Essays on game theory with applications to communication networks..pdf

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1、UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIALosAngelesEssaysonGameTheorywithApplicationstoCommunicationNetworksAdissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfactionoftherequirementsforthedegreeDoctorofPhilosophyinEconomicsPREVIEWbyJaeokPark2009UMINumber:3388179AllrightsreservedINFORMATIONTOALL

2、USERSThequalityofthisreproductionisdependentuponthequalityofthecopysubmitted.Intheunlikelyeventthattheauthordidnotsendacompletemanuscriptandtherearemissingpages,thesewillbenoted.Also,ifmaterialhadtoberemoved,anotewillindicatethedeletion.UMIDissertationPublishing

3、UMI3388179Copyright2009byProQuestLLC.Allrightsreserved.ThiseditionoftheworkisprotectedagainstunauthorizePREVIEWdcopyingunderTitle17,UnitedStatesCode.ProQuestProQuestLLC789EastEisenhowerParkwayP.O.Box1346AnnArbor,Ml48106-1346PREVIEW©CopyrightbyJaeokPark2009Thedis

4、sertationofJaeokParkisapproved.IeniroObarat/t•*J^LMihaelavanderSchaarPREVIEW•stroy,CommitteeChairvUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles2009uTomyparentsPREVIEWinTABLEOFCONTENTS1Overview11.1GameTheoryforHumansandGameTheoryforMachines....11.1.1GameTheoryforHumans21.1.2

5、GameTheoryforMachines31.1.3IntersectionofGameTheoryforHumansandGameTheoryforMachines41.2OverviewoftheRemainingChapters51.3ComplexityConsiderationsinRepeatedGamesandMechanismDesign91.4ConcludingRemarks112StackelbergContentionGamesinMultiuserNetworks142.1Introduct

6、ion142.2ContentionGameModel182.3StackelbergContentionGame222.3.1StackelberPREVIEWgEquilibriumwithTRD-basedIntervention..262.3.2NashEquilibriaoftheContentionGamewithTRD-basedIntervention282.3.3ReachingtheStackelbergEquilibrium302.4TargetSelectionCriteriaoftheMana

7、ger312.4.1NashBargainingSolution322.4.2Coalition-ProofStrategyProfile34iv2.5InformationalRequirementandItsRelaxation362.5.1ContentionGameandNashEquilibrium362.5.2StackelbergContentionGamewithTRD-basedInterven•tionandStackelbergEquilibrium362.5.3LimitedObservabil

8、ityoftheManager392.5.4LimitedObservabilityoftheUsersandConjecturalEqui•librium432.6IllustrativeResults452.6.1HomogeneousUsers452.6.2HeterogeneousUsers462.7Conclusion4