Myerson 1979 - Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem文稿.pdf

Myerson 1979 - Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem文稿.pdf

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1、Econometrica,Vol.47,No.1(January,1979)INCENTIVECOMPATIBILITYANDTHEBARGAININGPROBLEMBYROGERB.MYERSONCollectivechoiceproblemsarestudiedfromtheBayesianviewpoint.Itisshownthatthesetofexpectedutilityallocationswhicharefeasiblewithincentive-compatiblemechanismsiscompactandconvex,andincludesth

2、eequilibriumallocationsforallothermechanisms.ThegeneralizedNashsolutionproposedbyHarsanyiandSeltenisthenappliedtothissettodefineabargainingsolutionforBayesiancollectivechoiceproblems.1.INTRODUCTIONINTHISPAPERwewillconsidertheproblemofanarbitratortryingtoselectacollectivechoiceforagroupo

3、findividualswhenhedoesnothavecompleteinformationabouttheirpreferencesandendowments.Notonlydoesthisarbitra-torhavetoworryaboutsettlingfairlytheconflictingdesiresofthegroup'sdiversemembers,buthehastogetthemtotellhimwhattheirpreferencesareinthefirstplace.Ofcourse,hemayaskhisclientstotellhi

4、mwhatheneedstoknow;butifhecannotcompeltruthfulbehaviorthenhemustanticipatethatsomegroupmembersmaylietohiminanattempttomanipulatehisultimatedecision.Ourgoalinthispaperwillbetodevelopauniquesolutiontothisarbitrator'sproblem,basedonHurwicz'sconceptofincentive-compatibility[6]andNash'sbarga

5、iningsolution[7].Formally,wewilldescribethearbitrator'sproblembyaBayesiancollectivechoiceproblem,anobjectoftheform(1)(C,A1,A2,...,An,U1,U2,...*Um,P),whosecomponentsareinterpretedasfollows.Theindividualmembersofthegroup,orplayers,arenumbered1,2,...,n.Cisthesetofchoicesorstrategiesavailab

6、letothegroup.Foreachplayeri,Aiisthesetofpossibletypesforplayeri.Thatis,eachaieAirepresentsacompletedescriptionofplayeri'srelevantcharacteristics:hispreferences,beliefs,abilities,andendowments.EachUiisautilityfunctionfromCxA1x...xAnintotherealnumberssuchthateachUi(c,a1,a2,..,an)isthepayo

7、ffwhichplayeriwouldgetifcECwerechosenandif(a,,..,an)werethetruevectorofplayertypes.TheseUipayoffnumbersareassumedtobemeasuredintermsofsomevonNeumann-Morgensternutilityscaleforplayeri.Finally,PisaprobabilitydistributiononA1x...xAnsuchthatP(a,...,an)istheprobability,asjudgedbythe

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