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ID:346215
大小:52.50 KB
页数:11页
时间:2017-07-26
《企业内部的资源分配:转让定价的经济和会计成本分摊【外文翻译】》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。
1、本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译外文题目Intrafirmresourceallocation:Theeconomicsoftransferpricingandcostallocationsinaccounting外文出处《当代会计研究》外文作者Amershi,Aminh原文:Intrafirmresourceallocation:TheeconomicsoftransferpricingandcostallocationsinaccountingThepurposeofthispaperistoprovidetheelementsofageneraltheoryofin
2、trafirmresourceallocationmechanismsindecentralizedfirmswithinfonnationasymmetry.Inparticular,thestudyconsiderstheissueofhowthesemechanismsareoperationalizedbyanaccountingcontrolsysteminthefirm.Thisnaturallyrequiresasustaineddevelopmentofatheoryof"transferpricing."Theemphasisisontheterms
3、decentralizedandinformationasymmetry.Thedevelopmenthereiswithinthecontractualparadigm,whichhasdevelopedintoadominanttheoreticalparadigmineconomics.Consequently,theoperativetermsinthisstudyareresourceallocationandmechanismsforresourceallocationunderinfonnationasymmetryasdefinedandunderst
4、oodinthecontractualparadigmofmicroeconomictheoryofindustrialorganization(seeHartandHolmstrom,1987;HolmstromandTirole,1989;LaffontandMaskin,1982;andMyerson,1985,forsubstantivesurveys).Weshallretumtothisdiscussionlatersincetheassertionshereareofparamountimportanceindistinguishingourtheory
5、fromtheearliercooperativegamesliteratureoncostallocations.AtheoryofintrafirmallocationunderinformationasymmetrybasedonMyerson'sgeneraltheoryofmechanismsisdeveloped.Fromthegeneralmodel,itisshownthateveryMyersonequilibriumresourceallocationmechanismisa"costplus"typeoftransferpricing.Speci
6、alizingthegeneralmodeltoallowrisk-neutralagents,wederivetheexactformofthecompensationschemesindominantstrategyequilibriumtransferpricingmechanism.ThegeneralMyersonagencyproblemistransformedintoacentralplanner'sproblemenablingustobypassthefirst-orderapproachtotheproblem.Theclosedformsolu
7、tionshowsthateachoftheagents'compensationschemesiscomposedofaprofit-sharingcomponent,acostrefund,taxes,andsubsidies,makingitaGroveslikescheme.Additionalresultsshowthatiftheprincipalisasymmetricallyinformedaboutoneoftheagentsonly,theagentmayderiverentfromprivateinformationunderm
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