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5IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?JeremyWaldronI.FoundationandExplorationInthischapterI wouldliketoexamine,inpartwiththeeyeofapedant,thepropositionthathumandignityisthefoundationofhumanrights.Thatproposition,orsomethinglikeit,isfoundinthepreamblesofthemajorhumanrightsconventions,anditisquitecommontoointherhetoricofscholarsaddressingthesubjectofrights.Itbearsexam-iningforallsortsofreasons: first,onaccountoftherecentrevivalinthephilosophi-calstudyofdignity;1second,becausepeoplecontinuetodisagreeabouthumanrightsanditisworthlookingintoanythesisthatpromisestohelpuswiththesedisagree-ments;third,becauseclaimsaboutdignity,ifputforwardasfoundational,maypro-videabasisforchallengingothervaluesorprinciplesthathavealsoclaimedtooccupythisfoundationalground(liketheprincipleofutility,forexample);2andfourth(andthisisareasonthattakesusinadifferentdirection)becausetheveryideaoffounda-tionsforourpoliticalidealshasbeencalledinquestion,andwhatwefindoutaboutdignitymayconfirm(orrefute)thepropositionthatsearchingforfoundationsismoretroublethanitisworth.3IhastentoaddthatI amundertakingthisinquiry,nottodiscredittheconceptofdignity,buttoclarifyitsroleinhumanrightstheory.SomeofthethingsI willsayatvariousstagesmayseemcritical,evendismissive.Butitisnottheaimofthischaptertodenigratetheideaofdignityinrelationtorights.Forevenifitturnsoutthatastrictunderstandingofthefoundationalistclaimcannotbedefended,stilltheremaybeotherwaysinwhichdignitywillturnouttobeimportantinourunderstandingofhumanrights.Subjectingthefoundationalistclaimtocriticalscrutinymayhavetheside-benefitofrevealingsomeof these.1Forasample,see:JeremyWaldron,“DignityandRank,”EuropeanJournalofSociology,48(2007):201;MichaelRosen,Dignity:ItsHistoryandMeaning(HarvardUniversityPress,2012),GeorgeKateb,HumanDignity(HarvardUniversityPress,2011),ChristopherMcCrudden,“HumanDignityinHumanRightsInterpretation,”EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,19(2008):655.Seealsotheimmensevol-umeofthirty-nineessaysfromarecentconferenceonhumandignityatOxford:ChristopherMcCrudden(ed.),UnderstandingHumanDignity(OxfordUniversityPress/BritishAcademy,2013).2GeorgeFletcher,“HumanDignityasaConstitutionalValue,”UniversityofWesternOntarioLawReview,22(1984): 178.3See,eg,RichardRorty,Contingency,IronyandSolidarity(CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),44–5and 52–7. 118IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?II.TheBasicHumanRightsDocumentsWearetoldinthepreambletotheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)thattherightsitcontains“derivefromtheinherentdignityofthehumanperson.”TheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESCR)sayssomethingsimilar,thoughbothconventionsalsoproclaimthat“rec-ognitionoftheinherentdignityandoftheequalandinalienablerightsofallmembersofthehumanfamilyisthefoundationoffreedom,justiceandpeaceintheworld,”asthoughthetwowerecoordinateprinciples.WeseethissecondformulationalsointheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR);thereitisunaccompaniedbytheclaimofthetwoconventionsthatrightsderivefromdignity.Arethesedifferencesimportant?Thefirstclaim,that“rightsderivefromtheinher-entdignityofthehumanperson,”seemsstraightforwardlyfoundational.Itmakesitsoundasifthewholepointofhumanrightsistoprotectandpromotehumandignity,anditwouldseemtofollowthatthebestwaytofindoutwhatrightswehaveistofig-ureoutwhattheinherentdignityofthehumanpersoninvolvesandwhatisnecessaryfortheprotectionandpromotionofthatdignity.Thesecondclaim,bycontrast,treatsrightsanddignityascoordinateideasratherthanderivingonefromtheother: thisimpressionisreinforcedinthefirstarticleoftheUDHR: “Allhumanbeingsarebornfreeandequalindignityandrights.”Probablyitisamistaketoputtoomuchweightonthelogicanddetailofanyofthesepreambularformulations.Theyareintendedasprefatorypiecesofrhetoric;theyarenotnotedfortheirphilosophicalrigor;theyprobablyrepresentpoliticalcompromises;4andtheyarenotalwaysconsistent,atleastnottotheeyeofapedant.Butifwediscountthem,weshouldprobablydiscountbothformulations;itisnotclearthatweareentitledjusttosweepawayoneoftheformulationsbecauseitisinconsist-entwithwhatisnowouridea—ratherthansomethingexpressedunequivocallyintheconventions—namely,thatdignityisthefoundationofrights.III.ContentVersusFoundationof RightsContinuingwiththispurelytextualanalysis,itisinterestingthatbothcovenantsalsoseemtopresentdignityaspartofthecontentofcertainrights.Article10(1)oftheICCPRsays: “Allpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertyshallbetreatedwith...respectfortheinherentdignityofthehumanperson.”(Thisissimilartotherequirementininternationalhumanitarianlawthatdetainees,inparticular,beprotectedfrom,amongotherthings,“outragesuponpersonaldignity.”)5Dignityisalsoimplicatedincertainparticularclaimsaboutsocio-economicrights.Article13(1)oftheICESCRrecognizesarighttoeducationandlaysitdownthat“educationshallbedirectedtothefulldevelopmentofthehumanpersonalityandthesenseofitsdignity,”and,intheUDHR,Article23(3)proclaimsthat“[e]veryonewhoworkshastherighttojustand4SeeJohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights: Origins,DraftingandIntent(UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999), 281ff.5GenevaConventions,CommonArticle III. JeremyWaldron119favourableremunerationensuringforhimselfandhisfamilyanexistenceworthyofhumandignity.”Istheparticularityoftheseclaimsaboutdignityconsistentwiththeviewthatdignityisthegeneralfoundationofallhumanrights?Somescholarsperceiveacontradictionhere.6Othersinferthat“dignity”mustmeandifferentthingsinthesedifferentcontexts.7I thinktheyarewrong.Supposedignityisthefoundationofourrightsandthattheroleofparticularrightsclaimsistopointtowhatdignityrequiresinparticularareas(speech,worship,privacy,healthcare,andsoon.)Forsomeoftheseparticularareas,itmaybewellknownthatdignityrequiresφ(say,freedomofworshiporfreedomfromtorture)andsowetalkdirectlyofarighttoφwithoutmentioningdignity.Inotherareas,theremaybenofamiliarbenchmark,sowesimplyrefertodignityitselfasthecriterionofwhatisrequired: thatiswhatseemstobegoingonintheUDHR’sinsistenceon“remunerationensuring...anexist-enceworthyofhumandignity.”Wedon’tsaywhattherequiredlevelofremunerationis: butwepointtodignityasawayofpinningit down.Also,inasetofrightsbasedgenerallyupondignity,theremaybesomerequire-mentswhichengagethedignitarianfoundationmoreorlessdirectly.Prohibitionson“degrading”treatmentarelikethis: theyaddressthemostdirectandalarmingwaysinwhichhumandignitymightbeassaulted—forexample,consciousattemptstotreatpeopleashavingasub-humanstatus.Considerananalogy.Membersofthejudiciaryhaveacertaindignityinmostlegalsystems,anditisnotimplausibletosaythatmarkingandprotectingthatdignityisthefoundationofmanyoftherightsthatjudgeshave.Theyhavetherighttoappearintheirjudicialrobesonstateocca-sionsandtheyhave,asonenationalconstitutionputsit,arightto“remunerationconsistentwiththedignityoftheiroffice...”8Aswellasthis,theyhaverightnottosufferdirectaffrontstotheirdignityincourt;thisisthebasisofthelawoncon-temptofcourt.Nowthefactthatthislatterrightrefersmoreorlessdirectlytotheirdignitydoesnotprecludethepossibilitythatjudicialdignityisthefoundationofalltheirrights.Thelawforbiddingcontemptofcourtengagesjudicialdignitydirectly;butitisnotallthereistojudicialdignity.Andsomethingsimilarmaybetrueforhumandignity.Wemaybeabletodistinguishbetweenhumandignityingeneralandcertainparticularrightsthatprotectitexplicitlyandmoreorlessdirectly.Aswehaveseen,someoftheseparticularrightsareaffirmativeandsomearenegative.Bothkindsofprotectionareimportant,buttheyarenotallthereistohumandig-nity.Dignity’spresenceasacriterionfordeterminingappropriatetreatmentmaybeexplicitinsomecasesandimplicitinothers.Thereisnocontradictionhereandwehavenothadtoassigndifferentmeaningstodifferentoccurrencesof“humandig-nity”topreventacontradictionfromarising.6LuisRobertoBarroso,“Here,There,andEverywhere: HumanDignityinContemporaryLawandintheTransnationalDiscourse,”BostonCollegeInternationalandComparativeLawReview,35(2012): 331,357: “Itwouldbecontradictorytomakehumandignityarightinitsown,however,becauseitisregardedasthefoundationforalltrulyfundamentalrightsandthesourceofatleastpartoftheircorecontent.”7Rosen,Dignity:ItsHistoryandMeaning,59–60.8TheConstitutionofPoland,Article178(2). 120IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?IV.FoundationalPluralismOntheotherhand,weshouldnotneglectthepossibilitythatdignitymightturnouttobefoundationalforsomerightsandnotothers.Humanrights,notoriously,presentthemselvestousintheformofalistratherthanasaunifiedtheory,9andalistencour-agesus(thoughitdoesnotrequireus)tothinkpluralisticallyaboutrights.Maybeweshouldsaythatthereareallsortsofrights,withallsortsoffoundations: freespeechhasonesortoffoundation;humanetreatmentfordetaineeshasadifferentfoundation;therighttoeducationyetanother;andso on.10Someonemayprotest: doesn’tthefactthatalltheserightsarepresentedashumanrightsmeanthattheymustbeunifiedintheirgroundsbyasingletheoryofwhatittakesforsomethingtobearightofthatkind?Possibly;butthecharacterizationofasetofrightsashumanrightsmaymeannomorethanthattheyarerightswhichareproperlyattributedonauniversalbasistoallhumanbeings.Thispresumablymeansthateachofthemisbasedonsomefactabouthumannature.Buthumannatureismulti-facetedandrightRmaybebasedoncharacteristicC(whichallhumansshare),1rightRmaybebasedoncharacteristicD(whichallhumansshare),andrightRmay23bebasedoncharacteristicE(whichallhumansshare).Forthesealltoberegardedashumanrights,itisnotnecessaryfortheretobeasingletheoryofhumanity—orhumandignity—thatmakessenseofC,D,andEtogether.Afterall,thefactthatdignityisimportantdoesnotmeanthatotherfoundation-ishvaluesarenotalsoimportant.Dignity’simportancedoesnotnecessarilymakeitintoamaster-value,overshadowingeveryothervaluethatmightoccupyafoundationalrole.Somerightsmaybebaseddirectlyonlibertyorautonomy—withoutregardtotheplacethoseideashave,inturn,intheanalysisofdignity.Somemightbebasedonequalityandsocialjustice.Somemightbeevenbasedindirectlyonutility.11DignitydoesnotfigureintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,butitisinvokedsporadicallyinAmericanconstitutionaldoctrine.Againthisistrueofsomerightsratherthanothers.ItseemstobeparticularlyimportantwithregardtotheEighthAmendmentprohibitiononcruelandunusualpunishment;12butonewouldnotexpecttoseeitcited,say,ininterpretationsoftheThirdAmendment(therightnothavetroopsquarteredinone’shome).EvenwhenitiscitedinsupportofSecondAmendmentmat-ters(therighttobeararms),dignityiscitedtendentiouslyasanadhominemresponsetothesuggestionofliberaljusticesthatonlyrightsprotecting“fundamentalaspectsofpersonhood,dignity,andthelike”areincorporatedintothemeaningof“liberty”(asagainstthestates)intheFourteenthAmendment.13Moregenerally,itispossible9Forsomereflectiononthelist-ishaspect,seeJohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986),292andJeremyWaldron,“Socio-economicRightsandTheoriesofJustice,”SanDiegoLawReview,48(2011): 773, 793.10Weshouldalsonotruleoutthepossibilitythatwhatweregardasone-and-the-samerightmayhavemultiplefoundationsormultiplefoundationalelements.11Itwouldbeamistaketothinkthatbecausethetrumpinglogicofrightsseemstodisplacedirectutilitariancalculationsthatthereforeutilitarianideascanhavenoplaceatallinatheoryofrights.12cfTropv. Dulles356U.S.86,100(1958): “ThebasicconceptunderlyingtheEighthAmendmentisnothinglessthanthedignityof man.”13McDonaldv. Chicago130S.Ct.3020,3051and3055(2011),ScaliaJ.,concurring. JeremyWaldron121toreadtheBillofRightswithoutgettinganyimpressionthattheparticularrightsareallderivedfromasinglefoundation.Nothingintheirhistorysuggeststhattheyare.Particularlyincircumstanceswhererightsareaddedovertimetoalistorbillorchar-terofrights—inthewaythattheThirteenth,Fourteenth,Fifteenth,andNineteenthAmendmentswereaddedtotheAmericanBillofRights—itisperfectlypossiblethattheconcernsthatmotivatedtheoriginallistmaynotbethesameastheconcernsthatmotivatethelateradditions.Certainlymanyofthenon-rightsamendmentshavebeenaddedinanadhocway,withoutparticularregardtoanytheoreticalunity—thepro-hibitionamendment,electionstothesenate,legalityoftheincometax,reductionofthevotingageto18,andsoon.Itisperfectlypossiblethattherightslistedamongtheamendmentshaveanadhoccharacteraswell.I amnotactuallyarguingforthisplu-ralisticapproach,butI donotthinkwecanruleitoutasapossiblereasonwhydignityseemsmoregermanetosomerightsthantoothers.V.DefinitionalDifficultiesPotentialdifficultieswiththeideathatdignityisthefoundationofhumanrightscropupalsofromanotherdirection.Perhapsthephrase“humandignity”istoovaguetobeofanyfoundational use.Arespectedhumanrightsjurist,OscarSchachterhasobservedthatthereisnoexplicitdefinitionof“humandignity”inanyofthechartersthatinvokeit.“Itsintrin-sicmeaninghasbeenlefttointuitiveunderstanding,”saysSchachter,whichishardlysatisfactorysofarasafoundationalrolefortheconceptisconcerned: “Withoutarea-sonablycleargeneralideaofitsmeaning,wecannoteasilydrawspecificimplicationsforrelevantconduct.”14ChristopherMcCruddenhasarguedthatthislackofdefini-tionisnotanoversight.Dignitywaswrittenintothepreamblesofthegreathumanrightscovenantsnottoconveyanyparticularmeaning,buttooperateasasortofplace-holderincircumstanceswherethedrafterswantedtosoundphilosophicalbutcouldn’tagreeonwhatto say.15Outsidetheareaofhumanrights,commentatorshavebeenquiteskepticalaboutthemeaningof“dignity.”Addressingitsuseinbioethicsdebates,StephenPinkercalledit“asubjectivesquishy”notionandRuthMacklinobservedthat“theconceptremainshopelesslyvague...[T]oinvoketheconceptofdignitywithoutclarifyingitsmeaningistouseamereslogan.”16Onsomeaccounts,theamorphouscharacterofdignityissimplyasignthatweareintheearlystagesofitselaboration: ourunderstandingofitsmeaningisawork-in-progress.Thisisnotinconsistentwithdignityoperatingasafoundationforrights,forourunderstandingofhumanrights,nomorethanseventyyearsoldinitsmod-ernincarnation,isawork-in-progressalso.Thereisstillnosettledconsensusaboutwhatitmeanstosaythattherighttoφisahumanright,apartfromtheminimum14OscarSchachter,“HumanDignityasaNormativeConcept,”AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,77(1983): 848, 849.15McCrudden,“HumanDignityinHumanRightsInterpretation,” 675–8.16StevenPinker,“TheStupidityofDignity,”TheNewRepublic,May28,2008andRuthMacklin,“DignityisaUselessConcept,”BritishMedicalJournal,327(2003): 1419. 122IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?claimthatitisarightthatallhumansarenowconceivedtohave.Andwestilldisagreeaboutwhichrightsarehumanrights.Itshouldnotbesurprisingthenthatdissensusaboutrightsisassociatedwithindeterminacyinrights’foundations.Buildingadeter-minatetheoryisgoingtoinvolveworkatbothlevels.Onthisaccount,theclaimthatdignityisthefoundationofrightsdoesnotpointustoadeterminatepremise.Rather,itinstructsustopayattentiontoquestionsaboutdignityintryingtoaddressques-tionsaboutrights;itimplicatestheonelineofinquiryintheother.Forexample,inaddressingissuesaboutthelimitsonrightsandthepossibilityofdevelopingconceptslikeabuseofrights,weareinvitedtoexplorerecentdiscussionsofhumandignitythataddressitsmoralisticornon-emancipatorycharacter,ideasofhumandignitythatexploretheresponsibilitythateachindividualhasinrespectofthehumandignityembodiedinhisorherperson.17Mypointisthattheseresponsibilitycharacteriza-tionsofdignityare,atthisstage,works-in-progress,justliketheideaofresponsibilityrightsthattheyappeartounderpin.18Onotheraccounts,whatanobservermightseeasadefinitionalmessmaybeanindicationthatdignityisinfactacontestedconcept—withreasonablydeterminateconceptions,opposedtooneanother,alreadywellcrystallized.19Forthereisnotjustaproliferationofusesoftheterm“dignity”;thereisinmodernpoliticalphilosophyaproliferationofdignitariantheories.ThereistheKantiantheorybasedonautono-mousmoralcapacity,thereistheCatholictheorybasedonhumans’beingcreatedintheimageofGod,thereisatheorydevelopedbymeandothersaboutdignityasastatusratherthanavalue(moreofthislater),andthereisthetheoryofdignitydevel-opedbyRonaldDworkininJusticeforHedgehogs.20Theserivalaccountsconfrontoneanother,andthecacophanyofcontestationmaymakeusdespairthatthereisanycommongroundtoactasarightsfoundation.Atleastonescholarhasarguedthatifwetreatdignityasthefoundationofrights,wearelikelytoendupwithdifferentconceptionsofrightsmatchingdifferentconceptionsofdignity.This,shesuggests,mayalreadybehappeningsofarasconstitutionalalternativesonthetwosideoftheAtlanticareconcerned.21Ofcoursethiswon’tbethefirsttimethatfoundationalideasinpoliticaltheoryhavepresentedthemselvesascontestedconcepts.Contestationaboutthemeaningoflib-ertyisnotorious.22Democracywascitedasaparadigmcaseofanessentiallycontested17See,eg,StephanieHennette-Vauchez,“AHumanDignitas?TheContemporaryPrincipleofHumanDignityasaMereReappraisalofanAncientLegalConcept,”InternationalJournalofConstitutionalLaw,9(2011): 