企业内部的资源分配：转让定价的经济和会计成本分摊【外文翻译】

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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Intrafirmresourceallocation:Theeconomicsoftransferpricingandcostallocationsinaccounting外文出处《当代会计研究》外文作者Amershi,Aminh原文：Intrafirmresourceallocation:TheeconomicsoftransferpricingandcostallocationsinaccountingThepurposeofthispaperistoprovidetheelementsofageneraltheoryofin

2、trafirmresourceallocationmechanismsindecentralizedfirmswithinfonnationasymmetry.Inparticular,thestudyconsiderstheissueofhowthesemechanismsareoperationalizedbyanaccountingcontrolsysteminthefirm.Thisnaturallyrequiresasustaineddevelopmentofatheoryof"transferpricing."Theemphasisisontheterms

3、decentralizedandinformationasymmetry.Thedevelopmenthereiswithinthecontractualparadigm,whichhasdevelopedintoadominanttheoreticalparadigmineconomics.Consequently,theoperativetermsinthisstudyareresourceallocationandmechanismsforresourceallocationunderinfonnationasymmetryasdefinedandunderst

4、oodinthecontractualparadigmofmicroeconomictheoryofindustrialorganization(seeHartandHolmstrom,1987;HolmstromandTirole,1989;LaffontandMaskin,1982;andMyerson,1985,forsubstantivesurveys).Weshallretumtothisdiscussionlatersincetheassertionshereareofparamountimportanceindistinguishingourtheory

5、fromtheearliercooperativegamesliteratureoncostallocations.AtheoryofintrafirmallocationunderinformationasymmetrybasedonMyerson'sgeneraltheoryofmechanismsisdeveloped.Fromthegeneralmodel,itisshownthateveryMyersonequilibriumresourceallocationmechanismisa"costplus"typeoftransferpricing.Speci

6、alizingthegeneralmodeltoallowrisk-neutralagents,wederivetheexactformofthecompensationschemesindominantstrategyequilibriumtransferpricingmechanism.ThegeneralMyersonagencyproblemistransformedintoacentralplanner'sproblemenablingustobypassthefirst-orderapproachtotheproblem.Theclosedformsolu

7、tionshowsthateachoftheagents'compensationschemesiscomposedofaprofit-sharingcomponent,acostrefund,taxes,andsubsidies,makingitaGroveslikescheme.Additionalresultsshowthatiftheprincipalisasymmetricallyinformedaboutoneoftheagentsonly,theagentmayderiverentfromprivateinformationunderm