Integrating Program Management with Systems Engineering

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1INTEGRATINGPROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDSYSTEMSENGINEERINGMethods,Tools,andOrganizationalSystemsforImprovingPerformanceEricS.Rebentisch,EditorinChiefWithForewordbyLarryPrusak

2Thisbookisprintedonacid-freepaper.Copyright©2017byJohnWiley&Sons,Inc.Allrightsreserved.PublishedbyJohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,Hoboken,NewJersey.PublishedsimultaneouslyinCanada.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,scanning,orotherwise,exceptaspermittedunderSection107or108ofthe1976UnitedStatesCopyrightAct,withouteitherthepriorwrittenpermissionofthePublisher,orauthorizationthroughpaymentoftheappropriateper-copyfeetotheCopyrightClearanceCenter,222RosewoodDrive,Danvers,MA01923,(978)750-8400,fax(978)646-8600,oronthewebatwww.copyright.com.RequeststothePublisherforpermissionshouldbeaddressedtothePermissionsDepartment,JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,111RiverStreet,Hoboken,NJ07030,(201)748-6011,fax(201)748-6008,oronlineatwww.wiley.com/go/permissions.LimitofLiability/DisclaimerofWarranty:Whilethepublisherandauthorhaveusedtheirbesteffortsinpreparingthisbook,theymakenorepresentationsorwarrantieswiththerespecttotheaccuracyorcompletenessofthecontentsofthisbookandspecificallydisclaimanyimpliedwarrantiesofmerchantabilityorfitnessforaparticularpurpose.Nowarrantymaybecreatedorextendedbysalesrepresentativesorwrittensalesmaterials.Theadviceandstrategiescontainedhereinmaynotbesuitableforyoursituation.Youshouldconsultwithaprofessionalwhereappropriate.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorshallbeliablefordamagesarisingherefrom.Forgeneralinformationaboutourotherproductsandservices,pleasecontactourCustomerCareDepartmentwithintheUnitedStatesat(800)762-2974,outsidetheUnitedStatesat(317)572-3993orfax(317)572-4002.Wileypublishesinavarietyofprintandelectronicformatsandbyprint-on-demand.Somematerialincludedwithstandardprintversionsofthisbookmaynotbeincludedine-booksorinprint-on-demand.IfthisbookreferstomediasuchasaCDorDVDthatisnotincludedintheversionyoupurchased,youmaydownloadthismaterialathttp://booksupport.wiley.com.FormoreinformationaboutWileyproducts,visitwww.wiley.com.LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataisAvailableISBN9781119258926(Hardcover)ISBN9781119259145(ePDF)ISBN9781119259152(ePub)Coverimage:©VLADGRIN/GettyImagesCoverdesign:Wiley

3Totheprogrammanagers,chiefsystemsengineers,projectmanagers,systemsengineers,andreformersinacademia,corporations,government,professionalsocieties,andresearchinstitutionswhoarehelpingtoadvanceintegratedapproachestosuccessfullydelivervaluethroughwellexecutedcomplexprograms.

4EDITORSEricS.RebentischMarvinR.NelsonStephenA.TownsendEdivandroCarlosConfortoVirginiaA.GreimanEricS.NormanElizabeth“Betsy”K.ClarkTinaP.SrivastavaKennethM.Zemrowski

5CONTRIBUTORSAkioMitsufujiAlanS.HardingBohdanOppenheimBrianMaddocksBryanMoserDavidPearsonDeborahNightingaleDennisVanGemertEricNicoleGuruprasadC.VasudevaJosefOehmenKambizMoghaddamMarkA.LangleyMichaelO'BrochtaStanleyI.WeissThomasPaiderTimothyWiseley

6TableofContentsCoverTitlePageCopyrightDedicationEditorsContributorsListofFiguresListofTablesForeword:Practices,Knowledge,andInnovationPrefaceReferenceAcknowledgmentsIntroductionTheOriginsofanImportantCollaborationCreatingaKnowledgeFoundationthroughExploratoryResearchOverviewoftheBookReferencesPARTI:INSEARCHOFINTEGRATEDSOLUTIONSCHAPTER1:TOWARDANEWMINDSET1.1StrivingforPerfectioninComplexWork1.2BoldlyGoingAgainWherePeopleHaveGoneBefore1.3StrategyRealizationRequiresGoodManagement1.4Workforce+OrganizationalCapabilities=CompetitiveAdvantage1.5RaysofHope1.6TrekkingtowardaNewMindset1.7Summary1.8DiscussionQuestions1.9ReferencesEndnoteCHAPTER2:THEENGINEERINGPROGRAMPERFORMANCECHALLENGE2.1Introduction

72.2MakingWhiteElephantsExtinct2.3LargeEngineeringProgramsAreComplex2.4WeNeedaBetterSolution2.5Summary2.6DiscussionQuestions2.7ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER3:THEFEATURESOFSUCCESSFULINTEGRATIONOFPROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDSYSTEMSENGINEERING3.1AMajorEngineeringProgramFailure?3.2BridgingBoundariestoFosterProgramSuccess3.3ContributorstoSuccessinAction3.4Summary3.5DiscussionQuestions3.6ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER4:THECASEFORINTEGRATINGPROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDTECHNICALMANAGEMENT4.1TheRootsofNonintegration4.2ProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringAreDifferent4.3ProgramManagement4.4SystemsEngineering4.5WhyDivergenceIsSuchaProblem4.6IntegratingIsDifficult,butNotImpossible4.7DiscussionQuestions4.8ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER5:KEYCONCEPTSININTEGRATION5.1Introduction5.2AssessingIntegrationbetweenDisciplines5.3AttributesofIntegrationinComplexOrganizations5.4PractitionerPerspectivesonIntegration5.5Summary5.6DiscussionQuestions

85.7ReferencesPARTII:BUILDINGCAPABILITIESTOEFFECTIVELYEXECUTEENGINEERINGPROGRAMSCHAPTER6:HOWINTEGRATIONWORKSINPROGRAMS6.1Introduction6.2TheIntegrationFramework6.3Summary6.4DiscussionQuestions6.5ReferencesCHAPTER7:INTEGRATIONINPRACTICEINTHEF/A18E/FSUPERHORNETPROGRAM7.1Introduction7.2F/A18E/FSuperHornetProgramBackgroundandtheContextofIntegration7.3TwelveDaysofAugust:AStartontheIntegrationJourney7.4EnablingIntegrationbyReducingProgramComplexity7.5AParallelProcessinNAVAIRtoImproveIntegration7.6TheE/FProgramPilotsaNewWayofWorkingTogether7.7ImprovedDecisionMaking7.8ProgramDelivery7.9IntegrationPracticesObservedintheF/A18E/FProgram7.10Summary7.11DiscussionQuestions7.12ReferencesEndnoteCHAPTER8:PROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDSYSTEMSENGINEERINGINTEGRATIONPROCESSES,PRACTICES,ANDTOOLS8.1Introduction8.2EpisodicIntegrationMechanisms8.3PervasiveIntegrationMechanisms8.4ANoteonTailoring8.5Summary8.6DiscussionQuestions8.7ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER9:THEORGANIZATIONALENVIRONMENT

99.1Introduction9.2StructuralDimensionsofIntegration9.3OrganizationalEnvironmentalFactors9.4TheChallengesofIntegrationinLargeScalePrograms:SystemsFailure9.5CharacteristicsofSuccessfulProgramIntegration9.6TheInternationalSpaceStation:AModelinSystemsIntegration9.7Summary9.8DiscussionQuestions9.9ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER10:DEVELOPINGINTEGRATIONCOMPETENCIESINPEOPLE10.1Introduction10.2IdentifyingIntegrationCompetencies10.3DevelopingIntegrationCompetencies10.4ManagingIntegrationCompetencies10.5Summary10.6DiscussionQuestions10.7ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER11:INTEGRATIONTHROUGHOUTTHEPROGRAMLIFECYCLE11.1Introduction11.2IntegrationandtheGenericLifeCycle11.3LifeCycleStagesforSystemsEngineering11.4ProgramManagementLifeCycleCharacteristics11.5LargeScaleInfrastructurePrograms11.6LifeCycleIntegration11.7LeadershipStylesfortheBigDig'sFiveStagesofProgramManagement11.8Summary11.9DiscussionQuestions11.10ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER12:THEIMPACTOFEFFECTIVEINTEGRATIONONPROGRAMPERFORMANCE12.1Introduction

1012.2ProgramPerformance12.3MeasuringIntegrationinPrograms12.4IntegrationasaCatalystforProgramPerformance12.5CaseStudy:ElectronicSupportUpgradefortheRoyalAustralianNavy'sAnzacClassFrigate12.6Summary12.7DiscussionQuestions12.8ReferencesEndnotePARTIII:DEVELOPINGINTEGRATIONCOMPETENCIESINYOURORGANIZATIONCHAPTER13:INTEGRATIONMEANSCHANGE13.1Introduction:TheCaseforChange13.2TheNeedtoBeThoughtfulaboutChange13.3FrameworksandModelsforChange13.4ReadinessAssessment13.5TheRoadAheadandHowtoPrepareforIt13.6Summary13.7DiscussionQuestions13.8ReferencesAdditionalResourcesCHAPTER14:SUCCESSFULCHANGEPROGRAMSTHATIMPROVEDINTEGRATION14.1Introduction14.2RedefiningWhatIsPossible:TheMarriageofSystemsEngineeringandProgramManagementatLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany14.3UsingCertificationtoFosterIntegrationinU.S.GovernmentAgencyAcquisitionPrograms14.4IntegratingSoftwareEngineeringandProgramManagementatNationwide14.5ManagingChangeinEngineeringProgramOrganizations:BoostingProductivityinBMW'sEngineeringDepartment14.6DeliveringtheWorld'sMostComplexInnerCityInfrastructureProgram:Boston'sBigDig14.7Summary14.8DiscussionQuestions

1114.9ReferencesEndnotesCHAPTER15:LEADINGANINTEGRATIONCHANGEPROGRAM15.1Introduction15.2UnderstandingtheWorkAhead:TheOrganizationalContext15.3PlanningforChangewithintheOrganizationalContext15.4PuttingtheFourInputDimensionsforChangeTogether15.5PracticestoConsider15.6Summary15.7ReferencesPARTIV:ACALLTOACTIONCHAPTER16:CALLSTOACTION16.1CalltoActionforAcademia:HelpBuddingProfessionalsLearntoAdapt16.2CalltoActionforEnterprise:BuildtheRightEngineforStrategyImplementation16.3CalltoActionforPolicymakers:RefocusOversightandAccountabilityintheRightWays16.4CalltoActionforIndustryandProfessionalSocieties:TakeanInterdisciplinaryView16.5CalltoActionforResearchers:ExploreInterdisciplinarySystems16.6ReferencesAFTERWORD:TOWARDANINTEGRATEDFUTURETheCaseforIntegrationNewInsightsGainedAlongtheWayThePathForwardGLOSSARYINDEXEndUserLicenseAgreement

12LISTOFFIGURESFigureTheSpaceXfacilityinHawthorne,California,USAbringstogetherpeopleandnearly11allprocessesfromdesignthroughlaunchintoonelocation.FigureCostincreaseofthelargest96acquisitionprogramsoftheU.S.Departmentof21DefenseFigureCynefinframeworkillustratingthedimensionsofprogramcharacteristics22FigureTheprogrammanagementprocessflow41FigureTherelativefocusofP2Mcomparedwithotherstandards42FigureSystemsengineering“Vee”diagram43FigureThecurrentviewoftheapplicationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering44todevelopingasolutionFigureTheperceivedsourcesofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandchief45systemsengineersFigureDefinitionofroles:Acomparisonbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystems46engineersFigureUseofstandardsbyprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers47FigureReportedresponsibilitiesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers48FigureDegreeofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andthe51formalityoftheintegrationapproachFigureMoreformalordeliberateapproachestointegrationofprogrammanagementand52systemsengineeringresultinhigherlevelsofintegrationFigureMorefrequentassessmentsofdisciplineprocessesandcapabilitiescorrelateto53achievinghigherlevelsofintegrationFigureTheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering61FigureKeyelementsoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdimensionoftheIntegration62FrameworkFigureKeyelementsoftheorganizationalenvironmentdimensionoftheIntegration63Framework

13FigureKeyelementsofthepeoplecompetenciesdimensionoftheIntegrationFramework64FigureKeyelementsofthecontextualfactorsdimensionoftheIntegrationFramework65FigureKeyelementsoftheeffectiveintegrationdimensionoftheIntegrationFramework66FigureKeyelementsoftheprogramperformancedimensionoftheIntegrationFramework67FigureThecompleteIntegrationFrameworkwithalldimensionsandkeyelements68FigureThetwinengineaircraftF/A18ESuperHornet(U.S.Navy,2006)71FigureF/A18E/Fmetitsdevelopmentcosttargets,unlikeother,similaraircraft72developmentprogramsFigureProductarchitectureoftheF/A18E/FSuperHornetismirroredintheprogram73organizationFigureTheF/A18E/Fprogramhadaverystablescheduleduringitsdevelopment74FigureUnitedTechnologiesCorporation'sPassportgateprocess81FigureRequirementsacrosstheportfolio,program,andprojectdomains82FigureLifecycletypesandrequirementsprocess83FigureProgramgovernancefunctionsandactivities84FigureSharedownershipofbenefitsmanagement91FigureHighlevelboardintegrationoftheInternationalSpaceStationprogram92FigureSurveyresultsidentifyingperceptionsofcriticalskillsforprogrammanagersand101chiefsystemsengineersFigureSourcesofunproductivetension102FigureSystemsengineerandprogrammanagerrolesoverlapandcreatepotentialfor103unproductivetensionFigureGenericlifecyclesystemsengineeringstages,theirpurposes,anddecisiongate

14111optionsFigureLifecycleoftheCentralArtery/Tunnelproject112FigureIntegratedprogramperformance:Combinedmanagementandtechnicalmetrics121FigureExamplesofmanagementandtechnicalmetrics122FigureThepositiveimpactofeffectiveintegrationonprogramperformance123FigureSynthesisofthekeyindicatorsofeffectiveintegration124FigureThedifferentiationofgreaterandlesserintegrationonprogramperformance;greater125integration(n=90),lesserintegration(n=67)FigureIntegrationindexversusscheduledeviation126FigureIntegrationindexversusschedulepressureandscheduledeviation127FigureHMASWarramunga:ThefirstAnzacshiptoreceivethefullESsystemupgrade128FigureThemodelforsustainablechange131FigureChangelifecycleframework132FigureEnterprisetransformationroadmap(LAI,2012)133FigureAssessreadinessforchangeaspartoftheupfrontplanningforchange134FigureOneofthechallengesfacingtheEDivisionatBMW:Anexpandingrangeof141vehiclesFigureThefiveelementsofBMW'sengineeringtransformationprogram142FigureSavingsfromtheE3programrealizedoverafouryearperiod143FigureThedimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkinviewforinitialengagementactivities151FigureThefourinputdimensionsthatinfluencetheeffectiveintegrationdimension152

15FigureJohnKotter's(2012)eightstepchangeprocessgroupedintofivechangeenabling153activitiesFigureExampleofthemessagingcontent154FigureExampleofquestionsforwhichtheaudiencewillwantanswers155FigurePrioritizationmatrixexample156FigurePrioritizationtablethatrevealsfocusonclarifyingprogrammanagementandsystems157engineeringrolesFigureTheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering158

16LISTOFTABLESTableTheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationknowledgebasewas01establishedovermultiplephasesofresearchTableLeadSystemsIntegratorobjectivesstatedintheU.S.Army'scontractwiththeFCS21programpartnersTableEngineeringprogramchallenges22TableIntegrationofprogrammanagement,projectmanagement,andsystemsengineering41disciplinesTableComparisonofprogramandprojectactivities42TableComparisonofprogramprocessphasesandprojectprocessgroups43TableComparisonofcharacteristicsandpracticesbetweenorganizationswithgreaterand51lesserintegrationTableTheHornetWEBsystemenabledaccesstodatafromacrosstheentireprogram71TableModSDFdatabasesandanalysistools72TableIntegrationfactorsevidentintheF/A18E/Fcasestudy73TableKeydistinctionsbetweenstandardsandmethodologies81TableMappingofDisneyPixarculturalattributestoHofstede'sculturalfactors91TableSuccessfulleadershipcompetencies101TableSystemsengineeringlifecyclestages111TableTheprogrammanagementlifecyclephasesandactivities112TableGenericprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycleintegration113TableOptimizingthebenefitsofintegration114

17TableLeadershipfortheBigDig'sfivestagesofprogrammanagement115TableIntegrationelementswiththehighestcorrelationcoefficientswithprogram121performancemetricsTableTypesofenterprisetransformationfailures131TableThreephasesofthetransformationalchangeframeworksandtheprimaryfocusof132eachTableMaincompetenciesforengineeringstudents161TableProjectmanagementprofessionalcredentialsandcertifications16.2

18FOREWORD:PRACTICES,KNOWLEDGE,ANDINNOVATIONDocumentedknowledgeandassociatedpracticesexistasfarbackastheearliestcivilizations.Someofthefirstwrittendocumentsarespeculationsaboutwhatisknownandwhatisn't.However,becauseofthewaytheEnglishlanguageworks,theword“knowledge”standsforafairlylargevarietyof“things.”Wetalkaboutmathematicaltheoremsandcomputeralgorithmsasbeingknowledgeessentialtomathandcomputerscience.Butwealsotalkabouttheknowledgeofaskilledsurgeonorcarpenter—atypeofknowledgethatisquiteadifferentthingthanformulaeandcompletelycodifiedsignals.Philosophers,beginningwithAristotle,markedthisdistinctionbybreakingthewordknowledgeintotwodistinctcategories:knowwhatandknowhow.Theformerfocusesonknowledgethatisselfcontained,codified,andcheapandeasytotransmitfromoneknowertoanother.Thelatterisaboutthetypeofknowledgethatismuchcloserrelatedtoskills,expertise,talents,andpractices.Thislattertypeofknowledgeismuchmorecontextualthanknowwhat,isdifficultandsometimesimpossibletocodify,andisexpensiveandtimeconsumingtotransmit,ifitcanbedoneatall.Mostoftheknowledgeweworkwithinourdailylivesisknowhow.Itspanssuchmundanetasksasgettingtoworktotheactualtasksandworkweperformaspartofourcareeractivities.Howeverabstractitmayseem,alltheseactivitiesareembeddedinpractices.Sowhatdoesthisactuallymean?Simplythatknowhowdoesnotstandalone.Itbecomesembeddedinourhabitualwaysofactingandworking,andisembodiedinourmemories,habits,andpsychologicalpathways.Practicesarecomposedofvocabularies,workhabits,accumulatedhistoricalstories,interfacesandentanglementswithtechnologies,andourdeepunderstandingastothebestwaytodothings.Thissharedjumbleofactivitiesandwords,emotions,andtacitmemoriesallowspractitionersinthesamefieldtoratherquicklyunderstandoneanotherandallowsthemtoworktogetherinwaysthatwouldbealmostimpossibleifpracticeswerenottosomeextentsimilar.Ihaveseenmanyexamplesofthisinmyworkasaconsultantfocusedonknowledgedevelopmentandtransmission.Forexample,IonceworkedwithoilriggersworkingintheNorthSeawhowerebeingtemporarilytransferredtotheGulfofMexicoinordertoteachtheworkerstheresomenewmethodstheyhaddeveloped.Vastdistancesinculture,language,andphysicalappearancesmeltedawaywhenitcametodiscussinganddoingtheactualrigwork.Bothgroups'oilrigpracticeswereenoughaliketoallowthistransfertobeaccomplishedwithlittlefriction.Ontheotherhand,peopleworkingindifferentareasofpracticeprobablywon'tbeasfortunateastheoilrigworkersintransferringknowledge.Tacitknowledgeis“sticky”withinitsownarenaandcanbeexpensiveanddifficulttoshareoutsideofitsarena.Thatisaprimarychallengewithknowledgeworkingeneral,andtheparticularchallengeaddressedinthisbook.

19Howdoyousuccessfullybringtogethertwo(ormore)differentwaysofknowinganddoingtoaccomplishanimportanttask?Moreover,practicesdonot,andshouldnot,standstill.Newtechnologiesandnewaccumulatedknowledgeofvarioustypesarecontinuouslybeingdevelopedthathavethecapabilitytoalterandimprovepractices.Sometimesentirelynewpracticesemergefromtheabsorptionofthesenewtechniques.Othertimes,olderpracticesevolveintoneweroneswithoutanycentralforceactinguponthem—notwildlydissimilartobiologicalevolution.Thinkofhowthefieldofcybernetics,developedduringWorldWarII,hasevolvedinthepast75yearsorso,losingitsnameandtransformingintoseveraldifferentanddistinctpractices,oneortwoofwhicharethefocusofthisbook.Myownfieldofknowledgemanagementwasprimarilythesynthesisofinformationmanagementandprocessmanagementmixedinwiththeemergingpersonalcomputertechnologytoolsinthelate1980s.ThiswasaheadymixleavenedwiththeideasofPeterDrucker,AlvinToffler,DanielBell,andseveralotherpopularprognosticatorsoftheblossoming“knowledgeage.”Therewasaneedtodevelopanewpracticetosynthesizethesetoolsandideas,andthisnewpractice,knowledgemanagement,quicklydeveloped.Itbroughtfortheagerpractitionerswhowerequicktomixcasesfrombusinessschools,journalist'sstories,andconsultingadvice.Thiswasmeldedwithvariousmethodsandframeworkstohelporganizationsgetstarted,alongwithmetrics,technologies,incentivepolicies,andalltheothertoolsthatmakepracticesapplicableandworkable.Withinadecadeofgettingunderway,thepracticewasestablishedinover300organizationsanditisstill,asIwrite,alivelyandestablishedactivity.Butit,too,willevolvebyincorporatingnewideas,perspectives,andtoolstoremainrelevanttosocietyandtheeconomy.Practicesinthepastthatfailedtoevolve,orfoughtoffanyattemptatchange,almostalwaysdisappeareventually,althoughnotwithoutseriouscoststothoseconcerned.Manypractices,likethemoreformaldisciplinesfoundinuniversities,donotexactlyembracesubstantivechangetothecoreassumptions.Everyprofessorknowstheperilsofdoingcrossdisciplinarywork,andstudentspaythepricebynotbeingtaughtwhatcouldbesthelpthemtounderstandtheworldanditsways.Economicsisagoodfieldtolookatinthisregard.Thefieldwasveryslowtobringtheinsightsofpsychologyandsociologyintoitsmodels,tosaynothingofconsideringknowledgeasafactorofproduction.EvennowthestandardtextbooksshyawayfromthesetypesofinsightseventhoughtwoNobelprizesineconomicshavegonetononeconomists(HerbertSimonandDanielKahneman)whohaveforcedthefield,throughthepoweroftheirideas,toadaptsomewhattothem.So,withthesechallenges,thisbookhastakenonthetaskofhelpingtwoimportantpracticeareasworktogetherinamoreseamlessfashion.Programmanagementandsystemsengineeringhaveeachexistedasformaldisciplinesforlessthanacentury.Eachhasextensivebodiesofknowwhatintheirstandards,publications,andtoolswithstructuredcertificationprocessesthattakepractitionersyearstodemonstratemastery.Butevenmoreimportantly,theyarecriticallydependentupondeepreservesofknowhowthatisembodiedwithintheirmost

20experiencedandskilledpractitioners.Thedifferenceincapabilitiesbetweentheexperienced“A”teamandthelessexperienced“B”teamorevenwhetherafewhighperformingindividualsareavailabletocontributecanquicklydeterminewhetheracomplexprogramwillbeasuccessorafailure.Transferringthisknowhowfromonegenerationtothenextwithineachpracticeareacantakethesubstantialpartofacareer—despitethefactthattheyareinthebestcasesusingthesamepractices,speakinginthesameterms,andworkingonthesameproblems.Imaginethechallengeoftransferringknowhowwhentheknowwhatisstillfuzzyandperceiveddifferentlyacrossthediscipline.Themergingofknowhowbetweenthetwodisciplinesaroundacommonchallengeisevenmoreimposing—butultimatelynecessarytosuccess.“Nothingcomesfromnothing”thephilosophersproclaim.Allnewideasbuilduponother,olderideas.Newknowledgeemergesfromorderlyprocessessuchasscienceormoretypicallyfromthefusion,merging,fighting,orembracingofolderknowledge.Iteventuallybecomescodifiedintoknowwhatandnewpracticesarethenbuiltuponit.Ithasalwaysbeensoandwilllikelycontinuethiswayaslongasthisremainsaninherentlysocialprocess.Thisbookisawonderfulattempttoseewhattwoestablishedandvaluabledisciplineshavetooffertooneanother,totheircustomers,andtosociety.Whatmaycomeoutofithasthepotentialofbringingaharmoniousunderstandingofhowtodeliverbettersolutionsmoresuccessfully.Thiscouldbeagreatblessingtoallconcernedsoletuscongratulatetheauthorsofthisfirstattemptandhopeforitssuccess.LarryPrusak

21PREFACEIn2011,InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE)andProjectManagementInstitute(PMI)alliedtoenhance,foster,andenablecollaborationbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Ourorganizationsbelievedthatthetwodisciplineshaddevelopedsilosbetweenthemthatinhibitedcollaborationandthatweneededtochangemindsetstoremovesuchbarriers.Weissuedacalltoactionthroughajointwhitepaper,TowardaNewMindset:BridgingtheGapBetweenProgramManagementandSystemsEngineering(Langley,Robitaille,&Thomas,2011),thatidentifiedthefollowingchallenge:Whileprogrammanagementhasoverallprogramaccountabilityandsystemsengineeringhasaccountabilityforthetechnicalandsystemselementsoftheprogram,somesystemsengineersandprogrammanagershavedevelopedthemindsetthattheirworkactivitiesareseparatefromeachotherratherthanpartoftheorganicwhole(p.24).Regardlessofwhowasinauthority,whoseinputsweremorerespectedandaccepted,orwhobetterunderstoodthepathforward,thewhitepaperputforwardthepropositionthatsilosfocusedeachdisciplineonadvancingitsownapproachtowarddeliveringsolutionstomeetcustomerneeds.Thewhitepaperwentontosay:Historically,programmanagersandsystemsengineershaveviewedthestakeholderproblementirelyfromwithintheirowndisciplinaryperspectives….Asaresult,thetwogroupshaveapplieddistinctlydifferentapproachestothekeywork—managingtheplanningandimplementation,definingthecomponentsandtheirinteractions,buildingthecomponents,andintegratingthecomponents(Langleyetal.,p.25).Sincethewhitepaper'spublication,oursubsequentengagementswithstakeholdershaveanecdotallyconfirmedtheexistenceoftheissuesweidentifiedtovaryingdegrees.Thatledourorganizationstoformallyevaluatethelevelofintegrationandcollaborationbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.PartneringwithMIT'sConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence(MITCEPE),ourorganizationsconductedaseriesofstudiesoverthreeyearsexploringthefollowingquestions:Howintegratedwerethepractices,tools,andapproachesusedbychiefsystemsengineersandprogrammanagers?Didcriticallinksexistwheretheywereneeded?Werecommonpractices,suchasriskmanagement,managedinintersectingorparallelpaths?Werepractices,tools,andapproachesevaluatedandbenchmarkedtoidentifyopportunitiesforimprovement?Howformalizedweretheroles,responsibilities,andcompetenciesofeachdiscipline?Dideachdisciplineperformuniquefunctionsorweretherefunctionsthatbothdisciplinesperformed?Howwelldidthechiefsystemsengineerandprogrammanagercollaboratewitheachother?Didanytensionexistintheirrelationshipand,ifso,howdidthattensionaffecttheir

22abilitytoworktogether?Inorganizationswithstronglyintegratedpracticesandlowlevelsofinterdisciplinarytension,whatdistinguishingcharacteristicscouldbeidentified?Howdidthedisciplinesachieveintegrationandcollaboration?Inorganizationswithweaklyintegratedpracticesandhighlevelsoftensionthataffectedcollaboration,whatdistinguishingcharacteristicscouldbeidentified?Whatwerethebarrierstoachievingintegrationandcollaboration?Doesintegrationandcollaborationdemonstrablyimpactprogramperformance?Theresearchhelpedtovalidatetheneedtomovetowardanewmindset:Thisnewmindsetrecognizesthattherecannotbetwoseparateviewsofthestakeholderproblem,butratherasingleonethatincorporatesallelementsoftheprogram….Whatemergesisanunderstandingthatalloftheworkisrelevanttobothgroups,andthatthedeliveryofstakeholdervaluerequiresanappropriatecontributionfrombothareasofprofessionalexpertise(Langleyetal.,2011,p.26).Ourresearchandourstakeholderengagementshaveuncoveredactiveeffortstomovetowardthismindset.Effortsarestartingattheprogramlevelasindividualprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersjoinforcestoimprovetheirprogramoutcomes.Theseeffortsareoftennotdeliberatethough.Astwocolleagues—oneaprogrammanagerandoneachiefsystemsengineerinthesamecompany—sharedatthe2015INCOSEInternationalSymposium,“dumbluck”helpedthemuncoverthateachhadapieceofthesolutionthattheotherneeded.Therelationshiptheyforgedbroughtaboutchangethatestablishedbetteralignment,integration,andcollaboration.Butasoneofthemlefttheorganization,theyfearedthatthechangetheystarteddidnothavesufficientrootsbeyondtheirrelationshiptobesustained.Inotherwords,alignment,integration,andcollaborationhadnotbecomeembeddedintheorganizationalculture,processes,andsystemsascriticalcomponents.Alignment,integration,andcollaborationwerenotmeasuredorreportedtoseniorleadership,andthustheirvaluetotheorganizationwashiddenfromtopleadership.Sobeyondthepremiseandbeyondtheabilitiesofthetwodisciplinestochangeontheirown,seniorexecutiveswithincorporationsandgovernmentalsomustchangetheirmindsets.Theymustseetheconnectionsbetweenstrategy,benefits,performance,andcapabilities,andworkwithintheirorganizationstoremovegapsandimproveperformance.Theymustrecognizethevaluetheirorganizationscouldgainfromevenincrementaleffortstoreducewastedinvestmentsduetopoorprogramexecution.Theymustensuretheirorganizationslearnfromexamplesofsuccessandfailure,suchasthosepresentedinthisbook,andutilizethatlearningtocontinuouslyimprovetheirownpractices.Mostimportantly,theymuststandwiththeirprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersandleadthechangetowardanewmindset—thefocusofthisbook.AlanHarding,President,InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering

23MarkLangley,President&CEO,ProjectManagementInstituteReferenceLangley,M.,Robitaille,S.,&Thomas,J.(2011).Towardanewmindset:Bridgingthegapbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.PMNetwork,25(9),24–26.

24ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThisbookresultsfromasignificantcollaborativeeffortinvolvingmanyindividualsandinstitutionsduringthecourseofthelastfiveyears.Thecomparisonofthiscollaborativeefforttoaprogramisappropriate.Ithasdefinedobjectives,manystakeholders,andastreamofbenefitsgeneratedovertime.Thisbookisbutoneprojectproducingbenefitsfortheoveralleffort.Likeanyprogram,multiplestakeholdersoperateinanumberofdifferentfunctionstoproducetheoverallbenefit.Eachplaysauniquerolethatcollectivelyproducessomethingthattheyindividuallycouldnotproduce.Someofthecontributionsaremanagerial,somearetechnical,andothersareenabling.Uponreflection,overthecourseofthelast16monthsduringwhichthisbookhasbeeninvariousstagesofdevelopment,manyhavecontributed.Thisisanattempttoacknowledgetheireffortsinwhathasbecomeafairlydynamicproject.Someofthosewhostartedtheprojectwereunabletocompleteitorcompletedtheirpartsearlyandwentontootherthings.Othersjoinedpartwaythrough,orevenclosetothecompletion.Othershavebeenpartoftheprojectfromstarttofinish.Theyrepresentparticipationfromabroadspectrum,andtrulyexemplifythespiritofthisbook:bringingtogethermultipleperspectivestocreatesomethinguniqueandnoteworthy.Itisnotintentionalthatanyonewhocontributedtothiseffortwouldnotberecognized,andallcontributionsandinvolvementhavebeendeeplyappreciatedwhetheracknowledgedhereornot.TheoveralleffortwasdirectedthroughthePMI/INCOSE/MITAllianceteam,whichincludedRandallIliff(INCOSElead),StephenTownsend(PMIlead),andEricRebentisch(MITlead),withTinaSrivastava,KennethM.Zemrowski,JackStein,AshokJain,RichardGryzbowski,andEileenArnold,allfromINCOSE,andKeithRosenbaumfromPMI.Thisgrouphelpedtodefinethevisionforthebook,helpedorganizeandenabletheresearchactivitiesthatsupportedtheknowledgebaseforthebook,organizedthedisseminationofthefindingsatconferencesandothervenues,andassistedwiththedevelopmentandpublication.Theyalsohelpedtoidentifyandrecruitthenumerouscontributorstothebookfromwithintheirrespectiveprofessionalcommunities.BothPMIandINCOSEmobilizedtheirnetworkofchaptersandchapterleadstosolicitsubjectmatterexpertandpractitionerparticipationandcontributionstothisbook.Notably,JeanClaudeRoussel,theINCOSEEMEASectorDirector,ClaesBengtssonfromtheINCOSESwedishchapter,andJackSteinfromtheINCOSEMichiganchapterhelpedtorecruitcontributorstothiseffort.PlayingcentralrolesincreatingtheknowledgefoundationforthisbookwereMariaPacenzafromPMIMarketResearch,whoconductedthefirstintegrationsurveyandpresentedtheinitialfindings.EdivandroConfortoandMonicaRossiperformedindepthanalysisofthefirstintegrationsurveydata,andfollowedupwithadditionalinterviewsandsynthesisoffindingstoclarifywhatismeantbyintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.ThomasReinerandLuciaBecerilconductedfollowonconfirmatoryresearchaspartoftheirgraduatestudiestofurtherrefineandvalidatetheconceptofintegration.Additional

25perspectiveinshapinganddirectingthebookcontentcamefromRandallIliff,JeffreyThompson,AnnBachelor,ClaudeBaron,SamuelBoutin,andTomoichiSato.PMIandINCOSEmembersHeinzStoewer,JamesArmstrong,BrianMaddocks,JeffreyThompson,RandallIliff,andTinaSrivastavahelpedtobuildawarenessofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration'spotentialthroughtheirconferencepresentations,asdidpresentationsbyMITresearchersJosefOehmen,EdivandroConforto,andEricRebentisch.Theeditorsandcontributorshavebeenacknowledgedinlistsinthefrontofthebook.Theyhadformallydesignatedrolesincreatingthecontentofthisbook.Theeditorscreatedchapterdraftsthatformthebasicstructureofthebook.Thecontributorsprovidedsignificantandimportantcontentforthosechapters.Theirrolesareinfactnotsoeasilydefined,asmanyofthemfilledinandtookontheworkthatneededtobedonetoproducethebook.Whilealltheircontributionsprovidethesubstanceofthisbookandaregreatlyappreciated,twoindividualsplayedanoutsizedroleanddeserveadditionalmentionfortheircontributions.MarvinNelsonfilledtheroleofprincipalcoeditorofthisbook.Inadditiontowritingchaptersinthebook,healsoeditedandintegratedtheentiremanuscriptofthebookanddidmuchofthedetailedtechnicalworkthatisnecessarywhenpublishingabook.StephenTownsendwroteorplayedasignificantroleinwritinganumberofchaptersinthebook.Additionally,heprovidedessentialleadershipinshepherdingthemanuscriptthroughthemanystepsandaroundpotentialpitfallsintheprocesstogettingacompletedmanuscript.Bothwerecriticaltothecompletionofthisprocess,andwhosecontributionsarenotadequatelycapturedbytheirappearanceinthelistsabove.Asthemanuscriptwastakingshape,manysubjectmatterexpertreviewersfrombothPMIandINCOSEhelpedtoreviewanearlydraftofthemanuscriptandprovidefeedbackonitsstrengths,weaknesses,andomissions.OveronethousandcommentswereprovidedbytheseexpertsfromNorthAmerica,EuropeandAsia,whoprovidedgoodideas,importantinsights,andinsomecasestheawarenessoftheneedtochangecourseorredosomesections.TheywereBryanPflug,BrigitteDanielAlle,AlainRoussel,JeanClaudeRoussel,GarySmith,J.RobertWirthlin,MedAhmadoun,LaurieWiggins,LiewPakSan,LindaAgyapong,ClementYeung,KambizMoghaddam,ClaesBengtsson,MagnusCangard,TimothyH.Wiseley,DennisVanGemert,JörgLalk,CeciliaHaskins,TimothyFerris,ArieWessels,KennethZemrowski,VirginiaLentz,JosephDyer,EduardoFlores,HeatherRamsey,MichaelMorgan,andGarryRoedler.Othersprovidedessentialsupportforthiseffortbyenablingconnectionstopeople,content,orintheformofknowledgeofhowtowriteabook.DonnGreenberg(PMIPublicationsManager)helpedtofacilitateinitialcontactswithWileyandofferedvaluableadviceonstructuringagreementsbetweentheparties.BarbaraWalsh(PMIPublicationsDepartment)facilitatedthegraphicsdesignworkforthebook.HollyWitteandBobKenleyfromtheINCOSEPublicationsOfficeprovidedassistanceinenablingaccesstoINCOSEcontentandintheformalINCOSEreviewprocess.PaulSchreinemakers(TechnicalDirector),MikeCelentano(DeputyTechnicalDirector),andKennethZemrowskifromtheINCOSETechnicalOperationsTeamhelpedwiththereviewandapprovalofthefinalmanuscriptbyINCOSE.MargaretCummings(ExecutiveEditoratJohnWiley&Sons)wasaninvaluablesourceof

26guidanceandsupportthroughoutthisprojectandwasabletoeffortlesslyidentifyapathforwardthroughallpotentialchallenges.Becauseofthemultistakeholdernatureofthisproject,legalexpertiseprovedtobeessential.ElizabethLevy(MITOfficeofGeneralCounsel),MarjorieGordon(PMICounsel),andGitaSrivastava,StephanieTso,andLauraKalesnik(fromNortonRoseFulbright,INCOSE'sCounsel)playedkeyrolesinstructuringthelegalframeworksforthebookprojectandrelatedcollaborativeagreementsneededtoallowthecollaborativeworktoproceed.PeterBebergal(MITTechnologyLicensingOffice)andCatherineViega(fromPMI)helpedinmakingtheintellectualpropertyfromtheirrespectiveorganizationsavailabletotheteamtoproducethefinalmanuscript.ThanksalsotoBenjaminLindorf,GeneralCounsel,InstituteforDefenseAnalysis,forhishelpinmakingthecontentofChapter7readilyavailableforthisbook.Othersprovidedessentialenablingsupporttotheproject.CraigKillough(PMIVicePresident,OrganizationMarkets)supportedtheparticipationofStephenTownsendandMarvinNelsonintheproductionofthebook,whichprovedcriticaltoitscompletion.CindyAnderson(PMIVicePresident,Brand)signedoffonthecobrandlicensewithWiley.DavidLong(PastINCOSEPresident)didthesameforINCOSE.JordonSims(PMIOrganizationRelationsDirector)helpedwithengagingLarryPrusaktowritetheForeword.ThanksalsogotoDavidLong(PastINCOSEPresident)andJohnA.Thomas(PastINCOSEPresident)fortheirenthusiasticsupportofthePMI/INCOSEAllianceandtheoriginsofthisparticularproject.Seeminglysimplethingscanoftenmakeabigdifferenceintheprogressofaproject.Inthiscase,beingabletomeetasateamperiodicallytodiscuss,takestock,andmakeplanswasveryimportanttobeingabletomaintainprogresstowardtheendgoal.ThankstoJillianMorieraandtheSociotechnicalSystemsResearchCenteratMIT,StephenTownsendatPMI,andRandallIliffatBB7eachforhostingtheseimportantmeetingsoftheteam.Last,butfarfromleast,notafewfamiliesandthoseclosetotheauthorsandcontributorswereinconveniencedby“thebookproject”aswritingwasunderway,andparticularlyaroundkeydeadlines.Aspecialthankyougoestothemfortheirpatienceandsupportduringthisproject.Thisistheproductofmanyhands.Asthesayinggoes,manyhandsmakelightwork.Inacomplexprojectinvolvingthecoordinationandreconciliationofadiversesetofinputs,thatdoesn'talwaysseemtobethecase.However,inthecaseofthisbook,itiscorrecttosaythatmanyhandsmakesuperiorwork—thatisthemessage(andtheexperience)ofthiseffort.Anyerrorsoromissions,howeverunintentional,arethesoleresponsibilityoftheeditorinchief.