32.18JeremyWaldron,“Dignity,Rights,andResponsibilities,”ArizonaStateLawJournal43(2011): 1107.19Fortheideaofwell-definedconceptionsinrelationtoacontestedconcept,seeRonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(HarvardUniversityPress,1977),134–6.SeealsoMcCrudden,“HumanDignityinHumanRightsInterpretation,”679–80.20ImmanuelKant,GroundworktotheMetaphysicsofMorals,ed.MaryGregor(CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),42–6;JohnPaulII,EvangeliumVitae(25March1995);JeremyWaldron,Dignity,Rank,andRights(OxfordUniversityPress,2012),30–6;RonaldDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs(HarvardUniversityPress,2010),202–14.21SeeNeomiRao,“OntheUseandAbuseofDignityinConstitutionalLaw,”ColumbiaJournalofEuropeanLaw,14(2008): 201andNeomiRao,“ThreeConceptsofDignityinConstitutionalLaw,”NotreDameLawReview,86(2011): 183.22IsaiahBerlin,“TwoConceptsofLiberty,”inhiscollectionFourEssaysonLiberty(OxfordUniversityPress,1969), 118. JeremyWaldron123concept,bythephilosopherwhointroducedustothatlatteridea.23Andequalityandtheruleoflawhavebothintheirtimepresentedcontestationastheirleadingdefini-tivecharacteristic.24Presentingthesevaluesasfoundationalraisesthestakesinthecontestationabouthowtheyareproperlyconceived.Itshouldbenosurprisethatcon-testationaboutthepropermeaningofdignityhasincreasedsincepeoplebegantak-ingseriouslythefoundationalclaimspresentedinthepreamblesofthegreathumanrightscharters.VI.DoHumanRightsActuallyNeedaFoundation(LikeDignity)?Ontheotherhand,thedifficultyindefiningtheword“dignity”raisesthequestionofwhetherweactuallyneedafoundationaltheoryforourcommitmenttohumanrights.Arewebetteroffwithsuchafoundationorareweworseoffbecausewehavenowentangledrights(aboutwhichwewereoncereasonablyclear)withanallegedlyfoundationalideawhichposesmoreproblemsthanitseemstobeworth?AsGeorgeKatebputsthepoint(thoughhedoesnotactuallyendorse it),[W]hateverwasthecasesomecenturiesago,thedefenseofrightsatpresentrequireslittletheoreticalarticulation.Whymaketroublebydefendingrightsatlengthandmakeworsetroublebyclaimingthathumandignityisthebasis,orpartofthebasis,forhumanrights?Theoreticaldefenseinvitesphilosophicalskepticism,whichissometimesusefultostimulatethought,butthereisthesedaysnotverymuchthe-ory,thoughthereissome,thatcomesoutandsaysthathumanrightsare,inJeremyBentham’sphrase,“nonsenseuponstilts,”andthattheideaofhumandignityaddsyetmorenonsense.25Fromanumberofpragmaticpointsofview,thispositionmightsoundsensible.Ifourpragmatismisjustamatteroftheoutcomesthatwearetryingtopromoteashumanrightsactivists,thenprobablyweshouldconcedethatfoundationalism,particularlydignitarianfoundationalism,ismoretroublethanitisworth.WeshouldjustgetonwithsendingmoneytoAmnestyInternational,etc.Again,ifourpragmatismisthatofbottom-linelawyering,thenwemaynotfindpropositionsaboutthefoundationalstatusofdignitymuchuseeither.Onnoaccountaresuchpropositionslikelytogener-ateclearandcompellinglinesoflegalargumentforparticularrightsclaims.Lawyersandjudgeswilldisagreebackandforthabouttheallegedfoundationalpremise,theywilldisagreeaboutitscharacteranditsdefinition,andtheywillcertainlydisagreeabouthowtodrawinferencesfromitandaboutwhatitsbottom-lineimplicationsare.Itisnotatallclearthatthistangleofdisagreementsrepresentsanyimprovementonanenvironmentforlegalrightslawyeringthatisbereftofphilosophicalfoundations.23W.B.Gallie,“EssentiallyContestedConcepts,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,56(1955–56),167,168and 183.24SeeRonaldDworkin,“WhatisEquality?I andII,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,10(1981): 185and283andJeremyWaldron,“IstheRuleofLawaContestedConcept(inFlorida)?”LawandPhilosophy,21(2002): 137.25Kateb,HumanDignity, 1–2. 124IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?Butfoundationsarenotinquiredintofortheirpragmaticbenefits.Sometimestheyarepursuedjustforthesakeofbetterunderstanding,where“better”means“deeper,”not“morepracticallyeffective.”Quantumphysicsisthefoundationofourunder-standingofmaterialnature;andalthoughacasecouldbemadethatforallsortsofpracticalpurposeswehaveamuchclearergraspofthenatureandbehaviorofordi-narymiddle-sizedobjectsthanwedoofsub-atomicparticles,stillweareledintellec-tuallyintothesub-atomicworldforalevelofunderstandingthatisdeeperthanthat.Andevenifquantumphysicsoffersmoreinthewayofquestionsratherthananswers,webelievethatposingthosequestionsandwrestlingwiththemisthebestwaytounderstandhowthematerialworldreallyworks.Somethingsimilarmaybetrueoffoundationalisminmoralandpoliticaltheory.Evenifourfoundationalinquiriesdonotpromisetoyieldanysortoflitmustestforassessingrightsclaims,stilltheques-tionswefaceinpursuingtheseinquirieshelptodeepenandenrichourunderstand-ingofhumanrights.I thinkthisistrueofvalue-inquirygenerally;itiscertainlytrueofwhatRichardPrimushascalledthe“resurgenceofnormativefoundationalism”inthestudyofrights.26Legaltheoristsdonotpursuefoundationalinquiriesjustinordertoequiptheirmorepractical-mindedcolleagueswithimpressivesoundingargumentsthatwillworkinthecourtroom.Theypursuethembecauseitisintrinsicallyimpor-tanttohaveadeepandabstractaswellasasurface-levelandpracticalunderstandingoftheserightsthatweclaimtotakesoseriously.Noneofthisshows,ofcourse,thathumandignityisthesortoffoundationwearelookingfor,inpursuitofthisdeepunderstanding.Dignitymightbeacul-de-sacinthisfoundationalenterprise.ButI donotthinkitshouldbedismissedoutofhandonthegroundsthat,pragmaticallyspeaking,itismoretroublethanitis worth.Thesamepointcanbeputanotherway.Wedidnotinventtheconceptofdignitytobeimmediatelyuseful.Ithasemergedanywayasanapparentlyimportantideaineth-icsandpoliticalphilosophy.Wecannotreverseandweshouldnotignoretheheritageofmoraltheology,natural-lawtheorizing,andKantianphilosophythathasputthisideainfrontofus.Somephilosophersclaimthatdignityaddslittletoconceptsthatarealreadyreasonablywell-understood,likeautonomyandrespectforpersons.27Theymayberight.Butwewouldbeunwisetodismissdignityunlessweweresurethatitneitheraddedanythingtonormodifiedourunderstandingofthoseotherconcepts.28Being(sotospeak)stuckwiththisconceptbythelegacyofourmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,itisincumbentonustoexploreitscontentanditsrelationstoothermoralideas.I don’tpretendthereareeasyanswershere: thelegacyofourdisciplinehasgivenussomethingofaconundrumtounravelratherthanaconceptionalreadyresplend-entinitsclarity.Notonlythat,butwhetherwelikeitornot,amorerecentheritage—thistimeaheritageofhumanrightsproclamations—hassaddleduswithclaimsaboutdignity’sfoundationalroletoexplore.Thoseofuswhowanttoexploretheconnectionbetween26RichardA. Primus,TheAmericanLanguageofRights(CambridgeUniversityPress,1999), 