[博弈论书籍].two-sided.matching.with.partial.information

[博弈论书籍].two-sided.matching.with.partial.information

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时间:2019-01-16

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1、Two-SidedMatchingwithPartialInformationBAHARAKRASTEGARI,UniversityofBritishColumbiaANNECONDON,UniversityofBritishColumbiaNICOLEIMMORLICA,NorthwesternUniversityKEVINLEYTON-BROWN,UniversityofBritishColumbiaThetraditionalmodeloftwo-sidedmatchingassumesthatall

2、agentsfullyknowtheirownpreferences.Asmarketsgrowlarge,however,itbecomesimpracticalforagentstopreciselyassesstheirrankingsoverallagentsontheothersideofthemarket.Weproposeanovelmodeloftwo-sidedmatchinginwhichagentsareendowedwithknownpartiallyorderedpreferenc

3、esandunknowntruepreferencesdrawnfromknowndistributionsconsistentwiththepartialorder.Thetruepreferencesarelearnedthroughinterviews,revealingthepairwiserankingsamongallinterviewedagents,performedaccordingtoacentralizedinterviewpolicy,i.e.,analgorithmthatadap

4、tivelyschedulesinterviews.Ourgoalisforthepolicytoguaranteebothstabilityandoptimalityforagivensideofthemarket,withrespecttotheunderlyingtruepreferencesoftheagents.Asinterviewsarecostly,weseekapolicythatminimizesthenumberofinterviews.Weintroducethreeminimiza

5、tionobjectives:(veryweak)dominance,whichminimizesthenumberofinterviewsforanyunderlyingtruepreferencepro le;Paretooptimality,whichguaranteesthatnootherpolicydominatesthegivenpolicy;andoptimalityinexpectationwithrespecttothepreferencedistribution.Weformulate

6、ourproblemasaMarkovdecisionprocess,implyinganalgorithmforcomputinganoptimal-in-expectationpolicyintimepolynomialinthenumberofpossiblepreferenceorderings(andthusexponentialinthesizeoftheinput).Wethenderivestructuralpropertiesofdominantpolicieswhichwecallopt

7、imalitycerti cates.Weshowthatcomputingaminimumoptimalitycerti cateisNP-hard,suggestingthatoptimal-in-expectationand/orParetooptimalpoliciescouldbeNP-hardtocompute.Finally,werestrictattentiontoasettinginwhichagentsononesideofthemarkethavethesamepartiallyord

8、eredpreferences(butpotentiallydistinctunderlyingtruepreferences),andinwhichagentsmustinterviewbeforematching.Inthisrestrictedsetting,weshowhowtoleveragetheideaofminimumoptimalitycerti catestodesignacomputatio

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