27INTRODUCTIONThecoremessageofthisbookisthatbringingpeopletogetherfromdiverseperspectiveswilldramaticallyimprovetheirabilitytoproducevaluableoutcomes.Thisisnotnecessarilyanewidea.Thevalueofworkingthiswayisaxiomaticinfieldsasdiverseasscience,politics,orindustrialmanagement.Thisbookspecificallyexploreshowacloseworkingrelationshipbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersincomplexprogramscansignificantlyimprovetheresultingbenefitstotheirstakeholders.Indeed,thisbookistheproductofthatveryapproachtoworking.Representativesfromprogrammanagement,systemsengineering,andacademiccommunitiesworkedcollaborativelytopool,merge,andsynthesizetheircollectiveinsightsintosomethingofpotentiallygreatimportancetonotonlytheirrespectivedisciplines,butalsotoanarrayofindustrialsectors,government,andtosociety.TheOriginsofanImportantCollaborationThispublicationresultsfromacollaborativejourneyunderwayforfiveyearsasofthiswriting.Thejourneybeganwithtwoseparateeffortsthatsharedcommoninterests,participants,andinstitutionalsponsors.In2011,ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI)andInternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE)formedastrategicalliancetoadvancetheintegrationofthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementdisciplines.Thatalliancewasdrivenbythevisionthatbetterintegrationofthesetwodisciplineswouldleadtothedeliveryofbettersolutionsfororganizationsandtheirstakeholders.Alsoin2011,agatheringofresearchersandpartnersfromanumberofindustrialfirms(primarilyaerospace)mettoexploretheapplicationofLeanprinciplestoprogrammanagement.ThisgroupwouldeventuallycoalescearoundwhatwouldcometobecalledtheConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence(CEPE)attheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT).Manyoftheinitialparticipantswereexperiencedprogrammanagersorsystemsengineers(orboth).SomeofthemwerealsomembersofPMIandINCOSE.Throughtheseinitialinteractionsandthemutualconnectionsbetweenthem,bothinitiativesbegantobecomemoreinvolvedataninstitutionallevel.Thefirstmajoroutcomeofthiscollaborativeworkingrelationshipbetweenindustry,professionalsocieties,andacademicsbroughttogetherresearchandpracticalexperiencetoproduceTheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehmen,2012).Thecreationofthisjointpublicationnotonlydevelopedworkingrelationships,butalsocreatedtheformalagreementsforcollaborationandsharingnecessarytoproduceajointpublicationandestablishedacommunityofdiverseperspectivesfocusedonaddressingissuesofsharedinterest.SubsequentcollaborativeeffortswithinthecommunityproducedexpandedonlinecontentfortheGuide.In2013itwasawardedtheShingoResearchandProfessionalPublicationAwardinrecognitionofitscontributionstotheunderstandingofLeanandoperationalexcellence.Perhapsthemostimportantoutcomeofthecollaborationwasthedevelopmentofameansfor

28twoimportantprofessionaldisciplinesandacademicstoworktogetherandbringtheiruniqueperspectivestobeartoaddresscommonproblems.CreatingaKnowledgeFoundationthroughExploratoryResearchTheresearchbasisforthisbookunfoldedthroughfourdistinctphasesoveraperiodofnearlythreeyears.Itcombinedsurveyresearch,interviews,literaturereviews,statisticalanalysis,andsimulationmodelingmethods.Thedataweredrawnfromsourcesgeographicallydispersedandincludedadiversearrayofindustrialsectorsandgovernment.Supportingevidencewasdrawnfromotherpublishedresearchinthisareaandwasusedtoshapeandconfirmtheinsightsthatemergedfromtheanalysis.Whilelargelyexploratoryinnature,theevolutionofthestudyincludedformaldefinitionandtestingofseveralhypothesesaboutintegration.Thecombinedinsightsfromthesenumerousmethodsformtheknowledgefoundationofthisbook.InOctober2012,PMIandINCOSEconductedajointsurveytobetterunderstandtherolesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersandtogaugetheleveloftheirintegration.MITCEPEresearchersprovidedresearchsupportinanalyzing,reviewing,andsummarizingthesurveyresultswithPMIandINCOSE.TheresultsweresubsequentlypresentedtoaudiencesatPMIGlobalCongressesandINCOSEInternationalSymposia,aswellastoworkinggroupsofprofessionalsfrombothorganizationsandotherindustryparticipants.Theinitialresultsfromtheanalysisofthesurveydatawereinformative,butraisedmorequestionsthantheyanswered.Theinitialfindingsjustscratchedthesurfaceofwhatappearedtobeanimportantbutlargelyunaddressedarea.Newquestionswereformulated,andadditionalinvestigationwasbegunbytheresearchersatMITCEPE.Witheachnewcycleofinvestigation,newquestionswouldarise.Throughthisprocessofevolvingquestionsandstudiestofindanswers,amultiphaseresearchprogramemerged.Thefourdistinctphasesoftheresearchandtheirobjectivesareexplainedinthefollowingtable,withadditionaldetailonthestudiestofollowinsubsequentchapters.

29Table01TheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationknowledgebasewasestablishedovermultiplephasesofresearchPhaseIPhaseIIPhaseIIIPhaseIVOctober2012July–Sept2013Nov2013–Mar2014June2014–Feb2015FocusExploratoryInvestigationofInvestigationofSurveytogathersurveytopracticesinpracticesincompaniesdataandtesttheunderstandcompanieswithoutfacingunproductiveIntegrationhowprogramunproductivetension.Framework.managementtension.andsystemsengineeringareintegratedwithintheorganization.MethodologyOnlinesurveyInterviewswithInterviewswithsurveyOnlinesurveywithaglobalsurveyrespondentsrespondents(7programwithaglobalsampleof694(9programmanagersorchiefsampleof157usablesurveysmanagersorchiefsystemsengineers)tousablesurveys(340currentsystemsengineers)characterizewhattheir(programprogramtocharacterizeorganizationsdidtomanagersandmanagers,222whattheirintegrateprogramsystemscurrentchieforganizationsdidmanagementandengineers)systemstointegratesystemsengineeringandrepresenting18engineers,132programtobetterunderstandindustrysectors.functioningasmanagementandunproductivetension.Validationboth).systemsthroughstatisticalengineering.analysis.PhaseIStudyTheinvitationtoparticipateinthejointPMIandINCOSEsurveyin2012wassenttoapproximately3,000INCOSEmembers(systemsengineers)and5,000PMImembers(programmanagers).Usableresponseswerereceivedthroughawebbasedsurveyfromalmost700participantsspreadacrosstheglobe.Therespondentswererestrictedfromparticipatinginthesurveyunlesstheywereeitheracurrentprogrammanager(theonewhohastheultimateauthorityandaccountabilityfortheoverallprogramconsistingofmultiplerelatedprojects),acurrentchiefsystemsengineer(theonewhohasultimatetechnicalauthorityandaccountabilityfortheproductorsystembeingdeveloped),orcurrentlyfunctioningasboth.Thesurveywasconstructedtobetterunderstandhowprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringareintegratedwithinorganizations.Itposedquestionsabout:

30CommonjobskillsandresponsibilitiesbetweenthetworolesThelevelofinteractionandintegrationbetweenthetworolesTheinteractionsbetweentheuseofstandards,integration,formalization,levelofeffectiveness,anddegreeofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringWaysthatINCOSEandPMIcouldcollaboratetobetteralignsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementpracticesThesurveyprovidedhelpfulfirstinsightsaboutthestateofinteractionsandintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Becausethesurveyspannedanumberofdiversetopics,itdidnotdiveintogreatdetailinanyoneofthoseareas.Inadditiontointegration,unproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersemergedasanimportantfactortohelppartitiontheresponsesintodifferentgroupsthatsuggesteddifferinglevelsofperformance.Unproductivetensionwasdefinedasanyissuebetweenthetwodisciplinesthatmightnegativelyaffectprogramperformancewithafocusonpractices,tools,andtechniques,aswellasjobdescriptionsandresponsibilities.Alloftheresponsestothequestionaboutunproductivetension,withtheexceptionof“Nounproductivetension,”reflectedaspectrumwithvaryingdegreesofnegativeimpactontheprogram'sperformance.Thedataunderwentextensivestatisticalanalysistounderstandthecircumstancesunderwhichintegrationandunproductivetensionoccurred.Whileanumberofusefulinsightsemergedfromthisanalysis,theconnectionbetweenintegration,unproductivetension,andoverallprogramororganizationalperformanceremainedunclearatthisstage.Theactionmechanismsforenablinggreaterlevelsofintegrationwerelikewiseunclear.PhaseIIandIIIStudiesThesurveyprovidedagoodstartingpointtounderstandthehighlevelissuesassociatedwithintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Inordertoclarifythemechanismsofintegrationandtheimpactofintegrationonperformance,additionalinformationabouthowintegrationactuallyoccurredinorganizationswasneeded.Fortunately,thesurveyallowedtherespondentstoindicatethattheywerewillingtoanswerfollowupquestionsrelatedtothestudytopic.Thisprovidedanopportunitytolearnmoreabouthoworganizationsmanagedintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Thosewhoindicatedthattheywerewillingtoengageinfurtherdiscussionwerealsomostlikelytohaveindicatedthattheirorganizationsexperiencedlittleornounproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Consequently,PhaseIIoftheresearchfocusedonthoseorganizationsthatexperiencedlittleornounproductivetension.Therespondentswereaskedtodescribewhattheyunderstoodaboutintegration,unproductivetension,thecharacteristicsoftheirteams,therelationshipbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andotherrelatedfactorsthatmightexplainwhytheyindicatedthattheirorganizationsexperiencedlowerlevelsofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Toprovideabasisforcomparison,aseparatesampleofrespondentsthatindicatedhighlevels

31ofunproductivetensionintheirorganizationswasidentifiedfromtheinitialgroupofsurveyrespondents.InterviewswiththissamplecomprisedPhaseIIIoftheresearch.TherespondentswereaskedtoanswerthesamequestionsusedinPhaseII.Additionally,theywereaskedtodescribewhattheyperceivedtobetheprimarysourcesofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintheirorganizations.Theresponsesfromeachphasewerecomparedandthecontrastswereusedtobetterdefineintegration,unproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andtounderstandthefactorsthatmightcontributetoormitigateeither.TocomplementthefindingsfromthePhaseIstudyandtheinterviews,publishedresearch,includingcasestudies,onthetopicofintegrationingeneralandspecificallybetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwasreviewed.Explorationoftheseandanumberofperipherallyrelatedtopicareasrevealedthatapparentlylittleresearchhadbeendoneinthisareapreviously.Whilecasestudiesfocusingonprogrammanagementorsystemsengineeringalonewereavailable,veryfewcasestudieswerefoundthatfocusedspecificallyonthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringandhowthecharacteristicsofthatrelationshipaffectsprogramoutcomes.Withoutastrongresearchprecedentorempiricalbasetobuildon,thisstudybecamelargelyexploratory,orinthe“observe,describe,andmeasure”stageoftheorydevelopment(Christensen,2006).Thismeansthatthestudywasinductive,witheffortprimarilyfocusedonidentificationofthekeyfactorsorconstructsthatdrivetheoverallbehavior,andhowthosefactorsrelatetooneanother.Oncetheprimaryconstructsandrelationshipsbetweenthemhavebeenidentifiedbyastudy(i.e.,amodelofthesystemisdeveloped),deductiveorconfirmatoryanalysiswherespecifichypothesescanbetestedandthestrengthofrelationshipsestablishedbecomesavailable.Withmodeldevelopmentandtestingastheobjectivethen,theanalysisofboththesurveyandinterviewdatawereusedtodraftapractitionerorientedframeworktohelporganizationsunderstandintegrationandpossibleareasforimprovement.Theanalysisoftheinterviewsalsoproducedmoreformaldefinitionsofintegrationandunproductivetension.Thedefinitions,framework,andresearchresultswerepresentedatanumberofconferencesandworkshopswithbothprogrammanagementandsystemengineeringaudiences,andwereadditionallyscrutinizedbysubjectmatterexpertsfromeachdomain,helpingtofurtherrefinetheworkingdefinitionoftheintegrationconstructs.PhaseIVStudyFromthepractitionerorientedframeworkamoreformalresearchintegrationframeworkwascreated.Thisincludedformaldefinitionofvariablesandhypothesizedrelationshipsbetweenthevariables.Usingthisframework,asurveywascreatedtomeasureeachofthevariablesintheframeworkconsistentwithacceptedresearchstandardsandpractices.ThiswasthenhostedonlineandinvitationstoparticipateinthesurveyweresenttoasampleofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersdrawnfromthesamegeneralpopulationsasthePhaseIsurvey.ThedataproducedbythenewsurveywereusedtoformallytesttheIntegrationFrameworkandprovide

32additionalinsightsintotherelationshipsbetweenthevariouselementsofintegration.Theonlinesurveysampled157participantsfromaroundtheworldandincludedprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Theresultingdatasetenabledamorerigorousandsystematicanalysisofthedatatovalidatetheconceptsthathadbeenidentifiedpreviouslyusingadvancedstatisticalanalysisandmodelingmethods.Theresultsprovidedabetterunderstandingofwhatfactorscontributetointegrationinprograms,aswellasabetterestimateoftheimpactofintegrationonprogramperformance.Withthedetailedempiricaldataabouttheintegrationelements,asimulationmodelwasdevelopedtohelptestthenatureofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringunderarangeofdifferentcircumstances.StrengthsandLimitationsoftheResearchFoundationThisoverviewoftheresearchpresentsnotonlytheempiricalbasisfortheideaspresentedinthisbook,butalsohighlightsitslimitations.Researchontheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringshouldbeconsideredatthispointintheearlystagesoftheorydevelopmentandunderstanding.Ageneralruleofthumbinresearchistokeepcollectingdatauntilnosignificantnewinsightsemergefromtheanalysisofthatdata.Thedatausedasthebasisofthisdiscussioniscertainlymoreextensivethanwhathadbeenuncoveredatthebeginningofthiseffort.Butnewinsightsemergedwitheachadditionalsample,suggestingthatresearchinthisdomainisstillintheexploratoryphase.Theideaspresentedhere,therefore,maybestbeconsideredasreasonableapproximationsofhowprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringcanbebetterintegrated.Theymaybeusefulforpractitionersandresearchersalike,butmuchyetremainsunknown.Someofwhatishintedatbytheresearchsofarlikelyprovidesonlyanincompleteperspectiveatthispoint.Otherideasoractivitiespresentedheremayonlyaddresssymptomsratherthantheunderlyingissuesandrootcausesassociatedwiththeimpactofpoorintegrationonprogramperformance.Toaddresstheselimitations,moreresearchonthesetopicsisnotonlywelcomebutwarranted.So,thisbookisnotmeanttoprovidethelastwordonintegrationbetweenthesedisciplines.Rather,itshouldbeconsideredaninitialinvitationtoopenactivediscussionandinvestigationaboutacriticaltopic.IntegratingPractitionerKnowledgewithResearchTheresultsofthemultipleresearchphases,andparticularlytheIntegrationFramework,frametheflowandpresentationofinformation,examples,andideasinthisbook.Excerptsfromtheanalysisappearinvariouschaptersthroughoutthebook.Theanalysisresultedinpapersthatwentthroughtheacademicpeerreviewprocessandweretargetedtowardacademicaudiences.Italsoresultedinpractitionerfocusedpublicationsandpresentationswithdiscussionsthatgavea“realitycheck”tothefindings.Theexposureoftheseideastomultipleperspectiveshashopefullyimprovedthemwitheachiterationofthereviewprocess,andmadethemmorerelevantandaccessibleinthisbook.Theideasandconceptsidentifiedintheresearchalsoprovidedaroadmapforthecontentthatwascontributedbypractitionersandcollaboratorsonthisproject.Openingupthepotential

33numberofcontributorsandperspectivesnotonlygreatlyenhancesthestrengthandapplicabilityoftheideas,butitalsomakesthebookmorereadableandinterestingtoawiderarrayofpotentialreaders.Moreover,itprovidesadditionalobservationsandexamplestohelpovercomethelimitationsinthesizeandscopeofthedatasetasdescribedpreviously.Asnotedearlier,notmanycasestudieswerefoundthatfocusspecificallyontherelationshipbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Casestudyexamplesareusefultoillustratecomplexconceptsandtomakethetextmorereadableandmemorable.CasestudieswrittentoillustratethespecificpointsoftheIntegrationFrameworkwereusedwhenevertheycouldbeidentifiedandwereavailable.Published,researchbasedcasestudiesweregenerallypreferredastheywouldhavebeenrequiredtoadheretoascientificstandardofverificationofevidence.Inotherinstances,caseexamplesdrawnfromthepopularpresswereusedtoillustratespecificpoints.Inthoseinstances,alleffortsweremadetofindcorroboratingevidencefromdifferentsourcesinordertoincreaseconfidencethatthepointsbeingrepresentedwereaccurate.Inallcases,thestandardfordecidingwhethertousematerialinthisbookisthatexamplesshouldbedocumentedinaverifiablewayandbeconsistentwithfindingsfromthisorothersystematicresearch.Finally,amaturedraftofthemanuscriptofthisbookwasreviewedbysubjectmatterexpertsdrawnfromthePMI,INCOSE,andacademiccommunities.Over30reviewersreadpartsorallofthedraftmanuscriptandprovidedoverathousandcommentstoaddresstheaccuracy,relevance,andtoneofthecontent,ortosuggestalternativeornewconsiderationsregardingtheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Theirfeedbackincludedconsiderablethoughtandinsomecasesnewcontentthatstrengthenedandimprovedthetextoverall.Thisbookis,therefore,anamalgamofadiversearrayofpreliminaryevidenceaboutwhytheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringisimportanttothepracticeofbothdisciplinesand,ultimately,valuabletothebeneficiariesoftheirprograms.Thehopeisthatbybringingthiscontenttogethernow,practitionersmayderivesomeneartermbenefitandothersmaybeinspiredtocontinuetheinvestigationanddocumentationofthisimportantarea.Throughthenormaloperationofthescientificmethod,gaps,errors,andincompleteelementsmayhopefullybeaddressedinthefuture.OverviewoftheBookThisbookispartitionedintofourparts,asoutlinedbelow.PartImakesthecaseforwhyintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringisimportant—whythereadershouldcareaboutthistopic.Theprogressionofideasineachchaptertakesthereaderfromtheinitialrecognitionthatthereisgreatopportunitytoimprovetheperformanceofprogramsthroughbetterintegrationoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines,toanunderstandingoftheunderlyingbarrierstointegration,andthepotentialbenefitsthatmightcomefrombetterintegration.PartIIdescribesingreaterdetailthepracticesandmethodsthatenablegreaterintegration

34betweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines—whattodotohavemoreintegratedprogramexecution.ThechaptersareorganizedaroundthemajorelementsoftheIntegrationFramework.Eachincludesresearchfindingsfromthestudydiscussedhere,complementedbyexamplesdrawnfromotherstudiesandfrompractitionerexperience.PartIIIaddressesthechallengeofhowtocreatesustainedchangetowardanewwayofoperatinginamoreintegratedstate—howtomakeintegrationarealityinprograms.Changeisdifficult,andtransformationalchangeisevenmorechallengingbecauseofthecomplexityintroducedbythevariousfactors.Thechaptersinthispartdescribethesechallengesandhowtoovercomethem,supportedbyexamplesofsuccessfulchange.ThebookconcludesinPartIVwithacalltoaction.Theideaspresentedinthefirstthreepartsareorientedtowardprogramsandtheorganizationsthatimmediatelysupportthem.Programs,however,existinanenvironmentthatpractitionersoftenarenotabletoeffectivelycontrol,butwhichmayexertconsiderableinfluenceontheprogramitselfandthepractitioners'abilitytooperateinanintegratedfashion.Thechallengestointegrationposedbyvariouselementsintheprogram'soperatingandresourceenvironmentareaddressedherewithrecommendationsforchangesthatareintendedtoenableprogramstooperateinamoreintegratedfashion.Finally,thefocusofthisbookisonprogramsandtheircontext.Manyreadersmayworkprimarilyinaprojectenvironment,andmayconcludethattheseideasarenotrelevantfortheirwork.PMI(2013)definesprogramsas“agroupofrelatedprojects,subprograms,andprogramactivitiesthataremanagedinacoordinatedwaytoobtainbenefitsnotavailablefrommanagingthemindividually”(p.4).Projectsdifferfromprogramsinthattheytendtohaveatightlydefinedscopeofwork,alongwithafixedbudgetandtimeframewithinwhichtheoutputistobedelivered.Whilethefocusofthisbookisonprograms,theprinciplesandpracticesofintegrationdiscussedinthechaptersshouldbeapplicabletobothprogramsandprojects.Ineithercase,sometailoringoftheprinciplestotherequirementsoftheimmediatesettinglikelywillbeneeded.ReferencesChristensen,C.M.(2006).Theongoingprocessofbuildingatheoryofdisruption.JournalofProductInnovationManagement,23(1),39–55.Oehmen,J.(Ed.).(2012).TheguidetoLeanenablersformanagingengineeringprograms,version1.0.Cambridge,MA:JointMITPMIINCOSECommunityofPracticeonLeaninProgramManagement.URI:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70495ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013).Thestandardforprogrammanagement(3rded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.

35PartIINSEARCHOFINTEGRATEDSOLUTIONSPartIexplorestheimportanceofcomplexprogramsforsocietyandthepositiveimpacttheycanhavewhentheyperformwell,aswellasthedownsideswhentheydonot.Someofthechallengesandcausesofpoorprogramperformance,aswellasfactorsthatcontributetoprogramsuccess,areexamined.Thereareanumberofcommonelementsthatbegintoexplaintherangeinprogramperformance,includingthefunctionsperformedbytheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesandtheirapproachtoworkingtogether.Thesectionconcludesbyidentifyingawaytomitigateoravoidmanycommonprogramchallenges—theconceptofintegration.Chapter1usestheexampleofSpaceXCorporationtoilluminatethedifferenceinperformancethatcanresultfromauniqueapproachtomanagingengineeringprograms.Itexploreshowperformanceoutcomesmayresultfromacombinationoffactors,butultimatelyarerootedinthecapabilitiesthatorganizationsbuildtobebothinnovativeandefficient.Keyplayersincreatingtheconditionsforsuccessorfailureintheseprogramsaretheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Chapter2illustratesthedifferentchallengesthatprogramsface,oftenrootedinthecomplexityoftasksandhowthatcomplexityisnavigated.Poorhandlingofthesechallengesresultsinpoorprogramperformance,asillustratedinthreecaseexamples.Thesechallengesarewellknown,yetmanyprogramsstillsufferthenegativeconsequencesofnotidentifyinganddealingwiththemappropriately.Thechapterarguesthatanintegratedmanagementframeworkthatbringstogetherprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringmayproducebetteroutcomesforthesecomplexprograms.Chapter3examineseffectiveorhighfunctioningprogramstobetterunderstandthefactorsthatcontributetotheirsuccess.Higherlevelsofprogramperformanceareachievedthroughwhatisreferredtoas“integration”—increasingtheabilityofallprogramparticipantstocollaborate,communicate,andbringtheirrespectivecontributionstobearinaddressingchallenges.Bettercollaborationandintegrationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementfunctionscanovercomeprogramchallengesandimproveoverallperformance.Chapter4exploresthefieldsofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringtounderstandtheirhistoryandevolution,therolesplayedbytheirrespectivepractitioners,andtheirorientationstowardworktasks.Large,complexprogramsrelyonhighperformanceonthetechnicalsideandexceptionalmanagementoverall.Bothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinescontributecriticalbenefitstotheprogram,butcanoftenworkatcrosspurposes.Bothpossessuniqueandspecializedsetsofknowledgecapableofcreatingsignificantbenefitsindependently,but,moreimportantly,evengreaterbenefitswhenworkingtogether.However,theyarealsosusceptibletobeingtrappedwithintheirownlocalmindsetstothedetrimentofoverallprogramperformance.

36Chapter5exploresintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringtoidentifyitsroleinprogramsuccess.Properlydefiningandunderstandingintegrationacrosstheorganizationisparamounttoimprovingperformanceinlargeprograms.Integrationmaymanifestitselfinanumberofdifferentwaysdependingonthesetting.Thischapterconveysanexpansivedefinitionofintegrationinoperationaltermsandhowitismanifestinspecificorganizationsacrossmanysectors.

371TOWARDANEWMINDSET1.1StrivingforPerfectioninComplexWorkAoncerelativelycommonexpressionintheUnitedStateswas“ifwecanputamanonthemoon,whycan'twe?”Itconveyedasensethatthecountry,itstechnicalexperts,itsgovernment,anditspeoplewerecapableofamazingthingsiftheyputtheirmindstoit.Therewasanothertermthatwentalongwithit—“rocketscientists.”Thosewerethecleverpeoplewhomadethosemiraculousthingshappensothattheyseemedcommonplace.Givenenoughrocketscientists,oneimagined,justaboutanyproblem,nomatterhowcomplex,couldbesolved.Perhapsthoseexpressionsarelockedinacertaintimeandplace—thelate1960sandearly1970s—whentheUnitedStateswasroutinelyputtingmenonthemoon,lessthansevendecadesafterpeoplefirsttooktotheskyinthedawnofpoweredflight.Thesameexpressionsimultaneouslyconveyedasenseoffrustrationthatthingsdon'talwaysworkashopedorplanned,nomatterhowcleverorskilledwemightappearorhowmuchthoughtweputintotheplans.Whyisitthatdespitehavingadvancedknowledge,tools,andcapabilities,andevenhavingdemonstratedthatitispossibletodosomethingamazing,besteffortssometimesendindisappointmentorfailure?Manyotherhumanactivitiesthatdon'tinvolvethecomplexitiesofspaceflightbutareintheirownwaycomplex(thinkenergy,infrastructure,transportation,publichealth)neverthelessinvokethesamequestion.Thisbooktriestoanswerthatquestioninthecontextofcomplexprograms.TheefforttosendmentothemoonandbringthembacksafelywasahugeprogramthatwasitselfembeddedintheU.S.nationalspaceprogram,andwaslinkedwithotherprogramsthatservedU.S.nationalstrategiesandprioritiesduringtheColdWar.TheApolloprogramcomprisedmanyindividual,highlycomplicatedengineeringprojects,butalsootherprogramactivitiesthattouchedresearch,education,defense,andultimatelycommercialproducts.Themanagementchallengesweresignificant,andso,ofcourse,weretheengineeringchallenges.Toaddressthesetechnicalchallenges,anewdisciplinecalledsystemsengineeringrosetoprominence.ThemarriageofsystemsengineeringwithprogrammanagementapproachesprovedtobecriticaltotheApolloprogram'ssuccess.Assuccessfulasitwas,though,itwasnotsustainedorrepeatedinquitethesameway.Thelasthumantowalkonthemoon,GeneCernan,steppedintohisspacecraftandleftthesurfaceofthemoononDecember14,1972.Humanshavenotreturnedsince,norleftlowearthorbit(LEO)forthatmatter.Ofthe12peoplewhoeverwalkedonthemoon,onlysevensurvivetoday.Thepassageofsomuchtimehasleftthoseremainingelderly.Howeveroftenitmightappearthatthecapabilitytoaccomplishimportantandinspiringthingsisdiminishing,counterexamplesseemtoappear.Ithasbeenoverfourdecadessincepeople

38lastsetfootonthemoonaftertheUnitedStatesmobilizedanationallevelefforttoaccomplishthattask.ButasmallU.S.companyisdefiantlyworkingnotonlytorecapturethosecapabilities,buttosignificantlyexceedthem.TheSpaceExplorationTechnologiesCorporation,betterknownasSpaceX,duringitsrelativelyshortexistencehasnotonlyaccomplishedmanyimportantandinspiringthings,buthasdonesoinawaythatsignificantlyoutperformsallcompetitors,bothgovernmentandprivate,andseemspoisedtocreatearenaissanceinthespacesector.1.2BoldlyGoingAgainWherePeopleHaveGoneBeforeThefounderofSpaceX,ElonMusk,isasuccessfulentrepreneurwithatendencytodisruptbusinessasusualinasurprisingarrayofbusinesssectors,includingfinance(PayPal),energy(SolarCity),transportation(TeslaMotors),andofcoursespacetransportation(SpaceX).HislongtermvisionandtheimpetusforstartingSpaceXwastomakehumansamultiplanetspeciesbyenablingthemtosettleonMars,andmorequicklythantheperpetuallyslippingtimetablesofgovernmentspaceagencyplans.BasedonwhatSpaceXhasaccomplishedsofar,thatvisionseemsachievable(Vance,2015).PerhapsascompellingastheimpressivelaunchhardwareandsupportsystemsthatSpaceXhascreatedisthewaythatithasbeenabletoassembleteamsof,yes,rocketscientists,andtodesignaworksystemthatenablesthemtobeincrediblyproductiveandproducecomplexsystemsquickly.ThefollowingcasestudydescribeshowSpaceXhasbeenabletoaccomplishthis.1Sinceitsinceptionin2002,SpaceXhasaccomplishedmoreinashortperiodoftimethananyofitscompetitors.SpaceXhasloggedover30successfulflightsandhasachievedcertificationforNASAandUnitedStatesAirForcelaunches.SpaceXhasdevelopedabout100majorflightprovenproductsin14years.Theseincludethedevelopmentoffiveengines(Merlin,MerlinVacuum,Kestrel,DracoThruster,Raptor),threelaunchvehicles(Falcon1,Falcon9,andthefullthrustFalcon9)andDragonandDragon2spacecraft,anautonomousspaceportdroneshiptoenablelandingreusablerockets,alongwithassociatedmoderngroundtest,launch,andmissionfacilities.AtthetimeofthiswritingSpaceXiscompletingdevelopmentofthemostpowerfulrocketsincetheSaturnVmoonrockets,theFalcon9Heavy.ItcontinuestofinetunethepropulsivelandingreusablefirststageofitsFalcon9booster,andareusablepropulsivelandingversionitsDragon2spacecraft.Thedevelopmenttimeandcostoftheseproductsareseveraltimessmallerthanthecompetition.ANASAanalysisofcommercialspacelaunchalternativesusedahistoricalcostbasedcostestimatingtooltopredictthedevelopmentcostsforspacehardwaresystems.ItpredictedthatusingatraditionalNASAapproachtodevelopanewlaunchvehiclewouldcostUS$4billion,butusingamorecommercialapproachwouldcostaboutUS$1.7billion.ItverifiedthatSpaceXdevelopedboththeFalcon1andFalcon9vehiclesforatotalofUS$390million(NASA,2011).UnitedLaunchAlliance(ULA),anincumbentlaunchservicesproviderandSpaceXcompetitor,hasacknowledgedthatdevelopinganewenginehastypicallycost

39aboutUS$1billionandanewrocketdevelopmentaboutUS$2billion(Ray,2015).Thereducedcostsdirectlyimpactthemarketplaceforlaunchservices.SpaceXistheonlylaunchproviderthatpubliclyliststhepriceofitslaunches.ItquoteslaunchcostsofUS$62milliononitswebsite;bycomparisonthecostofaULAlaunchonanAtlasVisaboutUS$164million(Ray,2015).Formanyyears,thecostoflaunchingakilogramofmasstoLEOhoveredaroundUS$14,000/kilogram,abenchmarkintheindustry.Thiscosthadnotchangedmuchfortheindustryincumbents.Incrementalimprovementsovertime,particularlyinthefaceofnewcompetition,haveloweredthecostperkilogramforLEOtobetweenUS$10,000and$13,000.TheFalcon9hasreducedthatcosttoaboutUS$4,000/kilogram.TheFalconHeavyispricedatacostofUS$2,200/kilogramtoLEO(Stackexchange,n.d.),andisprojectedtoachieveacostofUS$1,000/kilogramifallfirststagesarerecoveredandreused.SpaceXlaunchpricesaresolowthatevenheavilystatesubsidizedrocketslikeChina'sLongMarchfamilycannotcompetewiththemonprice(Vance,2015).ItslowcostsallowSpaceXtoenjoycomfortableprofitmarginsoneachlaunch.ItsotheractivitiesillustratethekindsofefficienciesthatSpaceXisabletoachieveinitsoperations.Forexample,thelaunchoperationsteamfortheFalcon9compriseseightpeopleintheLaunchControlCenter.Bycomparison,theSpaceShuttlelaunchcontrolteamcomprisedapproximately200people(NASA,1995).Similardifferencesinefficiencyofoperationsareobservedinawiderangeofotheractivities.SpaceX'soperationalrecordisnotperfect.Ithasexperiencedafewfailuresduringtesting,systemdevelopment,andoperations.TheinitialFalcon1experiencedthreeanomalies,“rocketscientist”speakforvehiclesthatarelostduringalaunch,sometimesspectacularly.TheFalconflight19failedinJune2015becauseanexternallypurchasedstructuralstrutthatwassupposedtobetestedandcertifiedbythevendorwasnotandfailedinflight.AFalconvehicleanditspayloadwerelostduringafuelingexerciseonthelaunchpadinSeptember2016,withthecauseofthataccidentunderinvestigationatthetimeofthiswriting.SeveraltestsofpropulsivelandingoftheFalcon9reusablefirststagefailedduringtheinitialtesting.TheFalconflight20landingwassuccessful,andastringofsuccessesfollowedbothonlandandatseaontheautonomousspaceportdroneship.Landingarocketboosterintactafterflyingatypicalorbitalmissionprofilewasunprecedented.Sincethealternativetoattemptingtolandandrecoverthemwastoletthemfallintotheocean,theseattemptsarebestthoughtofaslowcostaddonexperimentstodevelopnewtechnologiesandoperationsmodelsthatwouldotherwisebetooexpensivetopursueindependently.Thisapproachtousingoperationalsystemsastestbedstolearn,improvetheproduct,anddevelopnewtechnologiesisintrinsictotheSpaceXdevelopmentprocess.Mostimpressiveisthatwithacomplexandunforgivingtechnology,SpaceXhasmanagedtobuildanorganizationthatiscapableofrapidlearning.Inadditiontodevelopingnewproductsrapidly,ithasdemonstratedthatitcanidentifyfaultsandcorrectiveactionsrapidly.ThereturntonormalflightoperationsoccurredonlysixmonthsaftertheFalconflight19loss,withFalconflight20alsomarkingthefirstsuccessfulintactlandingofaFalcon9firststage.Returntoflightafteraccidentsinvolvingotherlaunchsystemstypicallyhastakenlonger—oftentwoyearsormore.

40HowhasSpaceXbeenabletoaccomplishthis?Anumberoffactorshaveplayedarole:Focusonsimplicityinthedesign.SpaceX'sapproachtorocketdesignrevolvesaroundthecorebeliefthatsimplicityistheprecursortobothreliabilityandlowcost.FromtheverybeginningSpaceXhasdesigneditsFalconrocketswithcommonalityinmind.BothoftheFalcon9stagesarepoweredbyrocketgradekeroseneandliquidoxygen,whichallowstheuseofacommonengine.Bothstagesarethesamediameterandareconstructedfromthesamematerial,reducingthetoolingandprocessestosignificantlyreducecostsinmanufacturing.TheFalcon9wasdesignedfromthebeginningtobehumanrated,whichincreasedthefocusonproducingareliablesystem.Usingninesmaller,commonenginesforthefirststageratherthanfewer(orone)largeenginesenabledtheuseofafewcommonenginemodels.Thisimprovesreliabilitysincetherocketcantolerateanenginefailureinflightwithoutcatastrophicfailureorabortingthemission.Italsohelpsdriveupmanufacturingvolumetoreducecoststhroughlearningeffects.Itallowscontinuousproductimprovementeffortstofocusononeengineinsteadofacrossanumberofdifferentengines.Thishasresultedinreducingthenumberofpartsandincreasingitspowerandefficiency.TheMerlin1DproductionmodelfortheFalcon9hasthehighestthrusttoweightratioofanyrocketengineevermade,andisdesignedwithaservicelifemeasuredintensofmissions(Chaikin,2012).Colocation.SpaceXhasavoidedthepracticeofspreadingitsdevelopmentactivitiesgeographicallyandoutsourcingasignificantportionofitsproducttosuppliers.TheoriginalmotivationforMusktostartthecompanywasthatbycontrollingmuchoftheprocessfromrawmaterialstoflighthardware,hecoulddramaticallyreducethecostoflaunchcomparedwithexistingproviders.Thisisaccomplishedbytightcolocationofmostactivities(engineeringoffices,testinfrastructure,missioncontrol,acompletefactoryforallproducts,logistics,management,andadministration)inasingle,onemillionsquarefootbuildinginHawthorne,California(seeFigure11),wheremostoftheapproximately4,000peoplework.Thefloorlayoutinthefacilityisquiteopen.Everyoneworksinopencubicles,fromthemostjuniorinterntotheCEO(theexceptionbeingjobfunctionsthatrequireprivacy,suchashumanresources).OnlypropulsionandlargescalestructuraltestingisdoneattestfacilitiesatMcGregor,Texas.SpaceXusesorisplanningtodevelopfourlaunchsitesinthesouthernUnitedStates.AllofthesitesarelinkedtoHawthornebymoderninternettoolssothatengineersatHawthornehaveavirtualpresenceattheseremotesites.Thiscolocationhasvastlysimplifiedcommunicationandcoordination,andenabledSpaceXtoproducetheresultsthatithas.