178–9.27SeeMacklin,“DignityisaUselessConcept,”andPinker,“TheStupidityofDignity.”28NeitherMacklinnorPinkerpresentsanythingotherthanabareassertionthatthemeaningfulcontentof“dignity”isexhaustedbyreferencetoautonomyandoneortwooftherespect-basedrequire-mentsofmedicalethics. JeremyWaldron125dignityandhumanrightsdidnotmakethatconnectionup.Theworld(asitwere)committeditselftoclaimsaboutafoundationalconnectionbetweendignityandhumanrights.Thoseclaimsmightturnouttobefalse,misconceived,confused,ormerelyrhetorical.Theskepticsmayberightwhentheysayitismeredecorationinthegreatcharters,oraplace-holdertoconcealintractablecontroversy.Butwecannotbesureofthisinadvance.Anyway,forthosewhopracticephilosophy,thereisnooptionbuttoexploretheseclaims.Thefactthatgood-heartedmenofactionmayhaveotherprioritiesdoesnotaffectthephilosopher’smission.Itisoftenourjob,inthegreatdivisionoflabor,toexploreclaimslikethislongafteramorepragmatic-mindedper-sonhasthrownuphishandsandgonebackoutintothefield.Theexplorationmaybeundertakeninamoderatelyskepticalspirit(asmineis,inthischapter).Butitneedstobeundertakenneverthelessingood faith.VII.WhatisaFoundation?Partofthisexplorationinvolvesasking: whatisit,anyway,forsomethingtobethefoundationofrights?Arefoundationalclaimsjustsymbolic?Isthisfoundationalclaimjustaclaimaboutdignity’simportance?—forexample,theproclamationof“humandignityasarightsofundamentalthatnodecentsociety,orlegalsystem,woulddenyitstrongprotection.”29Oristherearealsenseinwhichdignitymayberegardedas“thefountainheadfromwhichtheequalrightsofmanfollow”?30Theideaoffoundationscanbeunderstoodinmanyways.I amgoingtoexplore(andapplytotherelationbetweendignityandrights)fourpossibleaccountsofwhatitmightmeantosaythatoneconcept,α,isthefoundationofanotherconcept,β.Itmightmean that(i)asamatterofhistoryandgenealogy,βwasgeneratedout of α;(ii)αisthesourceofβ,inthewaythattheapplicationofonelegalpropositionmaybethesourceofthevalidityofanother;(iii)βcanbederivedlogicallyfromα,eitherdeductivelyorwiththehelpofempiricalpremises; or(iv)αthrowssomeindispensablelightonβorhelpsintheinterpretation of β.Aswepursuethesepossibilitiesfor{α = humandignity,β = humanrights},itisproba-blyworthnotingthattheβ-term,humanrights,mightalsobeunderstoodindifferentways.Notonlyaretherestillsubstantivedisagreementsaboutthecontentandchar-acterofhumanrights,buttheideaoffoundationsmightengagewithhumanrightsatanumberofdifferentlevels.“Humanrights”mightbeunderstoodtodescribeacon-cept,alistofrights,andapracticeofassertingandapplyingthem;andtheconcept,29ThisphraseistakenfromNormanRosenberg,Dignity,Rights,andRecentLegalScholarship,AmericanQuarterly,45(1993): 429,430(reviewingMichaelJ. MeyerandW. A.Parent(eds.),TheConstitutionofRights: HumanDignityandAmericanValues).30YehoshuaArieli,“OntheNecessaryandSufficientConditionsfortheEmergenceoftheDoctrineoftheDignityofManandhisRights,”inD.KretzmerandE.Klein(eds.),TheConceptofDignityinHumanRightsDiscourse(KluwerLawInternational,2002), 1, 8. 126IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?thelistandthepractice,maybeunderstoodinmoralorlegalterms.Accordingly,whathumandignityissupposedtobefoundationalto(orfor,orof)mayvarydependingonwhetherweclaimittobefoundationalvis-a-visamoralorlegalproposition,amoralorlegalconceptortheory,oramoralorlegalpractice.Mypedantryinthesemattersusuallyknowsnobounds,butI willnotexplorethesevariationssystematically.Asweconsideroptions(i) through(iv),I hopeitwillbeclearwhichlevelofhumanrightstalkI amengaging.A.OriginsandgenealogyWhenpeoplesaythathumanrightsarebasedonhumandignity,onepossibilityisthattheymeanthatourdiscourseofhumanrightsgrewoutofapre-existingdiscourseabouthumandignity.Theclaimwouldbethatthelatterisfoundationalinagenealog-icalsense,thattheprevalenceorpoweroftalkabouthumandignityhelpsusexplain,inanhistoricalway,whereourideasabouthumanrightscamefrom.Thegenealogyofhumanrightstalkisanimportanttopic: itisaninterestingtaskinthehistoryofideastorelateittomuchearliertalkofnaturalrights,andtoexplainwhy,whenthenotionofnaturalrightslayfallowordiscreditedinmanycirclesformorethanahundredyears(roughlyfromtheendoftheeighteenthuntilmid-waythroughthetwentiethcentury),itwassoeasilyrevivedunderthisnewlabel.31Therewascertainlyapre-existingdiscourseofhumandignitybeforetheemergenceofhumanrightstalkinitsmodernform.But,asOscarSchachterhasargued,itisimplausibletosupposethathumanrightsgrewoutofthediscourseofdignity:TheHelsinkiFinalActdeclaresinPrincipleVIIthatallhumanrightsandfundamen-talfreedoms“derivefromtheinherentdignityofthehumanperson.”Thisstatementshouldbeunderstoodinaphilosophicalratherthanhistoricalsense.Ashistory,itwouldprobablybemorecorrecttosaytheopposite: namely,thattheideaofdignityreflectssociohistoricalconceptionsofbasicrightsandfreedoms,notthatitgeneratedthem.32Nodoubtexistingdignitydiscoursehadsomeeffectonthewayinwhichhumanrightsdiscourseemerged.Butitwouldbewrongtotreattheformerasthehistoricalprecursorofthelatter.Andinmanyrespects,thereversestoryseemsmoreplausible,asSchachtersuggests.Ourmoderndignitydiscourseowesmoretothehumanrightsdiscoursethathasemergedsince1948thanthelatterowestotheformer.B.SourceandlegitimacyInarecentessay,KlausDickehassuggestedthatintheUDHR“thedignityofhumanbeingsisaformaltranscendentalnormtolegitimizehumanrightsclaims.”33This31See,eg,JeremyWaldron,“TheDeclineofNaturalRight,”inAllenWoodandSongsukSusanKahn(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofPhilosophyintheNineteenthCentury(CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),62,andSamuelMoyn,TheLastUtopia: HumanRightsinHistory(HarvardUniversityPress, 2012).32Schachter,“HumanDignityasaNormativeConcept,” 853.33KlausDicke,“TheFoundingFunctionofHumanDignityintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights”inKretzmerandKlein(eds.),TheConceptofDignityinHumanRightsDiscourse,111, 118. JeremyWaldron127terminologyisratheropaquebutDickeseemstobeinvokingaKelsenianidea.Justasthe“grundnorm”ofalegalsystem—thenormthatsaysthattheprovisionsofthehigh-estconstitutionaretoberespected—isthesourceoflegalvalidityand,inthatsense,oflegitimacyinthatsystemforallstatutoryandregulativenorms,34soanormregardinghumandignitymightbeanultimatesourceforthelegitimacyofhumanrightsnorms.Thevalidityofastatutederivesfromtheconstitutionalnormsthatempoweragivenlegislatureandlaydownthebasicproceduresforenactment;and,onKelsen’saccount,inordertoprecludeunanswerablequestionsaboutwherethevalidityoftherelevantconstitutionalprovisionsderivefrom,wepositafinalandtranscendentalnormtounderpinthevalidityoftheconstitution,ratherthantryingtolocateastillhigherpositivenorm(say,theempoweringstatuteofaformercolonialpower)tovalidateit.Inamoment,I shallsaysomethingaboutthedifferencebetweenthisstory,whichcon-cernswhatKelsencalledthe“dynamics”ofalegalsystem,andthesortofstorythatI suspectDickehasinmind,whichseemstohavemoreincommonwithwhatKelsencalledthe“static”derivationofonenormfromthecontentofanother.35Butfirstletusexplorewhatcouldpossiblybemeanthere.Dickepresumablydoesnotwanttodenythestatusofthegreathumanrightscovenantsassourcesoflaw,validonaccountoftheirsignatureandratificationbyalargenumberofcountries.ButI thinkhewantstodenythatpersonshavetherightsmentionedinthosecovenantsjustbecausetheICCPR,forexample,wasenactedasamulti-lateraltreaty.TheICCPRonhisaccountdoesnotcreatetherights;itrecognizesandproclaimstherightsthathumansalreadyhave.Whyistheinvocationofhumandignityawayofsayingthis,orwhatdoesitaddtothis?Dickebelievesthattheinvocationofhumandignityisarefer-encetothespecialnatureofhumanbeings,theirinherentworth,whichexplainswhytheyreallydohavetherightsthatthecovenantsproclaim,priortoandindependentofthepositivelawproclamation.OscarSchachterseemstoinfersomethingsimilar,atleastinanegativeway: “asaphilosophicalstatement,thepropositionthatrightsderivefromtheinherentdignityoftheperson...impliesthatrightsarenotderivedfromthestateoranyotherexternalauthority.”36Again,Schachter,oneofthefirstgenerationofgreathumanrightsjurists,neednotbeinterpretedhereasdenyingtheauthorityofpositiveinternationallaw.Heismerelyinsistingonthe“suprapositive”elementthatliesbehindthelaw’srecognitionoftheserights.37Moreaffirmatively,theinvocationofdignitymaysuggestthatthereisasuprapositiveexplanationforouraccordingtheimportancetohumanrightsthatwedo,forourinsistenceontheiruniversality,inalienability,andnon-forfeitability.Itisnotsimplyamatterofourhavingdecidedtocreatepositivelawinthisform;ourcrea-tionoflawswiththesefeaturespresentsitselfasanaffirmativeresponsetofactsabouthumanspecialnessthatwerecognizeinourethicaltalkofhumandignity.IthinkthisisaboutasfarasI cantakethisversionofthefoundationalclaim.I sup-poseonecouldgoastepfurtherandsaythatthelegitimacyofourhumanrightslawis34HansKelsen,PureTheoryofLaw,trans.MaxKnight(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1967),198–205.35Kelsen,PureTheoryofLaw, 108ff.36Schachter,“HumanDignityasaNormativeConcept,” 853.37For“suprapositiveelement,”seeGeraldNeuman,“HumanRightsandConstitutionalRights:HarmonyandDissonance,”StanfordLawReview,55(2003): 1863. 128IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?derivedfromahigherlawrespectinghumandignity—God’slaw,forexample,orsomenaturallawconception.Certainlythebeliefinsuchahigherlawexplainsthepositivelaw-creatingactionsofmanywhodraftedandsubscribedtothehumanrightscove-nants.ButI thinkthisisbetterconveyedbysaying,asI saidinthelastparagraph,thatthecovenantsrepresentthemselvesaspositivelawresponsestosuprapositiveideas,ratherthanthatthelegitimacyorvalidityofhumanrightsnormscanbetracedtonon-positivelaw.Somewillconcedethepointreadilyenoughsofaraslegalvalidityisconcerned;likemetheymaybeunabletomakegoodsenseofDicke’simplicitcompar-isonofthevalueofhumandignitywithaKelseniangrundnorm.But“legitimacy”isalooserterm—itcanmeananythingfromlegalvaliditythroughpopularacceptancetomoralappeal.Ifitmeans“moralappeal,”then,yes,wecansaythatthelegitimacyofhumanrightsideasowesalottothelegitimacyofdignitarianideas(andviceversa).Inhislegaltheory,HansKelsendistinguishedbetweenthedynamicsandthestaticsofalegalsystem.38Inadynamicsense,validityisamatterofhigherlawsempoweringthemakingoflawsorlegalordersatalowerlevel.Theconstitutionempowerslegisla-tors;theyenactstatuteswhichempowermunicipalauthorities;municipalauthoritiesenactordinanceswhichempowerlocalmagistratestocondemnthisorthatdilapi-datedhouse.39A staticanalysis,ontheotherhand,isarelationbetweenlegalproposi-tionswhichismorelikederivationthanlikeempowermentandenactment.A staticanalysiswillshowwhyifwoundingiswrong,thenstabbingiswrong: theideaofstab-bingisalreadycomprisedinthemoregeneralideaofwoundingandtheconnectionisestablishedmoreorlessbydeduction.40I thinktheDickeapproachunhelpfullyblursthisdistinctionbetweenstaticanddynamicapproaches.Butofcourse,thisdoesnotmeanthatastaticanalysisoftherelationbetweenhumandignityandhumanrightsisimpossible.Maybeonecanbederivedfromtheother;itistothispossibilitythatwenow turn.C.A genuinebasisforderivationThesenseof“foundation”thatpromisesthemostisthesuggestionthatknowingwhatthefoundationofrightsiswouldenableustogenerateorderivehumanrightsclaims.Wecouldthenbuildupanaccountofhumanrightsonamorerigorousbasisthanthelistofrightsgiveninalegalcharter;andthisfoundationalismwouldalsoprovideasortoflitmustestforassessingwhatpeoplesayabouthumanrights.Peoplemakeallsortsofsuggestionsastowhatrightswehaveorwhathumanrightsthereare: afoun-dationofthekindnowbeingcontemplatedwouldgiveusabasisonwhichwecouldtestsuchclaims,bylookingtoseewhetherthecontentofagivenclaimcouldindeedbederivedfromthefoundation.Ofcoursethisfoundationalpowercouldnotbeboughtcheaply.Slightvariationsinthewaythefoundationisspecified—variationsinourconceptionofdignity,forexample—mightleadtosignificantdifferencesintheclaimsaboutrightsthataregeneratedorcertifiedbythismethod.Peoplewillbetemptedtorigtheirconception38Kelsen,PureTheoryofLaw, 195–8.39Kelsen,PureTheoryofLaw, 221–8.40Kelsen,PureTheoryofLaw, 195. JeremyWaldron129ofthefoundationalvaluesothatitgeneratesthekindsofrightsclaimstheyalreadyfavor;andantagonistswillstandreadytoaccuserightstheoristsofdoingthis.Inotherwords,thisfoundationalapproachdoesnoteasetheburdeninvolvedinthedefenseofparticularclaimsabouthumanrights.Insteaditshiftstheburdentothefoundationallevel,byimplyingthatthatisthelevelatwhichrightscontroversiesreallyarise.Still,inthespiritofthewaywehavebeenproceeding,thisshiftingofcontroversiesisnotnecessarilydisreputable.Itmaybesensibleandilluminatingtorelocateourcontro-versiesabouthumanrightsinthisway.Perhapswewillbebetterabletoseewhatisatstakeintheassessmentof(say)claimsaboutsocio-economicrights,byseeingthedistinctiveformofdignity-foundationthatisneededtogeneraterightsofthis kind.Formally,thesortofderivationsI haveinmindaregoingtobepartlydeductiveandpartlyempirical.Onadeductiveapproach,webeginwithourconceptionofthefoundationalvalue—say,humandignity—andweunpackitanalyticallytoseewhatitinvolves.JamesGriffin’sargumentinOnHumanRightsisanexample.Griffinbeginswith“thedignityofthehumanperson”andhearguesthatthatideaisbestunderstoodintermsoftheimportanceofnormativeagencyinthelifeofahumanbeing.41Thevalueofthenormativeagencyofahumanbeingdisclosesitselfinthatbeing’sautonomy,thatis,inherabilitytodetermineforherselfwhattheshapeofherlifewillbeandwhatitisforherlifetogowell.42Andthatabilityinturnrequireslibertyincertainkeyareas—indeedcertainbasicrightsembodyingliberty,toguaranteethatthepersoninquestionistheonewhomakesthekeydecisionsaboutherlifewithoutcoerciveinter-ference.Griffinbelieveswecanalsoinferfromtheimportanceofautonomythatthekeychoicesmustbeeducatedchoicesandmustbemadefromanarrayofmeaningfulavailableoptions.43Allofthis,I think,issupposedtobeestablishedmoreorlessana-lytically,withdignitybeingconstitutedbynormativeagency,withnormativeagencybeingcharacterizeddefinitionallybyautonomy,andwithvariousformsofnegativeandpositivelibertybeingderivedfromwhatisnecessarytoprotectautonomy.Andofcourseitcanbechallengedbysomeonewhodeniesthatdignityisthefoundationofhumanrights,orthatdignity(ifitisthefoundation)isconnectedsuccessivelytothevalueofnormativeagency,theimportanceofautonomy,andtherighttoliberty,inthewaythatGriffinargues.SomeofthederivationsthatGriffinhasinmindaremediatedinpartbyempiricalpremises.(Theseoperate,presumably,asminorpremises,withdignitarianproposi-tionsorpropositionsdeducedfromorassociatedconstitutivelywithdignitarianprop-ositionsasmajorpremises.)Sotheytooareopentochallenge—butnowempiricalchallengeaswellasanalyticchallenge.Inhisargumentthathumanrightsincludecer-tainwelfarerights,Griffinsuggeststhattheremaybepointsaboutwhatisneededtoprotectandpromoteautonomythatcannotbeestablishedaprioributonlybyobser-vationofhowautonomyflourishesorwithersinparticularkindsofpoliticalecon-omy.Hesaysthatnotallargumentsforwelfarerightsareofthischaracter—“Thereareformsofwelfarethatareempiricallynecessaryconditionsofaperson’sbeing41JamesGriffin,OnHumanRights(OxfordUniversityPress,2008), 152.42Griffin,OnHumanRights, 150–1.43Griffin,OnHumanRights,159–69. 130IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?autonomousandfree,buttherearealsoformsthatarelogicallynecessary.”44Stillarightsfoundationalisthastobereadytoworkbothsidesofthisstreet.45IhavegoneonatlengthaboutGriffin’stheorybecauseitillustrates,betterthananyother,whatmightbeinvolvedinthisthird,mostrobustkindofrightsfoundational-ism.I donotmeaneithertoendorseitortocriticizeit.I dothinkitisimportanttoseeitasoneaccountamongseveralofwhatitmeanstosaythatsomethinglikedignityliesatthefoundationofhumanrights.D.ThekeytointerpretiveunderstandingTheapproachwehavejustbeenconsideringenvisagesthefoundationofrightsasaveryabstractmajorpremisefromwhichwederiveparticularrights,perhapsalsowiththehelpofminorempiricalpremises.Westartwiththefoundationandwegeneraterightsoutofthat.Analternativeapproachwouldbemoreinductiveor“bottom-up,”andgoesasfollows.46Webeginwithanunderstandingoftherightswehave—maybenotacompleteorfullyelaboratedunderstanding,butsomethinglikeoneofthelistsofhumanrightsthatisalreadywidelyaccepted.Andthenwetrytomakesenseofthat,perhapsbycon-sideringthevaluesthatwouldhavetobepresupposedinorderforthislistofrightstobesensible.WemaytrytohookupwiththeapproachdescribedinsectionCbyfirstaskingwhatwouldhavetobepostulatedasafoundationinordertogenerateallormostoftheitemsonourlist,andthentreatingthevaluethatwehavepostulatedasamajorpremisefortheformalderivationofwhatwehadassumedasourrightsalready.Orthebottom-upapproachmaybelooserthanthat.Wemightthinkofthepostu-latedvalueashelpingusmakesenseoftherightsonourlist,whetherwethengoontoassignaformallyfoundationalroletoitornot.MichaelRosensaysthisabouttheconnectionbetweenhumandignityandhumanrights:Humanrightsareobviouslydeeplypuzzling—almosteveryonenowadaysprofessescommitmenttothem,yetfewpeoplewouldclaimthattheyhadagood,principledaccountofwhattheyareandwhywehavethem.Couldamodernunderstandingofdignitymeetthatneed?47Givingagood,principledaccountofwhatrightswehaveandwhywehavethemneednotinvolvelinearderivationonthemodeloutlinedinsectionC. Understandingwhywehavehumanrightsinvolvesunderstandingthepointoftherightswehave.But44Griffin,OnHumanRights, 180.45IfI readhimrightly,ArthurChaskalson,“HumanDignityasaConstitutionalValue,”inKretzmerandKlein(eds.),TheConceptofDignityinHumanRightsDiscourse,133,135,givestheimpressionthatthewholeofthedignitariancaseforrightsisinstrumental.Hesaysthathavingintroduceddignityintothepicture,theideaisthatalloftheremainingrights“canbeanalyzedanddefendedasbeingnecessaryfortheprotectionorpromotionofhumandignity.”Butthismaybetoignoretheconstitutiveanddeduc-tiveelement.46I owethedistinctionbetweentop-downandbottom-upapproachesinthiscontext,toGriffin,OnHumanRights,29–30.Griffinclaimsthathisownaccountisabottom-upaccount,butI thinkthisismisleadinginlightofthegreatemphasishegivestopremisesofpersonhood,dignity,andnormativeagencyat30–48and149–58.47Rosen,Dignity, 54. JeremyWaldron131again,thepointofrightsneednotbeunderstoodinarigidlyteleologicalsense—asensethatwouldlicensethederivationofotherrightsfromastatementofthetelos.ThesortofunderstandingI haveinmindinthissection(D) maybelooselyorientedtoaclassofhumanrightsthatisinsomesensegiven,andourunderstandingofitneednotbeconceivedinawaythatpermitsanyexpansionofthelistofrightsbeyondwhatwestartedwith.Thisofcourseisdefinitelythecasewhenhumanrightsareunder-stoodaslegalrights.Wecannotalwaysshowthatsomethingislawbyshowingthatitcanbederivedfromwhatseemsnecessaryforunderstandingotherlegalpropositions.Still,thefactthatrightshavealegalpresence(inconstitutionallaworinhumanrightslaw)doesnotobviatetheneedforanunderstandingofthekindI amtalkingabout.Evenourmostclearlyestablishedrightsmaystillbebewildering.AsRonaldDworkinput it,TheinstitutionofrightsagainstthegovernmentisnotagiftofGod,oranancientrit-ual,oranationalsport.Itisacomplexandtroublesomepracticethatmakesthegov-ernment’sjobofsecuringthegeneralbenefitmoredifficultandmoreexpensive,anditwouldbeafrivolousandwrongfulpracticeunlessitservedsomepoint.Anyonewhoprofessestotakerightsseriously,andwhopraisesourgovernmentforrespectingthem,musthavesomesenseofwhatthatpointis.Hemustaccept,attheminimum,oneorbothoftwoimportantideas.Thefirstisthevaguebutpowerfulideaofhumandignity.Thisidea,associatedwithKant,butdefendedbyphilosophersofdifferentschools,supposesthattherearewaysoftreatingamanthatareinconsistentwithrec-ognizinghimasafullmemberofthehumancommunity,andholdsthatsuchtreat-mentisprofoundlyunjust.Thesecondisthemorefamiliarideaofpoliticalequality.Thissupposesthattheweakermembersofapoliticalcommunityareentitledtothesameconcernandrespectoftheirgovernmentasthemorepowerfulmembershavesecuredforthemselves,sothatifsomemenhavefreedomofdecisionwhatevertheeffectonthegeneralgood,thenallmenmusthavethesamefreedom.I donotwanttodefendorelaboratetheseideashere,butonlytoinsistthatanyonewhoclaimsthatcitizenshaverightsmustacceptideasveryclosetothese.48WeneednotacceptDworkin’saccountofthealternativestoappreciatethepointthatheismaking.Whatweneed—andwhatwesometimeslooselycalla“foundation”—isawayofunderstandingthepointofrightsthatwillhelpusinterpretparticularrightsprovisionsaswellashelpusdeterminethespiritinwhichweshouldproceedinadvancingrights-basedclaims,aswellasthewayinwhichwedealwithpossiblecon-flictsofrightsandthequestionoftheirlimitation.49Ifdignityweretreatedasthefoundationinthesenseofthissection(D),itmighthaveagreateroralesserimpactdependingonhowrobusttheconceptionofdig-nitywastakentobe.IntheGermanAirlinerCase,theGermanConstitutionalCourtconsideredtherighttolifeinthecontextofastatutethatwouldempowerthearmedforcestoshootdownapassengerplaneina9/11typeofsituation.TheCourtinsistedonviewingtherighttolifethroughthelensofdignityandsinceitwasusingastrongly48RonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(HarvardUniversityPress,1977), 198.49Foragoodaccountofhowdignityworkstostructureourunderstandingoflegalrights,seeBarroso,“Here,There,andEverywhere.” 132IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?Kantiannotionofdignity,itwasabletoinsistthattheinnocentpassengersandcrewoftheairlinercouldnotbedestroyedsimplytosavethelivesofagreaternumberofotherinnocentpeople(forexample,inabuildingtargetedbythehijackers).50Onalessrobustconceptionofdignity,however,approach(D) mightsimplyindicatethatwearetotakeindividualsandtheirautonomyseriouslyininterpretingrightsandnottreatthemasheuristicsfortheadvancementofthegeneralgood.Itwouldnottellusmuchmorethan that.VIII.FoundationsandCharacteristicsThelooserourapproachtotheallegedfoundationalroleofdignity,themoreweneedtobealerttoanotherpossibleworry.Weneedtobealerttothefallacyofmistakingafeaturecommontoallrightsforsomethingthatplaysoneofthesefoundational roles.Thisoftenhappenswithrightsonaccountoftheirrathercomplexformalstructure.Theideaofaright(let aloneahumanright)isanotasimpleone.Inthediscourseofrights,agivencontentisnotjustpresentednormatively;itispresentedinaparticu-larlydemandingnormativemode.Thedemandisperemptoryandthedemandisforthesecuringnotjusttheadventitioussatisfactionofthenorm.Moreover,thedemandispresentedinawaythatrelatesitessentiallytotheinterestsandperhapsalsotothechoicesofanindividual.Finally,ifwearetalkingabouthumanrights,wearealsotalkingaboutequality—thatis,wearetalkingaboutrightsthatareheldequally,rightssuchthatifanypersonhasthem,theneverybodyhas them.Thesefeaturesofhumanrightscanbeestablishedbyanalysis.Theyareimpor-tantandtheirubiquitymightleadustomistakethemforfoundationalelements.Butthoughtheyarestructuralcomponentscharacteristicofallrights,itisamistaketoinferanythingfoundationalonthis basis.Forexample,onsomeapproaches,havingarightmeansbeingabletocontrolanoth-er’sdutybyone’schoice.51Thisisnottheplacetodiscussthedetailofthe“ChoiceTheory”ofrights,beyondsayingthatevenifthetheoryweretrue,itwouldbewrongtoinferthatfreechoiceisthereforethefoundationofrightsorthatrightsexistinordertoprotectandpromoteautonomy.I donotmeanthattheselatterclaimsarefalse;I meanratherthatthisformalmoveisnottherightsortofwaytoestablishsuchfoun-dationalclaims.Thesubstanceofagivenrightmighthavenothingtodowithfree-dom: itmaybeahumanrighttohealthcareforexample.AllthattheChoiceTheoryimpliesisthatevenforarightlikethis(whichdoesnotdirectlyconcernliberty),theright-bearerhastheprivilegeofchoosingwhethertheduty-holderisheldliableforabreach.Itisuptoher(herchoice)whetheralaw-suitisbrought.Thatisnotenoughtoestablishafoundationinlibertyfortherighttohealth care.50Bundesverfassungsgericht,15February2006,115BVerfGE118,at§122: “Bytheirkillingbeingusedasameanstosaveothers,theyaretreatedasobjectsandatthesametimedeprivedoftheirrights;withtheirlivesbeingdisposedofunilaterallybythestate,thepersonsonboardtheaircraft,who,asvictims,arethemselvesinneedofprotection,aredeniedthevaluewhichisduetoahumanbeingforhisorherown