capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage

capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage

ID:36058349

大小:195.00 KB

页数:48页

时间:2019-04-30

capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage_第1页
capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage_第2页
capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage_第3页
capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage_第4页
capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage_第5页
资源描述:

《capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在教育资源-天天文库

1、Capitalstructureandcorporatecontrol:TheeffectofantitakeoverstatutesonfirmleverageCapitalstructureandcorporatecontrol:TheeffectofantitakeoverstatutesonfirmleverageGeraldT.GarveyGordonHanka**GarveyisfromtheFacultyofCommerceandBusinessAdministration,UniversityofBritishColumbia.HankaisfromtheSmeal

2、CollegeofBusinessAdministration,PennsylvaniaStateUniversity.ThankstoRonGiammarinoforsuggestingtheuseofsecond-generationantitakeoverlawsandtoJonKarpoffforprovidingdataonsuchlaws.ForcommentsandsuggestionswethankLuigiZingales,RajeshAggarwal,BobGregory,PeterHartley,RobHeinkel,JosephHirshberg,Burto

3、nHollifield,WalterNovaes,RohanPitchford,LauraField,HaroldMulherin,ChrisMuscarella,EdRice,PaulMalatesta,andtheparticipantsofthePennStateandUniversityofWashingtonFinanceworkshops,theUtahWinterFinanceConference,andtheAmericanFinanceAssociationconference.AbstractWefindthatfirmsprotectedbySecondGen

4、erationstateantitakeoverlawssubstantiallyreducedtheiruseofdebt,whileunprotectedfirmsdidthereverse.Thisresultsupportsrecentmodelsinwhichthethreatofhostiletakeovermotivatesmanagerstotakeondebtthattheywouldotherwiseavoid.Animplicationisthatlegalbarrierstotakeoversmayincreasecorporateslack.JELClas

5、sificationNumbersG32,G341Corporatemanagershavediscretionovercapitalstructurechoices,asthefirmsfoundingshareholderscannotwriteacomprehensiveexantecontractspecifyingallfuturefinancingdecisions.Mostcapitalstructuremodelsmakethesimplifyingassumptionthatmanagerschoosecapitalstructureintheinterestso

6、fshareholders.Examplesofthisapproachrangefromtheclassicstatictradeoffbetweentaxbenefitsandexpectedcostsoffinancialdistress,toLelandandTofts(1997><6)dynamicanalysiswhichallowsforagencyproblemsbetweendebtholdersandshareholders.Increasingly,however,researchintocapitalstructurehasexplicitlyrecogni

7、zedthatmanagersself-interestcanleadtofinancialpoliciesthatdonotmaximizeshareholderwealth.AnearlyexampleisDonaldsons(19<69)fieldstudyoffinancingchoices,whichemphasizedgoalssuchasorganizationalsurvivalandgrowth.Recently,Jung,KimandStulz(1

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。