41Figure11:TheSpaceXfacilityinHawthorne,California,USAbringstogetherpeopleandnearlyallprocessesfromdesignthroughlaunchintoonelocation.SpaceXVerticalintegration.SpaceXquicklylearnedinitsearlydevelopmenteffortsthatsuppliersinthelaunchsectorwereaccustomedtothepracticesoftheirexistingcustomers,particularlythelongleadtimesandtoleranceforhighprices.Itfoundthatitcouldoftenbuildwhatitneededinhousemuchmorerapidlyandforlowercostthanbyprocuringitfromoutsidevendors.Ithadtheaddedbenefitofkeepingtheexpertiseinhouse,whichenabledrapidresponsestochangesandcontinuousimprovement.Thecompanybuysrawmaterialsanddevelops,builds,assembles,andtestsinhouseallengines,rockets,andspacecraft,andavarietyofsupportsystemssuchasgroundsupportequipmentandremotetrackingstations.Mostofthecomponentsforthesesystemsaremanufacturedinhousetoo,includingpartsnormallyprocuredfromspecialtysubcontractorssuchastankdomes,stagetanks,flightcomputers,enginecontrollers,batteries,enginesandthrusters,turbopumps,valves,startrackers,Lidars,radios,compositeoverwrappressurevessels,andnumerousothersmalleritems.Verticalintegrationenablesefficientandfrequentsystemdevelopment,testing,andintegrationactivities.Missionassuranceembeddedinroutineoperations.SpaceXreliesonextensivesystemoptimizationandtestinginallphasesofdevelopment,production,andjustbeforetheflightinthe“whatyoufly”condition.SincetestingisapillarofSpaceXmissionassurance,thecompanycreatedaunique,highlymodern,andadvanceddesigntestingmanufacturingintegrationITinfrastructureforrapid,repeatable,advanced,and

42inexpensivetestingovertheentirelifecycle:fromprototypetodesign,qualification,integration,preflight,andflighttesting.Thefocusisonassuringqualityandperformancewithpowerfulandefficientsystemleveloptimizationandportfoliooptimization.Theoptimizationisperformedbytradingoffmajorsystemlevelparameterssuchasmass,orbit,andflightcharacteristics.Inordertopermittestingofallcomponents,subsystems,andthesystem,allpartsmustbereusable,includingarestartableengineandstageseparationdevices.Thecompanydesignatesindividualsresponsibleforthedifferentaspectsofdevelopmentandintegrationduringthesystemandmissionlifecycle.Thehighlycovetedpositionofa“responsibleengineer”comeswithcomplete“horizontal”responsibilityforthetimelydevelopment,testing,acceptance,production,integration,andperformanceofanassignedcomponentthroughoutitslifecycle,includingallcoordinationwithanyandallapplicableindividualsanddepartments.Verticalintegratorsassuretheintegrationofelementsintosubsystemandtheoverallsystem.Vicepresidentsassuredevelopmentandperformanceofmajorsubsystems(propulsion,structures,avionics,etc.).Payloadmanagersassurepayloadvehicleintegration.Missionmanagersassurethemissionlifecycle.Theseindividualscoordinatewithallrelevantstakeholdersefficiently,fullydocumentingtheirdecisionsandagreementsusingspecializedsoftware.Alltogether,theseindividualsconstituteawelldesignedmatrixofmissionassuranceactivities.Culture.ArguablythemostimportantpillarofSpaceXistheculturethatpromotesveryhighlevelsofteamwork,mutualsupport,coordination,andcommunicationinthespiritofpushingtheboundaries.Employeesareencouragedtocontinuouslyseekbettersolutions.Senioremployeesareselectedonthebasisofexperienceandaccomplishments.Junioremployeesareselectedonthebasisofcompetence,butalsounusualinterests,passion,anda“sparkintheeye.”Informationtechnologyisregardedasacriticallyimportantactivitysupportingefficientexecutionofallotheractivitiesandextraordinarilyefficientcommunication,coordination,andapprovaltools.Tobesure,SpaceXisnottheonlyinnovativecompanyworkinginthisareamakingthevisionofexpandedhumanpresenceinspaceareality.Thereareanumberofstartupsthataremakinginspiringprogressinanumberofdifferentareas.SpaceXdoes,however,provideagoodexampleofwhatcanbeaccomplishedusingtherightapproach.Intheend,asignificantpartofthissuccesscomesdowntoanewwayofworkingtogetherthatSpaceXhaspioneered,atleastinthissector.Itcombinesmanagementpractices,engineeringpractices,productstrategy,organizationalprocessesandtools,andaleadershipclimatethatencouragesresponsibility,innovation,learning,andhighperformance.Perhapsthisisafittingreturntothepracticesseenintheearlydaysofthespaceindustry.Thisexampleillustratesmorethanjustthereinvigorationofasinglesector.Itdemonstratesthatorganizationscanbringtogetherdiverseskillsetstoovercomechallengingproblems,andultimatelymakemiraclesseemcommonplace.ThisbookarguesthatthesebehaviorsarenotjustconfinedtoSpaceX,butcanbeachievedinawiderarrayofsettingswheremanagementandtechnicaldisciplineslearntoworktogetherseamlesslyinordertocreatethebenefitsneededbytheircustomersandotherstakeholders.

431.3StrategyRealizationRequiresGoodManagementProgrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersleadeffortslikethosewithinSpaceXtoimplementastrategytorealizeitsassociatedbenefits,bothtangible(e.g.,financial,marketshare)andintangible(e.g.,newknowledge).Theyleadteamsofindividualswhotakestrategy—avisionorideaofwhatcanbe—andtranslatethatstrategyintoproducts,services,orcapabilitiesthatarerealandbeneficialforcustomers,employers,andotherstakeholdersthroughcollaboration,skill,anddisciplinedapproaches.TheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehmen,2012)madeastrongcaseforwhyengineeringprogramsarevitaltosocietyandtoorganizationalstrategy:Takingonlargescaleengineeringprogramsisoneofthemostdifficult,risky,and—whendonewell—rewardingundertaking[s]agovernmentorcompanycanattempt.Itnotonlypushestheenvelopeofwhatispossible,butdefinesanewenvelope.Itgeneratescapabilities,technologies,products,andsystemsthatareinnovativeandunique,andgeneratestremendoussocietalbenefits—fromhybridcarstoatriptothemoon,fromroadnetworkstoGPSnavigation,andfromcarbonneutralelectricitysourcestothe“smart”city(p.3).Onemightarguethatthisisjustaboutdevelopingtherightstrategy.ButtheEconomistIntelligenceUnit(EIU,2013)report,WhyGoodStrategiesFail:LessonsfortheCSuite,pointedtotheneedforlinkagesbetweenstrategydevelopmentandstrategyimplementation.Strategyimplementationrepresentedthecollectiveorganizationalefforttoexecutestrategybyinvestingintherightinitiativestodeliverdesiredbusinessbenefits.Thestudyfoundthatorganizationalleadersrecognizethatthereisacriticalgapbetweenwhattheywanttoaccomplishandtheabilityoftheirorganizationstosuccessfullydeliver.Organizationsdependontheprofessionalcapabilitiesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerstodeliverstrategyandamazingresults.Recentexamplesinclude:TheBigDigthatunsnarledtrafficbetweenBoston,Cambridge,andothercitiesinMassachusettsandcreatedopportunitiesforneweconomicdevelopment.The2012LondonOlympicssponsoredbytheUnitedKingdomgovernmentthatconstructednewcompetitivevenueswiththedeliberateintentionofrepurposingtheinfrastructureforongoingcommercialactivitiesaftertheOlympics.TheAirbusA380andtheBoeing787Dreamliner,planeswithlongerrangeandhigherfuelefficiencies.Therehavebeenmanyothersuccessesthathavenotcapturedheadlinesorgarneredbroadattentionfortheunsungindividualswholed,facilitated,andcontributedtoresultsthatdeliveredbenefitstotheircustomersandtheiremployers.Theengineeringprogramsthatfail,andevenmanyofthesuccesses,experienceperformancechallenges.TheBigDigcostoverUS$14billionandwillnotbefullypaidforuntilabout2038atafullpricetagofaboutUS$24billion,whichisUS$22.6billionmorethanitwas

44projectedtocost(Hofherr,2015).WhentheLondonOlympicsAuthorityexperiencedcostoverrunsrelatedtosomeoftheOlympicvenues,theAuthorityhadtoobtainmoneyfromtheU.K.government,notallofwhichhasbeenrecovered(Kortekaas,2012).BoeingandAirbushavehadtodosubstantialreworkondifferentcomponentsoftheirplanesatsignificantcosttothoseorganizationsandtotheircustomers(Botelho,2015;Flottau,2015;Hamlin,2015).Soalthoughsomeprogramsultimatelydeliversomethingvital,thedeliverypathisoftenpainful.PMI's2016PulseoftheProfession®study(PMI,2016)foundthatforeveryUS$1billioninvestedinstrategicinitiatives,organizationswasteUS$122millionduetopoorperformance.Manyofthosestrategicinitiativesalsofailtomeettheiroriginalgoalsandbusinessintent;failtodeliverwithinallocatedbudgetparameters;oraredeliveredlate.Otherdatapointsseemtobearthisout.In2009,theU.S.DepartmentofDefense's96largestengineeringprogramsgeneratedacumulativecostoverrunofnearlyUS$300billionandanaveragescheduleoverrunofmorethantwoyears(GAO,2009).TheUnitedKingdom'sNationalAuditOffice(2014)estimatedthatin2014atleast£112billionofmajorinvestmentswasatriskduetoprogramperformanceissues.Inallfairness,manyoftoday'sengineeringprogramsrepresentleadingedgebreakthroughs.Theinnovativeness,technicalrisk,andcomplexityoftheseendeavorscannotbeoverstated.AirbusandBoeingtranslatedthedreamoflongrangeandhighlyfuelefficientaircraftintoreality.Boston'sBigDigultimatelyreducedtraveltimesandcreatedneweconomicopportunitiesforareasofthecitywhilesustainingthedaytodaycommuterflowofthousandsofpeopleandvehicles.ThatiswhyINCOSE's(2014)AWorldinMotion:SystemsEngineeringVision2025specificallycallsoutcomplexityasagrowingfactorthatwillcontinuetoconfrontsystemsengineeringprofessionalsandrequireanewskillsettomanage.Buttheperceivedfinancial,social,andpoliticalpainamongstakeholdersinachievingthosebreakthroughsismostoftenwhatreceivesattention,insideandoutsideoforganizations.Despitetheperceptionsandrealitiesrelatedtoprogramperformance,oneoftheunderlyingchallengesisbuildingthewillwithinorganizationstoinvestinimprovingengineeringprogramcapabilities.Manyexecutiveleadersoftendonotviewprogramswithintheircompaniesasbeingstrategic,andactivitiesthatarenotstrategicoftendonotreceiveexecutivelevelattention.Enhancingengineeringprogramcapabilitiesmuststartwithabetterunderstandingofthelinkagesbetweenengineeringprogramsandstrategyamongexecutives.Highlightingthelinkagebetweenengineeringprogramsandstrategyalsoneedstomakethecasethatinvestinginstrengtheningsuchcapabilitiescouldhelptoreducethemillionsofdollarsatriskfrompoorperformance.Achievingtheseobjectivesnecessitatesanorganizationalculturethatlinkstalentmanagementwithstrategyalongwithongoinginvestmentstoimproveworkforcecapabilitiesandenablingsystems,structures,andprocess.1.4Workforce+OrganizationalCapabilities=CompetitiveAdvantage

45Theincreasingrequirementfordeeperknowledgebyorganizationsemphasizesandrewardsspecialization.Withincreasedspecializationcomesthepotentialtocreatebarrierstosharingandcollaborationasobjectives,tools,andevensyntaxbecomemoreuniquetoeachfield.RootedinthesamehistoricalandprofessionalcontextoftheColdWar,thearmsrace,andtheracetothemoon,theprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplineshaveadvancedalongsimilarpaths.Bothshowthehallmarksoftraditionalprofessions:Eachhasauniquebodyofknowledgethatiscodified,butcontinuestoevolvetoreflectgoodpractice.Thereareprofessionalcertificationsthatdemonstratewhetherindividualscanapplytheirknowledgeandexperiencetoeffectivelyutilizetools,techniques,andpracticestoaddresschallengestheyarepresented.Professionalsfrombothdisciplineshaveabroadrangeofprofessionaldevelopmentoptionstokeepthemabreastofevolvingpractice,buildtheirskills,andhelpthemtoeducateothers.Academic,industry,andgovernmentresearchhelpstoinformandevolvepractice,competence,andcapabilities.Eachhasacommunityoflikemindedprofessionalswithwhomtonetworkandexchangeinformation.Despitehavingthesamerootsandfollowingsimilarpathstoprofessionalism,thetwodisciplineshaveexperiencedsomewhatdivergentevolutions.Programmanagementhasbecomemuchmoredefinedwithinsomeorganizationsthansystemsengineering,particularlyinthegovernmentsector.Programmanagerroles,responsibilities,andauthorityhavebecomeformalizedanddocumented,andclearcareerpathsfortherolehavesprouted.Programmanagementprocessesandprocedureshaveevolved,somebystatutoryrequirement,someuniquetothetypesofprogramsbeingmanaged,andothersthroughtheevolutionofthepractice.Mostengineeringprogramshaveanassignedprogrammanagerfromtheverystart,butachiefsystemsengineermaynotbeassignedbeforeelementsoftheprogramrequirementsaredefined.Today,elementsofthisdivergentevolutionappeartobeimpactingtheabilityofthetwodisciplinestoeffectivelyaligntheirworkpracticesandcollaborate.Thisisacriticalareawhereorganizationsneedeffectiveworkplaceculturesthatguidethewaypeopleandgroupsworkwitheachother.Inadditiontopotentiallycompetitiveissuesbetweenthetwodisciplines,organizationalsystems,orthelackthereof,alsoinhibiteffectiveengineeringprogrammanagementandperformance.Often,thelackofalignedpracticesisblamedwhenprogramdisruptionsoccur.Forexample,theProfessionalServicesCouncil(2013)report,FromCrisistoOpportunity:CreatingaNewEraofGovernmentEfficiency,InnovationandPerformancenoted:

46…theservicesacquisitionprocessisoftendrivenbyalooseamalgamationofregulations(FederalAcquisitionRegulationandagency/componentsupplements)andagrowingbodyoflegislativeandexecutivebranchpolicypronouncementsthatareattimesineffectiveand/orinconflictwithoneanother.Theyoftenfailtoalignwhatisbeingacquiredtoarealstrategyandareexceptionallydifficulttoimplementconsistently,evenwithinasinglegovernmententity.Effectivepracticesarecriticalforintegratingeffortstodeliverresultsinprogramenvironments.Engineeringprogramenvironmentsrequiregoodplanningapproaches,proactiveriskmanagement,stakeholderengagement,andother,similarcapabilities.TheProfessionalServicesCouncil(2013)reportcapturedthechallengeveryeffectively:Inanerawhen“collaboration”isincreasinglyrecognizedasacentraloperationalcomponentinthebestofprivatesectororganizations,andacriticalelementoftheirsuccess,itisinworrisomedeclinewithinthegovernmentitselfandsuchdeclinehasfrequentlybeencitedinGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)studiesasacontributingfactorinunderperforminggovernmentprograms,duplicationandfragmentation.Disconnectsbetweenthepolicy,humancapital,mission,technologyandacquisitioncommunitieshaveimprovedonlymarginallyattheleadershiplevelsandalmostimperceptibly,ifatall,attheoperationallevels.Thisstovepipeapproachleadsdifferentcomponentswithinanagencytopursuedifferentimmediategoals,oftentothedetrimentofthedesiredoverarchingmissionoutcome.Interestingly,whilethereportindicatedthatthereisstrongercollaborationintheprivatesector,thenewresearchforthisbookonintegrationandcollaborationfoundsimilarchallengesinbothsectors(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013).Everyday,organizationalleaders,systemsengineers,andprogrammanagersaretacklingthesetoughchallenges.Thisbookintendstocapturesomeofthevaluablelessonsfromtheirexperiencesinhopesofsupportingtheireffortstofindapproachesthatyieldbetterresults.1.5RaysofHopeAllisnotdoomandgloomfortworeasons.First,thisbookhighlightssuccessfulengineeringprogramsalongwithkeyintegrationelementsthatplayedaroleinthatsuccess.Forexample,thePrairieWatersprogramdiscussedinSection3.2adoptedahighlyintegratedteamingapproachthatalignedvariousprogramparticipantsfromvariousgovernmentalbodies,contractors,andsubcontractors.ThisbookwillsharesomeoftheinnovativewaysthatBoston'sBigDigprogramenabledstrongercollaborationfromwhichnewbestpracticesemerged.Second,learningfromfailureisabsolutelycriticaltoadvancingengineeringprogramperformance.ThisbookfeaturesexamplesfromtheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)andexploreshowNASAtransitionedintoamorecollaborativeandintegratedorganization.

471.6TrekkingtowardaNewMindsetThisbookblazesanewpathbyfocusingonapproachesforbetterenablingcollaborativeworkbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Whilethereisplentyofpublishedmaterialfocusedonenhancingtheperformanceofeachindividualdiscipline,verylittlepublishedmatterspotlightshowthetwodisciplinesaligntheireffortsandworkcollaboratively.Thisbookintendstohelpclosethatgapby:Uncoveringhowengagedpeopleworkingwithinlivingsystemscalled“engineeringprograms”aligntheireffortstodeliverresults.Thisbookidentifiespotentialinsightsfromtheexperiencesofinterdisciplinaryteamsthatmaybeusefultoprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersfacingsimilarchallenges.Thecaseexamplesarenotlimitedtoprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,butallcontainapplicableinsightsthatarediscussedinthecontextofhowthoseinsightsrelatetoengineeringprogrammanagement.Shiningalightonenablingfactorsthatsupportengineeringprograms.Thisbookpresentsnewresearchandaframeworkforintegrationtohelpprogrammanagers,systemsengineers,andtheirexecutiveleadersenhancejointeffort,joinedthinking,andcommonlanguage.Thisexaminationyieldsinsightintofactorsthateitherenablecollaborationorcreatebarrierstointegratedapproaches.Whilesomeofthecasestudyexamplesinthisbookmaybewellknownfromanengineeringorprogrammanagementperspective,thisbookwillobjectivelyassessthosecasestudiesthroughthelensofinterdisciplinaritytooffernewinsights.Prescribingspecificpracticesforintegratedsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementisneithertheintentnorfocusofthisbook.Sparkingfurtherresearchtoadvanceunderstandingofdynamicsofinterdisciplinarycollaboration.Giventhescantcontent—scientificstudies,casestudies,articles,etc.—exploringinterdisciplinarychallengesamongteamscollaboratingonlargescaleprograms,thisworkattemptstofillthatgapandtoencouragefurtherresearchandcontentinthisimportantarea.Thisbookisanamalgamofadiversearrayofpreliminaryevidenceaboutwhytheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringisimportanttothepracticeofbothdisciplines,andultimatelytobeneficiariesoftheirprograms.Thehopeisthatbybringingthiscontenttogethernow,practitionersmayderivesomeneartermbenefit,andothersmaybeinspiredtocontinuetheinvestigationanddocumentationofthisimportantarea.Becauseclearlydefinedterminologyiscriticaltounderstanding,itisimportanttonoteherehowtheterms“program”and“project”areusedinthecontextofthisbook.Readerswillfindthattherearearangeofdefinitionsforthesetermsand,insomeinstances,thetermsareusedinterchangeably.Aprogramis“agroupofrelatedprojects,subprograms,andprogramactivitiesthataremanagedinacoordinatedwaytoobtainbenefitsnotavailablefrommanagingthemindividually”(PMI,2015).Aproject,ontheotherhand,is“atemporaryendeavorundertakentocreateauniqueproduct,serviceorresult”(PMI,2015).Inthespecificcontextofthisbook,referencesto“programs”shouldbeunderstoodtomeantheprogramanditssubordinateprojectsthatproduceoutputsrequiredfortheprogramandtherealizationof

48targetedbenefits.Thisbookalsousesterminologytoidentifykeyrolesintheprogramenvironment,andthoserolesaredefinedasfollows:Programmanagerreferstothejobpositionthathastheultimateauthorityandaccountabilityfortheoverallprogram.Chiefsystemsengineerisusedspecificallyinreferencetoresearchundertakenforthisbookandreferstothejobpositionthathasultimatetechnicalauthorityandaccountabilityfortheproductorsystembeingdevelopedbytheprogram.Projectmanagerreferstothejobpositionthathasultimateauthorityandaccountabilityforprojectdeliverables.Whileprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersleadandintegrateeffortsattheprogramlevel,projectmanagersandsystemsengineersdrivedeliveryofprojectleveloutputsfortheprogram.Somecasestudiesandexamplesinthisbookhighlightprojectlevelconsiderationsthatalsohaveapplicabilityorimpactattheprogramlevel.Aspartoneofthebookwillshow,integrationandcollaborationarecriticalincoordinatingcomplexwork,whichultimatelyadvancesorganizationalstrategiesormissions.Itisimportanttounderstandtheorganizationaldynamicsandchallengesthatframeelementsofinterdisciplinaryintegrationandcollaborationthatwillbefurtherelaborateduponintheremainingchaptersofthebook.1.7SummaryEngineeringprogramsarechallenging,butthereareinterventionsthatorganizationalleaders,programmanagers,andsystemsengineerscanutilizetoaddressthosechallenges.Thekeyenablersincluderecognizingthelinkagesbetweenprogramsandstrategy,andsupportingprogramleadershipinenablingalignmentandcollaborationwithintheprogramteam.CompanieslikeSpaceXarepioneeringmethodsfortacklingtoughengineeringprogramchallengesusingthesekeyenablers.Thisbookprovidesadditionalinsightsandapproachesthatsupportrealizingthebenefitsfromsuchobjectives.1.8DiscussionQuestions1.Onprogramsonwhichyouhaveworked,werethereanymechanismsthathelpedtheteamestablishasenseof“collectiveconsciousness?”Werethosemechanismsformallystructuredinsomewayorinformallydevelopedbyteammembersthemselves?Didyouobserveanydifferenceintheuseofformalversusinformalmechanismstoenabletheteam?2.Identifyaprogramthatyoufelthadstrongconnectionstostrategyandonethatdidnot.Ifapplicable,identifyanydistinctionsbetweenthoseprogramsandthelevelofexecutive

49involvement.Ifapplicable,howwouldyouexplainthedifferences?3.Howdoesyourorganization'sapproachtotalentmanagementanddevelopmentenableorhamperintegrationbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers?Whatenhancementsorchangesdoyouthinkwouldbettersupportintegration?1.9ReferencesBotelho,G.(2015,May5).FAAfindsBoeingDreamlinercouldloseallpower,issuesmaintenancemandate.Retrievedfromwww.cnn.com/2015/05/02/us/boeing787dreamlinerfaadirective/Chaikin,A.(2012).IsSpaceXchangingtherocketequation?SmithsonianJanuary2012.Retrievedfromwww.airspacemag.com/space/isspacexchangingtherocketequation132285884/Conforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxEconomistIntelligenceUnit(EIU).(2013).Whygoodstrategiesfail:Lessonsforthecsuite.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/Publications/WhyGoodStrategiesFail_Report_EIU_PMI.ashxFlottau,J.(2015,October29).Reportcard:AirbusA380aftereightyearsinservice.Aviationweek.Retrievedfromhttp://aviationweek.com/airbusa380/reportcardairbusa380aftereightyearsserviceGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO).(2009).Defenseacquisitions:Assessmentsofselectedweaponprograms.Washington,D.C.Retrievedfromwww.gao.gov/new.items/d09326sp.pdfHamlin,G.W.(2015,February9).Viewpoint:AnAirbusA380neomakesnosense.Aviationweek.Retrievedfromhttp://aviationweek.com/advancedmachinesaerospacemanufacturing/viewpointairbusa380neomakesnosenseHofherr,J.(2015,January5).CanwetalkrationallyabouttheBigDigyet?Retrievedfromwww.boston.com/cars/newsandreviews/2015/01/05/cantalkrationallyaboutthebigdigyet/0BPodDnlbNtsTEPFFc4i1O/story.htmlInternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).(2014).Aworldinmotion:Systemsengineeringvision2025.Retrievedfromwww.incose.org/AboutSE/sevisionKortekaas,V.(2012,August19).Projectmanagement:Lessonscanbelearnedfromsuccessful

50delivery.FinancialTimes.Retrievedfromwww.ft.com/cms/s/0/57d92e9cd7df11e1998000144feabdc0.html#axzz4C8vX47N9NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA).(1995).Thespaceshuttlelaunchteam.Retrievedfromhttp://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/countdown/launchteam.htmlNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA).(2011).Commercialmarketassessmentforcrewandcargosystems.Retrievedfromwww.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Section403(b)CommercialMarketAssessmentReportFinal.pdfOehmen,J.(Ed.).(2012).Theguidetoleanenablersformanagingengineeringprograms,version1.0.Cambridge,MA:JointMITPMIINCOSECommunityofPracticeonLeaninProgramManagement.URI:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70495ProfessionalServicesCouncil.(2013).Fromcrisistoopportunity:Creatinganeweraofgovernmentefficiency,innovationandperformance.Retrievedfromhttps://issuu.com/professionalservicescouncil/docs/2013_psc_commission_reportProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2015).ThePMIlexiconofprojectmanagementterms(version3.0).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2016).PulseoftheProfession®:Thehighcostoflowperformance:Howwillyouimprovebusinessresults?Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org/learning/pulse.aspxRay,J.(2015,April13).ULAunveilsitsfuturewiththeVulcanrocketfamily.Spaceflightnow.Retrievedfromhttp://spaceflightnow.com/2015/04/13/ulaunveilsitsfuturewiththevulcanrocketfamily/Stackexchange.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://space.stackexchange.com/questions/1989/whatisthecurrentcostperpoundtosendsomethingintoleoVance,A.(2015,May14).ElonMusk'sspacedreamalmostkilledTesla.BloombergBusiness.Retrievedfromwww.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015elonmuskspacex/Endnote1.ContributedbyBohdanOppenheim,ProfessorofSystemsEngineering,LoyolaMarymountUniversity.

512THEENGINEERINGPROGRAMPERFORMANCECHALLENGE2.1IntroductionExploringlessonslearnedfrompastactivitiesformsthefoundationformakingimprovementsinfutureactivities.Understandingthereasonswhysomeapproachesmayworkbetterthanothersundercertainconditionsandthenfurtherenhancingsolidprocessesortechniquesleadstocontinuousimprovementandbetterperformance.Thischapterexploresengineeringprogramexamplestohighlightchallengesthatoftenaffectcomplexprograms.Notalloftheexamplesusedformalprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringapproaches,andwhererelevant,thatfactishighlighted.However,centraltoeachexampleanditsapplicablelessonsistheviewthatanintegratedapproachincludingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringmaywellhaveproduceddifferentoutcomes.Thereareno“silverbullets”orperfectsolutionsthatworkineverycircumstance.Theindividualsworkingoncomplexprogramsmustbeadaptiveandresponsivetotheuniquecharacteristicsoftheirprogramsandthechallengesencounteredthroughouttheprogram'slifecycle.2.2MakingWhiteElephantsExtinctMerriamWebster(n.d.)definesa“whiteelephant”as“somethingthatrequiresalotofcareandmoneyandthatgiveslittleprofitorenjoyment.”Itsusagewithincomplexprogramscanrefertoaircraftandweaponssystemsthathaveoutlivedtheirusefulnessbutcontinuetobemaintained;strandedinfrastructurethatnolongerservesanyusefulpurpose;andtechnologythathasbecomeobsoleteandisnolongersupportedbyitsdeveloper.Whiteelephantsexistinalmosteveryindustrysectorandgeographicallocationaroundtheworld.Atthestartofthe2016OlympicGamesinRiodeJaneiro,Brazil,theworld'seyeswerefixednotonlyontheactualsportingevents,butalsoonhowBrazil,thehostcountry,wouldperform.BrazilisthefirstcountryinSouthAmericatohostamodernOlympicGames.Expectationsarealwayshighforsuchaglobalspectacle,butthestakeswerehigherforthefirstcountryintheregionhostingtheGames.LeadingintotheGamesBrazil'seconomyhadshrunkby27%inthepreviousyearandnationalpoliticswereunsettledbyscandals.ThatwasinstarkcontrasttotheeconomicstrengthandnationalconfidencethatBrazildisplayedduringitsbidtohostthegamessomenineyearsearlier.AmongthepromisedbenefitsofhostingtheOlympicGamesweretheimprovedinfrastructure,roads,publictransportation,andsoforththatremainaftertheGamesconclude.Alsoofinterestwasthehopetoleveragetheinvestmentinthefacilities

52topromoteeconomicgrowth.AsaresultofthedeteriorationoftheBrazilianeconomicandpoliticalsituation,fundingwasscarceformanyoftheinfrastructureimprovementprojects,potentiallyunderminingthedeliveryofthelongtermbenefitsfromhostingtheGames.WouldBrazilbeleftburdenedwithstrandedassetsor“whiteelephants”ashasoftenbeenthecasewithsimilarevents?FacilitiesthatdirectlysupportedorwerecriticaltothedeliveryoftheGameswerefinishedbythestartoftheGames,butinsomecasesonlyjustbarely.Olympicteamsarrivedtohousingwithsignificantplumbing,electrical,andotherproblems(Phillips,2016).Officialsscrambled,butfinishedworkonanextendedsubwaylinetotransportparticipantstokeyvenues,conductinglimitedoperationalandsafetytestsusingsandbagsinsteadofhumanpassengers(Phillips,2016).Otherpromisedinfrastructureimprovementsfailedtomaterializeasfundingandtimeranout.Forinstance,promisedsewagetreatmentforthehighlytoxicGuanabaraBaywheremanyofthewatereventsweretooccurwasnotdeliveredatall(Connors,2016).Despitetheconcernsandgloomypredictionsbeforehand,thedeliveryoftheGamesthemselveswasgenerallyconsideredtobesuccessful,withonlyafewminoroperationalissuesthatwouldnaturallybeexpectedinanycomplexundertaking.Nevertheless,thefearremainedthataftertheGames,Brazil'sinvestmentintheassociatedfacilitiesandinfrastructurewouldproduce“whiteelephants”(Pearson,2016).ItcantakemanyyearstoassesstheimpactofOlympicGamesonthehostcountry,soitisstilltooearlytocommentaboutthelongtermbenefitsoftheRiodeJaneiroOlympicGameswhenconsideredasacomplexprogram.Thehopeisthatlessonswerelearnedandappliedfromthe2014WorldCupexperience.The2014WorldCupgamesinBrazilprovidecautionaryevidenceofhowearlyhopesofaproductivelegacyfrommajorsportingeventscanfailtoproducethepromisedbenefits.AninvestigationayearaftertheWorldCupgamesfoundthatR$11billion(US$3.5billion)worthofthe35projectsbudgetedin2010werenotcompleteorhadbeenabandoned(Rapoza,2015).ManausishometoaUS$600millionstadiumthatwasusedforfourWorldCupgamesandisnowrentedoutforprivatepartiesandsimilarevents.Brasilia'sUS$900millionstadiumseats72,000,butthehomeBrasiliaclubbarelydraws5,000peopletoitsgames.Thecityisusingthefacilitytoparksome400busesinthevast,unusedparkinglot(Stromberg,2015).Severalofthebigprojects,suchaslightrailsystemsinSãoPaulo,Cuiabá,andFortaleza,stillarenotclosetobeingfinished.Only21.4%ofthepromisedpublictransportationinfrastructurewascompleteayearafterthegames(Rapoza,2015).Bywayofcomparison,theLondon2012OlympicGamesisconsideredamongthemoresuccessfuloftheseeventsatcreatingalegacyofsustainedbenefitstoitshostcountry.Judgingwhetherthepromisedbenefitsweredeliveredcanbechallenging,especiallysinceonlyfouryearshaveelapsed.Bythemostbasicmeasure,whetherresidentsareusingthefacilitiesorhaveabandonedthem,Londonseemstohavesucceeded.Thevenues,includingthemassiveOlympicstadium,arebeingupdated,repurposed,andusedmoreorlessasintended.Localresidentsaremovingintorepurposedandnewhousing.Fourmillionsquarefeetofnewcommercialandofficespaceisapprovedforconstructionandisexpectedtobringmanynewprofessionaljobstoaformerlyneglectedandunderdevelopedarea.Someofthese

53developmentswereunderwaypriortotheGames,butthepreparationsfortheLondon2012Gameshelpedtosignificantlyenable,accelerate,orexpandtheoveralldevelopmentofthearea(Hill,2015;White,2015).Whatexplainsthisapparentsuccessinanendeavorthathaschallengedsomanyothers?TheLondon2012OlympicCommitteeadoptedamanagementapproachthatdemonstratedapplicationofcoresystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementprincipleswithanemphasisonintegrationandcollaboration.ClearVision/GoalsandBenefits:Thereweretwokeygoalsthatgovernedeveryaspectofplanning,execution,andmanagement:deliveryandlegacy(ensuringtheneworenhancedinfrastructureremainedusableaftertheGames).TheOlympicGamesweresuccessfullydeliveredandtherearevaryinglevelsoftheuseoflegacyinfrastructureandofnewinvestmentsintheregion(Guskey,2016).Governance:TheOlympicDeliveryAuthority(ODA)integratedthevariousgovernmentalbodiesandagenciesthatneededtobeinvolvedintoa“singlegovernmentalinterfacewithplanningauthority”(Kortekaas,2012).“Fromtheoutset,theODAinstitutedprocessesandsystems,meetingstructureanddelegationstoensurestrategicdirection,performancemanagementandvalueformoney”(Kintrea,2012).ManagementApproach:OrganizersmaintainedanintegratedsystemsviewoverallaspectsoftheGamesandleveragedprogramandprojectmanagementtomaintainalignmentandintegration.“Attheprogrammeleveladditionalprocesseswererequiredtomanagethecrossprojectinterfacestoensuretheconsequentialimpactswereidentifiedandprogrammeprioritiesappliedinresolution”(Kintrea,2012).IntegratedPlanningandRiskManagement:Withaconstanteyeoncriticalpath,integratedplanningincorporated“dependencymanagement(schedulelogic/constructionsequencing),designmanagement(coherentandcompatiblesolutions),physicalintegration(forexample,twoormoreprojectsneedthesameplaceatthesametime)and[scope]changemanagement(consequentialimpactofscopeorschedulechangesparticularlyacrossproject/organizationalboundaries”(Kintrea,2012).CustomerandStakeholderManagement:TheODAmaintainedproactivecustomerandstakeholderengagementandcommunicationsatboththeprojectandprogramlevels(Kintrea,2012).ScopeandRequirementsControl:Organizersrealizedthatoverthefiveyeardevelopment,delivery,andmanagementlifecyclefortheprogram,variouschangeswithinandoutsideoftheprogramwouldimpactitsscope.Theyestablishedachangecontrolsystemtomanage“requirementscreep,”risk,andnecessarytradeoffstoachieveprogramlevelobjectives.TheprogramalsoincorporatedverificationandtestingprocessesintotheprogramschedulewithsufficienttimetoaddressanydefectswellinadvanceoftheOpeningCeremonies(Kintrea,2012).Viewingthemanagementchallengethroughasystemsorientedlens,OlympicGamesarecomplexprograms.Theyareverycomparableinscale,requiredinterfaces,andcomplexityto

54complexprogramslikethoseintheaerospace,medicaldevice,andautomotiveindustries.Ofcourse,OlympicvenuesandassociatedinfrastructurecanbefairlyspecializedandarenotalwaysabletobeusedasextensivelyaswasanticipatedintheoriginalbidstohosttheGames.However,theLondonOlympicsexampleshowedhowapplyingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringapproachestocomplexsystemscansupportstrongperformance.Thatperformancecanbemuchmoreeffectivewheninterdisciplinaryalignmentandcollaborationalsoexist,astheLondonOlympicsexamplealsodemonstrated.2.3LargeEngineeringProgramsAreComplexTheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehmen,2012)notedthatinanorganizationwhoseworkforcehasdevelopedamongthemostmatureengineeringprogrammanagementcapabilities—theUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense—theunderperformanceofitsengineeringprogramswasastounding.Theaccumulatedcostoverrunofthelargest96engineeringprogramshadreachednearlyUS$300billionwhenassessedin2009.Engineeringrelatedcostsrepresentedalmosthalfoftheexpenseincreasesassociatedwiththoseprograms(seeFigure21).Figure21:Costincreaseofthelargest96acquisitionprogramsoftheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseOehmen,2012.TheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms,Version1.0.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2012.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.Mostofthoseprogramswereatleasttwoyearslateintheirdelivery.Recognizingthatsuchunderperformanceisnotsustainable,theGuideidentifiedapproachestohelpcounterthe

55challengesthataffectperformance.Forthepurposesofthiswork,itisimportanttodefinesomekeytermsthatwillbeusedthroughoutthebooktodescribepropertiesassociatedwithsomeprojectsandprograms.Theterm“complicated”generallymeansthat“theinteractionsbetweenthemanypartsaregovernedbyfixedrelationships.Thisallowsreasonablyreliableprediction”(INCOSE,2015).Ontheotherhand,theterm“complex”generallymeansthat“interactionsbetweenthepartsexhibitselforganization,wherelocalinteractionsgiverisetonovel,nonlocal,emergentpatterns”(INCOSE,2015).Thekeydistinctionisbetweenelementsthatdemonstratepredictablebehaviorsandthoseinwhichexpectedorunexpectedbehaviorsmayemerge.Inprojectandprogramenvironments,complexityisacharacteristicthatisdifficulttomanageduetohumanbehavior,systembehavior,andambiguity(PMI,2014).TheCynefinFramework(Snowden&Boone,2007),developedbyDavidSnowdenanddepictedinFigure22,providesagraphicalrepresentationoftheseandrelatedcontexts.Beingabletocharacterizethedifferentregionsofcomplexitywiththeirassociatedcharacteristicsandchallengescanenableprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerstotailortheirapproachtobettersuitagivensetofcircumstancesandtoincreasethelikelihoodofprogramsuccess(Kemp,Beasley,&Williams,2015).Figure22:CynefinframeworkillustratingthedimensionsofprogramcharacteristicsAdaptedfromDeLaRue,2008.Followingarethreespecificexamplesthatillustratethecomplexarrayofissuesthatmakecomplexprogramschallenging.Theexamplespulloutscenariosfromcomplex,multiyearprogramstoidentifyhowspecificchallengesevolvedovertimeandimpactedtheprogram.Theyaresimplevignettesthatarenotintendedtoreflectthefullprogram,fullyanalyze“rootcauses,”ordetailallofthefactorsthatchallengedperformance.

