferonlyinthei
8、rlossprobabilities,andinsurersareassumedtoberiskneutral.ByfocusingonBernoullimodelswithnonstocha