根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】

根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】

ID:456167

大小:57.00 KB

页数:11页

时间:2017-08-04

根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】_第1页
根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】_第2页
根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】_第3页
根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】_第4页
根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】_第5页
资源描述:

《根深蒂固的管理,改变了的资本结构和企业价值【外文翻译】》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在应用文档-天天文库

1、外文翻译原文Entrenchedmanagement,capitalstructurechangesandfirmvalueMaterialSource:http://springer.lib.tsinghua.edu.cn/content/e143697042062757/Author:LeonardL.LundstrumTherelationshipbetweenmanagerialshareownershipandthefirm’schangeinleveragearoundasecurit

2、yissuanceisexamined.Wefindthatentrenchedmanagersarenotmorelikelytoissueequity,howevertheydoaffectlowerleveragebychoosingdebtissuanceswhicharesmallerandequityissuancesthatarelargerthanthosechosenbymanagersthatarenotentrenched.Themagnitudeofthedeclinein

3、leveragethatoccursfrombeforetheissuancetoaftertheissuanceispositivelyrelatedtomanagerialshareownership.Inaddition,thisrelationshipisconfinedtoonlythe“entrenchment”rangeofmanagerialshareownership.Themarketreactsnegativelytoanissuanceannouncementwhenman

4、agerialshareownershipishigh.1IntroductionAnumberofinvestigators,includingBergeretal.(1997)andGarveyandHanka(1999)reportthatmanagerialentrenchmentaffectsthefirm’schoiceofleverage.Theoryimpliesthatdebtconstrainsmanagementdiscretionbyeitherreducingtheman

5、ager’sbargainingpower(NoeandRebello1996)orbyreducingdiscretionoverspending(Stulz1990).Zwiebel(1996)arguesthatentrenchedmanagersusetheirinfluencetolowerdebtlevelstothepointthatcapitalstructuremaximizesempirebuildingsubjecttosufficientefficiencytopreven

6、tatakeover.Agencycostswillbeincurredatthetimeofsecurityissuanceifthemanagermakesasub-optimalsecurityissuancechoice.JensenandMeckling(1976)findthatagencycostsaredecreasinginmanagerialshareownership.YetStulz(1988)arguesthatagencycostsarenotnecessarilymo

7、notonicallydecreasinginmanagerialshareownershipasthereexistsan“entrenchment”rangeoverwhichthemanager'sabilitytodetertakeovers10dominatesthe“incentive”effectofmanagerialshareownership.Weexaminetherelationbetweenmanagerialshareownershipandthelikelihood,

8、magnitude,andinformationcontentofsecurityissues.Whennegotiatingdebtcovenants,creditorsappeartorespondtothefractionofsharesheldbytheCEO.BegleyandFeltham(1999)findthatthenumberofcovenantsindebtcontractsisincreasinginthefractionofthefirm’ssharesh

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。