562.3.1AWhiteElephant:DenverInternationalAirportBaggageHandlingTheexperienceoftheDenverInternationalAirportautomatedbaggagehandlingsystemprovidesinsightintochallengesofintegratedplanning,stakeholdermanagement,requirementsmanagement,andtechnicalscalability.GrowthinandaroundtheDenvermetropolitanareacoupledwiththeneedtoaccommodatenewerairplanessignaledthattheregion'sStapletonInternationalAirportwasobsolete.Stapletonwasalsoinfamousforflightdelays(deNeufville,1994).DespiteresistancefromUnitedandContinental,thelargestairlinecarriersservingthearea,cityandstateofficialsdecidedtoproceedwiththeprogram,believingtheywouldeventuallyconvincetheairlinestoembracetheprogram(Kerzner,2006).Sofromthestart,programstakeholdershaddivergentexpectationsaboutthenewairport(GAO,1994).Thenewairportwasexpectedtohandlecloseto20millionpassengersby1995,twoyearsafteritsscheduledopening.ItwasalsoplannedtohousemoreairlinegatesthanStapletonandincorporatenewertechnologiestomaketravelerservicesmoreefficient.Theprogram'sprojectedcostin1989wasclosetoUS$2billion(Bryant,1994).HavingsecuredfundingfromtheU.S.federalgovernmentandmunicipalgovernments,theprogramtobuildDenverInternationalAirport(DIA)beganinDecember1989(Bearup,2015).Programplanningbeganwiththeassumptionthateachindividualairlinewouldberesponsibleforbaggagehandlingbetweentheconcoursesandairplanes.Anearlyfeasibilitystudyforimplementinganintegratedbaggagehandlingsystemindicatedsuchasystemwouldbetoocomplexandcostly(CalleamConsulting,2008).AtStapleton,airlinesmanagedtheirownbaggagehandlingusingcartsandtrolleys,sodesignsforDIAdidnotincorporateanyconsiderationsforcentralizedbaggagehandlingcapabilities(CalleamConsulting,2008).Sincetheairlineswerenotcommittedtotheprogram,theywerenotinvolvedintheairport'sinitialdesign.Thatfact,coupledwiththelackofastrongchangecontrolprocessfordocumenting,evaluating,consideringalternatives,orprioritizingrequirementschangeswouldsooncreatemajorissuesfortheprogram(CalleamConsulting,2008;INCOSE,2016).Twoyearsintotheprogram,UnitedandContinentalsignedon,andUniteddecidedtoimplementanautomatedbaggagehandlingsystemthatwouldspeedupairplaneturnaroundtimesinitsmainconcourse.ThecompanyhiredBAESystemstodesignandimplementasolution.Afewmonthslater,DIAofficialscontractedwithBAEtodesignthebaggagehandlingsystemforairportwideimplementation.DIAwouldthenleasethecentralizedsystemtotheairlinesforafee(Kerzner,2006).OtherairportsaroundtheworldhadbeenusingsomeelementsofthebaggagehandlingsystemDenverauthoritiesplannedtodeploy,whichmadethedesignchangeappeartobeeasy.However,nootherairporthadasystemonthesamescaleasthatplannedforDIA(deNeufville,1994;Langnau,2000).Thebaggagesystemhadtobedesignedaroundthefixedbuildingconstructionplans,whichincludedseveralsharp,angledturns(deNeufville,1994).Thebaggagehandlingsystemdesignwasverycomplicated.Thesystemwouldincorporatesixmilesofconveyorsthatwouldcarryluggagetoandfromover4,000radiocontrolledluggage

57cartstravelingovercloseto17milesoftrackbetweenairlineterminalsandplaneswithverylimitedhumanintervention.Thesystemwasintendedtodeliverbagsatarateof60bagsperminute,allowingloadingandunloadingofplaneswithin20–30minutes(deNeufville,1994;Swartz,1996).Thebaggagehandlingprojectstruggledfromthestart.Thecompressedtimelineforplanning,development,testing,anddeploymentplacedsignificantpressureonBAESystemstodeliverresults.Basedonpostdeliveryreportsoftheproject,thereseemedtobelittleriskmanagementplanningappliedandmitigationutilized(INCOSE,2016).Sotheprojectteamwasforcedtoreacttosituationsastheyoccurred.Someofthesituationsincluded:DIAauthoritiescommittedtoanautomatedrailmountedcartsystemeventhoughtheexistingbaggagehandlingtunnelswerenotdesignedtoaccommodatesuchasystem.Thischangeoccurredmorethanayearintothedevelopmentandconstructionoftheluggagesystem(deNeufville,1994).Engineersfailedtoconsiderimportantdesignelementsfortheairport'ssystem.First,luggagequeuesvarybasedonthenumberofpassengers,numberofflightsarrivinganddepartingataparticulartime,andotherrelatedfactors.Asluggagetrafficincreased,someconveyorsdidnothaveanyemptycartsintowhichbagscouldbeloaded.Thisissuewasnotidentifiedwithintheprojectuntillate1993(deNeufville,1994).Second,systemdesigndidnotadequatelyconsidertheinteractionsbetweenluggageweight,thecart'stiltingdesign,speed,andsensorsthatcontrolledbagloading.Therefore,whensensorsallowedtoomuchluggagetobeloadedintocarts,thetiltingcartstossedbagsastheyspeddownthetracks.Andsensorsdidnotstopthecartsiftherewerebagsonthetracks(deNeufville,1994;Swartz,1996).Astestaftertestshowedthatthefullyautomatedsystemwouldnotfunctionproperly,theprojectteamreportedthattherewasnobackupplanforbaggagehandling.Asoneassessmentpointedout,“Remarkably,thedesignofthefullyautomatedbaggagesystematDenver[DIA]didnotincludeameaningfulbackupsystem.Theplannersprovidedneitherafleetoftugsandcartsthatcouldcopewiththelevelofbaggageexpected,norevenaccessroadsbetweenthecheckinfacilitiesandtheaircraft”(deNeufville,1994,p.4).Soincasesofpowerfailures,softwareglitches,orotherissuesaffectingbaggagehandlingtheairportriskedhavingtoshutdownbecauseithadnoalternativebaggagehandlingcapability.Thebaggagehandlingsystemresultedinprogramdelaysanddelayedtheultimateobjective—theairport'sopeninganditsattendantbenefits.ThedelayscosttheairportauthorityaboutUS$33millionpermonth,andcosttheairlinesaboutUS$50million.Analternativebaggagehandlingsystemusingtugsandcartswasimplementedsotheairportcouldfinallyopenforbusiness—twoyearsbehindschedule.ThechangetoamanualsystemcostanadditionalUS$75milliontoimplement(deNeufville,1994)ontopofwhatwasbeingspenttocontinueworkontheautomatedsystem.Afterseveralyearsofstrugglingtogettheautomatedsystemtoworkeffectively,thesystemwaseventuallydecommissionedin2005(Bearup,2015;CalleamConsulting,2008).

58Thiscasehighlightsseveralissuesthataffectengineeringprogramperformance:Lackofplanningforanintegratedairportsystem.Theprogramplandidnotincorporateanintegratedsystemsviewoftheairportfromthebeginning.Ineffectivegovernanceandstakeholdermanagement.Cityofficialscommittedtheprogramtoseveralmajorchanges,includingthebaggagehandlingsystem,withoutconsiderationtoimpactsonscope,cost,schedule,technicalrisk,feasibility,oralternatives(INCOSE,2016).Thisgapopenedthedoortoanuncontrolledstreamofchangestoconvincecriticalstakeholders—theairlinesthatwouldoperateoutofthenewairport—tosupporttheprograminprogress.Failuretoapplysystemsengineering.Thelatedecisiontoimplementanintegratedbaggagehandlingsystemwouldhavebenefitedfromapplicationofsystemsengineering.Suchapplicationcouldhaveidentifiedtradeoffsearlyintheprocessthatmayhavedeliveredalesscomplicatedbutworkingsystem.Itlikelywouldhaveidentifiedneededredundanciesandbackupsincaseoffailureinanyoftheprimarysystems.Ineffectiveriskmanagement.Makingtheotherchallengesmoreintenseisthefactthatriskmanagementwasnotintegratedatanylevel—programorproject.Despitetheshortenedplanningtime,theprogramandprojectleadershipfailedtomitigatethebaggagehandlingprojectrisksinanyway.Reactivemanagement.Allofthesechallengesmadetheprogramandprojectteamshighlyreactivetosituationsthatflaredup.Itishighlylikelythatthisreactiveapproachaffectedcollaborationamongtheprogram,project,andengineeringleadership.2.3.2LearningWhileFailing:FutureCombatSystemsAnotherexamplecomesfromtheUnitedStatesArmyanditsFutureCombatSystems(FCS)program,whichevolvedovera10yearperiodbeforeitscancellationin2009.TheFCSexemplifiesmanyofthechallengesandopportunitiesassociatedwithengineeringprograms.Ityieldedsomenewbestpracticesaswellasmanyimportantlessonslearned.Tomaintaintwentyfirstcenturymilitarysuperiority,U.S.Armyleadershipenvisionedaresponseforcethatcoulddeploywithindaysandproviderapidstrikecapability.Toachievethelevelofefficiencyandcoordinationrequiredforsuchsuperiorstrikeperformance,theArmywouldneedahighlysophisticatedtechnologicalinterfacetosupportsoldiersinthefield.WhiletheconcepthadbeenevolvingwiththeU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)andmilitarybranchesforyears,theideabecameastrategicgoalinOctober1999.TheFCSprogramevolvedfromthatstrategy.Itsobjectivewastodevelopanddeliverdigitallylinkedbattlefieldvehicles,sensors,andcommunicationsequipmentandimprovetheirinteroperability(GlobalSecurity.org,n.d.).AnotherkeygoalforFCSrepresentedasignificantbreakthroughinthewaytheDoDapproacheddevelopingmajornewtechnologies.Armyofficialsrealizedtheprogramwouldrequireamassiveworkforcewithdiversemanagement,technical,analytical,contracting,and

59othercapabilities.Butitalsoneededthatworkforcetooperateas“oneteam,”whichbecamethecornerstonefortheprogram.Becauseofthesignificanttechnicalinterfaces,Armyofficialsalsounderstoodthatdesignanddevelopmentrequired“systemofsystems(SoS)”integration(Perninetal.,2012).Sofromthebeginning,integrationandcollaborationwerecentralprogramthemes.TheArmyinitiallypartneredwiththeDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA),anagencywithintheDoDresponsibleforresearchintobreakthroughtechnologiesfornationalsecurity.However,neitherorganizationpossessedtheworkforcescalabilityorthefullrangeofskillsrequiredforsuchacomplexprogram.OfficialsdecidedtocontractwithaLeadSystemsIntegrator(LSI),asinglecontractorresponsiblefordevelopingandintegratingSoScapabilitieswithinbudgetandscheduleparameters(Perninetal.,2012).LSIshadbeenusedonsmallerprogramsinthepast,buttherewasnounderstandingofhowitsapplicationwouldworkwithinalargescale,revolutionaryprogramlikeFCS.ArmyofficialsselectedtheconsortiumofBoeing/SAICastheLSIinMarch2002.ThecontractidentifiedkeyLSIobjectivesasshowninTable21.Table21LeadSystemsIntegratorobjectivesstatedintheU.S.Army'scontractwiththeFCSprogrampartnersAdaptedfromGAO,2007CollaborationMaintainacollaborativeenvironmentthroughouttheprogram'slifecycleHavea“oneteam”operationthatfacilitatedteamworkandpartnershipPerformanceAchieveprogramaffordabilityLeverageexistingtechnologytominimizedevelopmentcostandmaintainscheduleSystemDesignandplanforthecontinuousintegrationandinsertionofnewRequirementsandtechnologicalcapabilitiesoverthelifespanoftheFCSIntegrationEnsureconsistentandcontinuousdefinitionofrequirementsWorkforceDevelopthegovernmentacquisitioncommunity'scapabilitiesCapabilitiesCreateopportunitiesforhighlyskilledtalentwithinindustrytoparticipateintheprogramAlsoundertheLSIagreementterms,theArmyprovidedprogrammanagementleadershipwhiletheLSIservedastheintegratinginterfacebetweenprogrammanagementandthevariousprogramteams(Perninetal.,2012).TheFCSprogrammanagementapproachattemptedtorevolutionizeestablishedprogrampracticeswhileremainingalignedwiththe“oneteam”andSoSobjectives.Theprogramtested

60newacquisitionapproachesliketheLSIthatallowedforinnovation,streamlinedbusinessmanagement,anduniquegovernment/industrycollaboration.ItimplementedcollaborativetoolsliketheAdvancedCollaborativeEnvironment(ACE),aonestopshopforimportantinformationandresourcesassociatedwiththeprogramthatwasaccessibletoallprogramteammembers.Itattemptedtoadaptplanning,management,andcontroltoolslikethoseforearnedvaluemanagementandriskassessmentandmitigationfortheuniqueprogramenvironment.SomeoftheinnovationslikeACEweredeemedhighlysuccessfulwhileothers,includingadaptingprogramtoolsandpilotedapproachesthatproducedimportantinsights,wereconsideredlesssuccessful(Perninetal.,2012).Accordingtopostcancellationassessments,the“oneteam”philosophyandintegratedteamculturechangehadmixedresults.Seniorlevelofficialsfeltstronglythattheprogramculturehadhighlevelsofcollaboration,teamwork,andopendiscussion.“Governmentofficialsworkingatthefirstandsecondtiersinthestructurereportedtheyhadgoodworkingrelationshipsandgenerallyachievedconsensusonkeyprogramdecisions”(Perninetal.,2012).Atlowerlevelswithintheprogram,though,thefeelingswerenotaspositive.Teammembersreportedbeingreluctanttoordiscouragedfromescalatingcriticalissuesuptheprogramleadershipchain.TherewastensionbetweenArmystaffandstaffworkingfortheLSI—LSIstaffwereperceivedashavinggreaterauthoritythantheArmystaff.ArmystaffalsofeltunclearabouttheirresponsibilityforoversightandcriticaldecisionmakingversusthatoftheLSIstaff(Perninetal.2012;GAO,2007).FCSdidhavestrongexecutivesponsorship.Thoseleadersimpactedtheprograminvariousways.ExecutiveleadershipwithintheArmyandDoDchampionedtheprogram,andtheirsupportwasinstrumentalinitsrapidstartupin2000.Leadershipsetthetoneforinnovationandexperimentationwithintheprogram.Executives,however,alsocreatedsomechallengesfortheprogram.Theinitialprogramschedulesetthefirstmajormilestoneforconcepttestinganddesignoutsixyearsfromtheprogram'sstart.ButtopArmyofficialspushedforamoreacceleratedschedule.AfterreceivingapositiveassessmentoftechnologicalreadinesstoachievetheacceleratedschedulefromtheArmy'sChiefEngineer,leadershipreducedthesixyearmilestonetotwoyears(Perninetal.,2012).Shortlyaftertheacceleratedschedulewasapproved,theU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO,2007)identifiedmajorrisksassociatedwiththeArmy'sabilitytodeliverbasedontheacceleratedschedule.TheFCSprogram'scomplexityandaggressivescheduleisunprecedentedfortheArmy.Aswehavereported,theprogramwasnotnearreadyforstartingthesystemdevelopmentanddemonstrationphasewhenitdid,primarilybecausethemajorityoftheneededtechnologieswereimmature.TheArmynotonlywentforwardwithFCS,itdidsowithaplannedschedulelessthanthatofasinglenewsystem.AretrospectivereviewoftheprogramprovidedfurtherinsightintothereasoningbehindtheGAO'sassessment:

61TheFCSconsistsof[18]individualsystems,includingmannedandroboticgroundandairvehicles,softwareradios,andsatellites,aswellasanoverarchingnetworkandoperatingsystemtyingthosecomponentstogether.Developingsuchenormous“systemsofsystems”posestechnicalandmanagementproblemsthatareneitherwelldefinednorwellunderstood.Thesoftwarealone—95millionlinesofcodefortheFCS,atlastcount—posesadauntingchallenge.Nobodyhasyetfiguredoutawaytodevelopreliable,securesoftwareformuchsmallerprojects(Charette,2008).InitialFCSrequirementsstartedtoevolveimmediatelyaftertheprogram'sstartandbeforesomeofthekeymanagementandoperationalcomponentswereinplace.Therushtoquicklyadvancerequirementsimmediatelyplacedthreemajorconstraintsontheprogram:Initialrequirementsweredesignedforconventionalwarfareanddidnotanticipatenonconventionalmilitaryconflicts.Initialrequirementswerenot“properlyevaluatedfortechnicalfeasibility,”whichcausedsignificantrework,scheduleslippage,andincreasedcostthroughouttheprogram'slifecycle.Requirementsfailedtobalancecompetingobjectivesforsmallandlightsystemsononehandandsurvivabilityandlethalityontheother(Perninetal.,2012).Programleadershiphadcontractedforcomponentsbeforesystemsengineeringandarchitecting(SE&A)workwascompletedoninitialrequirements.SocompaniesreceivedcontractsforrequirementsandtechnicalspecificationsfortheSoSanditscomponentsbeforetheprogramensuredthespecificationscouldbeharmonized(Perninetal.,2012).“Ultimately,therewasserious‘misalignment’betweentheconcurrentlydevelopedSoSandproductspecifications,andnogoodmechanismforadjudicatingthedisconnects….Thegovernment'sshortfallinpersonnelwithSE&Aexperienceandexpertisealsocontributedtotheproblem….seniorleaders—drivenbyscheduledemands—chosetoauthorizejustenoughSE&Atolaunchtheprogram”(pp.149–150).Atvariouslevels,programrequirementsandprioritiesshiftedsignificantlyinresponsetoexternalpressures.TheAlQaedaterroristattacksontheWorldTradeCenterandPentagononSeptember11,2001ledtotheUnitedStatesanditsalliesfightingsimultaneouswarsinIraqandAfghanistan.Insteadoffightingthemilitaryofanothercountryinconventionalwarfare,alliedforceswerefightinginsurgentsusingnontraditionaltactics.ThecourseofthewarsandrealtimeadaptationstoadifferenttypeofwarfarequicklyaddedpressurestotheFCSprogram.Whentheprogramhititsfirstmajormilestonein2003,thetotalnumberofsystemstobeincludedinFCSdroppedfrom18to14duetocostandprioritizationconsiderations.Butayearlater,thenumberofsystemswasrestoredto18andtheprogramwasexpectedto“spinout”newcapabilities,meaning“producingandfieldingsystemsastheirtechnologiesmatured”toprovidealliedforceswithtacticaladvantagesasquicklyaspossible.SpinningoutcapabilitiesrequiredassignedprogramteammemberstoshifttheirfocusfromSoSactivitiestosupporttasksrelatedtodeploymentandsupportoffieldedtechnologies.Withatightscheduleandacomplexsystemstillunderdevelopment,thischangeconsiderablyinterrupted

62SoSworkflows(Perninetal.,2012).By2007,CongressbegantointerveneintheFCSprogram.GAOauditsandotherreportsindicatedthattheprogram'stechnologywasstillveryimmatureandquestionedwhethercontinuedinvestmentwaswarranted.Congressrespondedwithsignificantreductionsinfundingandhearingstodeterminetheprogram'sfeasibility.Eventually,Congressmandateda“go/nogo”reviewtodeterminetheprogram'sfinalfate(Perninetal.,2012).Thefundingimpactsandobviousrisksthattheprogrammightbecancelledpushedexecutiveleaderstobreakthesingleprogramintoeight“programelements”focusedondeliveringspecificcapabilities.Thisapproachallowedforshiftingfundingandresourcesasprioritiesandrequirementschanged.Andifthefullprogramwerecancelled,someoftheprogramelementsmightbeshiftedtootheractiveprograms.Thisparticularchangegreatlyunderminedthe“oneteam”andSoSintegrationgoalssetattheprogram'sstart(Perninetal.,2012).By2008,theFCSteamcompletedthe“go/nogo”reviewoftheprogram'sfeasibility.Thefollowingyear,Armyofficialsannouncedthattheprogramwascancelled(Perninetal.,2012).Someprogramelementsremainedactiveaftertheprogram'scancellation,butfewofthedevelopedtechnologiesremaininusetoday(GlobalSecurity.org,n.d.).Thetotalcostoftheprogram,includingcancellationcosts,isestimatedataboutUS$20billion,withverylittleresultingwarfightingcapabilitytoshowfromthatexpenditure(Freedberg,2012).Inadditiontothelostinvestmentfromthatprogram,FCSwasalargeenoughpartoftheArmyacquisitionbudgetthatitdisplacedordelayedotherprogramscompetingforfundingintheacquisitionportfolio.Finally,thecomponentelementsofFCSstillrepresentedcapabilitiesthatwereneededandhadtobeaddressedthroughneworrestructuredprograms,resultinginyearsofdelayinfieldingthosecapabilities.Thiscaseiscomplexbecauseitgoesagainstthegrainofprogramsbeingclassifiedaseithersignificantfailuresorunqualifiedsuccesses.Itdemonstratesthatthereisalotofgrayspaceinwhichprogramsmaydeliverbenefits,products,practices,orlearningthatcanbeusedandimproveduponbyotherprogramseventhoughtheprogrammaynotfullyachieveitsoriginalgoals.Italsohighlightsthefollowingimportantpoints:Systemsengineeringiscriticalfromthebeginningandthroughoutthedeploymentphasesforprogramsrequiringhighlevelsoftechnicalintegration.Programleadershipneedstheabilitytoadaptandperhapsevenrevolutionizeprogrammanagementapproaches,particularlywhenmanagingprogramsthatarebothnovelandcomplex.Programteamsshouldcollaboratetodeveloporadapttoolstofacilitatetheirwork,collaboration,orreporting.Executiveleadershipcanplayimportantenablingrolesthatremovebarriers,setexpectationsaboutprogramculture,andasktoughquestionsofprogramleadershipthatneedanswers.Theycanalsomakedecisionsthatcanderailtheprogramstheysponsororaddtoscope,cost,andschedule.

63Talentmanagementiscriticalfororganizationssponsoringtechnicalprograms,particularlyforgovernmentagenciesthatareoftenreluctanttoinvestinstafftraininganddevelopment.Forgovernmentprograms,guidancemaybeneededforeffectiveworkforcescalingpractices,particularlywhenprogramsgrowfrom250peopletomorethan10,000overthelifeoftheprogram(Perninetal.,2012).Althoughstudyafterstudyhasidentifiedthevitalimportanceofeffectiverequirementsengineeringandmanagementapproaches,itremainsakeyvulnerabilityforprogramsandprojects.2.3.3WhatDoesEthicsHavetoDowithIntegration?Volkswagen'sEmissionsScandalPrivateindustryisalsonotimmunefromprogramchallengesasVolkswagenfoundwithitsattempttocircumventemissionstestinglaws.Volkswagen'scasereflectsasysteminwhichthefailureofprogramleadershiptostandfirmagainstdetrimentalexecutivedecisionshavedamagedtheorganization'sbrandandreputationglobally.Volkswagenreportedlyhadaculturethatlookedtheotherwaytoavoidtellingsuperiorsthetruth.ThatmaybebecauselongstandingchiefexecutiveFerdinandPiechcreatedacultureoffearthatdidnottoleratefailure(Smith&Parloff,2016).Accordingtoafirsthandaccount,Piechrelatedhowheusedfearandintimidationtogetresults:Icalledallthebodyengineers,stampingpeople,manufacturingandexecutivesintomyconferenceroom.AndIsaid,“Iamtiredofalltheselousybodyfits.Youhavesixweekstoachieveworldclassbodyfits.Ihaveallyournames.Ifwedonothavegoodbodyfitsinsixweeks,Iwillreplaceallofyou”(Lutz,2015).Intheearly2000s,Volkswagenhadambitionstobetheworld'smostprofitableautomotivecompany.Toachievethatobjective,thecompanyhadtoincreaseitsshareoftheU.S.market,whichstoodatonly2%atthetime.TheproblemwasthatU.S.cleanairstandardstargetedthetypeofpollutionfromoxidesofnitrogenthatdieselengineslikethoseinVolkswagenvehiclesproduced.Sountilthecompanycouldfindawaytoreducethoseemissionstoacceptablelevels,itcouldnotcracktheU.S.market(Smith&Parloff,2016).Thencame“cleandiesel.”AccordingtotheDieselTechnologyForum(n.d.),“Today'sultralowsulfurdieselfuel,advancedenginesandeffectiveemissionscontrolcombinetoachievenearzeroemissionsthatissmokefree.”AVolkswagenengineeringprogramteamwaschargedwithdevelopingavehiclethatcouldrunoncleandieselandmeetU.S.emissionstandards.Despitetheteam'sbestefforts,theyseemedunabletoproduceasatisfactoryresult.Thatincreasedthepressuresincefailurewasnotanoption(Smith&Parloff,2016).Astheteamwasworkingonthechallenge,theU.S.standardsbecamestricterin2009.Basedoninvestigationsthatarestillongoingatthetimeofthiswriting,itappearsthattheteamdecidedtofindawayaroundtheproblemsincetheteamcouldnotresolvetheproblem.Softwareengineersweretaskedwithdevelopinga“defectdevice”thatcouldsenseemissiontestingconditionsand“putthevehicleintoasortofsafetymodeinwhichtheengineranbelow

64normalpowerandperformance”(Hotten,2015),whichwouldmasktheactualemissionoutputthatwouldbeproducedundernormaldrivingconditions.Thesoftwaredidthetrick,andtheengineeringteamreportedsuccesstoVolkswagenexecutives.Volkswagenspentmillionsrollingoutits“cleandiesel”fleetofautomobiles.Steadily,thecompany'ssalesbegantoclimb,andsalesfiguresfromtheUnitedStatesstartedtoshowongoingimprovement.The“cleandiesel”carswonallkindsofawardsandreceivedpositivenewscoverage.Forsixyears,Volkswagencontinuedtoproduceandsellitshighperformingcarsaroundtheworld(Smith&Parloff,2016).Thenthetruthcameout.Newsreportsindicatedthataninternalwhistleblowernotifiedaseniorcompanyofficialoftheuseofthe“defectdevice”asearlyas2011.Then,engineersattheInternationalCouncilonCleanTransportation(ICCT)weretestingcaremissionsinEuropeusingbothstationaryandonroadtesting.TheirtestsidentifiedthatVolkswagenvehiclesdidnotperformthesameduringbothtests.ICCTshareditsresultswiththeCaliforniaAirResourcesBoard(CARB),andtheydecidedtoconductsimilartestsintheUnitedStates.TheypartneredwithWestVirginiaUniversity'sCenterforAlternativeFuels,EnginesandEmissions,whichfoundsimilarresultsinitsteststothoseofICCT.TheinformationwassharedwiththeU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)in2014(Raby,2015).WhentheEPAnotifiedVolkswagenofthefindings,Volkswageninitiallyclaimedthatitwasaminorerrorthatrequiredfixingandissuedalimitedrecall.Butinternally,damagecontroleffortshadstarted(Smith&Parloff,2016).Aftertherecall,CARBcontinuedexploringwhythestationeryandonroadtestsweredifferentandfinallydeterminedthattheautoshadsometypeoftriggerdevice.EPAofficialscontinuedtobelievethattherewasalargerissue.Finally,inJuly2015,whentheEPAandCARBrefusedtoapproveanyofthecompany's2016modelsforsale,Volkswagenofficialsadmittedthatthecompanyhadinstalledthe“defectdevice”initscarssince2008(Raby,2015).TheVolkswagenemissionsscandalcostthecompanyitsreputation,andthefinancialdamageisstillbeingtallied.ThecompanylikelyfacesupwardsofUS$20billioninfinesandpenalties.Therewilllikelybelawsuitsfromcarowners,dealers,andshareholdersseekingtorecovervariousdamagestheyhaveincurred(Barrett,2015).GovernmentofficialsinGermany,Italy,theUnitedKingdom,France,SouthKorea,andCanadahavestartedinvestigations(Hotten,2015).Volkswagenexecutivesandengineersarealsoatrisk.Theboardchairman,CEO,twoexecutiveengineers,andtheheadofbranddevelopmentwereforcedout.TheU.S.JusticeDepartmenthasopenedcriminalinvestigationsintowhethertherewasaconspiracywithinthecompanytoperpetuatethefraud(Barrett,2015).ItseemsthatfailureispossibleatVolkswagen.Inthiscase,highlyauthoritarianleadershipandorganizationalcultureharmedacompanywithasolidreputationforquality.Programleadershipwassoafraidtotellexecutiveleadersthattheirrequirementscouldnotbemetthattheyinsteadengineeredapotentiallycriminaldevicetocircumventemissionregulations.Itispossiblethatexecutiveleadersdidnotbecomeaware

65ofthedeviceuntilexternalinvestigationsrevealedthetestingirregularities.However,thelackofobjectivegovernanceatthecorporatelevelremovedanypotentialchecksandbalancesbetweenthedemandsoftopexecutivesandengineeringprogramstaff.Andthefactthatstaffwillinglyparticipatedpotentiallyunderminesintegrity,whichisfoundationaltotrust,collaboration,and,ultimately,integration.2.3.4TypicalEngineeringProgramChallengesTheissuesaffectingengineeringprogramperformanceandtheprofessionalswholeadthemhavenotchanged.TheteamthatdevelopedTheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehmen,2012)undertookextensiveresearchtolearnwhyengineeringprogramsaresochallenged.Thatresearchuncoveredseveralmajorchallengesthataffectengineeringprogramperformance,asdocumentedinTable22.Table22EngineeringprogramchallengesAdaptedfromOehmen,2012.Workingsession:Leanenablersformanagingengineeringprograms.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2012.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.TypicalDescriptionProgramChallengesFirefighting—Thelackofcarefulandcollaborativeplanning,coordination,andReactivemanagementresultsinprogramsbeingexecutedinareactivemode.RatherProgramthaneffectivelycoordinatingplannedactivities,programteamsspendtheirExecutiontimefirefighting,focusingtheireffortsonfixingurgentproblemsinsteadofpreventingthem.Theunderlyingissuescanbecausedbyinterpersonalissues(e.g.,thereisnocoherentleadershipteam);lackofrequiredskills(e.g.,insufficientprogramriskmanagementcapabilities);ineffectivemanagement(e.g.,competingresourcerequirements);orlackofexecutiveengagement(e.g.,differingprioritieswithincollaboratingorganizations).Unstable,InadequaterequirementsmanagementrepresentsoneofthehighestUnclear,andcontributorstoprogramandprojectfailures.ForproductsandservicesthatIncompletehavetobehighlyadaptiveandresponsivetohumaninterfaces,itcanbeRequirementsextremelychallengingforpotentialcustomerstoclearlyarticulateallofthefunctions,capabilities,situationalapplications,anddetailstheymayneed.Itcanbeequallychallengingforadesignerorrequirementsspecialisttoproperlycapturewhatthecustomerstates,includingappropriatereflectionoftheassociatednuancesandinterpretations.Theremayalsobealackofappreciationforthecomplexityoftherequirements.Asaresult,engineeringprogramrequirementsmaychangefrequently,beunclear,and/orbeincomplete.Sincetherequirementsdeterminewhatisbuiltandhow,unstableorinaccuraterequirementsaffectefficientandeffectiveexecutionoftheprogramdeliveringthem.Iftherearemultiplecustomers

66involved,onecustomer'ssetofrequirementsmayconflictwithorcreateamismatchwiththeothercustomer'sneeds.Intheend,itispossiblethatbothcustomers'needsmaynotbefullymet.MismanagementSomeprogramslackappropriateexpertiseandknowledgeassociatedwithofProgrammanagementofcomplexengineeringprogramsamongindividuals,teams,Culture,Teamandwithintheorganizationatlarge.EitherindividualsdonothavetheCompetency,necessaryskillsandexperienceorthereisineffectiveknowledgetransferandKnowledgefromexperiencedemployeesandteammemberstonewemployees.Additionally,knowledgeandexperiencecapturedfromlessonslearnedarenottranslatedintoimprovementsthatcouldenhanceprogramperformanceandmanagement.InsufficientThecomplexnetworkoforganizationsanddepartmentsinvolvedinAlignmentanddeliveringtheprogramvalueisnotalignedwithitspriorities.ThisCoordinationofincludesthealignmentandoptimizationofstrategicprioritiesandtheExtendedportfolios.EnterpriseUnclearRoles,Theroles,responsibilities,andaccountabilityofindividuals,teams,staffResponsibilities,functions,andlinefunctionsarenotclearlydefined.ThereislackofandalignmentandintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsAccountabilityengineeringexacerbatedbyincentivesthatinhibitordiscouragecollaboration.Theremaybepowerstrugglesoverwhohasaccountabilityforplansandoutcomesandoverwhoisempoweredtomakedecisions.InsufficientThereisalackofdetailedandintegratedplanningattheprogram'sstart.ProgramUncertaintiesarenotadequatelyrecognizedandincorporatedintoearlyPlanningplanning,leadingtounrealisticexpectationsandplans.LackofBudgetaryandtimeconstraintscanleadtolimitedornoriskmanagementProactiveactivitybytheprogramteam.TheprogramteamattemptstofunctionProgramRiskwithoutclearofframpsandmitigationapproaches.OwnershipofrisksisManagementilldefined.PoorProgramTimeconstraintsleadtoinadequatequalityoftherequestforproposalorAcquisitionandcontractbid.Legalandregulatoryrequirements,impropermanagementofContractingimmaturetechnologies,andinsufficientleadershipexacerbatethisPracticeschallenge.Therequestforproposalsisissuedbeforecustomerrequirementshavesufficientclarityandstability.Thereisnoadequateprocessformaturingprogramtechnologies,andtradeoffsaredifficulttonegotiate.Askanyprogrammanagerorsystemsengineerwhoisunfamiliarwiththisresearch,andtheyarelikelytocitesimilarissuesandchallenges.SoweknowwhatcangowrongandwehaveroadmapsliketheGuidetohelpcharttheway.Sowhatmoreisneeded?

