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ID:39354156
大小:5.79 MB
页数:140页
时间:2019-07-01
《A Primer in Game Theory-Gibbons》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。
1、APRIMERINRobertGibbonsAPrimerinGameTheoryRober!GibbonsContentsPrefacexi1StaticGamesofCompleteInformation11.1BasicTheory:Normal-FormGamesandNashEquilibrium.....................21.1.ANormal-FormRepresentationofGames.2!.l.BIteratedEliminationofStrictlyDominatedStrategies....................'4l.1.C
2、MotivationandDefinitionofNashEquilibrium81.2Applications............141.2.ACoumotModelofDuopoly141.2.BBertrandModelofDuopoly211.2.CFinal-OfferArbitration...221.2.0TheProblemoftheCommons271.3AdvancedTheory:MixedStrategiesandExistenceofEquilibrium..............291.3.AMixedStrategies.........291.3
3、.BExistenceofNashEquilibrium.331.4FurtherReading481.5Problems.481.6References...512DynamicGamesofCompleteInformation552.1DynamicGamesofCompleteandPerfectInformation..................572.1.ATheory:BackwardsInduction....572.1.BStackelbergModelofDuopoly....612.l.CWagesandEmploymentinaUnionizedFirm
4、642.1.DSequentialBargaining..............682.2Two-StageGamesofCompletebutImperfectInformation....................71viiviliCONTENTSContentsix2.2.ATheory:SubgamePerfection714.2.BJob-MarketSignaling.....1902.2.BBankRuns...734.2.CCorporateInvestmentandCapitalStructure.2052.2.CTariffsandImperfectInt
5、ernational4.2.DMonetaryPolicy........208Competition754.3OtherApplicationsofPerfectBayesian2.2.DTournaments79Equilibrium.........2102.3RepeatedGarnes824.3.ACheap-TalkGarnes.·.........2102.3.ATheory:Two-StageRepeatedGames824.3.BSequentialBargainingunderAsymmetric2.3.BTheory:InfutitelyRepeatedGame
6、s88Infonnation.....·..............2182.lCCollusion~'eenCournotDuopolists..1024.3.CReputationintheFinitelyRepeated2.3.DEfficiencyWages....107Prisoners'Dilemma·.....,.....2242.3.ETune-ConsistentMonetaryPolicy...1124.4RefinementsofPerfectBayesianEquilibrium..2332.4DynamicGamesofCompletebut4.5Furth
7、erReading..........244ImperfectInformation.................1154.6Problems.24524.AExtensive-FonnRepresentationofGames·1154.7References.........2532.4.BSubgame-PerfectNashEquilibrium.1222.5FurtherReading.129Index2572.6Problems·1302.
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