多属性逆向拍卖中最优信息披露政策分析

多属性逆向拍卖中最优信息披露政策分析

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时间:2018-11-08

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1、摘要IIAbstractAbstractWiththerapiddevelopmentofe-commerce,onlinereverseauctionshasbecomeanewprocurementtool,whichnotonlycanexpandthescopeofsupplierselectionbutalsoreducethecostgreatly,improvetheefficiency,andbringmoregainsforbothparties.Asaresult,moreandmorecompa

2、nieshavestartedtousethistechnologyforglobalpurchasing.Howtodiscloseinformationdisclosuretoinfluencethebehaviorandbenefitsforbothsideshasbecomeahotissueinrecentyears.Themainpurposeofthisarticleistoexploretheoptimalinformationdisclosurepolicyindifferentphasesofmu

3、lti-attributereverseauctions.Weusethesimulationexperimenttovalidateandcomplementtheconclusionsofmodelderivation,andexplorethemanagementstrategiesofinformationdisclosurebasedontheconclusions.Thisstudyisdividedintotwostagesofbeforeandafterreal-timequote.Beforethe

4、real-timequote,firstofall,wecalculatetheequilibriumofthesupplierwhethertodisclosetrueinformationandthebuyerwhethertoverifytheinformationbyestablishingthegamemodel,thenwegivedifferentcopingstrategiesforbothsidesunderdifferentsituationsandsupplymanagementadviceon

5、bothsidesinordertopromotethehonesttrade.Secondly,wecalculateandanalyzebuyer'sutilityundersuppliers’qualityattributevaluedisclosureornot.Afterreal-timequote,weanalyzetheeffectsofsuppliers'quotescompletedisclosureandincompletedisclosureforbuyerandsuppliersbyestab

6、lishingthedynamicgamebasedontheBertrandmodel,andgraphicalinterfaceisobtainedbyMATLAB7.0software.Andthen,asimulationexperimentsiteisdevelopedtosimulatetheprocessofauctionunderdifferentinformationdisclosurepolicies,andwecollectandanalyzetheexperimentaldatainorder

7、tovalidateandcomplementtheconclusionsofmodelderivation.Finally,weputforwardadviceoninformationdisclosureeffectivefrombuyerandsuppliers'views.Findingsindicatedthat:(1)Beforereal-timequote,improvingtheverificationefficiency,increasingtheintensityofpunishment,redu

8、cingverificationcostandsuppliers'additionalbenefitswhentheydisclosefalseinformation,etccanpromotesupplierstodisclosetrueinformationandreducebuyerverification.Buyershoulddisc

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