672.4WeNeedaBetterSolutionThescopeofprograms,nowandintothefuture,requiresstrongperformanceandoutcomes.TheWorldEconomicForumestimatesthattheworld'sinfrastructureneedsrequireinvestmentofUS$5trillionperyearforthenext15–20years(WorldEconomicForum,2013,p.12).Suchinvestmentwoulddeliverenergygenerationanddeliverysystems;waterandsewageservices;roads,airports,ports,andbridges;andtelecommunicationsservices.Subjectingsuchinvestmenttothecostandscheduledelaysassociatedwithtoday'sprogramperformancecouldmorethantriplethepricetag.Somethingmustchange.Aswiththechallenges,thereareknownsolutions.Thesolutionbeginswithorganizationalculturethatvaluespeopleandtheircapabilities.Thatcultureengagesexecutiveleadersingovernancerolestoprovideoversight,decisionmaking,andsupporttoengineeringprogramteams.Thoseexecutiveleadersempowerprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersascollaboratorstodelivercomplexprogramsbybalancingmanagementconsiderations,technicalrequirements,andcustomerneeds.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersguidetheirteamstoplan,develop,test,andmanageprogramelementsasacohesiveunitofsubjectmatterexperts.Processes,methods,tools,techniques,andsystemssupportindividualsincompletingtheirtasks,handingoffwork,addressingemergingissues,andengagingtherightpeople.Ongoingtraininganddevelopmentensuresthatindividualsgainandenhancetheirknowledge,experience,andcapabilities,andbegintoworkinacollaborative,integratedwayifintegrationconceptsandpracticesareincludedinthetraining.2.5SummaryChallengestoprogramperformancearewelldocumentedandknown.Frompoorplanningtoineffectiverequirementsmanagementtolackofeffectivestakeholdermanagement,manyprogramsreflectasituationofhistoryrepeatingitself.Thecurrentsituationisnotsustainable,particularlyassocietiesaroundtheworldrequirethebenefitsthatonlymajorengineeringprogramscandeliver.Fortunately,thereareprinciplesthat,ifapplied,canmakeadifference.Theprincipleofrespectforpeoplestrikesattheheartofwhatisimportant—creatingstructures,systems,cultures,incentives,tools,processes,andcapabilitiesthathelppeopleworktogethermoreeffectively.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersplayimportantrolesinmakingthatprinciplecometolife.Byhelpingtofosterintegrationandcollaboration,theseleaderscandriveteameffortsfocusedonreducingdevelopmentalcost,cycletime,andrisk.Andthatmeansstrongerprogramperformance.Thisbookcapturestheselessonsalongwithresearchfindingstosuggestabetterwaytomanagecomplexprograms—througheffectiveintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.2.6DiscussionQuestions1.Inasingleday,howmanyindividualelementsoforganizationalinfrastructuredoyou

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723THEFEATURESOFSUCCESSFULINTEGRATIONOFPROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDSYSTEMSENGINEERING3.1AMajorEngineeringProgramFailure?Successrelatedtoengineeringprogrammanagementisoftenverynarrowlydefinedintermsofcostandscheduleperformance,andthiscanbetothedetrimentofdeliveredvalue.Ifeitherorbothmeasuresfalloutsidetargetsbuttheprogramdeliversthedesiredresult,theentireprogrammayneverthelessbedeemedunsuccessful.Whilethesemeasuresareconvenienttoassessandreport,theyprovideonlyalimitedperspective.Theydonotaccountforthefullrangeofvalueandbenefitsthattheseprogramsareintendedtodeliver,andconsequentlydonotprovideafullaccountingoftheprogram,itsbenefits,oritsdegreeofsuccessorfailure.Inshort,themorecomplicatedtheprogramobjectives,themorecomplicateditislikelytobeinprovidingafullaccountingofitsoutcomesand,ultimately,itssuccess.Boston'sCentralArtery/Tunnel(akatheBigDig),likeothermajorinfrastructureprogramssuchastheEnglishChunnelandSanFrancisco/OaklandBayBridge,isanexampleofaprogramthataccomplishedacompleterestructuringofBoston'scentralroadways,whichgreatlyimprovedtheflowoftraffic.Theprogramalsoopenedupareasofthecityfornewdevelopment.Buttheconstantmediabarrageofarticlesandreportsofscheduledelays,outofcontrolcosts,andallegationsofmajorcorruptioncementedamindsetamongmanystakeholdersthattheprogramhadfailed.Elementsofthatperceptionstilllingertoday.Thus,engineeringprogramssuchasthismayalwaysriskbeingdeemedfailuresiftheyareevaluatedsimplyonmeasuresofcostandschedule.Whenthedefinitionofsuccessisexpandedwithmoreofafocusonbenefitsrealized,programsmaybeseeninadifferentlight.Benefitsmetricssuchasreducedtraffic,economicgrowthopportunities,clientsatisfaction,customerretention,futurebusinessenabled,andprogramteamcapabilitydevelopmentbetterdemonstratethedegreetowhichdesiredbusinessormissiongoalsmayberealized.TenyearsaftercompletionoftheBigDig,aBostonGlobe(Flint,2015)articlehighlightedsignificantachievements:

73“Rushhourbringswhatradioreportersrefertoasheavyvolume.Butthetrafficmovesandfor1.5milesthroughdowntownBoston,itmovesoutofsight,underground….GettingtoandfromLoganAirporthasneverbeeneasier”(Flint,2015).Whentheprogramstarted,Boston'sCentralArteryroadwaycarriedabout200,000commuters.Itnowcarriesabout536,000commuterseachweekday.“Bottlenecksareminimizedthroughtheuseoftheaddalanedesign,whereonrampsbecomeapermanentadditionallane,requiringlessmerging”(Flint,2015).“thegreatestsuccessoftheBigDigisthis:Itestablishedanewlandscapeforthecitytoflourishallaroundit….Numerousreportshavechronicledbigjumpsinpropertyvalues….Allkindsofpreviouslynondescriptbuildingsarebeingredevelopedandturnedintoloftsandofficespace—buildingsthathadlittlevaluewhentheyoverlookedanelevatedhighwayandarenowsuddenlyonagoldcoast”(Flint,2015).PartofthechallengewithperceptionsofsuccessrelatedtotheBigDigisthatperceptionsstartedtosolidifyduringthedevelopmentandimplementationperiodswhencostandschedulewereabouttheonlysolid,trackablemetrics.Opinionscouldnotwaitforthefullprogramtoconcludetoevaluatethedegreetowhichdesiredobjectiveshadbeenachieved.Withonlypartoftheprogramvisibleandlookingthroughthecostandschedulelenses,itbecameimpossibletoseeanythingpositiveresultingfromtheprogram.Onlyafterthepassageof10yearsandsubsequentexperienceassociatedwiththeprogramhaveitsbenefitsledsometorevisittheirperceptionsofitssuccesses.Thetechnicalelementsofsuccessareoftenevaluatedbasedondesignelementsandtechnicalriskmanagementthatultimatelyaffectcostandschedule.Althoughthereareleadingindicatorsoftechnicalsuccess,truesuccessisoftenonlymeasurableattheendofaprogramorlongafteritscompletion.ReferringbacktotheBigDigprogram,engineersreceivedcreditforapplyingthebesttechnologiesandpracticesontheprogram.However,managingconstructionunderneathamajorcitywhiledailyworkandlifeabovegroundoccurredasusualwasasubstantialfeatinandofitself.Buttheprogramalsopresentedtoughproblemsthatrequiredsignificantreplanningandredesigninrealtime.Someofthetechnicalriskswereknowntothefederalandstateofficialsadvocatingfortheprogram,butthecostandscheduleimplicationsweredownplayedtogettheprogramauthorized.Asaresult,stateofficialsandtheprimarycontractorstookheatascostsincreasedandtheschedulewasextendedmonthsandmonthsintothefuture.Aswithprogramperformance,negativeperceptionsoftechnicalperformancecoloredviewsoftheprogram'ssuccess,despitetheinnovativeapproachesthatbecamenewbestpracticesinmajorinfrastructureprograms.Andaswithprogramsuccess,perceptionsoftechnicalsuccesscanchangewhenthesumvalueofalloptimizationdecisionsbecomevisibleattheendoftheprogram.TheBostonGlobe(Flint,2015)articlehighlightedthevaluedeliveredbyoptimizationdecisionsduringtheBigDig:

74“Thejointventureteamofthestate,Bechtel/ParsonsBrinckerhoff,andleadcontractorModernContinentalhadtoactlikeMattDamonandhisNASAteaminTheMartian,continuallyconfrontingproblemsandfiguringoutwaystosolvethemonthefly”(Flint,2015).“AsetoftunnelboxesfortheI90connector…neededtomatchupexactlyinthemurkywatersofFortPointChannel;engineersdeployedanelaboratejackingsystemthatwasunprecedentedinitsuseandinflatabledevicestofloatthegiantsectionsintoplace”(Flint,2015).Newbestpracticesandunprecedentedapproachestoengineeringmajorinfrastructureprogramsmeantlittletotaxpayers,mediarepresentatives,oropponentsoftheprogram,whowatchedthemeterrunandthedistancetothefinishlinestretchoutfurtherandfurther.Intheend,thearticlesummeduptheriskassociatedwithmajorengineeringprograms:“Thearchitectsofinfrastructureareexpectedtogeteverything100percentright,buttragically,somerealitiesonlybecomeapparentbywayoffailure”(Flint,2015).Individualdefinitionsofsuccessvarywildlyfromstakeholdertostakeholderandcanevolveovertime.Aswhenseeingamovie,nostillimagecaneverserveasatruemeasureofsuccess—individualsneedtoseetheentiremovietoofferatrulyinformedreview.Eventhen,eachindividual'sownbiasesandperceptionswillcolortheconclusions.Nevertheless,observationsfromwhathavebeendesignatedassuccessfulengineeringprogramscanprovideinsightsonthedriversofsuccess.InthecaseoftheBigDig,therewereunpredictableorganizational,political,operational,andtechnicalchallengesthathadtobeovercomebytheprogrammanagementteam.Theprogramfacedadiversesetofsteeptechnicalchallengesandhadtohaveworldclassexpertsineachofthoseareas,andthoseexpertshadtoworktogethereffectivelytoensurethattheoverallsystemfunctionedanddeliveredthebenefitsforwhichtheprogramwascreated.Theprogrammanagementteam(comprisingbothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringleads)appliedbestavailabletechnologiesandpractices,encouragedinnovationtocreatenewbestpracticeswhereexistingoneswereinadequate,andcontinuallyconfrontedproblemsandfiguredoutwaystosolvethemastheyarose.ExactlyhowtheydidthisisexploredingreaterdetailinChapters11and14.Theoverarchingpointisthatthemanagementteamwenttogreatlengthstoensurethattheprogramandprojectmanagers,systemsengineers,andtechnicalexpertswerecoordinatedandalignedintheireffortsonthisverycomplexprogram.LiketheFutureCombatSystemexampleinChapter2,thiscaseandtheotherspresentedinthischapterarerelevanttotheexplorationofintegrationandcollaborationbetweensystemsengineersandprogrammanagers.First,thereisadirecttiebetweenprogramandtechnicalactivitiesandbenefitsrealizedfromtheprogram'soutputs.Asnotedabove,theBigDigtestednewpracticesandapproachesfortacklingtoughproblemsinrealtime,justassystemsengineersandprogrammanagersmustdoastheyencounternovelchallenges.Suchexperimentationisabsolutelynecessary,butcomeswiththepotentialoffailure,addedcost,andscheduleimpacts.Second,howleadershiponanyengineeringprogramhandlesstakeholderexpectations,includingcommunicationswiththepublicthroughmedia,particularly

75onmajorprogramsthatimpactabroadgroupofstakeholdershasasignificantinfluenceonperceptions.IntheBigDigandLondonOlympicGamesexamplesinChapter2,bothprogramsundertookextensivemediaandcommunityengagementactivities,albeitwithdifferentoutcomes.Mostimportantly,thekeypointisthattherolesofchiefsystemsengineerandprogrammanageraremuchbroaderthantheymayappear.Theyarescientistsandpioneersdiscoveringnewways.Theyareproblemsolverswhoovercomenewchallenges.Theyarenetworkerswhofacilitateandenablemultiplebranchesofcommunicationandconnection.Theyareleaderswhochampionavision,directthecourse,andengageothersinsupport.3.2BridgingBoundariestoFosterProgramSuccessThePrairieWatersprogram(Oehmen,2012;PMI,n.d.)wasconsiderablylesscomplexthantheBigDig.Onitsmerits,itisrelativelyeasiertocallitasuccessfulprogram(itwasformallyrecognizedandawardedthe2011PMIProjectoftheYearAward),butthatrecognitionisrelatedtohowitapproachedtheuniquechallengesitfaced.Thosechallengesandultimateevaluationofsuccesswillbedifferentforeveryprogram.However,thecaseprovidesusefulinsightintoattributesandpracticesthatcansupportachievingsuccessfulprogramoutcomes.Amassivedroughtfrom2002to2003depletedthewatersupplyinthecityofAurora,Colorado,toanalltimelow,fallingtojust26%ofitstotalcapacity.Thecitywasleftwithaninemonthsupplyofwaterforitscitizens—farlessthanthethreetofiveyearsupplyitpreferstokeep.Officialsdecidedtoimplementaprogramthatwouldpreventfuturedroughtrelatedshortages.InAugust2005,theAuroraCityCouncillaunchedthePrairieWatersproject,whichcalledfortheconstructionofnearly34miles(55km)of60inch(1.5m)pipeline,fourpumpstations,anaturalpurificationarea,andoneoftheworld'smosttechnicallyadvancedwatertreatmentfacilities,handling50milliongallons(189millionliters)perday.Theprojectwastodeliverfulloperationalcapabilitybytheendof2010.C2HMHillwontheprimecontractforthePrairieWatersprogramandsixkeysubcontractorssupportedvariouselementsofengineeringdesign,constructionmanagement,andlegalmanagement.Fromtheoutset,C2HMHillanditssubcontractorpartnersestablishedthefoundationforstrongprogramintegrationwithinateamcomprisedofabout5,000individuals.ThePrairieWatersprogramfosteredprofessionalexcellenceregardingbehavior.Notonlydidprogramleadershipclearlycommunicatewhatbehaviorwasexpected,theyalsoaskedtheirmanagementtorolemodelthesebehavioralcharacteristics.Forexample,theteamestablishedacultureof“whatisright”andnot“whoisright,”emphasizingthefactthateveryonewasencouragedtosharetheirideasandthatthoseideaswouldbeheardandtreatedequally,regardlessoftheirpositionintheorganization.Theprogramhad11veryclearlydefinedbenefitsitaimedtoachieve,andthecoreprogramfocusedexclusivelyonthoseoutcomes.Alladditionalactivitieshadtoundergoreviewandapproval.Thispracticeensuredthattheprogramteamdidnotgetcarriedawaywithsideprojectsthatdidnotaddvalue.Theprogramteamestablishedasetofcriticalsuccessfactorssuchasbudget,schedule,environmentalprotection,andproactivecommunication.These

76successfactorswerecontinuouslytrackedanddisplayedinadashboardmakingthecurrentstatushighlyvisible.Thesetoplevelmetricswerebrokendownforeverybiddingpackagetotrackcontractors'performance.ThePrairieWatersprogramusedanumberofapproachestoensureefficientandcollaborativedecisionmaking.Duringaprocesscalledchartering,theteamdevelopedadeliveryorvaluestreammap,exploringthebestpathtoachievingtheprogramgoals.Withinthatsystem,eachworkflowwasbrokendownonaprocesslevelthatfacilitatedassigningresponsibilities,definingtheformatofthetaskoutput,andassessingthetimeavailableforcompletion.Thecharteringworkshopsalsoestablishedthefoundationsforefficientdecisionmakingthroughouttheprogram.Forexample,theorganizationalstructurewasadaptednotonlytofostercollaboration,butalsotospeedupdecisionmaking.Operatingproceduresalsoensuredthattherightinformationrequiredtomakedecisionswasavailableanduptodate.Theprogramteamdevelopedamanualtoserveasaguidebookforteammembers.Itoutlinedstandardoperatingproceduresaswellasrolesandresponsibilitiesforkeytasks.Itcoveredcommunicationflowsandprotocolsoutliningrulesforinformationdisseminationandquality.Sincetheprogramincorporatedmultipleorganizationsunderitsumbrella,foreachkeyorganizationtheprogramdesignatedspecificindividualsasdirectpointsofcontactbetweenorganizationalandfunctionalcounterparts,whichprovedtobeamajorfacilitatorofdirectandefficientcommunicationanddecisionmaking.Becausetheprogramhadaverytightdeadlineandmultipleconcurrentprojectactivities,itneededtoleveragesignificantinnovationandimprovisationwiththeteamandthesubcontractedorganizations.Contractorswereincentivizedtoproposeideastoreducecosts.Incaseswheretheideasprovedvalidandwereselectedforrealization,thesavingsweresplitevenly.But,evenmorechallengingwastheneedtodrawuponexpertiseinanumberofdisciplinestoworktogethercollaborativelyratherthanjustcontributeindividualskillsetstoobjectivesoftheirportionoftheprogram.Anothercriticalmanagementelementbasedontheprogram'sconstraintswaseffectiveriskmanagement.Programleadershipleveragedtheteamtodevelopadetailedriskmanagementplanandmitigationstrategies.Thepotentialimpactofeveryriskwasanalyzedandweightedbythepotentialimpacttheriskcouldhaveontheprogram.Responsibilityformonitoring,tracking,andreevaluatingriskswaspushedtotheappropriatemanagementlevelalongwiththeaccountabilityfortakinganynecessarymitigationactions.ThebenefitsrealizedfromthePrairieWatersprogramincludetheabilitytosupplyabout3.3billiongallonsofwaterperyearandtreatabout50milliongallonsofwatereveryday.Theoutcomeoftheprogramservesmorethan300,000peopleinthecityofAurora,andisexpectedtomeetthewaterneedsofthecityuntil2030(Kable,n.d.).SohowdidthePrairieWatersprogramdoit?Someofthepracticesemployedare(orshouldbe)standardforanyprogram.Thesestartedwithhavingacommonvisionfortheobjectivesoftheprogramthatwassharedacrosstheprogramteam,withclearlydefinedbenefitsandcriticalprogramsuccessfactorsonprominentdisplay.Otherpracticesaimedtoimprove

77communication,collaboration,andefficientdecisionmaking.Programleaderswereexpectedtomodelcollaborativebehaviorstosettheclimatefortheprogram.Rolesandresponsibilitiesforkeytasksweredefinedwithstandardoperatingproceduressoeveryoneknewhowtheycontributedtotheprogram.Programparticipantswereincentivizedtoproposeideastoreducecoststotheprogramthroughinnovativealternativesolutions.Whatemergesfromthiscaseisapictureofaprogrammanagementteamthatwasverycollaborativeandencouragedthefullengagementofallprogramparticipants.ButweretheseactionscharacteristicofjustPrairieWaters,orcantheybefoundingeneralacrossmanysuccessful,highperformingprograms?3.3ContributorstoSuccessinActionEngineeringprogramsuccessrequirescontributorstocombinetheirskillsandabilitieseffectivelytodeliverthedesiredbusinessbenefits.Thefollowingexampleswillshowbrieflytwoexamplesofprogramsdeemedsuccessful,andhowthejointcontributionsofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementcontributedtheirunderlyingcapabilitiestodeliverresults.3.3.1AcceleratedExcellenceLockheedMartin'sSkunkWorksstillstandstodayasthesymbolofhowinnovativeprogramsshouldoperateafterdecadesinexistenceandalonglistofcategorydefiningaircraftprograms.Theterm“skunkworks”isnowapartofbusinessvernacular.Althoughmanyofitsdefinitionsfocusontheprocess,structural,ormechanicalaspectsofthemodel,fewfocusonthemostimportantelementofwhatmadethemodelworkandsustainsitasthesymbolofinnovation—thepeople.UrbanDictionary's(n.d.)definitionofskunkworkscapturesthecriticalpeoplesideoftheequation:agroupofpeoplewho,inordertoachieveunusualresults,workonaprojectinawaythatisoutsideoftheusualrules.Askunkworksisoftenasmallteamthatassumesorisgivenresponsibilityfordevelopingsomethinginashorttimewithminimalmanagementconstraints.Typically,askunkworkshasasmallnumberofmembersinordertoreducecommunicationsoverhead.AstheU.S.WarDepartmentpreparedforthelandinvasionofEuropeduringWorldWarII,rumorscirculatedthattheGermangovernmenthaddevelopedaleadingedgeairplanecapableofveryhighspeeds.Tryingtoremainaheadoftheenemy,theWarDepartmentengagedLockheedMartintodesignandbuildaplaneintotalsecrecyinsixmonthsorlessthatcouldreachspeedsof600milesperhour.LockheedassignedClarenceL.Johnsontoleadtheeffort.Morethanamonthaheadofschedule,Johnson'steamdeliveredLulaBelle,theP80ShootingStarprototypethatlaterbecametheF80fighterplane.Johnsonandtheprogramleadershipappliedapproachestotheassignmentthattodaycarrylabelssuchas“lean”and“agile.”Programteammemberswereselectedforthespecializedskillstheprogramrequired.Thisfactalone,however,hadthepotentialtocreateunproductivetensionaseachspecializationwouldtendtoseethe“problemtobesolved”throughtheirown

78specializedfieldofexpertise.Theteamwasrelativelysmallforsuchamajorendeavor,growingquicklyfrom60to80peopleasplanninganddesignshiftedintodevelopmentandproduction.Teammembersfromdesigntoproductionwerelocatedinthesamebuildingsotheycouldquicklycollaboratetoresolveemergingproblems.Teammembersandprogramleadershiphelddailymeetingstoresolveproblemsandkeepworkflowsmoving.Thesedailymeetingsservedmorethanjusttoresolveproblems.Italsoprovidedforanenvironmentwheretheprogrammanager,projectmanagers,andtheengineeringteamworkedinconcerttointegratetheirexpertiseandprocessestoachievethehighergoaloftheprogramasawhole.Teamculturevaluedcooperationandcollaboration,butalsoencouraged“creativetension”whereteammemberschallengedeachother'sideastoimproveuponthem(Wilson,1999).Fordecadesmore,Lockheed'sSkunkWorkscontinuedtoperformmiraclesthatotherorganizationsstrovetoreplicateforthemselves.Havingotherscopyone'sapproachesisnotonlyflattering,butalsoreflectsthatothersrecognizethatthoseapproachesleadtosuccessfuloutcomes.3.3.2TheConsistentEnginethatCouldOneofthemostcomprehensivereviewsofanorganization'soverallengineeringprogramcapabilitieswaspublishedbytheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)in2008(Bilardoetal.).Ratherthanexploringhowindividualprogramssucceeded,thestudyfocusedinsteadonanorganizationalassessmentofsuccess—whichcapabilitieswithinNASAwerecriticalforeffectiveengineeringprogrammanagement.Thisviewprovidedimportantperspectivebecauseitexaminedthecomplexrelationshipsassociatedwithprofessionals—designersandbuilders—whoseinterestscouldsometimesbediametricallyopposed.Lookingathowtheengineeringprogramsystemdiffusedoppositionandforgedcollaborationillustratesanorganizationthathasleverageditskeysuccesscontributorsasastrategiccompetency.NASAformeditsOrganizationDesignTeam(ODT)to“investigateorganizationalfactorsthatcanleadtosuccessorfailureofcomplexgovernmentprograms,andtoidentifytoolsandmethodsforthedesign,modelingandanalysisofnewandmoreefficientprogramandprojectorganizations”(Bilardoetal.,2008,p.1).TheODTteamstartedin2003followingthelaunchofNASA'sNextGenerationLaunchTechnologyProgram.Thatprogram'sgoalwasthedevelopmentofnewtechnologiesthatwouldreducecost,improveperformance,andmaximizesafety.ODTwasoneofseveralteamsformedtoconductresearchrelatedtopractices,tools,etc.However,ODT'staskincludedanassessmentoftheimpactthat“program,project,andtechnicallineorganizationshaveonthespacelaunch‘systemofsystems’”(Bilardoetal.,2008,p.3).Toaccomplishitstasks,theODTbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromvariousdisciplineswhohadworkedon25majorprogramsoverthepast50yearsforaseriesofworkshopsonorganizationaleffectiveness.Theworkshopsidentifiedaseriesofprinciplesthatstaffmembersfeltwereinstrumentalinthesuccessoftheirprograms.Theseprinciplesequatetothekeysuccesscontributorsidentifiedearlierinthischapter:Vision:Effectiveprogramleadershipsetavisionandkepttheteamfocusedonprogram

79goals.WhenU.S.PresidentJohnF.KennedydeclaredthattheUnitedStateswouldputamanonthemoonandbringhimbacksafely,allofNASA'seffortsfocusedonachievingthatmission.Asstatedinthereport,“thereremainedlittledoubtamongNASAandindustrypersonnelaboutwhateverymeeting,everyproposal,everybudgetdiscussion,oreverydecisionwasultimatelyintendedtoaccomplish”(Bilardoetal.,2008,p.5).Continuousblockandtackle:Programsponsorsandleadershipplayedbothoffensiveanddefensiverolesasprogramprotectors.Giventhelonglifecycleofprograms,changesinorganizationalleadershiporprioritiesrepresentconstantthreatsthatmustbeanticipatedandmanaged,likemostrisks.SoNASAprogramsponsorsandleadershiphelpedtosustainexecutivelevelsupportfortheprogrambyactivelyandregularlyengagingstakeholders.Suchengagementnotonlysustainedsupport,butwasalsovitalforsecuringtoptalentandinsulatingprogramsfromdisruptivechangeslikerequirementschangesthatnecessitatedreplanning.Thereportcitedarealexampleofwhatcouldhappenwhenprotectorsdisappearedfromonespecificprogram.WhenPresidentBillClintoncametooffice,hisadministrationcancelledtheStrategicDefenseInitiativestartedunderPresidentRonaldReaganafteralloftheprogram'skeyexecutivesponsorshadbeenreplaced.Buildingempowered,collaborativeteams:Attheirinception,allofNASA'sprogramsbenefitedfromstrongleaderscapableofbuildingsolidfoundationsforsuccess.Theystartedwithestablishingtherightprogramculture.Leadersnotonlyinfluencedtheculturebutthroughtheirbehaviors,reflectedtherightwayofdoingthings.WithinNASA,strongprogramleaderswould“hirepeoplesmarterthan[them]andgivethemtheresponsibilityandresourcesneededtoaccomplishthetask”(Bilardoetal.,2008,p.9).Theseleaderspusheddecisionmakingauthoritytotheresponsiblepeoplewhilemaintainingoverallaccountabilityforperformance.Theyensuredthatroles,responsibilities,anddeliverableswereclearlydefinedandempoweredindividualstocharttheirownpathstosuccess.Atthesametime,leadersandmanagerscreatedanenvironmentwhereindividualsfromdifferentdisciplinaryapproaches,perspectives,androlesknewhowtocollaborate,negotiate,andacceptdecisionsoncetheyweremade.NASAleadersalsoutilizedstandardsformanagingprogramcostandschedulethatrequiredregularprogramreviewswithcriticalprogrampersonnelandstakeholders.Servingasalevelofprogramgovernance,thereviewmeetingsrepresentedimportantgatecheckstoensurethattheprogramremainedalignedwithmissionobjectives.Smoothengineeringmanagement:NASArepresentativesunderstoodtheimportantconnectionbetweentheeffectivealignmentofprogrammanagementandtechnicalmanagement:“Goodsystemsengineeringstartswithgoodrequirementsandgoodmanagementpracticesthatwillresultinclear,stableprogramobjectives”(Bilardoetal.,2008,p.22).Asanexampleofsolidalignmentandcollaboration,thereportcitedtheJointStrikeFighterprogramwhichuseda“strategytotasktotechnologyapproachtoprioritizeneededtechnologies”(p.18).Onceprogramleadership,includingtheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,approvedoperationalcapabilities,theyempoweredtheirteamstocollaborateto“identifyandprioritizemissionenablingtechnologies”(p.

8018).Theleadershipdiscouragedpracticesthatsimplyrepresentedfollowingstandardpracticesorprocesses,insteademphasizingapproachesdesignedtoenhancevalueandimprovetheproduct.NASA'smosteffectiveprogramsestablishedanenvironmentwhereeveryoneontheteamheldeachotheraccountableforprogramperformance.Akeymechanismfordoingsoinvolvedanintegratedprogrambaseline,“consistingofrequirements,systemconcept,budgets,schedules,andrisks,thenrigorouslycontrollingthatbaselineastheprogrammovesforwardthroughitslifecycle”(p.19).3.3.3Creating“CollectiveConsciousness”Performing,producing,anddeliveringwhatorganizationsneedinacompetitivemarkettosatisfycustomersiswhatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersdo.Theabilityofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerstosucceedrequirescombiningtheirefforts.Whentheydo,theycanachievesignificantresultstogetherasavionicsmanufacturerRockwellCollinsdemonstrates.RockwellCollinsoftenutilizesauniqueteamworkshopapproachattheoutsetofitsplanningprocessthathasdeliveredsubstantialsavingsacrossthelifeofaprogram.InJune2011,RockwellCollinssignedacontractwithBoeingtoprovidearangeofadvancedavionicsandmissionequipmentforKC46aerialrefuelingtankersbeingbuiltfortheU.S.AirForce.Akeypartoftheprogramwasthedevelopmentofastateoftheartremotevisionsystemthatusestechnologytoguiderefuelingcapabilitiesduringmidairoperations.Previously,refuelingoperationswereconductedbyaboomoperatorlyinginthebackoftheaircraftandflyingtheairrefuelingboombywatchingitthroughasmallwindow.ThesystemdevelopedbytheRockwellCollinsteamwouldallowtheoperatortoguidetheboomusingacomputerscreenthatoffersaviewoftheboomandtheotheraircraft.RockwellCollinsalsoprovidedtheflightdeck,aircraftnetworks,surveillanceandairtrafficmanagementequipment,andcommunicationsandnavigationgear.Toensuretheprogramwentsmoothly,theprogramteamreliedonRockwellCollins'sleanengineeringacceleratedplanning(LEAP)team,aninternalgroupdedicatedtohelpingprogramteamsapplyleanprinciplestoprogramplanning.DeborahSecor,LEAP'sprincipalprojectmanager,stated,“LEAPhelpsprojectandprogrammanagersfocusonthedependenciesbetweentasks.Byhelpingteammembersunderstandhowtheiractionsimpacttheprecedingandfollowingtasks,theyareabletomakemoreefficientchoices”(Gale,2013).TheLEAPteammoderatedakickoffmeetingwithallkeystakeholdersacrossthelifecycleoftheprogram,includingengineers,programmanagers,andfactoryteams.Becausesomeofthebiggestchallengesoccurredduringthetransitiontomanufacturing,everyoneinvolvedintheprogramneededtobeengagedasearlyaspossible,andbeforecriticaldecisionswerelockeddown.Theintegratedteamcreateda13foot(4meter)valuestreammapthatlaidouteverytaskanddecisionleadinguptothetransition,alongwithdeadlinesandexitcriteria.Thisstephelpedensurethatnothingwasmissed,andthatdecisionsimportantforoperationsandtestingwereevident.Forexample,inthemeeting,teammembersidentifiedtheneedtomandate

81standardizedscrewssothemanufacturinglinewouldn'thavetochangeouttools.Oncetheymappedoutthesteps,theteamsetdeadlinesforeachtaskanddecision.AccordingtoBrettStephenson,principalprogrammanageratRockwellCollins,“Thesecretsauceisknowingwhendecisionsneedtobemadeinorderforengineerstoincorporatethemintotheirdesigns”(Gale,2013).Forexample,ifdesignengineering,testengineering,andoperationsplansarenotconcurrentlyexecuted,minorupdates,suchasaddingatestpointorchangingtoapreferredpart,coulddrivereworkorrequalification.Theseformsofwastecanbeavoidedthroughsimulation,3Dmodeling,andbyincludingcriticalstakeholdersindesignreviews(Gale,2013).Intheend,thevaluestreammappingexercisetookonlysixhours,butitresultedinmeasurablesavingsacrosstheprogram.Stephensonnoted,“Inthebeginningpeopleworried,‘Howcanweaffordtoputalltheseresourcesintoleanplanning?’ButIwasabletoshowthatitdoesn'ttakealotofresourcestogetresults”(Lucae,2014).TheLEAPworkshopscaptureanumberofimportantelementsforadetailedprogramplanthatwillevolveoveritslifecycle:Actionitems,duedates,milestones,neededresources,andresponsibilitiesARACI(ResponsibleAccountableConsultedInformed)matrixthatdocumentscommunicationneedsbetweendifferentfunctionsandprogramcontributorsRisksandopportunitiesTraceableandvettedassumptionsAndaftertheinitialworkshop,someteamsusetheworkshopsforiterativeplanningbetweenphases(Lucae,2014).Forexample,afteracriticalmilestoneisachieved,theteamwouldagainusetheworkshoptoplanthenextperiodingreaterdepth.Frequentstandupandcadencemeetingsareusedtocheckifeveryonestandsbyhisorhercommitmentandtokeeptrackofpotentialrisks,assumptions,andotheridentifiedissues.Afteraplanningworkshop,otherworkshopformatsmaybeusedforadjacenttopics(e.g.,riskmanagementplanning,businessprocesstraining,tooltraining).RockwellCollinshasestablishedintegratedsystems,supportedbyorganizationalcomponentssuchasculture,todrivestrongprogramteamperformance.Thispervasiveintegrationcreatesthe“collectiveconsciousness”thathelpsteamsworktogethertodeliverstrongerresultstocustomers.Someofthepointsabovearefundamentalunderpinningsofanyprogramorproject.Butafewareworthnotingthatgobeyondjustgoodprogrammanagement.Infact,insomecases,goodprogrammanagementtechniquesinisolationmayactuallyleadtocontentionratherthansuccess.Butwhatappearsstrikingisthedegreetowhichtheteamsunderstood,orrealizedthroughlessonslearned,theneedtobringtogethertheirindividualcapabilitiesandperspectivesinawaythatforgedanintegrativeteamratherthanstarcontributorspursuingtheirownagenda.Theunifiedvisionassistsinfocusingtheteammembersonthepurpose,butitisthedownstreamprocesseswhereeachteammemberunderstandstheneedtointegratehisor

82herapproachwithothersontheteaminpursuitofthatcommonvision.3.4SummaryProgramsuccessismorethanjustmeetingcostandschedulebudgets.Itisalsoaboutthebenefitsdelivered,whichmaytakeyearstofullyrealize,asinthecaseoftheBigDig.Likeallgoodbusinessmanagement,itisaboutthebenefitsgained—bothtangibleandintangible.ButthatdoesnotmeanthatallsuccessfulprogramsmusthaveapositiveROIfromastrictlyfinancialperspective.Thebenefitsmusthavebeendeemedtohavebeenworththeinvestment(timeandcost)toachievethem.Programpaybackcantakeyearsandevendecades,andbedifficulttoquantify—theBigDigbeingacaseinpoint.However,successfulprogramsfocusonmaximizingthebenefitswhilemanagingcostandschedule,anddosothroughthecollaborativeandintegrativecontributionsofteammembers.Thereareanumberofrecurrentthemesobservedinsuccessfulprograms.Theseinclude,butarenotlimitedto:Teaming:Thegoodofthewhole(theoutcome)isvaluedmorethantheindividualdisciplinesseparately,asdemonstratedonthePrairieWatersprogram.Communications:Maintainingclearvisibilityintoallaspectsoftheprogramasitprogressessothatallstakeholders(bothinternalandexternal)arepresentedwithasinglepointofviewofthedetailsthroughouttheprogramlifecycleandunderstandhowanycontributiontheymakefitswithinthewhole,asseenintheBigDigprogram.Collaboration:Thecontributionofalldisciplinesisvaluedandinformationissharedopenly.ThiswasexemplifiedintheNASAcasewheretheydrovetobuildacommonvisionwithsupportingmanagementandempoweredteams.Alignment:Theintendedoutcomeoftheprogramasawholeavoidsthetendencytooptimizecomponentsattheexpenseoftheintegratedwhole.Thegoodoftheprogram'sresultistheintentandnotoptimizationofindividualcomponentsthatcanjeopardizetheoverallresults.Thesecharacteristicsofsuccessfulengineeringprogramscanbeachievedthroughintegration,specificallythedisciplinesofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.Whatonewillnoticeinthefollowingchaptersisthatsuccessfulintegrationreallyboilsdowntotheintentionalactionsofteammemberstoachieveanewwayofworkingtogether.Todoso,boththechiefsystemsengineerandtheprogrammanagermustunderstandtheparticularlensthroughwhichtheyviewthechallenge.Chapter4providesinsightintothemindset(lens)thateachdisciplinebringstothetask.Chapter5thenlooksatdefiningwhatintegrationlookslikewhenthesetwodisciplinesbetterunderstandtheirownlensaswellasthelensofothers.Asyouread,askyourself,“Howaremyactionscontributingtoorinhibitingtherealizationofgoodintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinmyorganizationorsphereofinfluence?”

833.5DiscussionQuestions1.Whatcomestomindwhenyouthinkofasuccessfulprogram?Whataspectsoftheprogramdoyouassociatewithsuccess?Whattradeoffsdoyouimaginewereinvolved?2.Nowthinkofanunsuccessfulprogram.Whatwasmissing?3.Whichpointsfromthischapterhaverelevancetointegrationandcollaborationbetweenchiefsystemsengineersandprogrammanagers?Howarethepointsdirectlyrelevanttothetworoles?4.Whatquestionsrelatedtotheexamplesinthischapterwouldprovidegreaterinsightintointegrationandcollaboration?Onprogramsinwhichyouareinvolved,aretheanswerstosuchquestionspubliclyaccessibleforreviewandevaluation?Whyorwhynot?3.6ReferencesBilardo,Jr.,V.J.,Korte,J.J.,Branscome,D.R.,Langan,K.,Dankhoff,W.,Fragola,J.R.,etal.(2008).Sevenkeyprinciplesofprogramandprojectsuccess:Abestpracticessurvey.Retrievedfromhttp://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20080021182.pdfFlint,A.(2015,December29).10yearslater,didtheBigDigdeliver?BostonGlobe.Retrievedfromwww.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/12/29/yearslaterdidbigdigdeliver/tSb8PIMS4QJUETsMpA7SpI/story.htmlGale,S.F.(2013).Leanintosavings.PMNetwork,27(6),29–35.Kable.(n.d.).PrairieWatersProject,Aurora,Colorado,UnitedStatesofAmerica.Retrievedfromwww.watertechnology.net/projects/prairiewatersprojectauroracoloradous/Lucae,S.(2014).Improvingthefuzzyfrontendoflargeengineeringprograms:Interviewswithsubjectmatterexpertsandcasestudiesonfrontendpractices.Diplomathesis,Nr.1392.Retrievedfromhttp://cepe.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/SL_Improvingthefuzzyfrontendofengineeringprograms_print.pdfOehmen,J.(Ed.).(2012).Theguidetoleanenablersformanagingengineeringprograms,version1.0.Cambridge,MA:JointMITPMIINCOSECommunityofPracticeonLeaninProgramManagement,http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70495ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(n.d.).SubmitteddocumentationforPMIProjectoftheYearapplication.CopyinpossessionofProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.UrbanDictionary(n.d.).Definitionofskunkworks.Retrievedfromwww.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=The+SkunkworksWilson,J.(1999,December).Skunkworksmagic.PopularMechanics.Retrievedfromhttp://me372.groups.et.byu.net/recreation/documents/skunkworks.pdf

84AdditionalResourcesGooch,J.(2005).Thedynamicsandchallengesofinterdisciplinarycollaboration:Acasestudyof“corticaldepthofbench”ingroupproposalwriting.IEEETransactionsonProfessionalCommunication,48(2).Retrievedfromwww.utd.edu/jcg053000/Gooch_IEEE_June2006.pdfNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA).(2007).Systemsengineeringhandbook.Washington,D.C.:Author.Stockman,B.,Boyle,J.,&Bacon,J.(2010).InternationalSpaceStationsystemsengineeringcasestudy.AirForceCenterforSystemsEngineering.Retrievedfromwww.nasa.gov/externalflash/isslessonslearned/docs/design_ISS_SE_Case_Study.pdf

854THECASEFORINTEGRATINGPROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDTECHNICALMANAGEMENT4.1TheRootsofNonintegrationThesystemsengineering,projectmanagement,andprogrammanagementdisciplinesevolvedfromsimilarrootsduringWorldWarII(Levitt,2011;CookeDavies,2012).Technologiesforaircraft,submarines,navyships,andweaponssystemswereevolvingatanincreasinglyrapidpaceastheAlliedandAxispowersstruggledtogaindominanceonthebattlefield.Missionmanagementfocusedonbringing“orderanddisciplinetolargeteamsofspecialists”facingtimepressureddeliveryofsolutions(Levitt,2011).Technicalmanagementneededtooverseedevelopmentofsystemswithcomplexinterfacesacrossmanytechnologies.Thosesystemswerethenexpectedtoperformconsistentlyduringhumaninteractions.Becausethewarhadtobewon,costwasnotthedrivingconsiderationatthetime.Missionmanagersandtechnicalmanagersoftenstruggledoverwhoseconsiderationswereprimary,buturgencyrequiredtheleadersinbothdisciplinestonegotiateamiddlegroundorcedethelargergoal.Therewerecracksintheinterdisciplinaryrelationship,butthecracksweregenerallycontained.TherebuildingofEuropeandAsia,theColdWar,andtheSpaceRacethatfollowedcontributedtoa“winatallcosts”mentalityforengineeringprogrammanagement.Sospeedandinnovationremainedcriticalfactorswhilecostwaslessimportant.Acrisispointcameinthe1970swhentheaccumulatedcostsofwarandspaceexploration,resistancetoincreasedtaxation,andtheenergycrisesalongwithrisinginflationexertedpressureonworldgovernmentstoimproveutilizationofmonetaryresources.Costquicklyreplacedspeedasaprimaryconsiderationinengineeringprograminvestments,andunstableorpoorlydefinedrequirementsbecameakeycontributortoincreasedcostandbudgetoverruns.Effortstocontrolrequirementsandreducecostspawnedmoreintensivemanagementandoversight.Lawsandregulationsmandatingpracticesandapproachessurfaced.Inthedefensesector,governmentandindustryoftenbecameadversariesratherthancollaboratorsaseachattemptedtoshiftfinancialrisktotheother(Oppenheim,2015).Withinindustry,tighteningprofitmarginsledtomoreinternalcontrolstoavoidfurtherprofiterosion.Asmanagementandcontroleffortswithinindustryandgovernmentbecamemoreformalized,thefocusshiftedawayfromaccomplishingthemission.Missionnowhadtobeachievedwithintheconstraintsofcost,schedule,andexpectedperformance.Thisnewparadigmexpandedthecrackthatexistedbetweenmissionmanagementandtechnicalmanagementthatcontinuestoday.Thefocusoncontrollingcost,schedule,andperformancealsospawnedprofessionalsocietieswhosemissionstargetedadvancingpracticesthatcouldhelpproducebetterresultswithinthedomainsofspecificdisciplines.In1965,theInternationalManagementSystemsAssociation,whichlaterbecametheInternationalProjectManagementAssociation(IPMA),formedin

