国外博弈论课件lecture(11)

国外博弈论课件lecture(11)

ID:40172962

大小:157.50 KB

页数:19页

时间:2019-07-24

国外博弈论课件lecture(11)_第1页
国外博弈论课件lecture(11)_第2页
国外博弈论课件lecture(11)_第3页
国外博弈论课件lecture(11)_第4页
国外博弈论课件lecture(11)_第5页
资源描述:

《国外博弈论课件lecture(11)》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在教育资源-天天文库

1、DynamicGamesofCompleteInformationDynamicGamesofCompleteandImperfectInformationJune18,2003173-347GameTheory--Lecture21OutlineofdynamicgamesofcompleteinformationDynamicgamesofcompleteinformationExtensive-formrepresentationDynamicgamesofcompleteandperfectinforma

2、tionGametreeSubgame-perfectNashequilibriumBackwardinductionApplicationsDynamicgamesofcompleteandimperfectinformationMoreapplicationsRepeatedgamesJune18,2003273-347GameTheory--Lecture21Today’sAgendaReviewofpreviousclassInfinitelyrepeatedgamesJune18,2003373-347

3、GameTheory--Lecture21InfinitelyrepeatedgameAinfinitelyrepeatedgameisadynamicgameofcompleteinformationinwhicha(simultaneous-move)gamecalledthestagegameisplayedinfinitely,andtheoutcomesofallpreviousplaysareobservedbeforethenextplay.Precisely,thesimultaneous-mov

4、egameisplayedatstage1,2,3,...,t-1,t,t+1,.....Theoutcomesofallprevioust-1stagesareobservedbeforetheplayatthetthstage.Eachplayerdiscountsherpayoffbyafactor,where0<<1.Aplayer’spayoffintherepeatedgameisthepresentvalueoftheplayer’spayoffsfromthestagegames.June18

5、,2003473-347GameTheory--Lecture21PresentvalueJune18,2003573-347GameTheory--Lecture21Infinitelyrepeatedgame:exampleThefollowingsimultaneous-movegameisrepeatedinfinitelyTheoutcomesofallpreviousplaysareobservedbeforethenextplaybeginsEachplayer’spayofffortheinfin

6、itelyrepeatedgameispresentvalueofthepayoffsreceivedatallstages.Question:whatisthesubgameperfectNashequilibrium?Player2L2R2Player1L11,15,0R10,54,4June18,2003673-347GameTheory--Lecture21Everysubgameofaninfinitelyrepeatedgameisidenticaltothegameasawhole1L1R12L2R

7、22L2R2L1R12L2R22L2R2L1R12L2R22L2R2L1R12L2R22L2R2L1R12L2R22L2R2115005441111(1,1)(5,0)(0,5)(4,4)115005441150054411500544TOINFINITYJune18,2003773-347GameTheory--Lecture21Example:strategyAstrategyforaplayerisacompleteplan.Itcandependonthehistoryoftheplay.Astrateg

8、yforplayeri:playLiateverystage(orateachofherinformationsets)Anotherstrategycalledatriggerstrategyforplayeri:playRiatstage1,andatthetthstage,iftheoutcomeofeachofallt-1previousstagesis(R1,R

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。