sake.”51Forthe“ChoiceTheory”ofrights,seeH.L.A.Hart,“AreThereAnyNaturalRights?”inJeremyWaldron(ed.),TheoriesofRights(OxfordUniversityPress,1984), 77. JeremyWaldron133Forasecondexample,considerthatitisoftensupposedtobeafeatureofrightsthattheymustsecurethegoodsorfreedomsthattheypromise,notjustbringthemaboutadventitiously.I donothavealegalrighttoφunlessφisinsomewayguaranteedtomebeyondtheday-to-dayvicissitudesofpublicpolicy.Butagainweshouldnotmaketoomuchofthis,atleastforfoundationalpurposes.Fromthefactthatsecurity(ofsomeinterestorliberty)iswhatonedemandswhenonedemandsone’srights,wecan-notinferthatallrightsarebasedonsecurity.Thosewhomakethisinferenceuseitsometimesasabasisforsayingthatcivillibertiescannotbesetupagainstsecurityoragainsttheactivityofthesecuritystate,becausetheyareallintheenddependentonsecurity.52TheremaybesomethingtothisifitismeantinthespiritofHenryShue’sclaimthatonecannotenjoyone’srightsexceptincircumstancesofsecurity.53Butitisnotpersuasiveiftheinferenceisdrawnsimplyfromthefactthatitisthepointofrightstoestablishthegoodsorfreedomstheyprotectsecurely.Athirdexampleinvolvesequality.Ifthereareanyhumanrights,theyarepresum-ablytobesecuredtoallhumansequally.Butthatdoesn’tlicenseustosaythatequal-ityisthefoundationofallrights,thoughagaintheremaybeindependentargumentstothateffect.54Nordoesitlicenseustomakethemorefoundational-soundingclaimthatitisthepointofhumanrightstoseethatallpersonsaretreatedasequals.Mighttheclaimthatdignityisthefoundationofhumanrightsbebasedonananalogousmistake?Itmaybe.Itissometimessaidthatthereisacertaindignityjustinbeingaright-holder.JoelFeinbergwhohaslonginsistedontheimportanceoftheanalyticpointthatexercisingarightmeansmakingaclaimhassuggestedthat“whatiscalled‘humandignity’maysimplybetherecognizablecapacitytoassertclaims.Torespectaperson,then,ortothinkofhimaspossessedofhumandignitysimplyistothinkofhimasapotentialmakerofclaims.”55ThisisarelativelyweakconceptionofdignityandevenifitisimplicatedwithrightsinthewayFeinbergsuggests,itcannotplausiblyberegardedasfoundationalforrights.Itisjustoneofthefeaturesthatallrightspossess.IX.Dignityasa StatusSometimesitissaid—correctlyinmyview—thatdignityisastatus-concept,notavalue-concept.56Ifwethinkcarefullyaboutstatus,itmayseemthatthisopensupyetanotherpossibilityforamistakeaboutdignity’sallegedfoundational role.52Fordiscussionofthismisconception,seeLioraLazarus,“MappingtheRighttoSecurity,”inBenjaminGooldandLioraLazarus(eds.),SecurityandHumanRights(HartPublishing,2007),325.SeealsoJeremyWaldron,“SafetyandSecurity,”NebraskaLawReview,85(2006): 454(reprintedinJeremyWaldron,Torture,TerrorandTrade-Offs: PhilosophyfortheWhiteHouse(OxfordUniversityPress,2010), 111).53HenryShue,BasicRights:Subsistence,Affluence,andU.S.ForeignPolicy(PrincetonUniversityPress,1980).SeethediscussioninJeremyWaldron,“SecurityasaBasicRight(after9/11),”inCharlesBeitzandRobertGoodin(eds.),GlobalBasicRights(OxfordUniversityPress,2009),207(reprintedinWaldron,Torture,Terror,andTrade-Offs,166).54See,eg,Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously, 272–8.55JoelFeinberg,“TheNatureandValueofRights,”JournalofValueInquiry,4(1970): 243, 252.56Forargumenttothiseffect,seeJeremyWaldron,Dignity,RankandRights(OxfordUniversityPress,2012), 57–61. 134IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?Inlaw,astatusisaparticularpackageofrights,powers,disabilities,duties,privi-leges,immunities,andliabilitiesaccruingtoapersonbyvirtueoftheconditionorsituationtheyarein.Bankruptcy,infancy,royalty,beinganalien,beingaprisoner,beingamemberofthearmedforces,beingmarried—theseareallstatuses,eachofthemcomprisingitsparticularpackageofrights,powers,etc.InBritain,themonarchhasdistinctivepowersandduties;inmostcountries,abankrupthasdistinctivedis-abilities;sodoconvicts(oftentheycannotvote,forexample);aservingmemberofthearmedforceshasdistinctivedutiesandafewdistinctiveprivileges;andinfantshavefew,ifany,ofthelegalrightsandpowersthatadultshave;andsoon.Inallthesecases,thestatuswordoperatesratherlikeanabbreviationforthelistofrights,pow-ers,etc.thatapersoninoneofthesesituationshas.Wecould,ifweliked,laboriouslyspellouteachoftheseincidents.Forinfancy,wecouldsay: (a) ifXisundereighteen,thenXhastherighttosupportfromX’sparents;and(b) ifXisundereighteen,thenXdoesnothavethepowertoenterintocertaincontracts;andsoon.Or,forbankruptcy,wecouldsay: (a) ifY’sliabilitieshavebeenadjudgedtoexceedhisassetsorhedoesnothavethewherewithaltopayhisdebtsastheyfalldue,thenheisforbiddenfromincurringanyfurtherdebts;and(b) ifY’sliabilitieshavebeenadjudgedtoexceedhisassetsorhedoesnothavethewherewithaltopayhisdebtsastheyfalldue,thenheisentitledtoprotectionfromhiscreditors;andsoon.ButinsteadwesummarizeallthisinformationbysayingthatinlawXisaninfantandYisabankrupt,andourunder-standingofthetechnicallegalmeaningsofthoseterms—bankruptcyandinfancy,respectively—carrieswithitknowledgeofthedetailsofthelegalpositionthatpeoplewiththisstatusare in.Itcaneasilyappearthatthestatustermdoesnotintroduceanynewinformation.JohnAustinthoughtthis.AshewroteinhisLecturesonJurisprudence,“[t]hesetsofrightsandduties,orofcapacitiesandincapacities,insertedasstatusintheLawofPersons,areplacedtheremerelyforthesakeofcommodiousexposition.”57A sta-tusterm,hesaid,is“anellipsis(oranabridgedformofexpression),”purelyamat-terofexpositoryconvenience.58Itisnothingbutanabbreviation,a“deviceoflegalexegetics.”59Ifallthisistrue,andifdignityisastatus,thenitwillbeamistake—asortofcat-egorymistake—totalkofdignityasthefoundationofrights.Instead,wemaysaythatdignityisastatusthatcomprisesagivensetofrights.Theoldnotionofdignitaswaslikethis: thedignitasofanoblewasadifferentstatusfromthedignitasofapriestandthedifferenceconsistedsimplyinthedetailoftherightsassociated,respectively,withthestatusofnobilityorthestatusofbeinginholyorders.Andsotoo,perhaps,withournotionofhumandignity.Tosayofanentitythatithasthestatusofhumandignityiscertainlytoimplythatithashumanrights.60Butthatisbecausehumandignityas57JohnAustin,LecturesonJurisprudence,orThePhilosophyofPositiveLaw,5thedn,ed.RobertCampbell(JohnMurray,1885),vol.II,LectureXL, 687–8.58Austin,LecturesonJurisprudence, 700.59ThisistherenderingofAustin’spositioninC.K.Allen,LegalDutiesandOtherEssaysinJurisprudence(Oxford: ClarendonPress,1931), 34.60Somejuristsmaintainthat,strictlyspeaking,thestatusofahumanpersonisasortofoxymoron.R.H.Graveson,StatusintheCommonLaw(AthlonePress,1953),2,defines“status”as“aspecialcon-ditionofacontinuousandinstitutionalnature,differingfromthelegalpositionofthenormalperson, JeremyWaldron135astatustermisjustashortwayofconveyingthatinformation.Likeeveryothersta-tusterm,itabbreviatesalistofrights.Wedonothavehumanrightsbecausewehavehumandignity;ourhavinghumandignityisourhavinghumanrights.Thisiswhatonemight think.Butperhapsthisisnottheendofthematter.OnAustin’sview,astatustermisjustanabbreviationforalistofrights,powers,disabilities,duties,privileges,immunities,andliabilities.Butperhapsitisalsoworthinsistingthatthelistisnotarbitrary;itissupposedtobealistthatmakessenserelativetosomeunderlyingideathatinformsthestatusinquestion.Andthemeaningofthestatustermembracesthisideaaswell.61Intheexampleofinfancy,propositions(a) and(b) arenotarbitrarylegalproposi-tions.Eachofthemmakessenseintermsoftheunderlyingideathathumanchildrenaremuchlesscapableoflookingafterthemselvesandmuchmorevulnerabletodep-redationorexploitationbyothersthanadultsare.Andtheymakesensetogether,asapackage,inresponsetothatidea—ie,theymakesensejointlyaswellasseverally.Theunderlyingidea—thatbeinganinfant(intheordinary-languagemeaningofthatterm)requiresspecialsolicitudefromsociety—iswhatmakessenseofinfancyinitstechnicallegalmeaning.Wecansaysomethingsimilaraboutbankruptcy,alienage,royalty,beingaprisoner,andalltheotherstatustermsI