86SwitzerlandtoadvanceapplicationoftheCriticalPathMethod(CPM).AccordingtoIPMA,“CPMshowedawaytomanagelargeprojectswithinternationalsponsors,uncertainresultsaswellaswithcomplexinfluencesanddependenciesfromdifferenttechnicaldisciplines”(IPMA,n.d.).TheProjectManagementInstitute(PMI®)followedin1969withamissionto:fosterrecognitionoftheneedforprofessionalisminprojectmanagement;provideaforumforthefreeexchangeofprojectmanagementproblems,solutionsandapplications;coordinateindustrialandacademicresearchefforts;developcommonterminologyandtechniquestoimprovecommunications;provideinterfacebetweenusersandsuppliersofhardwareandsoftwaresystems;andtoprovideguidelinesforinstructionandcareerdevelopmentinthefieldofprojectmanagement(Toth,1996,p.473).Theworldofsystemsengineeringevolvedabitdifferently.Becausesystemsengineeringisbyitsverynaturemultidisciplinary,manylongstandingengineeringassociationshadelementsofsystemsengineeringpracticeandapplicationundertheirumbrellas.Associationsrepresentingmechanical,electrical,civil,andotherengineeringbranchesdevelopedresourcesandinformationaboutsystemsengineeringfortheirmembers.TheAmericanSocietyforEngineeringManagement(ASEM),foundedin1979,servedaninstrumentalroleinestablishingsystemsengineeringasadiscipline(Wikipedia,n.d.).ItwasthroughASEMthatthefoundersofwhatwouldbecometheNationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(NCOSE)gathered.In1990,theyformedNCOSEtoadvancesystemsengineeringasauniquediscipline.NCOSEchangeditsnametotheInternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE)in1995(Honour,1998).4.2ProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringAreDifferentProgramsareinitiatedtocreatesomethingnew;andtechnicalprogramsgenerallyinvolveahighdegreeofengineering.Itisnotuncommonfortheseprogramstoinvolvemultiplecontributors,haveahighdegreeofambiguityoruncertainty,andalargenumberofinterfaceswithintheprogramcomponentsandtheenvironmentsinwhichtheywillfunction—inotherwords,theseprogramsexhibitahighdegreeofcomplexity(PMI,2013).Definingthesolutionthenbecomesachickenandeggchallengeinthatthebestsolutionisnotknownatprograminitiationandthetechnicalrequirementscannotbefullyknown.Thus,thechallengeisoneinwhichthechiefsystemsengineerisattemptingtodescribeanddefinetheoptimalsolutionwhileatthesametimetheprogrammanagerisattemptingtodeterminethenecessaryworkcomponentsanddeveloptheprogramimplementationplan.Onemightbetemptedtojumptotheconclusionthatthebestsolutiontothedilemmapresentedbytheseinterrelatedandinterdependentneedsistohaveonepersonfillbothroles.However,thistendstooversimplifytheissueasoneindividualislimitedbyavailabletimeandexperientialknowledge—nottomentionthatthesolutiondoesnottendtoscalewell.Asnotedabove,thetwodisciplinesofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringbegantodevelopspecializedknowledgealongindependentpaths.Theamountofinformationgeneratedwould

87bedifficult,ifnotimpossible,foronepersontoacquireinalifetime.Whilehavingonepersonfillbothrolesmightbetherightanswerforsmallerorganizationsorprogramswithlowcomplexityorlimitedscope,itisnotsurprisingthatindustryfaceschallengesassociatedwiththeintegrationofthesetwoimportantdisciplinesincomplexprograms,whichfirstrequiresthateachdisciplineunderstandatleastthefundamentalsandvaluecontributionoftheother.Acursoryunderstandingofeachother'sdisciplinebeginswithanunderstandingofhoweachdisciplineevolvedwithdifferentmeasuresforsuccess.Bringingthetwodisciplinestogetherwithacommonsuccessmeasurerequirestheintegrationoffunctionswithinprograms.Thestartingpointforimprovedintegration,then,isafoundationalunderstandingofeachdisciplineandthestandardsthatinformthepracticeofthediscipline.Aswillbeseen,tensionbetweenthetwodisciplineshasitsrootsinthespecializedpracticesandstandardsthatarehighlyrolespecificandoftenhavedifferentmeasuresofsuccess.Thisdoesnotmeanthatintegrationisnotpossible—difficultperhaps,butverymuchdoable.Thefollowingsectionsbrieflyreviewthedefinitionandstandardsassociatedwithprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpublishedbythevariousprofessionalbodiesthatsupporteachdiscipline.4.3ProgramManagementThetermprogrammanagementdoesnotyetcarryuniversalmeaning.Oftentheterm'smeaningisdefinedbythebackgroundandjobresponsibilitiesofthepractitioner.Unlessformallyattachedtoacommon,agreedupondefinitionorarticulatedincontext,theintendedmeaningcanbe,andoftenis,misunderstood.Areliablesourceofpractices,tools,andtechniquesforprogrammanagementisthepublishedstandardsthatreflectthebroadbodyofknowledgeinprogrammanagement.PMIpublishesonesuchstandard,TheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013).AccordingtoPMI,thestandard:providesinformationonprogrammanagementthatisgenerallyrecognizedasgoodpracticeformostprograms,mostofthetime.“Generallyrecognized”meansthattheknowledgeandpracticesdescribedareapplicabletomostprogramsmostofthetime,andthereisgeneralconsensusabouttheirvalueandusefulness.“Goodpractice”meansthatthereisgeneralagreementthattheapplicationoftheseactivities,skills,tools,andtechniquesmayenhancethechancesofsuccessoverawiderangeofprograms(p.2).4.3.1ProgramManagementasDefinedbyPMIPMI'sdefinitionsfor“program”and“project”detailedinthischapterserveasthereferencepointforhowthoseterms,theirmanagement,andtheassociatedrolesshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextofthisbook.ThePMILexiconofProjectManagementTerms(PMI,2015)definesaprogramas,“Agroupofrelatedprojects,subprograms,andprogramactivitiesthataremanagedinacoordinatedwaytoobtainbenefitsnotavailablefrommanagingthemindividually”(p.8).Agroupofunrelatedprojectscentrallymanagedissimplyaportfolioofprojects.Aprogram,however,initiatesanumberofrelatedprojectsandotherrelated

88operationalactivities,andcollectivelymanagesthemascomponentsofalargerinitiativetoachieveadefinedbenefitorsetofbenefits.Hereinliesthevaluecontributionofprogrammanagement.TheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013)definesprogrammanagementas“theapplicationofknowledge,skills,tools,andtechniquestoaprogramtomeettheprogramrequirementsandtoobtainbenefitsandcontrolnotavailablebymanagingprojectsindividually.”Thefocusoftheprogramisondeliveringbenefitsforthesponsoringorganizationorthebeneficiariesoftheprogram'soutcome.Thisdoesnotmeanthattherequiredcomponentsoftheprogramareclearlydefinedandunderstoodattheoutset.Oftenthemeanstoachievingtheoutcomearenotwellknownorevenclearlydefinableattheoutset.Unlikeaprojectwherethefocusisonproducingaspecificoutputbasedonadefinedscope,aprogrambeginswithadesiredbenefitorsetofbenefits.Theexactmeansbywhichtheoutcomeistobeachievedisoftenambiguousattheoutsetoftheprogramandisthusoftentermedthe“fuzzyfrontend.”Theinitiationofaprogramoriginatesfromasetofobjectivesorgoalsdelineatedduringthedevelopmentofanorganization'sstrategicplan.Thisthenleadstothecommissioningofaprogramaspartofaportfolioofinvestments.Itisuptotheprogramteamtodeterminethebestwaytoachievethebenefits.TheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013)capturesthisidea:Programsareameansofexecutingcorporatestrategiesandachievingbusinessororganizationalgoalsandobjectives.Programbenefitsmayberealizedincrementallythroughoutthedurationoftheprogram,ormayberealizedallatonceattheendoftheprogram(p.5).Astheprogramprogresses,themeansbywhichtheprogramwillachievethebenefits(i.e.,thecontributionsrequiredbyspecificprojectsandoperationalactivities)beginstotakeshape.However,astheprogramprogresses,thereareanumberofdecisionsthatmustbemade.Thereisanaspectthatremains“messy,”andthisuncertainspacecangenerateunproductivetension—tensionthatproducesconflictandworksatcrosspurposewithprogramsuccess—amongprogramteammembers.Whatremainsconsistentthroughouttheprogramlifecycleisthetargetobjectiveoftheprogram—thebenefitstobedelivered.Programmanagementconsistsofphasesofactivitiesthroughwhichtheworkprogresses.Thethreephasesoftheprogrammanagementlifecycleareprogramdefinition,programbenefitsdelivery,andprogramclosure.Projectsandotherworkinitiatedaspartoftheprogramoccurduringtheprogrambenefitsdeliveryphase.Theprogrammanagerdoesnottypicallymanageanyoftheprojectsdirectly,butisoftenthesponsoroftheprojectsandmonitorstheactivityandprogressoftheprojectswithaviewtomeetingtheprogramobjectiveswithinscheduleandcost.Theprojectmanager,ontheotherhand,isresponsibleforsuccessfulcompletionoftheprojectanditsdeliverables.Achiefsystemsengineermayalsomonitorprojectactivity,butwithadifferentfocusandobjective.Ratherthanmanagingforbenefitsdelivery,thesystemsengineerisoftenconcernedwithoptimizingthecomponents,forinstanceinaproductdevelopmentprogram,todeliveranoutcomethatmaximizesuserexperienceandoptimizesthefinalproductdelivered.Iftheserolesarenotworkingtogetherclosely,theresultisoftencontentionandconflict.Table41reflectstheintegratednatureofthedisciplineswithina

89programenvironment.Table41Integrationofprogrammanagement,projectmanagement,andsystemsengineeringdisciplinesAdaptedfromOehmen&Norman,2012.Applyingleanprinciplestoprogrammanagement:ResultsfromajointstudybyPMI,InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineeringandMIT'sLeanAdvancementInitiative.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2012.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.IntegratedProgramViewDomainRepresentationExample:NewAircraftDevelopmentofthe“StakeholderProblem”ProgramBenefitGlobalmarketleadershipinhubtohubconnectionsManagementProjectDeliverableDeliverenginefor$16milliononMay10ManagementSystemsFunctionalitiesOptimizationoftheentiresystemsuchthatoptimizationoftheEngineeringincludingindividualcomponentsdoesnotleadtosuboptimizationoftherequirementswhole.Theprocessproducestherequirement:Thenewenginemusthaveover300kNtakeoffthrust,weighlessthan6tons,mustbedesignedformanufactureonexistingassemblylines,costnomorethan$15milliontoproduce,andbeFAAcertifiedbyMay94.3.2DistinctionsbetweenProjectsandProgramsGiventhecommonalityoftermsandtheconnectionbetweenprogramperformancedomainsandprojectprocesses,itisnotsurprisingthattheterms“program”and“project”areoftenusedinwaysnotconsistentwiththedefinitioninthestandards.However,thereareimportantdifferences,ashighlightedinTable42.Programsconsistofoneormoreprojectsinitiatedtosupplyspecificoutputsnecessaryforrealizingthecollectivebenefitsoftheprogram.Projectsdifferfromprogramsinthattheytendtohaveatightlydefinedscopeofwork,alongwithafixedbudgetandtimeframewithinwhichtheoutputistobedelivered.ThePMI(2015)LexiconofProjectManagementTermsdefinesprojectsas,“Atemporaryendeavorundertakentocreateauniqueproduct,service,orresult”(p.8).

90Table42ComparisonofprogramandprojectactivitiesTheStandardforProgramManagement,3rded.(p.8),ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013;AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide),5thed.(p.8),ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.ProjectsProgramsDefinitionAprojectisatemporaryAprogramisagroupofrelatedprojectsandendeavorundertakentoprogramactivitiesthataremanagedinacreateauniqueproduct,coordinatedwaytoobtainbenefitsnotavailableservice,orresult.frommanagingthemindividually.ScopeProjectshavedefinedProgramshaveascopethatencompassestheobjectives.Scopeisscopesofitsprogramcomponents.Programsprogressivelyelaboratedproducebenefitstoanorganizationbyensuringthroughouttheprojectlifethattheoutputsandoutcomesofprogramcycle.componentsaredeliveredinacoordinatedandcomplementarymanner.ChangeProjectmanagersexpectProgramsaremanagedinamannerthatacceptschangeandimplementandadaptstochangeasnecessarytooptimizetheprocessestokeepchangedeliveryofbenefitsastheprogram'scomponentsmanagedandcontrolled.deliveroutcomesand/oroutputs.PlanningProjectmanagersProgramsaremanagedusinghighlevelplansthatprogressivelyelaboratetracktheinterdependenciesandprogressofhighlevelinformationprogramcomponents.Programplansarealsousedintodetailedplanstoguideplanningatthecomponentlevel.throughouttheprojectlifecycle.ManagementProjectmanagersmanageProgramsaremanagedbyprogrammanagerswhotheprojectteamtomeettheensurethatprogrambenefitsaredeliveredasprojectobjectives.expected,bycoordinatingtheactivitiesofaprogram'scomponents.MonitoringProjectmanagersmonitorProgrammanagersmonitortheprogressofandcontroltheworkofprogramcomponentstoensuretheoverallgoals,producingtheproducts,schedules,budget,andbenefitsoftheprogramwillservices,orresultsthatthebemet.projectwasundertakentoproduce.SuccessSuccessismeasuredbyAprogram'ssuccessismeasuredbytheprogram'sproductandprojectabilitytodeliveritsintendedbenefitstoanquality,timeliness,budgetorganization,andbytheprogram'sefficiencyandcompliance,anddegreeofeffectivenessindeliveringthosebenefits.customersatisfaction.

91Again,thereiscommonalitybetweentheprogramphasesandtheprojectprocessgroups,asshowninTable43.Thecommonalityofconcepts,however,doesnotmeanthattheworkisthesame.Butitdoesdemonstratewhyprogramsattimesarereferredtoasprojects.Thiswillbeseeninseveralofthecasestudiesthroughoutthebook.Projectshaveadefinitivebeginningandend,butthisdoesnotmeanthatthedurationisnecessarilyshort.Aprojectmaywellextendovermonthsandyears.Theworkisoftenbrokendownintosmallerchunks,someofwhichmayruninparallel.Aprogram,ontheotherhand,hasdeliveryofbenefitsasitsprimaryobjective,andwhileaprogrammaydeliveraproduct,thefocusisontherealizationofthebenefitstheproductisintendedtoproduce.Producingthedesiredbenefitsrequiresthecoordinationofmultipleprojectstodeliverthewhole.Table43ComparisonofprogramprocessphasesandprojectprocessgroupsTheStandardforProgramManagement,3rded.(p.19),ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013;AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide),5thed.(p.50),ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.ProgramProcessPhasesProjectProcessGroupsProgramDefinitionInitiatingPlanningProgramBenefitsDeliveryExecutingMonitoringandControllingProgramClosureClosingIntheearlystagesofmanagingaprogram,thedesiredoutcomeisfurtherelaboratedaspartoftheprogramscopestatement.Thescopestatementmayincludeanumberofhighlevelrequirements,buttheserequirementsevolvethroughfurtherelaborationastheprogramprogressesinanefforttouncoverthebestsolutionwithintheconstraintsoftimeandbudget.SopkoandDemaria(2013)portraytheprogrammanagementprocessanditsinitiationofrelatedprojectsasa“Vee”diagramelaboratedfromManagingSuccessfulProgrammes(AXELOS,2011),asshowninFigure41.Specificprojectsandotherworkactivitiesareinitiatedtobuildoutcomponentsofthesolution.Thebreakoutofworkintocomponentprojectsisintendedtoenableparallelworkstreamswithdedicatedexpertiseappliedtoeachundertaking.However,theresultcanbeanincreaseincomplexityandcanleadtoconflictingobjectives.Theroleoftheprogrammanageristoensurethateachprojectisoptimizedforthedeliveryofitscontributiontotheprogramobjectives,andthisisoftenanotherpotentialpointofunproductivetensionwiththesystemsengineerwhoisfollowingasimilar,butdifferentVeeprocess(seeFigure43).

92Figure41:TheprogrammanagementprocessflowSopko&Demaria,2013.SiemensCorporation,2013.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofSiemensCorporation.Tosummarize,programsbeginwithaconceptualstrategicobjectiveoroutcometoachieveenvisionedbenefits.Thebestwaytoobtaintheoutcomeisoftenunknownattheoutset.Theprogrammanagerbeginstoidentifyspecificoutputsneededtoachievetheintendedbenefitsandauthorizesprojectstoproduceoutputsthatinturncontributetotherealizationoftheintendedbenefits.Theseprojectsandotherworkmoveforwardundertheoversightoftheprogrammanagerwhoisfocusedonmanagingthecomponentscollectivelytogainmaximumbenefitandtoresolveconflictsorcontentionbetweencomponentprojects,andtodosowithinthespecifiedbudget.Theprogrammanageris,therefore,focusedprimarilyonbusinessprocessesandoutcomes.4.3.3ProgramManagementasDefinedWorldwideAsaprofessiondevelops,practitionersoftencometogethertosolidifythepracticeofthedisciplineinstandardsofpracticeandthendevelopcertificationsthatrecognizemasteryofthepractice.PMImembersdevelopedTheStandardforProgramManagement,nowinitsthirdedition(PMI,2013),asaconsensusbasedstandarddetailingthecommonpracticeoftheprofessionandbuildingoninternationallypublishedpracticeandresearch.Eachrevisionofthestandardisexposedgloballyforpractitionercommentandballotedasreflectiveofgoodpracticeswithinthediscipline.In2007,PMIreleasedtheProgramManagementProfessional(PgMP®)credentialtocertifymasteryoftheknowledgeandpracticeexperiencerelatedtomanagingprograms.Thecertificationcontentisbuiltuponthefindingsofaglobalroledelineationstudyofexistingpractitionersandissupportedbyanevaluationexamcontaining

93questionsthatalignwithrespectedpublicationsinthemarket.WhilePMIdoesnotpublishaspecificrolebasedcompetencyprofile,thecorecompetenciesnecessaryforgoodprogrammanagementarecontainedwithintheexamcontentoutlineassummarizedintheSidebar:ProgramManagerCompetencies.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,tofindthatcertifiedprogrammanagersaligntheirapproacheswiththestandardsandliterature.Whileitisquitepossibleanddesirabletointegratewithsystemsengineeringprocesses,itishelpfultounderstandthislensthroughwhichtheprogrammanagerseestheprogram.ProgramManagerCompetenciesPMI'sprogrammanagementcredentialisbasedonaRoleDelineationStudythatutilizesstandardizedbestpracticesforassessingpractitionercompetenceandfordeterminingthelevelofsalience,criticality,andfrequencyofeachoftheknowledge,tasks,andskillsrequiredtoperformintheroleofaprogrammanager(PMI,2011).Therearefivedomainsofpracticeinwhichaprogrammanagershoulddemonstratecompetence.Domain#1:StrategicProgramManagement.Identifyingopportunitiesandbenefitsthatachieveorganizationalstrategicobjectivesthroughprogramimplementation.Domain#2:ProgramLifeCycle.Performingactivitiesrelatedto:1.Initiating.Definingprogramandconstituentprojects,andobtainingagreementfromstakeholders.2.Planning.Definingscopeanddevelopingtheprogram,includingallconstituentprojectsandallactivitiesthatoccurwithintheprogram.3.Executing.Performingworknecessarytodeliverprogramobjectivesandbenefits.4.Controlling.Maintainingprogress,updatingtheprogramplan,andmanagingchangeandrisk.5.Closing.Finalizingallprogramactivities,includingconstituentprojects,executingtheprogramtransitionplan,archiving,obtainingapprovals,andreporting.Domain#3:BenefitsManagement.Defining,creating,maximizing,andsustainingbenefitsfromtheprogram.Domain#4:StakeholderEngagement.Capturingstakeholderneedsandexpectations,gainingandmaintainingstakeholdersupport,andmitigating/channelingopposition.Domain#5:Governance.Establishingprocessesandproceduresformaintainingproactivemanagementoversightanddecisionmakingsupportfortheapplicablepracticesandpoliciesacrosstheprogramlifecycle.InadditiontoTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013),thereareother

94complementarystandardsandpracticeguidanceforprogramandprojectmanagementinthemarket.Forexample,theProjectManagementAssociationofJapanpublishesAGuidebookofProject&ProgramManagementforEnterpriseInnovation(PMAJ,2014),whichcomprisespractices,tools,andtechniquesrelatedtodifferentlevelsofprogramandprojectmanagement,andtoenterprisemanagement.IPMApublishestheIPMACompetenceBaseline(ICB)(IPMA,2013),whichprovidesacomprehensivelistofcompetenciesforprofessionalsworkinginprojects,programs,andportfoliomanagement.TheOfficeofGovernmentCommerce(OGC),anagencyofthegovernmentoftheUnitedKingdom,originatedManagingSuccessfulProgrammes(AXELOS,2011),whichcomprisesasetofpractices,principles,andprocessesformanagingprograms.Organizationsalsouseprogrammanagementmodelsandpracticesthattheyformfortheirownuniquecommunityofpractice.Thisisparticularlytrueinthemilitaryandaerospacemarkets.Whiletherearesubtledifferencesinhoweachgroupdefinestheprogrammanagementprocesses,thereiscommon,underlyingagreement.Specifically,allofthegroupsseeprogrammanagementasaprocessforauthorizingandmanagingcomponentworkinpursuitofspecifiedbenefits.Still,therearesubtledifferencesanditisworthwhiletounderstandthemotivationofeachpublishingorganizationandtheuniqueapproachtheytakewithrespecttodetailsofwhatconstitutesgoodprogrammanagement.4.3.3.1InternationalOrganizationforStandardizationIn2007,theInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)beganworkonaseriesofinternationalstandardsforproject,program,andportfoliomanagementwiththeintentofidentifyingacommonunderstandinganddefinitionofeachdisciplinetowhichallmembercontributorsagree.Assuch,thestandardsfocusonbaselinedefinitionsandpractice,butdonotgointodetailontheunderlyingknowledgeandapplication.ISO21500:2012(ISO,2012)definesthedisciplineofprojectmanagementandisnowpublished.ISO21504:2015(ISO,2015)isalsopublishedandfocusesonportfoliomanagement.ISO21503willaddressprogrammanagement,butisstillincommitteewithananticipatedreleasein2017.4.3.3.2UKOfficeofGovernmentCommerceTheUKOfficeofGovernmentCommerce(OGC)initiatedthedevelopmentofManagingSuccessfulProgrammes(MSP)asaguideformanagingprogramsbasedonbestpractice.Assuch,itisnottechnicallyastandardinthatithasnotbeensubjectedtoreviewbyastandardsorganization.However,ithasbeenadoptedbyorganizationsandgovernment,particularlyintheUnitedKingdomandAustralia,asadefactostandardforthedevelopmentoforganizationalprocessesaroundprogrammanagement.MSPdefinesaprogramas“atemporary,flexibleorganizationcreatedtocoordinate,direct,andoverseetheimplementationofasetofrelatedprojectsandactivitiesinordertodeliveroutcomesandbenefitsrelatedtotheorganization'sstrategicobjectives”(AXELOS,2011,p.5).TheMSPframeworkis“primarilydesignedtocatertoleadingandmanagingtransformationalchange”(p.10).Theframeworkconsistsof:principles,governancethemes,andtransformationalflow.Theprogramisinitiatedbasedonanacceptedbusinesscaseforchangethatdefinesthevalue

95intendedrelatedtotheorganization'sstrategicplan.Thedetailsofhowthebenefitswillbedeliveredareoftenambiguousattheoutsetandpartoftheprogrammanagementprocessismovingfromambiguitytocertaintyoverthelifecycleoftheprogram.MSPdescribesatransformationalflowthatbeginswiththeprogrammandatefromthestrategicvisionandmovesthroughaprocesstoarriveattheprogramdefinition.Thedefinitionissubjecttochangeastheprograminitiatescomponentactivitiesandevaluatesbenefitcontributionfromtheoutputs.Thisisaniterativeprocessthatcontinuesthroughouttheprogramlifecycleuntiltheprogramiseitherterminatedorclosed.Thus,managingthetransformationalchangeasaprogramisvaluableinthatthefocusremainsonthewhole(theintendedbenefits)andnotonthecomponentsasisolatedendeavors.4.3.3.3AssociationforProjectManagementAPMdoesnotproducestandards.Rather,itdevelopsproductsandservicesbasedonOGCandISOstandards.APMisoneofthefederatedmembersofIPMAbasedintheUnitedKingdomandofferscertificationsforprojectmanagersalignedwiththeIPMAlevelsofcertification.APMalsopublishestheAPMBodyofKnowledge(APM,2012)coveringinformationrelatedtoproject,program,andportfoliomanagement.4.3.3.4ProjectManagementAssociationofJapanTheProjectManagementAssociationofJapan'sProjectandProgramManagementforInnovation(PMAJ,2014)placesheavyemphasisonmissionprofilingasthemostimportantprocess,andonethatshouldbeconductedasthefirststepofprogramformulation.Itconsistsofanalyzingthebusinessstrategies,clarifyingtheprogrammissiontocarryoutthestrategies,anddevelopingmultiplescenariosshowinghowtoreach“whattheprogramshouldbe”from“whatitis”now.Programdesigninvolvesdesigningtheprogramarchitectureorstructureofpluralprojectsbasedonseveralscenariosasaresultofthemissionprofiling.Eachoftheconstituentcomponentprojectsandtherelationshipsamongthemaredesignedsothattheprogrammissioncanbeachieved.Therootsofthisperspectiveonprogrammanagementgrowoutoftheadaptationofprogrammanagementtoitsculturalcontext.BackgroundonhowthestandardcameaboutisdiscussedintheSidebar:PMAJProgram&ProjectManagementanditexemplifiestheneedforadaptingtheprogrammanagementapproachtotheculturalcontextwithinwhichitisundertaken.PMAJProgram&ProjectManagementTheJapaneseMinistryofEconomy,Trade,andIndustry(METI)setupacommitteein1999tocreateanewmethodologythatcouldchangeJapaneseindustryafterhavingsufferedthrough10yearsofstagnation.Thecommitteepublishedin2001theProgram&ProjectManagementforEnterpriseInnovation,abbreviatedasP2Mandnowinitsthirdedition(PMAJ,2014).ItrepresentsacombinationofsystemsengineeringandprojectmanagementelementsfromtheWestandJapantailoredtoJapanesecircumstancesand

96culture.TheP2Mstandardfocusesmoreonemergentprograms(thosewithahighdegreeofuncertaintyandunknowns)thandootherstandards,asshowninFigure42.Figure42:TherelativefocusofP2McomparedwithotherstandardsAdaptedfromProgrammanagement,Thiry,M,©2015,GowerPublishingLimited.ReproducedbypermissionofTaylor&FrancisBooksUK.TheP2Mapproachdiffersinthatratherthandefineprogrammissions,goals,andobjectivesmainlythroughatopdownapproach,itisdoneusinga“middleoutapproach”thatismoreconsistentwithaJapanesestyleofconsensusbaseddecisionmaking.Inthisprocesstopmanagementprovidesavagueconceptinitsofficialandunofficialcommunications.Middlemanagerstrytoacquirethetruemeaningofthecommunicationsthroughaprocessthatdevelopsasharedvision.Theconceptchangesfromvaguetospecificmission,vision,andstrategythroughmissionprofilinginaniterativeprocess.Middlemanagersthenspecifyprogrammission,goals,andobjectives.4.3.4UnderstandingProgramManagersUnlikeengineerswhosedetailedtechnicaltrainingandcredentialingrequirementsforgeastrongsharedidentityregardlessofotherdifferences,programmanagersmaycomeintotheprofessionfromvariousbackgroundsandpaths.Manyengineerseventuallymoveintoprogrammanagement,someaspartofdeliberatecareerpathswithinanorganization.ThePhaseIstudyonintegrationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementfoundthat20%oftheprogrammanagerrespondentshadbeenchiefsystemsengineersinthepast,and49%ofchiefsystemsengineersreportedtheyhadbeenprogrammanagersinthepast(Conforto,Rossi,

97Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013).Otherprogrammanagersmayhavebeenprojectmanagers,businessmanagers,orleadsforotherfunctionalareas,suchasfinance.Thisdiversityofpathsintotheprogrammanagerroleispossiblebecausetheprogrammanagementskillsetcanbeaddedontopofexperienceinotherfieldsreasonablysuccessfully.Whilethereismovementtowardformaldegreeprogramsinprogrammanagement,todayitisstillmuchmorelikelythattheprogrammanagerwillhavedevelopedskillsbasedinpartfromonthejobexperience.Thefeedbackperiodbetweenmakingdecisionsandlearningpersonallyfromtheoutcomeisverylongonlargeprograms,arguablyfarlongerfortheprogrammanagerthanforengineers,whosedecisionscanoftenbeverifiedearlyinthedevelopmentcycle.Justasittakestrainingandyearsofexperiencetobecomeasolidprogrammanager,italsotakesexperienceasastakeholdertounderstandandappreciatetheroleofprogrammanagement.Itis,therefore,notsurprisingthatsomestakeholdersholdfarmorerealisticviewsthanothersregardingwhatprogrammanagementcanreasonablybeexpectedtoaccomplish.4.4SystemsEngineeringTheterm“systemsengineer,”liketheterm“programmanager”discussedabove,doesnotyetcarryuniversalmeaning.Aswithprogrammanagement,unlesstheterm“systemsengineering”isformallyattachedtoaprofessionalsocietydefinitionorarticulatedincontext,thetermcanbethesourceofgreatconfusion.ThisisparticularlytrueinIT,wheretheterm“systemsengineer”oftenreferstothecompletelydifferentspecialtyskillofnetworkadministration.Anotherproblemexistswhendefiningsystemsengineeringinthatmanyfieldshaveevolvedproblemsolvingapproaches,oftenverysimilarinfunctiontosystemsengineering,butcarryingunfamiliarnamesandterms.Anexperiencedsystemsengineerwillrecognizetheseparallelapproaches,butitislesscommonthatsomeonefromanunrelatedfieldwillrecognizesystemsengineeringastheuniversalmodel.Thecounterparttotheprogrammanagerissometimesdesignatedthechiefsystemsengineer.Similartotheprogrammanager,thechiefsystemsengineerhasultimatetechnicalauthorityandisaccountableforthetechnicalperformanceoftheproductorsystembeingdeveloped.Indefiningtheroleofsystemsengineer,INCOSE(n.d.)states:Thesystemsengineeristheprimaryinterfacebetweenmanagement,customers,suppliers,andspecialtyengineersinthesystemdevelopmentprocess.Whilemosthaveabackgroundinotherengineeringdisciplines,thecareerdescriptoralsohasalottodowiththeabilityandinteresttothinkwithasystemsperspective.Thismaycomefromthespecificandrecognizableengineeringfieldsbutalsofromascience/math,humansystems,business,oranyfieldthatdevelopscriticalandlogicalthinking.Tomakethingsmorecomplex,theroleofasystemsengineervariesbythetypeofprogramandthelifecyclestageofthatprogram.Whentheprogramrequiresaslightlydifferentsubsetofthe

98fullbodyofsystemsengineeringmethods,outsiderscanbeeasilymisledintothinkingthatsubsetrepresentsthewhole.Systemsengineeringisconcernedwiththeoverallprocessofdefining,developing,operating,maintaining,andultimatelyreplacingqualitysystems.Whereotherengineeringdisciplinesconcentrateonthespecificsofasystem…systemsthinkingallowsthesystemsengineertofocusontheintegrationofalloftheseaspectsasacoherentandeffectivesystem.Systemsengineersbringaparticularperspectivetotheengineeringprocess….thatservestoorganizeandcoordinateotherengineeringactivities(INCOSE,n.d.).ThissectionstartsbyexaminingthedefinitionsestablishedbyINCOSEandthenacknowledgesotherprofessionalbodiesworldwideandtheirunderstandingoftheterm.Acommonthreadinthesedefinitionsisthatsystemsengineeringappliestheprinciplesofsystemsthinkingtoengineeringproblems.Again,thereismuchvariabilityinhowsystemsthinkingisdefined,butattherootmostagreethatitistheprocessbywhichoneattemptstolookatthewholeratherthantheindividualpartstogainabetterunderstandingofhowthepartsinteractandareinterdependentwithinthelargersystem.4.4.1SystemsEngineeringasDefinedbyINCOSEAswiththedefinitionof“program,”theINCOSE(n.d.)definitionforsystemsengineeringdetailedinthischapterservesasthereferencepointforhowthatterm,itsmanagement,andtheassociatedroleshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextofthisbook.SystemsEngineeringisaninterdisciplinaryapproachandmeanstoenabletherealizationofsuccessfulsystems.Itfocusesondefiningcustomerneedsandrequiredfunctionalityearlyinthedevelopmentcycle,documentingrequirements,thenproceedingwithdesignsynthesisandsystemvalidationwhileconsideringthecompleteproblem….SystemsEngineeringintegratesallthedisciplinesandspecialtygroupsintoateameffortformingastructureddevelopmentprocessthatproceedsfromconcepttoproductiontooperation.SystemsEngineeringconsidersboththebusinessandthetechnicalneedsofallcustomerswiththegoalofprovidingaqualityproductthatmeetstheuserneeds.Fewsystemsstandalone.Sometimes,asystemanditsconstituentsubsystemscanbeimplementedbyasingleprogram.Inmanycases,however,asystemmustexistinanenvironmentwithothersystems,collectivelyreferredtoasasystemofsystems,whichareprobablyatdifferentpointsintheirlifecycle.INCOSE(2015)states:A“systemofsystems”(SoS)isanSOI[SystemofInterest]whoseelementsaremanageriallyand/oroperationallyindependentsystems.Theseinteroperatingand/orintegratedcollectionsofconstituentsystemsusuallyproduceresultsunachievablebytheindividualsystemsalone.BecauseanSoSisitselfasystem,thesystemsengineermaychoosewhethertoaddressitaseitherasystemorasanSoS,dependingonwhichperspectiveisbettersuitedtoaparticularproblem(p.8).Schwalb(2016)addstotheINCOSEdefinitionbypointingout:

99ASoSisdifferentfromasinglesystem.Itisactuallyasetofcomponentsthatwhenseparatedarestillregardedassystemsthemselves.ThismeansthateachoftheseindividualsystemsremainoperationalaftertheSoStheyareassociatedwithisdisassembled.Further,eachoftheseindividualsystemsisindependentlymanaged.ThismeansthattheycananddooperateasindividualentitiesandthiscontinuesregardlessoftheSoSofwhichtheyareacomponent.Anairportisagoodexampleofasystemofsystems.Therewillbemanytypesofaircraftsystemsoperatedbyseveralairlinesandotheroperators.Therewillbeanairtrafficcontroltowermanagedbyanairnavigationserviceprovider.Controllersandpilotswillcommunicateviaradiosystemsfromavarietyofmanufacturersandserviceproviders.Withintheterminaltherewillbemanysystemsfordealingwiththepassengersandtheirluggage.Therewillbegroundtransportationsystemssuchasparkinggarages,taxidispatchers,automobilerental,andsoon.Thissystemofsystemsmustbeintegratedandinteroperable,althoughitmightbeindividualentitiesmanagedbymultiplebusinessesandprivateindividuals.Whileitistheresponsibilityoftheprogrammanagertoensurethatincombinationallthesedifferentsystemsprovidethestreamofbenefitsstakeholdershavebeenpromised,itistheresponsibilityofthechiefsystemsengineertoensurethattheyarecapableofproducingthesebenefitsfromafunctionalandtechnicalstandpointwhileminimizingthepotentialforloss.Thisisaccomplishedthroughthefunctions,processes,andmethodsofsystemsengineering.EarlierinthischapteraVeemodelconceptforprogrammanagementwasintroduced.SystemsengineeringalsoadaptsaVeemodeltovisualizetheactivitiesofdefiningandvalidatingsystemsolutionsasdepictedinFigure43.INCOSE(2015)notesthattheVeemodelis:usefulindefiningthestart,stop,andprocessactivitiesappropriatetothelifecyclestages.TheVeemodelprovidesausefulillustrationoftheSEactivitiesduringthelifecyclestages.InthisversionoftheVeemodel,timeandsystemmaturityproceedfromlefttoright.ThecoreoftheVee(i.e.,thoseproductsthathavebeenplacedunderconfigurationcontrol)depictstheevolvingbaselinefromstakeholderrequirementsagreementtoidentificationofasystemconcepttodefinitionofelementsthatwillcomprisethefinalsystem.Withtimemovingtotheright,theevolvingbaselinedefinestheleftsideofthecoreoftheVee,asshownintheshadedportion…(pp.32–34).

100Figure43:Systemsengineering“Vee”diagramINCOSE,2015.JohnWiley&Sons,2015.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofJohnWiley&Sons.TheVeemodelisaframeworkbywhichthesystemsengineergoesaboutbreakingdownthewholeoftheproblemtobesolved,butdoessoinawaythatmaintainsconnectivityofthesubcomponentstothewholesolution.Theframeworkguidestheprocess,butdoesnotdefinethedetails,nordoesitmandateactions.Aswillbeseeninthefollowingdefinitionsofsystemsengineeringbyotherorganizations,allofthedefinitionscontainelementsofthisVeeapproachorthinkingasacentralconceptwithinthedefinitions,albeitwithoutnecessarilycallingitoutspecifically.Inordertoeffectivelyperformalltheprogramfunctionspreviouslydescribed,systemsengineersmustpossessabroadrangeofskillsandabilities.Theymustusesystemsthinkingandasystemsviewofthecomponentsofbenefitsdeliveryintheprogram.TheymusthavethecapabilitiestouseaspecificsetoftoolsandmethodsashighlightedintheSidebar:Z6SystemsEngineeringCompetencyFramework.Theserequiredskillsshapethesystemsengineer'sperspectiveonprogramresponsibilities,howtheworkisapproached,andhowchallengesaremanaged.Whilethesystemsengineer'sworkisintegraltothesuccessoftheprogramandintertwinedwiththatofprogrammanagers,thesystemsengineernecessarilyworksusingadifferentapproachwithitsownuniqueprocesses,methods,andtools.

