Contracts+as+Ref+Points+Experimental+Evidence

Contracts+as+Ref+Points+Experimental+Evidence

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时间:2019-05-25

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1、ContractsasReferencePoints–ExperimentalEvidence*ByErnstFehr,OliverHart,andChristianZehnderHartandMoore(2008)introducenewbehavioralassumptionsthatcanexplainlong-termcontractsandtheemploymentrelation.Weexamineexperimentallytheirideathatcontractsserveasrefe

2、rencepoints.Theevidenceconfirmsthepredictionthatthereisatradeoffbetweenrigidityandflexibility.Flexiblecontracts–whichwoulddominaterigidcontractsunderstandardassumptions–causesignificantshadinginexpostperformancewhileunderrigidcontractsmuchlessshadingoccu

3、rs.Theexperimentappearstorevealanewbehavioralforce:exantecompetitionlegitimizesthetermsofacontract,andaggrievementandshadingoccurmainlyaboutoutcomeswithinthecontract.InarecentpaperOliverD.HartandJohnMoore(2008)developatheorywhichprovidesabasisforlong-ter

4、mcontractsintheabsenceofnoncontractibleinvestments.Thetheoryisalsocapableofrationalizingtheemploymentcontract,whichfixeswagesinadvanceandleavesdiscretiontotheemployer.However,thetheoryrestsonstrongbehavioralassumptionsthatlackdirectempiricalsupportanddev

5、iateinimportantwaysfromtheassumptionsmadeinstandardcontracttheory.Forthisreason,andbecausethetheoryhasthepotentialtocastnew1lightonthetheoryofthefirm,itseemsimportanttotestit.Inthispaper,weprovidesuchatestbycarryingoutacontrolledlaboratoryexperiment.Indo

6、ingso,weidentifynewbehavioralforcesthatcannotbeexplainedeitherbytraditionalcontracttheoryorbyexistingbehavioralmodels.Theseforcesare,however,predictedbytheHart-Moorenotionthatcompetitivelydeterminedcontractsserveasreferencepoints.Itisusefultostartwithsom

7、ebackgroundandmotivation.Accordingtothestandardincompletecontractsliterature,tradingpartiesfinditdifficulttowritealong-termcontractbecausethefutureishardtoforesee.Astimepassesanduncertaintyisresolved,thepartiescancompletetheircontractthroughrenegotiation

8、.Thetypicalmodelsupposessymmetricinformationandnowealthconstraints,sothatCoasianbargainingensuresexpostefficiency.However,thereisahold-upproblem:asaconsequenceofrenegotiation,eachpartyshares*ErnstFehr:InstituteforEmpirical

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