mentioned.Eachofthemisnotjustanabbreviationofalistoflegal“if-then”propositions;itpackagesalistofpropositionsdeemedtomakesense,jointlyandseverally,invirtueofacertainunder-lyingideaaboutaparticularcircumstanceorvicissitudeofthehumancondition.Thisisnotjustamatterofeachitem(inthelistabbreviatedbyagivenstatus)hav-ingsomerationale.62Itisamatteroftheirhavingacommonrationalewhichexplainshowthevariousrights,duties,andsoonhangtogether,ie,theunderlyingcoherenceofthepackage.So,forexample,thecontractualincapacitiesofinfantsareunderstoodinrelationtothedutiesoftheirparentstomaketheprovisionforthemthatformostofusismadebyourownabilitytoenterintocontracts.Becauseaninfantlackscon-tractualcapacity,someoneelsemustmakeprovisionforthem.Abstractedfromthewhichisconferredbylaw...wheneverapersonoccupiesapositionofwhichthecreation,continuanceorrelinquishmentandtheincidentsthereofareamatterofsufficientsocialconcern.”I disagreewiththis: itcomparesunfavorablywithRomanlawnotions,whichincluded,asonestatusamongothers,thestatusoftheordinaryfree man.61Austinwasnotunawareofthisaccount.HeassociateditwiththeworkofhisownmentorJeremyBentham,andheofferedrarecriticismofthemasterinthisregard,atAustin,LecturesonJurisprudence,690,complainingthat“Mr.Bentham...appearstometobeinconsistentandobscureinallhesaysonthesubject.”ItisremarkablethatBentham(whohasclearedthemoralsciencesfromloadsofthelikerubbish)adoptsthisoccultqualityunderadifferentname.InthechapterintheTraitésdeLégislation,whichtreatsofÉtats(orofstatusorconditions),hedefinesastatusthus: Unétatdomestiqueouciviln’estqu’unebaseidéale,autourdelaquelleserangentdesdroitsetdesdevoirs,etquelquefoisdesincapacités.Austin,LecturesonJurisprudence,699.AustinisquotingfromaworkweknownowasJeremyBentham,TheTheoryofLegislation,ed.C.K.Ogden(KeganPaul,Trench,Trubner&Co.,1931),butwhichinAustin’sdaywaspublishedonlyinFrench.62I donotjustmeansomeone’sparticularopinionastowhyagivensetoflegalprovisionsisjusti-fied.I meansomethingmorelikealegallyestablishedjustification—likealegallyrecognizedpurposeorpolicy—somethingwhichisnotjustpresentinpoliticstopersuadepeoplethatthelawisgoodandright,butrathersuffusesthelawitselfwithasenseofpurpose. 136IsDignitytheFoundationofHumanRights?wholepackage,agivenincidentofagivenstatusmaynotmakemuchsense.But,inthepackage,itmakessenseinrelationtotheunderlyingideawhichitshareswithalltheotherincidents.Accordingly,ifhumandignityisastatus,thenweshouldsaythatitcomprisesnotjustasetofhumanrights,butanunderlyingideawhichexplainsboththeimportanceofeachoftheserightsinrelationtoourbeinghumanandtheimportanceoftheirbeingpackagedtogetherinthisregard.Ifthisisso,thentheobjectionweconsideredearlyoninthissectionisamistake.Itiswrongtocriticizeaclaimthatdignityisthefoundationofrightsbysayingthatallthatdignitydoesisabbreviateasetofrights.Itdoesn’tjustabbreviatethem,itreferstotheideathatunderliesandunifies them.X.TheGroundsofDignityMyaiminthischapterhasbeentoexploresomeofthedifficultiesthatmightseemtostandinthewayofaclaimthatrightsarederivedfromdignityorthathumandignityisthefoundationofhumanrights.Onelastobjectionneedstobeentertained.Whenwesaythatdignityisthefoundationofhumanrights,weoftengivetheimpressionthatdignityisanirreduciblevalue,thatwehaveburroweddeepbelowtherightsthatarerecognizedinthefamiliarhumanrightscharters,andthatonceweburrowdowntodignity,itisnotnecessarytogoanyfurther.Butwhendignityisdiscussedinothersettings,itisoftenacceptedthatdignityisanideawithfounda-tionsofitsownandthatitissensibletoaskwhatdignityisbasedonandfromwhatfeaturesofthehumanpersonorthehumanspecieshumandignityisderived.Forexample,somesaythatourdignityconsistsinGod’sclaimuponus,orourbeingcreatedinHisimage.63Otherssay,withKant,thatourdignityisbasedonthemeta-physicalsignificanceofourpossessionofmoralcapacity,theabilitytoactonprin-cipleevenwheneveryempiricalimpulseorinclination,everysentiment,andeveryelementofself-interestpressuresustothecontrary.64Otherssaythatdignityisbasedonourordinarynon-metaphysicalabilitytotakeresponsibilityforourlivesandourrecognitionofsimilarabilitiesinothers.65Othersstill,sayitisrootedpartlyinthespecialnessofthehumanspecies,ofwhicheveryindividualpartakesquahumanevenifheorshedoesnotactuallysharethequalitiesandachievementsthatdistinguishthespecies.66AsI saidinsectionV,arightstheorist’sfoundationalclaimaboutdig-nitydirectsus,nottoaclearconception,buttoquestionsandcontroversiesaboutthatidea—questionsandcontroversiesthatcan’tbeansweredwithoutgoingmuchdeeperthantheallegedfoundationitself.Isthisaproblem—thatourallegedfoundationalideaturnsouttobeinquestoffoundationsforitself?I don’tthinkso.ThatXisafoundationforYmaybearela-tiveratherthananabsoluteclaim;theclaimisthatXilluminatesYinaninteresting63Fortheformerconception,seeJürgenMoltmann,OnHumanDignity: PoliticalTheologyandEthics(FortressPress,1984).Forthelatter,seeJeremyWaldron,“TheImageofGod: Rights,Reason,andOrder,”inJohnWitteandFrankAlexander(eds.),ChristianityandHumanRights: AnIntroduction(CambridgeUniversityPress,2010), 21.64Kant,GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals, 42–6.65Dworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs,202–14.66SeeKateb,HumanDignity, 174ff. JeremyWaldron137wayorthatclaimslikeYcanbederivedfromX;itisnotnecessarilyaclaimthatXisrock-bottom,asitwere.ItdoesnotprecludethepossibilityoftherebeinganevendeepervalueWthatinturnilluminatesXorfromwhichconceptionslikeXcanbederived.I supposeitmightmeanthat,strictlyspeaking,dignityisredundant: onecouldjustgoallthewaydowntothedeepestfoundationalidea,bypassingdignityenroute.Butthiswouldsellshorttheroleofdignityinorganizingandexplainingtherelationbetweenrights,ontheonehand,andcertaindistinctiveaspects(andnototh-ers)ofthedeepestfoundational idea.Alternatively,wemayusetheframeworkdiscussedintheprevioussectiontocon-veythethoughtthattheinvocationofdignitypointsnotjusttotherightsthatconsti-tuteaparticularstatusbuttotheunderlyingideathatunifiesthem.Thatunderlyingideamaybethoughtofaswhatdignityultimatelyamountstooraswhatdignityisultimatelybasedonoraswhattherightsthatdignitycomprisesareultimatelybasedon.Itmightevenconveytheideathatdignityandrightsareco-foundational,whichwillbeunsurprisingifthegrammarofdignityisthatofastatusconcept,alongthelinesI setoutinsectionIX.Itisprobablywisenottobetoofussyaboutthis.SectionIXdealtwithstatusinatechnicallegalway.Butmoralphilosophersandothersusestatus—particularinrelationtodignity—inamuchloosersense.Onceweunderstandthatthetechnicalanalysisdoesnotdiscloseanyinsuperableobjectiontotalkofdig-nity(thestatus)asafoundationfortherightsitcomprises,thenwecanaffordtobeaccommodatingoftheloosersenseandrelativelyindiscriminateasbetweenthemod-elsindicatedinsectionsA to C.Isaidatthebeginningofthischapterthatmyaimwastoexploretheclaimthathumanrightsarebasedonhumandignity,notwithaviewtorefutingtheclaim,butinordertoseewhatobstaclestheclaimmightface.Theclaimisoftenmadeloosely;sometimesitisbarelymorethanapieceofdecorativerhetoric.Othertimes,itseemstoconveyaquiteprecise(andcontroversial)proposition.I don’twanttomakeafet-ishofprecision;partofthepointofmyanalysisistoseewherewecanaffordloosetalkinthisregardandwhereitisimportanttotightenuptheclaimabouttherela-tionbetweendignityandrights.Philosopherstendtothinkthatprecisionisalwaysimportant;buttheyhaveknownsinceAristotlethatthatmaynotalwaysbewise.67Sometimesthequestforprecisionblindsustocertaininsightsthatwecanasyetonlyformulatehaltingly;sometimesitblindsustotheimportanceofpursuingcer-tainquestions(andlinkingthemtootherquestions)evenwhenthereisnotyetananswerin sight.Ithasnotbeenmyintentiontodefendanyparticularversionoftheclaimthathumandignityisthefoundationofhumanrights.Forwhatitisworth,I thinksomesuchclaimistrueandhelpful.MostlyI havewantedtoseewhetherthereisroomforanysuchclaims.I thinkthereis;thereareallsortsofpitfallsandfallacies,butthepro-poundingofafoundationalrelationbetweenhumanrightsandhumandignityisnotalwaysamatterofconfusion.67Aristotle,NichomacheanEthics,Bk.I,ch.3(1094b13).