101Z6SystemsEngineeringCompetencyFrameworkWhatdoesagoodsystemsengineerneedtoknowandbeabletodo?TheINCOSEUKchapterdevelopedaSystemsEngineeringCompetencyFrameworkthatdescribesthecompetenciesthatarerequiredtoconductgoodsystemsengineering,consistentwiththeInternationalStandardsOrganizationISO15288,EIA632,andINCOSESystemsEngineeringBodyofKnowledge&SystemsEngineeringHandbook.TheSystemsEngineeringCompetencyFrameworkwasadoptedbyINCOSEandreflectstheorganization'spositiononsystemsengineeringcompetencies.TheINCOSEUKacknowledgesthatawellroundedsystemsengineerwillneedothercompetencies,knowledge,skills,andabilitiestailoredtotheparticularroleorareainwhichthesystemsengineeroperate.Nevertheless,thesereflectaconsensuspositiononthecompetenciesasystemsengineershouldpossess(INCOSEUK,2010):SystemsThinkingSystemsconceptsSupersystemcapabilityissuesEnterpriseandtechnologyenvironmentHolisticLifeCycleViewDetermineandmanagestakeholderrequirementsSystemdesign:ArchitecturaldesignConceptgenerationDesignforFunctionalanalysisInterfacemanagementMaintainingdesignintegrityModellingandsimulationSelectpreferredsolutionSystemrobustnessIntegrationandverificationValidation

102TransitiontooperationsSystemsEngineeringManagementConcurrentengineeringEnterpriseintegrationIntegrationofspecialismsLifecycleprocessdefinitionPlanning,monitoring,andcontrolling(Z6SystemsEngineeringCompetenciesFrameworkCopyrightINCOSEUK,www.incoseonline.co.uk.)4.4.2SystemsEngineeringasDefinedbyOthersPerceptionsofsystemsvaryworldwide,soitcanbeexpectedthattherewouldbedifferentapproachestosystemsengineering.Theseculturaldifferencesareassociatedwithpeople,butalsoformthemindsetassociatedwithaprofessionorindustry.Withinalmosteveryengineeringdisciplinethereisatleastasubgroupfocusedonsystems.Systemsthinkingisanimpreciseandevolvingconceptasisthesomewhatrelatedemergenceoftheconceptofdesignthinking.Howtheterm“systems”isdefined,therefore,varieswidely.Theeffortsofthefollowingwellknownorganizationstostandardizethepracticeofsystemsengineering,theprocessesused,andtheartifactsproduceddemonstratethenuanceofperspectiveandvarianceofdefinitioninthemarket.4.4.2.1InternationalOrganizationforStandardizationInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)standardsdefinesystemsengineeringasan“interdisciplinaryapproachgoverningthetotaltechnicalandmanagerialeffortrequiredtotransformasetofcustomerneeds,expectations,andconstraintsintoasolution,andtosupportthatsolutionthroughoutitslife”(ISO,2010).ISO/IEC/IEEE15288:2015definestechnicalperformancemeasures;theintegrationofengineeringspecialtiestowardtheestablishmentofanarchitecture;andthedefinitionofsupportinglifecycleprocessesthatbalancecost,performance,andscheduleobjectives(ISO,2015).Kowalski(2015)pointsoutthat“This[ISO/IEC/IEEE15288:2015]isthestandarduponwhichINCOSEalignstheprocessandlifecyclecontentintheSE[SystemsEngineering]Handbook”(INCOSE,2015).4.4.2.2NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)OnecouldarguethattheU.S.NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)wasthefirsttoimplementsystemsengineeringwidely.TheNASASystemsEngineeringHandbook(2007)definessystemsengineeringas:

103amethodical,disciplinedapproachforthedesign,realization,technicalmanagement,operations,andretirementofasystem.A“system”isaconstructorcollectionofdifferentelementsthattogetherproduceresultsnotobtainablebytheelementsalone.Theelements,orparts,canincludepeople,hardware,software,facilities,policies,anddocuments;thatis,allthingsrequiredtoproducesystemlevelresults.Theresultsincludesystemlevelqualities,properties,characteristics,functions,behavior,andperformance.Thevalueaddedbythesystemasawhole,beyondthatcontributedindependentlybytheparts,isprimarilycreatedbytherelationshipamongtheparts;thatis,howtheyareinterconnected.Itisawayoflookingatthe“bigpicture”whenmakingtechnicaldecisions.Itisawayofachievingstakeholderfunctional,physical,andoperationalperformancerequirementsintheintendeduseenvironmentovertheplannedlifeofthesystems.Inotherwords,systemsengineeringisalogicalwayofthinking.Systemsengineeringistheartandscienceofdevelopinganoperablesystemcapableofmeetingrequirementswithinoftenopposedconstraints.Systemsengineeringisaholistic,integrativediscipline,whereinthecontributionsofstructuralengineers,electricalengineers,mechanismdesigners,powerengineers,humanfactorsengineers,andmanymoredisciplinesareevaluatedandbalanced,oneagainstanother,toproduceacoherentwholethatisnotdominatedbytheperspectiveofasinglediscipline.4.4.2.3UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseTheU.S.DepartmentofDefensewasanearlypioneerinthedevelopmentandapplicationofsystemsengineering.Notsurprisingly,theDefenseAcquisitionGuidebook(U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2016)definessystemsengineeringinverysimilarlanguagetoNASA.FortheDepartmentofDefense,systemsengineeringis:

104amethodicalanddisciplinedapproachforthespecification,design,development,realization,technicalmanagement,operations,andretirementofasystem.Asystemisanaggregationofsystemelementsandenablingsystemelementstoachieveagivenpurposeortoprovideaneededcapability.Theenablingsystemelementsprovidethemeansfordeliveringacapabilityintoservice,keepingitinservice,orendingitsservice,andmayincludethoseprocessesorproductsnecessaryfordeveloping,producing,testing,deploying,andsustainingthesystem.SE[systemsengineering]ensurestheeffectivedevelopmentanddeliveryofcapabilitythroughtheimplementationofabalancedapproachwithrespecttocost,schedule,performance,andriskusingintegrated,disciplined,andconsistentSEactivitiesandprocessesregardlessofwhenaprogramenterstheacquisitionlifecycle.SEalsoenablesthedevelopmentofengineeredresilientsystemsthataretrusted,assured,andeasilymodified(agile).SEplanning,asdocumentedintheSystemsEngineeringPlan(SEP),identifiesthemosteffectiveandefficientpathtodeliveracapability,fromidentifyinguserneedsandconceptsthroughdeliveryandsustainment.SEeventdriventechnicalreviewsandauditsassessprogrammaturityanddeterminethestatusofthetechnicalrisksassociatedwithcost,schedule,andperformancegoals.4.4.2.4SmallerEntitiesSystemsengineeringasarecognizeddisciplineisoftenattributedtotheaerospaceanddefenseprogramsinthemidtwentiethcentury.Manyotherlargeorganizationshavealsoembracedsystemsengineeringandestablishedorganizationalstandards,suchasdescribedabovefortheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseorNASA.However,someorganizationsrecognizethevalueofsystemsengineering,butalsoconsiderthetradeoffswiththenecessaryinvestment.Inaddition,manypeoplepracticeaspectsofsystemsengineering,butwouldnotconsiderthemselvestobesystemsengineers.Inmanyways,smallerorganizationsarenowatthepointwheremanyinaerospacefoundthemselves50yearsago—seekingcommonsensewaystodealwiththecomplexityoftechnicalprograms.Assystemsbecomelargerandmorecomplex,thecontrolofsuppliersbylargesystemsengineeringorganizations,largelycomposedofsmallandmicroorganizations,iscriticaltothesuccessoftheirwork.Smallandmicroorganizationsareinvolvedinschemessuchasextendedenterprise,groupsofenterprises,andparticipationininnovationplatforms.Theseschemesofteninduceprofoundorganizationalandculturalchangesandtheadoptionofnewengineeringmethodologies.4.4.3UnderstandingSystemsEngineersIttakestrainingandyearsofexperiencetobecomeasolidsystemsengineer.SystemsengineersusuallystartoutwithaBaccalaureateorequivalentleveldegreeinanestablishedengineeringbranch—mechanical,electrical/electronic,civil,orthelike.Formany,thenextstepinvolvesmeetingjurisdictionalqualifications,suchasregistration,certification,or

105licensurebyastate,provincial,ornationalbody.Thenthereistheextensivetrainingandexperiencerequiredtodevelopsystemsengineeringcapabilities,includingthepossiblepursuitofprofessionalcertificationfromanorganizationsuchasINCOSE.Manyindividualspursuegraduateordoctoraldegreesinsystemsengineering.Sounliketheprogrammanagerrole,systemsengineersshareacommonfoundationalknowledgeassociatedwithengineeringandengineeringmanagementprinciples.Somesystemsengineersmayhaveextensiveexposuretotheirdisciplinewithoutopportunitiestodevelopbroadermanagementexperience.Thisisolatedprofessionaldevelopmentmaycontributetounproductivetensionwithprogrammanagers.Aswithprogrammanagers,stakeholdersmaynotfullyunderstandorappreciatetheroleofasystemsengineer.Thatlackofunderstandingmaybefurtherexacerbatedbythefactthatthedefinitionofsystemsengineeringismorevariablethanthatforprogrammanagement,andthesystemsengineerroleislesswelldefinedinmanyorganizationsthanthatoftheprogrammanager.4.5WhyDivergenceIsSuchaProblemProfessionaldisciplinesdemandongoingprofessionaldevelopment.Generally,suchlearningtakesplaceonlywithinthecontextoftheisolateddiscipline.Aseachfocusesondevelopingprofessionallywithintheirrespectivefields,thedangeristhattheywillcontinuouslytakeanarrowviewthatonlyseespossiblesolutionsthroughtheirrespectivelenses.Theseisolatedmindsetshaveoccurredinmanytechnicalprograms,andtheresulthasbeenlackofcooperationandintegratedapproachestoagreedsolutions.Eachoftenseesthesolutiondifferently,whichcanleadtounproductivetensionregardingtheoptimalsolution.AsillustratedinFigure44,eachdisciplineoftenfocusesonthesolutionfromitsownperspectivewithoutcollaborationtowardtheoptimalsolution.

106Figure44:ThecurrentviewoftheapplicationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringtodevelopingasolutionAdaptedfromTowardaNewMindset:BridgingtheGapBetweenProgramManagementandSystemsEngineering(Langley,Robitaille,&Thomas,2011),ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2011.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.OneofthedimensionsinvestigatedinthePhaseIresearchwasthelevelofunproductivetensionthatexistedbetweenthetwodisciplines.Surveyrespondentsratedthedegreetowhichunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemengineersexistedintheirorganization.Creatingastreamofbenefitsfromaprogramrequiresongoingintegrationofcontributionsfromateamofindividualsfromvariousspecializeddomains.Thedegreeofspecializationanddiversityofsourcesonlyincreasesastheprogramandassociatedbenefitsbecomemorecomplex.Eachspecializedknowledgedomainbringsadifferentanddistinctperspectiveregardingthesolutiontotheproblemtobesolved.Thisdiversityofdisciplinaryperspectivescreatestensionwithinprograms,particularlyasthedifferentperspectivescometogetherandclashinthebackandforthexchangeofideas.Thistensioncanbeproductiveifitforcesthedifferentdisciplinestoshare,collaborate,createcommonunderstanding,andmaketradeoffsinthepursuitofacommonsetofsolutions.Innovationoftenresultsfromthecollisionofdifferentperspectivesasnewideasareintroducedaspossiblesolutionstoachallengingproblem.However,thetensioncanbecomeunproductiveif,ratherthanseekingajointsolution,thepartiesretreatintothesecurityoftheirownperspectives,digin,andreinforcethemselveswiththeirownfactsaboutwhytheyareright.Suchapproachescreatebattleswithothersto

107establishwhoseperspectiveisthesuperioroneandwhichperspectivewillultimatelyleadtothepreferredsolution.ThePhaseIresearch(Confortoetal.,2013)exploredthisconceptofunproductivetensioninrespondents'organizationswithoutprovidingaspecificdefinitionofunproductivetensiontoensurethecaptureofallperceptionsofthetensionanditscauses.Individualswereaskedabouttheextenttowhichtheyhadexperiencedunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Fortunately,themajorityofrespondentssaidtheydidnotexperiencesignificantlevelsofunproductivetensionand19%indicatedtheyexperiencednounproductivetensionatall.However,29%ofrespondentssaidtheyhadexperiencedsomeorsignificantunproductivetensionintherelationshipbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Amongthefactorsratedbyrespondents(n=177),threekeyfactorsstoodoutassourcesofunproductivetension:lackofintegratedplanning,authoritynotclearlydefined,andconflictingpracticesforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering(seeFigure45).Figure45:TheperceivedsourcesofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersConfortoetal.,20134.5.1LackofIntegratedPlanningAlackofintegratedplanningwasmostoftencitedasacontributortounproductivetension.Disjointedplanningcreatestensionwhensystemsengineeringisengagedafterkeyprogramelementshavebecomeformalized.Forexample,studiesoffederalprogramsbytheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)foundthatsomefederalacquisitionrulesrestricttheapplicationofsystemsengineeringuntilprogramrequirementshavebeenestablishedandapproved(GAO,2001;GAO,2015).Often,bythetimesystemsengineeringisengagedandidentifiesissueswiththedocumentedrequirements,convincingtheprogrammanagerandprogramteamtomakesignificantchangestorequirementscreatesconflictovertheimpactto

108cost,schedule,andprogramperformance.ThemostrecentGAO(2015)reporthighlightedthatchallenge:Anotherservicechiefstatedthatrequirementchangesmadeduringweaponsystemdevelopmentareoftenviewedassacrificingcapabilityratherthanreconcilingrequirementswithoperationalconditions.Thechiefwasconcernedthatprogrammanagerstoooftentaketheviewthatrequirementscannotbechangedandavoidelevatingproblemstoleadershipbeforetheybecomecritical,forgoingtheopportunitytomakeneededtradeoffs(p.18).Theviewthatrequirementscannotbechangedandthattherecanbenonegotiationonpossibletradeoffsnotonlyaffectscollaborationbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers,italsoproduceswastethatnegativelyimpactsprogramcost,schedule,andperformance.Engineeringprogramsinsideandoutsideofthegovernmentsectorhavesignificant,unnecessarytensionattributabletoineffectiveplanning,inaccuraterequirements,andlackofcollaborationandtrust.Forexample,neededtradeoffs,suchasusingexisting,stabletechnologyratherthanrelyingontechnologythatisbeingdeveloped,couldkeepaprogramonscheduleandwithinbudgetparameterswhilestilldeliveringmissioncriticalcapabilities.But,iftherecanbenonegotiationovertheoriginalrequirements,theprogrammayexperiencesignificantcostandscheduleoverrunstryingtostabilizethenewtechnologydevelopedbasedontherequirements.TheGAO(2015)reportwentontoidentifyhoworganizationalculturecancontributetounproductivetension.Thereportstated:WehavefoundinpriorworkthatcharacteristicsofDOD's[U.S.DepartmentofDefense]processesandincentivescreatepressuretopushforunrealisticdefensesystemrequirementsandleadtopoordecisionsandmismatchesbetweenrequirementsandresources.Thisculturehasbecomeingrainedoverseveraldecadesandanumberofstudiesandreformshavebeendirectedatchangingtheincentivesunderlyingtheculture,withoutmuchsuccess(p.19).4.5.2AuthorityNotClearlyDefinedThesecondprimarysourceofunproductivetensionwasassociatedwithuncleardefinitionofauthority.Figure46presentsthecomparisonofprogrammanager's(n=469)andchiefsystemsengineer's(n=356)selfreportedresponsesabouttheirrespectiverolesandtheextenttowhichtheirrolesandtheauthorityassociatedwitheachrolearedefined.

109Figure46:Definitionofroles:AcomparisonbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersConfortoetal.,2013Nearlyhalfoftheprogrammanagersintervieweddeclaredthattheyhaverolesandresponsibilitiesdefinedinwrittenformcomparedwithonlyonethirdofchiefsystemsengineers.Writtenpositiondescriptionsanddefinedrolesarecriticalorganizationalenablersbecausetheyspecifysuchthingsas:AreasofaccountabilityspecifictotheroleLevelofauthoritytomakedecisions,commitresources,andsoonRequiredcompetenciesfortheroleSupervisoryorpersonnelmanagementandleadershipresponsibilitiesChiefsystemsengineersweresignificantlymorelikelytoreportexperiencingunproductivetensionthanwereprogrammanagers,attributingthetensiontounclearexpectationsandauthorityassociatedwithroleswithintheprogram.Thismayresultfromambiguityanduncertaintysurroundingtherelationshipsbetweenthetwofunctions.Decisionmakinginanenvironmentofambiguityanduncertaintyisakeyconceptindecisiontheory.Decisiontheorystatesthatinsituationsofuncertainty,decisionstendtobebiasedandreferential(Kahneman&Tversky,1979).Ratherthanusinganabsolutereferencetoevaluatealternatives,optionsareassessedfromaknownorfamiliarstate.Inastrongdisciplinebasedenvironment,theclearestreferencepointfromwhichtomakeadecisionisestablishedbyprofessionalidentity,whichincludestheknowledgebaseofthepractitionersandtheinfluenceupontheirknowledgebythestandards,certifications,tools,andsoondefinedbytheprofessionalorganizations

110withinthediscipline(Rebentisch,Townsend,&Conforto,2015).Further,thesedecisionprocessesarepartofaprocessthatisaffectedbyfactorssuchasperceivedinfluence,representation,participation,power,andotherfactorsnotentirelyinthecontrolofindividualdisciplines.Itisnotsurprising,then,thatthereportedprimarysourcesofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerslinkbacktouncertaintyinthecontextofshareddecisionsandresponsibilities.4.5.3ConflictingPracticesforProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringThethirdkeycontributortounproductivetensionismisalignedpractices.Manyprograms,particularlylargescaleprogramslastingmultipleyears,arelikeindependentbusinesses.Thesebusinesseshaveexecutivesthatleadthem;governancethatprovidesoversight;dedicatedresourcestodothework;andfinancing,supplychains,andsoonthathelpthebusinessoperateandproducethingsofvalue.Likeanybusiness,programsestablishtheirownuniquecultureandapproachestomanagingthework.Whentheapproachestomanagingtheworkareinformal,theconnectionpointsacrosstheorganization—whetherdepartmentsorteams—maybecomemisalignedintheabsenceofdocumentedprocessesorpractices.Similarly,whenprogramteamsdonotcollaborateondevelopmentofacommonprogrammethodology,eachdisciplinemayusepractices,processes,andtechniquesspecifictothediscipline.Astheintegrationstudyuncovered,manyprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersusethirdpartystandardsintheirwork,butthepracticeisnotuniversal.Forexample,overhalfofchiefsystemsengineersreportedusingINCOSE's(2015)SystemsEngineeringHandbook.OverhalfofprogrammanagersreportedusingPMI's(2013)AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide)andlessthanaquarter(22%)usedTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013).Insomeinstances,aspecificdisciplinereportedusingmorethanonestandard.Chiefsystemsengineers,forexample,reportedusingINCOSE'sSystemsEngineeringHandbook,aswellasguidelinesfromIEEE,governmentagencyhandbooks,andISOstandards.Thestudyfoundthatwhilethetwodisciplinesinsomeorganizationscrossreferencedstandardsineachdomain,thatapproachismoretheexceptionthantheruleasshowninFigure47(Confortoetal.,2013):

111Figure47:UseofstandardsbyprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersConfortoetal.,2013Theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerhaveuniqueresponsibilitiestheymustfulfill.Theintegrationstudyfoundgeneralagreementaboutelementsofthoseresponsibilities.Thestudyalsofoundthattherewereseveralareaswhereresponsibilitieswereshared,suchaslifecycleplanning,riskmanagement,supplierrelations,andqualitymanagement(seeFigure48).Inthosesharedspaces,wheneachdisciplineapproachestheresponsibilityfromitsownperspective,therecanbeduplicativework,criticalgapsthatcanaffectprogramperformance,orconflictingworkefforts.Forexample,iftechnical,stakeholder,organizational,andenvironmentalrisksareapproachedfromanindividualperspectiveinsteadofanintegratedapproach,keyprogramlevelriskscouldbemissedorignored.

112Figure48:ReportedresponsibilitiesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersConfortoetal.,2013Inadditiontothesurveyfindings,indepthinterviewswithprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersrevealedmoredetailsassociatedwiththeirexperienceswithunproductivetension.Themostcommonthemesfromtheindepthinterviewsexploringthecausesofunproductivetensionincluded:FailingtocommunicateandestablishacommonsetofobjectivessharedbyallIndividuals/groupsfocusingonachievingobjectivesdefinedbytheirowndisciplineidentityand/orprocessesBeingunabletoworktogethertoachievethedesiredoutcomeNotvaluingothers'rolesandcontributionstoachievingthedesiredoutcomeWithoutactiveapproachestodevelopandmaintainanintegrativeandcollaborativeteam,unproductivetensionbecomesanaturaloutcomeofbringingdifferentdisciplinestogether.4.6IntegratingIsDifficult,butNotImpossibleProgrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerseachhaveuniquebutintertwinedrolestoplayinsuccessfulprogramoutcomes.Viewedexclusivelyfromtheirownprofessionalidentities,capabilities,andmethods,theneedtoworktogethermaynotbeapparent.Theyeachhavetheirowndisciplinebasedmeasuresofwhatproblemshavehighestpriorityalongwithassociatedrewards.Sometimestheirrespectiverolesarenotwelldefinedandmayevenbeinconflictwithoneanother.Theopportunitiesandrationalesforthemnotworkingtogethercloselyaremanifold,andtheresultcanbeunproductivetension,orworse.Onemightconcludefromtheforgoingthatthesolutionforeffectiveintegrationistocombinetherolesofprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerintoonerole.Aswillbeseeninsubsequentchapters,thismayintroduceproblemsofitsown.Inaddition,combiningworktasksunderoneindividualdoesnotscalewelland,inthefinalanalysis,doesnotreallysolve

113theissueofunproductivetensionacrosstheorganization.Evenifthesetworolesarecombined,thereisstilltheneedtointegrateatthecomponentlevelforthemultipleprojectsundertakenaspartoftheprogram.Therefore,onemustfindawaytopromoteintegrationacrosstheorganization.Integrationofrolesentailsamindsetchangeforindividualemployeesandchangestoprocessesandproceduresfortheorganization.Thelattermayrequireachangetoorganizationalculture,whichcomeswithitsownsetofissuesaswillbeconsideredinChapter15.Forindividualemployees,thechangerequiresthatprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersfirstunderstandtherolesofeachdisciplineasdiscussedabove,andthenembracetheoverallgoalofimprovedtechnicalprogramperformanceandeachpractitioner'sabilitytocontributetothatgoal.Further,eachmustfindwaystoapplythespecializedknowledgeoftheirrespectivedisciplinesinawaythatworkstoproduceasumgreaterthantheparts.Thisrequiresvisionbeyondthetaskathandandcanprovetobeextremelydifficultbecauseitrequiresdevelopingnewwaysoflookingatthechallenges—ataskthatforcesnewpatternsofthinking.Asthecasestudiesinthisbookshow,thebenefitsofintegrationfaroutweightheeffortrequiredtointegratethedisciplines.Thepayoffcanbelarge.Butitisnotnecessarytomovefromminimalintegrationtofullintegrationinonestep.Changebeginswiththefirststepandissustainedbydeterminingtopressonwiththenextstepevenwhenthegoinggetstough.4.7DiscussionQuestions1.Howdoyoudefineprogrammanagement?Howhasyourunderstandingchangedasaresultofreadingthischapter?2.Howdoyoudefinesystemsengineering?Howhasyourunderstandingchangedasaresultofreadingthischapter?3.Evaluatingyourorganization,wheredoyouseeexamplesofunproductivetension?Whatspecificstepsmightbetakentochangethisunproductivetensionintoproductivetension?4.Wherehaveyouseensuccessfulintegrationofthedisciplinesofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinyourorganization?Describethesituationandnotetheexamplesofintegrationandhowintegrationhelpedachievepositiveresults.5.Inyourownwords,writeabriefbusinessproposalforyourmanagerjustifyingthevalueofinvestinginbetterintegrationwithinyourorganization.4.8ReferencesAssociationforProjectManagement(APM).(2012).APMbodyofknowledge(6thed.).Buckinghamshire,England:Author.AXELOS.(2011).Managingsuccessfulprogrammes.Norwich,England:StationeryOffice.

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115InternationalProjectManagementAssociation(IPMA).(2013).IPMAOrganisationalcompetencebaseline:Thestandardformovingorganisationsforward.Zurich,Switzerland:Author.Kahneman,D.,&Tversky,A.(1979).Prospecttheory:Ananalysisofdecisionunderrisk.Econometrica,47(2),263–292.doi:10.2307/1914185Kowalski,C.(2015,March23).INCOSENews.Retrievedfromwww.incose.org/newsevents/news/2015/03/24/isoiecieee152882015updateLangley,M.,Robitaille,S.,&Thomas,J.(2011).Towardanewmindset:Bridgingthegapbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.PMNetwork,25(9),24–26.Levitt,R.(2011).Towardsprojectmanagement2.0,EngineeringProjectOrganizationJournal,1(3),197–210.doi:10.1080/21573727.2011.609558NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA).(2007).Systemsengineeringhandbook.Washington,D.C.:Author.Oehmen,J.,&Norman,E.(2012,May).Applyingleanprinciplestoprogrammanagement:ResultsfromajointstudybyPMI,InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineeringandMIT'sLeanAdvancementInitiative.PresentedatProjectManagementInstituteGlobalCongressEMEA,Marseilles,France.Oppenheim,B.W.(2015).Programrequirements:Complexity,myths,radicalchange,andleanenablers.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/learning/projectcomplexity/PgmReqirements.ashxProjectManagementAssociationofJapan(PMAJ).(2014).P2M:Aguidebookofproject&programmanagementforenterpriseinnovation(3rded.).Tokyo,Japan:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2011).Programmanagementprofessional(PgMP)®examinationcontentoutline.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013a).Thestandardforprogrammanagement(3rded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013b).Aguidetotheprojectmanagementbodyofknowledge(PMBOK®guide)(5thed.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013c).Navigatingcomplexity:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2015).ThePMIlexiconofprojectmanagementterms(version3.0).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.Rebentisch,E.S.,Townsend,S.,&Conforto,E.C.(2015,June).Collaborationacrosslinkeddisciplines:Skillsandrolesforintegratingsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.

116PresentedatAmericanSocietyforEngineeringEducationAnnualConference,Seattle,Washington,USA.Retrievedfromwww.asee.org/public/conferences/56/papers/12512/viewSchwalb,J.(2016).Fromthesponsor.CrossTalk:TheJournalofDefenseSoftwareEngineering,29(3).Retrievedfromwww.crosstalkonline.org/storage/flipbooks/2016/201605/index.htmlSopko,J.A.,&Demaria,A.(2013).HowSiemensfocusesonbenefitstoacceleratevaluedelivery.Presentedatthe2013PMIGlobalCongress,NewOrleans,Louisiana.Thiry,M.(2015).Programmanagement(2nded.).Surrey,England:GowerPublishingLimited.Toth,R.B.(Ed.).(1996).StandardsactivitiesoforganizationsintheUnitedStates.Retrievedfromhttp://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/SP%20806.pdfUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense.(2016).Defenseacquisitionguidebook.Retrievedfromhttps://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=638295Wikipedia.(n.d.).Engineeringmanagement.Retrievedfromhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engineering_managementAdditionalResourcesForsberg,K.,Mooz,H.,&Cotterman,H.(2005).Visualizingprojectmanagement(3rded.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.McManus,H.(2005).Productdevelopmentvaluestreammapping(PDVSM)manual.Retrievedfromwww.metisdesign.com/docs/PDVSM_v1.pdfOppenheim,B.W.(2004).Leanproductdevelopmentflow,SystemsEngineering,7(4).

1175KEYCONCEPTSININTEGRATION5.1IntroductionThepreviouschaptersdiscussedunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringasanaturaloutcomeofdifferencesbetweenthetwodisciplines,andacorechallengetoprogramsuccess.Theyalsoshowedthatorganizationswithgreaterlevelsofintegrationbetweenthesetwodisciplinesexhibiteddramaticallylowerlevelsofunproductivetension.Integrationalsoplaysanimportantroleinprogramperformancebeyondjustunproductivetension,whichwillbediscussedingreaterdepthinsubsequentchapters.However,uptothispointtheunderstandingofintegrationremainsrelativelysuperficial.Thischaptertakesacloserlookattheconceptandmeaningofintegration.Itexploresintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfrommultipleperspectives.Itusesevidencefromtheresearchtoexplorewhatthistypeofintegrationlookslikeinpractice,includingfromthepractitioner'sperspective.Thisleadstoaformaldefinitionofintegrationthatwillbeusedthroughouttherestofthebook.5.2AssessingIntegrationbetweenDisciplinesThePhaseIstudyofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersexploredthestateofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Thatstudywasexploratoryanditsobjectivewastobetterunderstandhowtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesareintegratedwithinorganizations.Theexploratorystudywouldeventuallyleadtomoredetailedandfocusedresearchtotestfactorsandrelationshipsrelatedtointegration.ThestudyanditsplaceintheoverallresearchthatinformsthisbookwasexplainedingreaterdetailintheIntroduction.TwoquestionsfromthePhaseIstudywereparticularlyrelevanttothisdiscussionofintegration.Thefirstquestionaskedrespondentsaboutthelevelofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintheirorganization.ThepossibleresponseswereFullyintegrated,Mostlyintegrated,Somewhatintegrated,orNotatallintegrated.Thesecondquestionaskedwhetherintegrationoccurredformally(definedprocessestranscendtheboundariesacrossthejobposition)orinformally(itfallsuponindividualstomaketheintegrationoccur)intheirorganization.ThepossibleresponseswereFormally,Informally,Amixtureofboth,orDon'tknow.Becausethesurveywasexploratory,thewordingofthequestionswasgeneralratherthanusingpreciselanguagetodefineintegrationandtheformalityofintegrationprocesses.Figure51showsthatroughlyhalftherespondentsindicatedthattheirorganizationshadeitherfullyormostlyintegratedtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.

118Or,viewedinthenegative,abouthalfoftherespondentsindicatedthattheirorganizationsexhibitedeithersomewhatornointegrationatallbetweentherolesofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Onlyaboutoneinsixoftherespondentsindicatedthattheirorganizationhadfullyintegratedtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Figure51:Degreeofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andtheformalityoftheintegrationapproachConforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013Figure51alsoshowsthatabouthalftheresponsesweredrawnfromorganizationsthatuseacombinationofformalandinformalapproachestointegratebetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Theproportionofformalandinformalintegrationapproachesinorganizationsthatuseamixtureofbothisunknown,soitisnotclearhowmuchtheorganizationsreliedonindividualinitiativeversusformallysanctionedandsupportedmethodstointegratetheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Onlyaboutoneinsixoftherespondentscommittedtothedescriptionthattheirorganizationusedaformalapproachtointegratingtherolesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Thedistributionofresponsestobothquestionsisstrikinglysimilar,suggestingthatintegrationandusingaformalizedapproachtointegrationarerelated.Whatdoesthismean?Theresponsesindicatethatthemajorityoforganizationsareusingamixofformalandinformalprocessesforintegration.Themajorityoforganizationsarealsointegratedtosomedegree.Thisresultmaybeanartifactofthewaythequestionswereaskedinthesurvey,butitisnotparticularlysurprising.Mostorganizationsthataresophisticatedenoughtohaveformallydefinedprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerpositionswilllikelyhavesomedegreeofformalizedprocessesforthemtoworktogether,andiftheyarecompetitiveintheirrespectivemarketstheywilllikelyhavesomedegreeofsuccessfulintegrationofthedisciplines.Thestorybecomesmoreinterestingbylookingatthetrendsintheresponses.Statisticalanalysisshowedwithahighlevelofsignificancethattheformalityoftheapproachto

119integrationisrelatedtothedegreeofintegrationachievedbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Usinganinformalapproachtointegrationresultsinacorrespondinglydecliningdegreeofintegration.Organizationsthattookaninformalapproachtointegrationwerethreetimesmorelikelytobeonlysomewhatintegratedthanthosethatusedaformalapproachtointegration.Conversely,usingtheformalapproachtointegrationresultsinacorrespondinglyincreasingdegreeofintegration.Organizationsthattookaformalapproachtointegrationweresixtimesmorelikelytobefullyintegratedthanthosethatusedaninformalapproachtointegration.ThedifferenceineffectsisshowngraphicallyinFigure52.Inotherwords,theorganizationsthatweredeliberatelytryingtointegratetherolesoftheirprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersweremorelikelytohavefullyintegratedthem.Notsurprisingly,theorganizationsthatusedinformalapproachestointegrationandwereabletofullyintegratetheirprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplineswerequiterare.Figure52:MoreformalordeliberateapproachestointegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringresultinhigherlevelsofintegrationConfortoetal.,2013Usingaformalordeliberateapproachtointegrationisimportantforactuallybecomingmoreintegrated.Whatdoesusingaformalapproachmean,exactly,whenitcomestointegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?Onewaytoanswerthatquestionistoviewthisfromtheperspectiveofprocessmaturity.Processmaturitymodelsassumethatprocessesaremorelikelytoproducevaluableoutcomesastheybecomemoreformalizedandmanaged.OnecommonlyusedmaturityframeworkisCapabilityMaturityModelIntegration(CMMI,2010),whichdefinesaprocessmaturitythroughaspectrumrangingfrom1(Initial—processes

120unpredictable,poorlycontrolled,andreactive)to3(Defined—processescharacterizedfortheorganizationandisproactive)to5(Optimizing—focusoncontinuousprocessimprovement).Notethatthehighermaturitylevelsareassociatedwithexaminationandactivemanagementofprocesses.Withincreasingmaturitylevels,processesbecomemoredefined,applied,assessed,andimproved.Foraformalapproachtointegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,onemightexpect,withincreasinglevelsofformalization,toseegreateruseofstandardsordefinedprocesses,andmorefrequentandformalassessmentsofwhetherthosestandardsarebeingfollowed.Thesurveycollecteddatarelatedtothesetwopoints.Specifically,bothprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerrespondentswereaskedwhethertheirorganizationhadconductedaformalassessmentofitsprogrammanagementorsystemsengineeringpracticesandcapabilities,respectively,withinthelastthreeyears.Theanalysisofthedataconfirmedsignificantlythatgreateruseofstandardswasassociatedwithgreaterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Additionally,thoseorganizationswithhigherlevelsofintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringalsoconductedmoreregularassessments.Perhapsnotcoincidentally,largerorganizationswerefoundtobebetteratformallyintegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Thismightbeexplainedbylargerorganizationshavingmoreresources(typically“overhead”functions)todedicatetoestablishingandmaintainingformalizedprocesses.Largerorganizationsmayalsoneedtoformalizeprocessandstructureformanagementcontrol,whilesmallerorganizationsmaynotperceiveaneedforformalizationbecausetheyneedtobeagileandcanrelyontheexperienceembodiedinparticularresponsibleemployees.Smallerorganizationsinthesamplewererelativelymorelikelytouseinformalorcombinationsofformalandinformalapproachestointegration.Aswasthecasewiththelevelofformalizationoftheapproachtointegration,theanalysisshowedthatorganizationsthathadconductedformalassessmentsoftheirpracticesandcapabilitieswithinthepriorthreeyearsexhibitedhigherlevelsofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Organizationsthatdidnotconductaformalassessmentoftheirpracticesandcapabilitieswithinthepriorthreeyearswere50%morelikelytobeonlysomewhatintegratedthanthosethatdid.Conversely,thoseorganizationsthatdidconductaformalassessmentoftheirpracticesandcapabilitieswithinthepriorthreeyearswerealmostthreetimesmorelikelytobefullyintegratedthanthosethatdidnot.ThedifferenceineffectsisshowngraphicallyinFigure53.NotethatonlytheanalysisoftheprogrammanagerresponsesisshowninFigure53,buttheresultsmirrortheanalysisofthechiefsystemsengineers'responses.

121Figure53:MorefrequentassessmentsofdisciplineprocessesandcapabilitiescorrelatetoachievinghigherlevelsofintegrationConfortoetal.,2013Themeasuresusedinthisinitialexplorationofthecurrentstateofintegrationweresomewhatgeneralized.Keyvariablessuchasintegrationandformalizedwerenotextensivelydefinedfortherespondents,norweretheremultipleperspectivesormeasuresofthosekeyelements.Becausethiscouldresultinpotentiallyunreliableconclusions,additionaldatawereneededtotriangulateandrefinethedefinitionsofthesekeyfactorsinintegration,aswellasothersrelatedtothem.Thisinturnpromptedtheadditionalinvestigationthatunfoldedthroughinterviewsandanadditionalsurvey.Additionally,literaturefromorganizationtheoryscholarswasreviewedtolearnwhattheyhavewrittenaboutintegrationincomplexorganizations.Thesectionthatfollowssummarizesthatinvestigation.5.3AttributesofIntegrationinComplexOrganizationsThemostappropriategenericdefinitionofintegrationis“theactofcombiningoraddingpartstomakeaunifiedwhole”(HarperCollins,2014).Thisdefinitioniswellsuitedtothecombinationandalignmentofsystemsengineering,programmanagement,andperhapsotherfunctionsinordertomakeaprogrammoresuccessful.Butthesamedefinitioncouldalsobeappliedtoaworkerbuildinganautomobiletransmission,apoliticalleaderunifyingscatteredportionsofanation,orachildcompletingapuzzle.Amorepreciseunderstandingofwhatismeantbyintegrationinthecontextofcomplexandspecializedorganizationswouldhelpin

122creatingausefuldefinitionofintegrationforthisbook.Therearefewexistingstudiesoftheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringthatdefineinarigorousanddetailedwaytheattributesandmethodsofeffectiveintegrationofthosedisciplines.Togaindeeperinsightintothenatureofintegrationincomplexorganizationsonemustturntorelatedareasofknowledge.Thefieldoforganizationtheoryhasarichhistorythatincludesworkdirectlyrelevanttothisexploration.Scholarsmaynothavenecessarilyfocusedonintegrationasdefinedhere,buttheirworkhasexploredhoworganizationscoordinateeffortsacrossdisciplinesundervariousconditionsusingdifferentapproaches.Assuch,theirfindingsillustratethevarietyofwaysthatintegrationmightbeexpressedinorganizationsandcanhelptobringfocustothisdiscussion.Thoughtleadersinorganizationaltheoryseektoexplainhoworganizationsfunctionand,asaconstantlyevolvingfieldofstudythathasexistedoverdecades,haveproducedanumberofexplanationsandapproachestoorganizationalanalysis.Whiletheseexplanationsareoftenreferredtoastheories,inmanycasestheyrepresentideasandunderstandingthatisdevelopedwithinacommunityoflikemindedresearchers.Assuch,theymaynothavethesameformalityoftheoriesonewouldfindin,say,thenaturalsciencesorevenothersocialsciencessuchaseconomics.Furthermore,theyarenotgenerallydefinedtothelevelofdetailthatwouldmakethemimmediatelyusefultoprogrammanagersorsystemsengineers,andinmanycasestheylackstrongpredictivepowertosaywhichspecificoutcomesmightresultfromasetofactions.Nevertheless,theydohighlightconceptsthatcanhelptoframethisdiscussionofintegration,andparticularlypointtoareasoforganizationsandtheirprocessesthatmightbeimportanttointegration.Forthisbookitisn'tnecessarytoincludeanextensivesurveyofthefield.Consequently,whatfollowsisnotacomprehensiveoverviewoforganizationaltheory,butratherselectedexamplesthataremosthelpfultoinformtheexplorationofintegrationinthisbook.Oneoftheearliestmovementstocharacterizeandunderstandhoworganizationsconductworkwasscientificmanagement,frequentlyassociatedwithFredrickTaylor(1917)andmanagementexpertsinlabcoatswithstopwatchesshadowingworkersandanalyzingtheirmovementsingreatdetail.Thefocusofscientificmanagementwastousesystematicobservationandanalysistoimprovelaborproductivityviaprocessimprovement.Theunderlyingassumptionwasthatworkcouldbeimprovedthroughtheapplicationofscientificmethodsusingcontrolledexperimentstothebenefitofbothworkersandtheorganization.Scientificmanagementtheoriesaddressedintegrationbroadlythroughstandardizationandformalizationofwork,withmeasurementandfeedbacklearningforprocessimprovementthatresultedinthedesignofwork,methods,andprocessestoenablemoreefficientproduction.Bydeployingstandardizedworkdefinitionswithexplicitlydefinedgoals,experts(or,eventually,theworkersthemselves)couldimproveandoptimizeprocessesandsignificantlyimproveoutcomes.Unfortunately,theaspirationsofthescientificmanagementmovementwerenotfullyrealized,inpartduetothecomplexityoforganizations,evenatthattime,andthesocial,economic,andpoliticaldynamicswithinorganizationsthatwerenotwelladdressedbytheearly

123practitioners.Consequently,scientificmanagementwasviewednegativelyinsomecircles,aperceptionthathaslargelypersistedtothepresent.Itsoverallimpactshouldnotbeunderestimated,though.AcontemporaryofTaylor,HenryGantt,alongwiththescientificmanagementmovementanditsadherents,helpedinthecreationofsuchfieldsasindustrialengineering,quality,humanfactors,operationsmanagement,andmorerecentlysixsigmaandleanmanagement.Anumberofthesefieldsinturnindirectlyordirectlyinfluencedthefoundationsoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.MaxWeber(1947),apioneeringorganizationtheoristwhowasstronglyinfluencedbyTaylorandthescientificmanagementmovement,eventuallydevelopedwhatcametobeknownasbureaucratictheory.Bureaucracieswereseenasaremedytohumanidiosyncrasies(e.g.,inconsistency,selfinterestedbehavior,cronyism)thatundermineanorganization'sabilitytoachieveitsgoalsefficientlyoreffectively.Bureaucraciesenablethemanagementofintegrationbysupportingthecreationofformalorganizationbasedoffices,roles,andrulesthatgovernwhomakesdecisions,allocatesresources,andhowpeopleinteract.Theserequireformaltrainingand,therefore,representtheriseofprofessionalexpertise,certification,andcodesofconduct.Bureaucraciesaremaintainedbyaclearlydefinedgovernancehierarchythatdelineatestherolesandreportingrelationships.Seenintheseterms,bureaucracysoundslikeanidealsolutiontothechallengesofunproductivetensiondiscussedinthepreviouschapter.Bureaucracy,however,isoftenapejorativelabelthathasbecomeassociatedwithbloated,inefficient,andunresponsiveorganizationsthatappeartorespondmoretotheirownneedsthanthoseoftheirstakeholders.Thismaybeexplainedinpartbecause,withtheformaldefinitionoftherules,roles,relationships,andthelikebureaucracycaneasilybeexpanded(orscaledup)toaddresssituationsoutsideofthoseforwhichitwasoriginallydesigned.Ifastandardsolutionthatcanbereplicatedeasilyinanewsettingisnottailoredtothatcontext,theresultwilllikelybeanorganizationmismatchedwithitscontextthatappearsinflexibleandunresponsive.Bureaucraciesareprocessorientedandtendtobemosteffectivewhentasksareroutineandtheenvironmentinwhichtheorganizationfunctionsispredictable,butbegintofalterwhenthereisalotofnovelty,variety,anduncertainty.Thehumanrelationsmovementemergedinpartinresponsetosomeofthenegativeexperiencesofthescientificmanagementworkrationalizationefforts.ItsmostnotablefoundationsarefromstudiesconductedbyMayoandRoethlisbergerattheHawthorneWorksthatlaunchedtheterm“Hawthorneeffect,”atermthatdescribeshowindividualschangetheirbehaviorinresponsetotheirperceptionofbeinggivenspecialattention(Mayo,1933).Thehumanrelationsmovementexaminedtheeffectsofsocialrelations,motivation,andemployeesatisfactionontheirproductivity.Ratherthanemployeesbeingseenasmerelycommoditylabor,theemployees'psychologyandfitwiththeirorganizationwereperceivedaskeyfactorsinhowproductivetheywere.Byimprovinginterpersonalskills,communication,andmotivation,workplaceproductivitywasexpectedtoimprove.Fromthisperspective,integrationisinfluencedbyhowpeopleinorganizationsinteractwithoneanotherandhowtheorganizationencouragestheirparticipationandmentalandemotionalwellbeing.Thisincludeshowtheyaremotivated(i.e.,throughtheworkitself,itsdesign,recognitionoftheir

124contributions,and,tosomeextent,theconditionsunderwhichtheywork),whichimpactstheirlevelofengagementandcontributionstosuccessfuloutcomes.Barnard(1968)laterdefinedanimportantroleforexecutivestocreateanappropriateorganizationalclimatewithclearandconsistentvaluesandpurposetohelpimproveemployeesatisfactionandproductivity.Thehumanrelationsmovementleddirectlyorindirectlytodisciplinessuchasorganizationaldevelopment,industrialandorganizationalpsychology,andhumanresourcemanagement.Adherentstocontingencytheorytriedtoovercomeperceivedlimitationsinpreviousmovementsthatdidnotadequatelydescribehowmanagementstyleandorganizationalstructurewereinfluencedbytheorganization'senvironment.Integrationisdefinedas“theprocessofachievingunityofeffortamongthevarioussubsystemsintheaccomplishmentoftheorganization'stask”(Lawrence&Lorsch,1967).Inthistheorythereisnoonebestwaytomanageanorganization,andthedesignofanorganizationanditssubsystemsmustideally“fit”withtheenvironmentandwiththemselvesintheorganization.Integrationholdsadefiningpositioninthisfieldsinceorganizationalfitwithitsenvironmentisaddressedbyhowitsvariouselementsrelatetooneanother.Amongthecontingenciesthatmustbeconsideredwhentailoringtheorganizationresponsearestructure,leadership,technology,anduncertainty.Accordingtocontingencytheorists,anothercontributortooverallorganizationeffectivenessismanagement'sabilitytoadapttoenvironmentalchanges.Inrapidlychangingenvironmentsmanagersmusthavetheauthorityandthefreedomtomakedecisionsasrequiredtoadapttothesituationathand.Organizationalleaderscanalsoimprovefitwiththeenvironmentandoveralleffectivenessbyadjustingthealignmentbetweenthetaskstructureandtheleadershipapproach,andbyusingtrainingtoimproveleader–memberrelations(Fiedler,1964).Organizationalclimateandorganizationalculturearerelatedconceptsintendedtohelpidentifyelementsoftheworkenvironmentthatsignificantlyinfluenceemployeebehavior.Organizationalcultureisgenerallyconsideredtoencompassthesystemofbeliefs,values,andattitudessharedbypeopleinanorganization(Schein,1992).Itmayincludepolicies,rules,organizationstructure,andsharedritualsandroutines,andispotentiallyinfluencedbytheproductandprocesstechnologiesusedintheorganizationandbyitscompetitiveandindustrialenvironment.DealandKennedy(1982)arguethatorganizationalculturecanbeseenasthewaythatemployeesknowhowthingsgetdonesuccessfullyintheirworkplace.Integrationisaddressedbyutilizingtheconceptoforganizationalculturethroughthecombinationofelementsthatframetheperceptions,decisions,andactionsthathelppeopletoworktogethermoreeffectively.Thepromiseofasingle,strong,andcohesiveorganizationalcultureisthatithelpsitsemployeestosharegoalsacrosscriticalboundaries,bemorecommittedtoworkingtogethertowardcommonobjectives,understandwhattodowhenthesituationisuncertain,promotemoregroupcohesionandcapabilityaroundsolvingproblemsandlearning,andimproveclarityaroundthe“bigpicture”fortheorganization.Morethanoneunified,homogenousorganizationalculturemayexistinorganizations,whichcanbeasourceofchallengestointegration.Schein(1996)identifiedthreesubculturesor

125occupationalcommunities,the“operatorculture,”the“engineeringculture,”andthe“executiveculture,”thatcanleadonetomisunderstandanother'svaluesandobjectivesandcanconsequentlycauseindividualstoworkatcrosspurposes.Theexecutivecultureandtheengineeringculturearesignificantlyinfluencedbytheirrespectiveexternalreferencegroups(occupationalcommunitiesoflikemindedandtrainedprofessionals,e.g.,engineeringprofessionalsocietiesoracademicdisciplines).Theseexternalreferencegroupsdefinevaluesystemsoutsideoftheorganizationandcancontributetoconflictsabouthowtosolveproblemsorevenhowtocommunicate.Whileastrongcoreknowledgebaseenableseachsubculturetooperateeffectivelyandefficientlyinitsowndomain,possiblemisalignmentbetweenthemcanresultinfailuresoforganizationallearning,diffusionofinnovations,andinabilitytochangeandgrowattheorganizationlevel.Theterm“organization”impliesacoordinationofactivitiesinordertoachieveanoutcomethatisbetterthancouldbeaccomplishedbyindividualelementsoperatingseparately.Integrationisanintegralcharacteristicoforganizationsandhasbeenacentralpartoftheoriesaboutorganizationsfornearlyacentury.Thisreviewofdifferentorganizationaltheorieshasdrawnhighlightsfromthemajormovementsinthefieldtoidentifythemesthatcanbeusedtohelprefinetheworkingdefinitionofintegrationbeingdevelopedinthischapter.Italsohighlightsthemultiplefacetsofintegrativebehaviorthatoperateinacomplexorganization.

126IntegrationinProjectManagementandSystemsEngineeringResearchspecificallyonprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringhasidentifiedprinciplessimilartothosefromthereviewoforganizationtheory.Whilethisresearchwasfocusedontheprojectdomain,itneverthelessprovidesrelevantinformationapplicabletotheprogramdomain.Eisner(2008)characterizesahighdegreeofintegrationbetweenprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringby:1.Strongandeffectiveteams2.Commitmentto“gettingthejobdone”3.Deepinterestinthetechnicalissues4.Constructiveproblemsolving5.Corporatesupportfortheneedsoftheproject6.Littleornocomplaining7.Shortandproductivemeetings8.Rapidflowofinformation9.Effectivecomputersupport10.InvolvedandhappypeopleEisnerarguesthatintegrationcanberealizedondifferentcomplementarylevels:managers,teams,plans,thesystemsapproach,methodsandstandards,informationsystems,andenterprisescanactasintegrators.Thesecharacteristicsofintegrationbetweenprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringtendtofocusonbehaviorsandobservableoutcomesanddonotaddresstheintegrationoftheworkitself—howtasksarestructuredandperformed.Thatcriticismcouldalsobeleviedagainstorganizationalandmanagementtheories.Nevertheless,thesimilaritiesbetweenthesecharacteristicsandthosefoundinorganizationaltheoryandinthecasestudiespresentedsofarareconfirmatoryregardingthegeneralcharacteristicsandattributestobeemphasizedindefiningtheintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.5.3.1InsightsfromtheDifferentPerspectivesonIntegrationOrganizationaltheoristsexplainintegrationfromanumberofdifferentperspectives.Becauseofthediversityoforganizationaltypesandinstances,theoriesaboutthemareoftengeneralinnature.Theydonottypicallyhavethedetailthatischaracteristicofprogrammanagementor

127systemsengineeringpractices.Indeed,theyareoftensogeneralthattheyaresometimescharacterizedas“goodleadership”or“goodmanagement.”Nevertheless,theideasandrelationshipscoveredbythesetheoriescanstillhelptocreatearicherandmoreusefuldefinitionofintegration.Themostimportantelementsofthosetheoriesforthispurposeare:Worktowardclearandcoherentgoals.Defineandstandardizetasks.Tailorthecoordinationapproachtothetypeoftaskbeingperformed.Definerolesandcreateprofessionalismthroughtraining,codesofconduct,andsoon.Developinterpersonalskills,communication,andmotivationtoenablebettercoordination.Defineleaderdecisionauthoritiestoencompassallrelevanttasksandspanboundaries.Guidedecisionsandbehaviorunderuncertaintythroughsharedbeliefs,values,andattitudes.5.4PractitionerPerspectivesonIntegrationTogroundattributesofintegrationincomplexorganizations,professionalswithprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringbackgroundswereaskedabouttheirexperiencewithintegrationduringtheircareersandintheircurrentorganizations.ProgrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersfromanumberoforganizationsaroundtheworldwereinterviewedsubsequenttotheirparticipationinthePhaseIresearch.Thesefollowupinterviewswerecompletedtoclarifyhowprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersinterpretedandunderstoodconceptslikeintegration,unproductivetension,andtheapproachesusedintheirorganizationstoimprovethelevelofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.BecausetheyhadparticipatedinthePhaseIstudy,theycurrentlyfilledtheroleofprogrammanager,chiefsystemsengineer,orboth.Theinterviewsincludedprofessionalswhohadindicatedinthesurveythattheirorganizationshadeitherhighorlowlevelsofunproductivetension.Thetwolevelsofunproductivetensionweresampledinordertogainamorecompleteperspectiveonhowintegrationdoesordoesnotworkinorganizations.Becausethereissuchastrongnegativecorrelationbetweenintegrationandunproductivetension—thehigherthelevelofintegration,thelowerthelevelofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering—thelevelofunproductivetensionservesasausefulindicatorofintegrationintheseorganizations.Theinterviewquestionsfocusedonintegration,integrationpractices,unproductivetensionanditssources,andotherissuesrelatedtothewaythetwodisciplinesworkedtogetherintheorganization.Adescriptionoftheinterviewmethodswaspresentedintheintroduction.Thefullsetofinterviewresponseswerereviewedandusedtodevelopexpandeddefinitionsofintegrationandunproductivetension,andtodraftaframeworktoexplainhowintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringworksinorganizations.Asampleofthe

128responsesfromtheinterviewsarepresentedinthissectionfromtheperspectivebothofwhatishappeningwhenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersareworkingtogetherinanintegratedfashionandwhentheyarenot.5.4.1DescriptionsofIntegrationfromLowUnproductiveTensionSettingsWhatdotheinteractionsbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringlooklikewhenthingsareworkingwell?Thesequotesfrombothchiefsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersillustratesomeofthedifferentaspectsofintegrationfromtheperspectiveoforganizationswherethetwodisciplinesworktogetherwithlowlevelsofunproductivetension.Theydescribehowtheindividualexperiencesintegrationbetweenchiefsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersintheirorganization.Theyaredrawnfromasmallexploratoryinterviewsampleandareprovidedheretoillustratepractitioners'experienceswithintegration.Whiletheyillustratewhatworkedinoneorganization,theydonotnecessarilyimplythatthesameapproachtointegrationwouldapplyinallsettingsandcircumstances.Hereiswhatsomeoftherespondentsreportedaboutdifferentaspectsoftherelationshipbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesintheirorganizations:Theyhavesharedgoals.Theyareresponsibleforthewholeprojectsuccess.Theyhaveresultstoachieve….Thereisnotreallyconflictthere,itisonlyabouthowyoucanmakeithappen.Itisamatterofgoodleadership;itispeopleworkingtogethertomakethingswork.Itrequiresleadership—don'taskafollowertolead!—Programmanager,engineeringconsulting,U.S.A.Integrationisbeinginanenvironmentwhereyouwillbeworkingcollaboratively,withcommongoals,andmotivatedbythesameindicatorsofperformanceoftheproject….Theprogrammanagerandtheheadofengineeringworkingsidebyside,reportingtoaprogramdirectorresponsiblefortheoverallintegrationofthesedisciplines.—Systemsengineer,shipbuilding,EuropeIntegrationissomethingverynatural.Everyprojectistechnical,soit'saboutthesystemsengineering.Weteachallthesystemsengineeringconceptstotheprogrammanager.Theyareintegratedbecausetheyarenotconsideredseparated.Theprogrammanagerisresponsibletodelivertheprogramoncostandschedulebutalsoresponsibletodeliverapropersystemthatmeetstheneeds.Theprogrammanagementteamisaccountableforallofthoseaspects.Thereisnodivisionofdutiesordisciplines.—Chiefsystemsengineer,U.S.governmentagencyWeseeintegrationas“arisingnaturallyfromthenatureoftheworkitself.”It'sthendividedintoprofessionalrolestobeexecuted.Weputtheprojectfirstthentherolesandindividualperspectivesfollow.—Chiefsystemsengineer,commercialproducts,U.S.A.

129Bothprofessionalshavetounderstandtheothers'perspective.Aworkpackagethatseemscorrectfromtheprogrammanager'sperspectivealsomustbefeasiblefromthesystemsengineer'sperspective.—Systemsengineer,engineeringservices,U.S.A.Wetypicallyhaveengineerswhobecomesystemsengineers.Wealsohaveengineersthatbecameprogrammanagers,whoaremoreresponsibleforcost,schedule,andrelatedaspectstotheprogram.Theyarealllocatedinthesameoffice.Theyworktogethertoaccomplishthesamegoals.Theyareonly“oneteam.”Theinteractionsbetweentheprogrammanagerandthesystemsengineerareveryfrequent.—Portfoliomanager,informationsystems,U.S.A.Fromastrictperspectivesystemsengineeringshouldbethearmoftheprogramthatdirectlytranslatestheprogrammanagementobjectivesintotechnicalengineeringactions.Whenaprogrammanagersetsabudgetbaselineandintegratesthemasterscheduleandmasterplan,thesystemsengineeringgroupshouldbetheonethattakesownershipofthesystemlevelgoalsandimplementsthetechnicalsideonbehalfoftheprogrammanager.—Chiefsystemsengineer,aerospace,U.S.A.5.4.2DescriptionsofIntegrationfromHighUnproductiveTensionSettingsThefollowingquotes,primarilyfromchiefsystemsengineers,aredrawnfromtheinterviewsthatfocusedonorganizationsthathadhighlevelsofunproductivetension.Theyillustratehowtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesoperateintheseorganizationswhentheworkingrelationshipischallenged.[Therecouldbe]aconflictofinterestbetweenprogrammanagerandsystemsengineer.Wehadaprojectwhereitwasnotpossibletomeetthecustomer'sbudgetforexecutingtheproject.Wetriedtocutcost.Wereviewedtherequirements,reducedorsimplifiedsomerequirementsinordertomeetthecustomer'sbudget.Then,theprogrammanagerdidn'tacceptanyoftheproposals;thedesignthatwasproposedwasmoreimportantthanmeetingtherequirements.—Systemsengineer,aerospace,EuropeAsyougetdriventosmallerteamstobemorecostefficient,nimble,youstillhavetohaveaverystrongprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerroles.Managementoftendemandsthatasingleindividualdoesbothroles.Thatisarecipefortroublewithjustonepersondoingbothroles.Thatpersoncanbeverygoodatsettingcustomerexpectations,talkingtothem,definingneeds,selling,etc.,butheorshewillneedadifferentsetofskillstocommunicateallthisinformationtotheteam.—Programmanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,precisioninstruments,U.S.A.

130Oneproblemiswhenyouhaveaprogrammanagementteamthatdoesnotusesystemsengineeringtoimplementthetechnicalandprogrammaticrequirementsandsimplyfocusesonmanagingthebusinesssideoftheprogramandleavestheproductteamsthataredoingthedifferentsubsystemstoownthemajortechnicalprogrammaticgoals.—Chiefsystemsengineer,aerospace,U.S.A.[Y]oufailtogivesystemsengineeringtheabilitytocontroltheprocess.Yougivesystemsengineeringasmalldomainofactivities,somerequirements,anddon'tforcetheproductdevelopmentteamstoaccepttheleadershiproleofsystemsengineering.Theproblemislackofauthorityandresponsibilityforthesystemsengineerandlackofuseofsystemsengineeringgrouptoimplementtheprogrammaticobjectives.—Chiefsystemsengineer,aerospace,U.S.A.Systemsengineeringhasbeenviewedbythemanagementasalmosta“fad.”Theyhadonecontractforanewdevelopmentprogram[butthescopeofthecontractwascutsignificantly].Theyrampedupsystemsengineeringtoaboutsixtypeople.Beforethat,therewaspreviouslyoneothersystemsengineer.Theyarenowdowntotwentyfivesystemsengineersinthecompany.Anumberofpeoplethatusedtobesystemsengineershavemovedontootherpositionsorjobs.—Chiefsystemsengineer,shipbuilding,U.S.A.5.4.3ComparingPerspectivesonIntegrationVariousattributesofintegrationheardrepeatedlyacrosstheinterviewswerecompiledandacomparisonoftheattributesfromorganizationswithgreaterandlesserlevelsofintegration,respectively,areshowninTable51.Thecharacteristicsandpracticesoforganizationswithgreaterintegrationareshownintherightcolumn,whilethecharacteristicsandpracticesoftheorganizationswithlesserintegrationareshownintheleftcolumn.NotethatthetextshowninTable51paraphrasesthepointsmadeintheinterviewsratherthanprovidingquotes,asdidtheprevioussections.

131Table51ComparisonofcharacteristicsandpracticesbetweenorganizationswithgreaterandlesserintegrationSource:PhaseIIandPhaseIIIresearch—interviewanalysis.OrganizationswithLesserIntegrationOrganizationswithGreaterIntegrationChallengingtokeepthesameprogrammanagerKeepthesameprofessionalsworkingandsystemsengineerworkingtogetherfromtogetherfromtheproposaldefinitionthebeginningTheprogrammanagerisinvolvedinLackofprocessownership,autonomytomakethetechnicalaspectsoftheprogramdecisionsfromthesystemsengineeringPrioritizeproductquality,perspectiveperformance,thencostandscheduleConflictofinterests.TheprogrammanagerHavetheprogrammanagerandprioritizesscheduleandcostoverproductsystemsengineerworkinginthesameaspectslocationLackoftransparencybetweenprogramCollaborativedecisionmaking,managementandsystemsengineeringteambasedworkingenvironmentDonotunderstandorrecognizethevalueofSharedresponsibilitytowardasystemsengineeringcommongoalLackofcultureofintegration;divergentorUnderstandthedifferences,culture,uncleargoalsandobjectivesbackground,andbehavioroftheCulturaldifferencesbetweenprogramdisciplinesmanagementandsystemsengineeringseenasHaveagoodworkingrelationshipbarriersbetweentheprogrammanagerandLackoftrust/respectforeachother'ssystemsengineerdiscipline/roleBecauseTable51isconstructedfromanalysisoftheinterviewresponses,theissuesareconsistentwiththeselectedquotesinSections5.4.1and5.4.2.However,thereisalsoconsistencyandoverlapbetweenthepracticesshowninTable51andtheinsightsgainedfromorganizationaltheorysummarizedinSection5.3,andfromthecasestudiesdiscussedpreviously,suggestingthattheinterviewfindingsareaddressingpracticesandissuesthathavebeenidentifiedacrossawiderangeofstudiesofbehaviorincomplexorganizationsspanningdecades.Theinterviewsampleusedtoconstructthispictureofintegrationwasrelativelysmall.Thiswasconductedasanexploratoryeffort,soconsiderableexperimentation,refinement,andvalidationstillliesahead.Nevertheless,basedonthebalanceofevidenceobtainedsofar,auseful(i.e.,usablebypracticingprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers)operationaldefinitionofintegrationshouldincludetheseelements:Programobjectives,definedbyoverallratherthanlocalizedordisciplinebasedsuccess

132factors,areheldincommonacrossalldisciplines.Theprogram'sconstituentdisciplinesunderstandandcommittoworktowardmeetingthoseprogramlevelobjectiveswithhighestpriority.Theprogram'sconstituentdisciplinesunderstandtheothers'rolesandhowtheycontributetoachievingtheobjectives.Thedisciplinesrespectanddefertotheothers'respectiveroles,levelsofauthority,andcontributionstoachievingtheobjectives.Themanagementteamactivelypromotescollaborationovercompetitionwithintheprogramandwithassociatedstakeholders.Theseelementsserveasastartingpointtoorientthereadertowardaworkingdefinitionofhowprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinescanworktogetherinamoreeffectiveandproductiveway.Theseelements,orpracticesiftheyareappliedwithinaspecificcontext,areguidelinesforeffectiveintegration.Theyareconsistentwithwhatmanywouldconsidertobeleadingpractices.Theyarenotaconcludingstatementonhowtoimproveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,althoughmanyorganizationswouldseesignificantimprovementsiftheyembracedthemintheiroperations.Rather,theyareawaypointinajourneytorefiningtheintegrationconcept.Theevidencecollectedthusfarsuggeststhatwhatdifferentiatestheorganizationsthatsuccessfullyintegratethesedisciplinesfromthosethatdonotreacheswellbeyondwhethertheyuseleadingpracticesornot.Thedifferenceisanorientationtowardintegrationthatinformsthechoiceofanumberofattributesandpracticesemployed,therelationshipsandattitudesofpeoplefromtoptobottom,andtheskillsthatarerewardedinanorganization.Akeyquestioniswhetherintegrationresultsfromsuccessfullyemployingasetofpracticesorwhetheritrepresentsanorientationtowardhowanorganization,itsfunctionaldisciplines,anditspeopleoperate,andwhatsetsofcapabilitiesandvaluesitdevelops.PartIIofthisbookwillexploretheseideasinmuchgreaterdetail.Inthemeantime,thischapterconcludeswithasynopsisofintegrationthatbeginstoframethisexploration.Definition:IntegrationofProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringIntegrationisareflectionoftheorganization'sabilitytocombineprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpractices,toolsandtechniques,experience,andknowledgeinacollaborativeandsystematicapproachinthefaceofchallenges,inordertobemoreeffectiveinachievingcommongoals/objectivesincomplexprogramenvironments.

1335.5SummaryIntegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctionsinorganizationscanbedescribedintermsofitsoutcomes—quotesfromprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersdescribedwhathappenedintheirorganizationswhenintegrationworkedandwhenitdidnot.Theevidencepresentedshowedthatatleastintuitively,ifnotexplicitly,themajorityoforganizationsaremakingatleastsomeattempttofosterintegrationbetweentheirprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.However,uponcloserinspection,onlyarelativelysmallproportionofrespondentsreportedthattheirorganizationshavefullyintegratedprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Thiswasconfirmedalsobythesmallnumberoforganizationsthatcommittedtoformalprograms,resources,ormethodstointegratethesefunctions.Partofthechallengeishavingasastartingpointauseful,multifacetedunderstandingofwhatintegrationbetweenthesedisciplinesentails.Itismorethanjusthavingandemployingasetofacceptedpracticesorstandards.Integrationreflectsastateofanorganizationanditsoperations.Assuchitisnotasimpleconcept,butratheramultidimensionalindicationofanumberofattributes,activities,andorientationsinoperationwithintheorganization.Onecangeneratealistofpracticesassociatedwithintegration—manydo—andsuchalistmaybetemporarilyhelpful,butperhapsultimatelydistractingfromtherealworkinorganizationsthatisdemandedbytrueintegration.Oneimportantcaveatisthatthediscussionsofarhasfocusedongreaterandlesserlevelsofintegrationandonitsrelationshipwithunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Whileitisimportanttoestablishaclearconceptofintegration,moreimportantstill(notleastwithpractitioners)iswhetherithasapositiveimpactonprogramoutcomes,includingoverallperformanceandbenefitsdelivered.Theanswertothatquestion,notsurprisingly,isthatintegrationdoespositivelyimpactprogramoutcomes.MoredetaileddiscussionofthoseimpactswilltakeplaceinChapters6and12.AttheconclusionofPartIofthisbook,theassessmentisthatthestakesarehigh—societydesperatelyneedsprogramstobemoresuccessfulthantheyarecurrently.Inthefuture,theneedfortheprogramsthatsupportanddeliverthesecomplexsociotechnicalsystemstobesuccessfulmayhavesocietalimpacts.Outcomesassociatedwiththeprevailingapproachestointegratingthesefunctionssuggestthatthereremainsignificantopportunitiesforimprovement.Therearerealreasonswhyintegrationischallenging,rangingfromthewayprofessionalsgain,maintain,andupdatetheirskills,totheorganizationalenvironmentsandprocessesinwhichthoseprofessionalsareengaged.Thegoodnewsisthattherearenumerousexamplesoforganizationsthatproduceexceptionaloutcomesbyoperatinginamoreintegratedfashion.Theyoffermanylessonsabouthowtoachievethislevelofperformancebydescribingthestrategies,policies,andmethodologiesusedtoachieveahigherlevelofintegration,andthusbetteroutcomesfortheorganizationanditsprojectsandprograms.Thefollowingchapterswillattempttoconveythoselessons.

1345.6DiscussionQuestions1.Whichoftheintegrationelementsdiscussedinthechapterseemmostrelevantinyourexperience?Whicharemostelusiveandwhy?2.Howwouldyougoaboutgaugingthelevelofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinyourorganization?Howdoesyourorganizationscoreonintegrationbetweenthesedisciplines?3.Doesyourorganizationhaveaformalanddeliberateapproachtointegratingtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines?Whatarethecurrentelementsorpractices?Whatnewformalpracticeswouldyouaddbasedonwhatyouhavelearnedfromthischapter?4.Doyoubelievethattrueintegrationbetweendisciplinesresultsfromapplicationofleadingintegratingpracticesorfromanunderlyingorientationtowardintegration?Why?5.Whataretheorganizationalimplicationsofthedefinitionofintegrationprovidedattheendofthechapter?Whatelementsorfunctionsoftheorganizationmustbeengagedtoincreasethelevelofintegrationintheorganizationaccordingtothisdefinition?6.Whatbenefitsoroutcomesattheprogramlevelmightyoupredictiftheprogramwereoperatinginafullyintegratedfashion?Iftherewerepoorlevelsofintegrationthroughouttheprograminstead?5.7ReferencesBarnard,C.I.(1968).Thefunctionsoftheexecutive.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.CMMI.(2010,November).CMMI®fordevelopment:Improvingprocessesfordevelopingbetterproductsandservices,Version1.3,CMMIProductTeam,CMU/SEI2010TR033.Conforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxDeal,T.E.,&Kennedy,A.A.(1982).Corporatecultures:Theritesandritualsofcorporatelife.Boston:AddisonWesleyPublishingCompany.Eisner,H.(2008).Essentialsofprojectandsystemsengineeringmanagement(3rded.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.Fiedler,F.E.(1964).Atheoryofleadershipeffectiveness.InL.Berkowitz(Ed.),Advancesinexperimentalsocialpsychology.NewYork:AcademicPress.

135HarperCollins.(2014).CollinsEnglishdictionary,completeandunabridged,(12thed.).NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers.Lawrence,P.R.,&Lorsch,J.W.(1967).Differentiationandintegrationincomplexorganizations.AdministrativeScienceQuarterly12(1),1–47.doi:10.2307/2391211Mayo,E.(1933).Thehumanproblemsofindustrialcivilization.NewYork:Macmillan.Schein,E.(1992).Organizationalcultureandleadership:Adynamicview.SanFrancisco:JosseyBass.Schein,E.(1996).Threeculturesofmanagement:Thekeytoorganizationallearning.SloanManagementReview,38(1),9–20.Taylor,F.W.(1917).Theprinciplesofscientificmanagement.NewYork:Harper.Weber,M.(1947).Thetheoryofsocialandeconomicorganizations(A.M.Henderson&T.Parsons,Trans.).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

136PartIIBUILDINGCAPABILITIESTOEFFECTIVELYEXECUTEENGINEERINGPROGRAMSPartIItakesadeeperdiveintotheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.ItstartswiththepresentationinChapter6ofanorganizingframeworkdevelopedthroughtheresearchunderlyingthisbookthatresultedintheIntegrationFramework.Theresearchfoundthatintegrationincludestheelementsofprocesses,practices,tools,organizationalenvironment,andpeoplewithintegrationcompetencies.Thefullframeworkcontainselementsthatprovidearoadmapforthecontentinthispartofthebook.Itshouldbenotedthattheknowledgefoundationforthisbookisnotjustrestrictedtotheformalresearchthathasbeendiscussedpreviously.BeginningparticularlyinPartII,othersourcesofinsightsaboutintegrationareintroducedtoprovidemoredetailedexamplesofpracticesandmethodssuitableforimplementation.Inmostcases,theseexamplesarebasedonpublishedstudies.Inotherscases,theyareanecdotal,drawnfrompractitioners'experience,butconsistentwithotherreportedevidenceofeffectiveintegrationpractices.Chapter7presentsacasestudyofthedevelopmentoftheF/A18E/FSuperHornetaircraft,acomplexprogramthatwasoneofthemostsuccessfulprogramsinU.S.militaryacquisitionhistory.Itprovidesacompellingexampleofhowintegrationplayedadefiningroleindeliveringdifferentiatedprogramandenterpriseperformance,andillustratestheapplicationoftheconceptsdiscussedintheIntegrationFramework.TheprincipalelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkareexplainedindetailinChapters8,9,and10.Chapter8explainshowtheformallycodifiedprocesses,practices,andtoolsinanorganizationhelptoenableintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andacrossotherfunctionalboundaries.Itincludesexamplesofpractices,tools,andtechniquesthatprovidestructureandcadencetowork,bothepisodicallyandpervasively,andthatemphasizeintegrationacrosstheprogramratherthanjusthighperformancewithinspecializeddisciplines.Chapter9showshowcommonroles,organizationalstructures,andculturalvaluesfosteranorganizationalenvironmentthatleadstoproductivecollaborationandsharinginsettingswheretasksorinteractionsareatypicalornonroutine.Ithighlightspracticesthatshapehowprogramparticipantsworkandinteractwithoneanother,anddeterminethenatureoftheirrelationships.Chapter10explorestheneedforindividuals,includingprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers,butalsootherteammembers,tohavetheproperskillsandbackgroundinordertofillthecriticalrolesneededtointegratethevariousfunctionsanddisciplinesinaprogramandcontributetooverallprogramsuccess.Thisneedismetthroughcarefulselectionofqualifiedprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers,developmentprogramsthatexpandandreinforcetheintegrationmindset,andtheavailabilityoforganizationalresourcesthatenableeffective

137collaborationinthefaceofbusinessandtechnicalchallenges.Chapter11examineshowthefocusonintegrationmightevolveoverthelifeofaprogram.Thischapterisintendedtoprovideaprogrammanagerorchiefsystemsengineeratimephasedperspectivetohelpframeimportantdecisionsabouttheelementsofintegrationthatshouldbeemphasizedatgivenpointsintheprogram.Atypicalprogramtimelineillustrateswhichintegrationactionsareappropriateatspecificprogramphases.PartIIconcludeswithChapter12andadiscussionofhowincreasedintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesproducesrealanddiversebenefitsinprograms.Thecoreelementsformeasuringintegrationincluderapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing.Thespecificbenefitsthatresultfromintegrationspanabroadrangeofperformanceindicatorsbeyondtraditionalprojectperformancemeasuresreflectingthevariouswaysthatprogramperformancecanbeimprovedthroughintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.AcasestudyoftheprogramtoprovideanimprovedtacticalelectronicsupportcapabilityforAnzacclassfrigatesfortheRoyalAustralianNavyillustratesthearrayofactivitiesandoutcomesthatdefineasuccessfulprogramthatreliesonintegrationforimprovedperformance.

1386HOWINTEGRATIONWORKSINPROGRAMS6.1IntroductionImprovingthelevelofintegrationisajourneythatwillbeuniquetoeachorganization.Thejourney'sultimategoalistodevelopandstrengthentheorganizationalandbehavioralcompetencesthatdrivehigherperformance,strongerteamengagement,andresultsthatleavecustomersdelighted.Frameworkscanhelporganizationalleadersandchangeagentsevaluatewheretheyare,wheretheywanttobe,andpossiblestepsfortransitioningfromacurrenttoanintendedfuturestate.Thischapterlaysoutaframeworkthatdefinesthekeyfactorsimpactingeffectiveintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines,andhowthosefactorslinktooverallprogramperformance.Theframeworkpresentedherehighlightshowvariousfactorsworkinconcerttoproduceoutcomesincomplexbehavioralnetworks.Sinceintegrationisamultifacetedconcept,thisframeworkexplainsthecoredimensionsandobservedpractices,organizationalapproaches,andskillsetsinusebysuccessfulprogramswithhighlevelsofintegration.Thisframeworkemergedfromthemultiyearresearchactivitiesdescribedinthebook'sintroduction.Theconceptspresentedherelayouttheresearchfindingsandestablishthebasicknowledgefoundationfortheframework.Thediscussionincludessomeexplanationoftheprocessbywhichtheframeworkemergedtobetterillustratesomeofitskeydimensionsandelements.ThefollowingsectionsinthischapterexplainingreaterdetailthisjourneyandpresenttheIntegrationFramework.Moredetailedexplanationsoftheelementsoftheframeworkarepresentedinsubsequentchapters.6.2TheIntegrationFrameworkTheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringisdefinedinthisbookas:areflectionoftheorganization'sabilitytocombineprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpractices,toolsandtechniques,experience,andknowledgeinacollaborativeandsystematicapproachinthefaceofchallenges,inordertobemoreeffectiveinachievingcommongoals/objectivesincomplexprogramenvironments.TheIntegrationFrameworkencompassessixmaindimensions,showninFigure61.Thecenteroftheframework,figurativelyandliterally,is“effectiveintegration.”Ontherightsideistheprogramperformancedimension.Multiplefindingsfromtheresearchindicatedthatgreaterintegrationleadstoimprovedprogramperformance.ThisevidenceisdiscussedindetailinChapter12.

139Figure61:TheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringOntheleftsideoftheframeworkarefourdimensionsthatwhencombinedcontributetogreaterintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Thesedimensionsareprocesses,practices,andtools;organizationalenvironment;peoplecompetencies;andcontextualfactors.IneachdimensionshowninFigure61thereareseveralvariablesandassociatedelements.Thefollowingsubsectionsexamineeachdimensioninmoredetail,definethedimension,andhighlightsomeofthekeyinsightsthatemergedduringtheresearchonintegration.Oneobjectiveofthisframeworkistocharacterizeintegrationasanorganizationalandbehavioralcompetencethroughtheelaborationofthemultipleintegrationfactors.Evidencefromtheresearchsuggeststhattheindividualelements,suchasprocesses,practices,andtoolsfromprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringareas,arejustonepieceofalargerpuzzleoforganizationalcapabilities.6.2.1DimensionI:Processes,Practices,andToolsTheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdimensionfeatures:TheuseofmultiplestandardsThecleardefinitionofrolesandresponsibilitiesfortheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,aswellastheteammembersinvolvedinprogramexecutionThefrequentassessmentoftheuseofstandardizedleadingpracticesandprocessesTheuseofsystemsorprocessesthatbridgetheboundariesbetweendisciplinesinthe

140programinordertoimprovecommunicationandinformationsharingFigure62illustratesthesekeyelementsoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdimensionidentifiedduringtheresearchonintegration.Figure62:Keyelementsoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkManyorganizationsacrossavarietyofindustriesrecognizethevalueofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,whetherbuildinganuclearpowerplantordevelopinganITsystemforapublictransportationcompany.Oftenthewaytheknowledgeandpracticesinthesedisciplinesareassessedisthroughthediscipline'sstandardsandpublishedknowledgebase.ThePhaseIresearchfoundthattheuseofstandardsfromeachdomain,respectively,wasstronglyalignedwiththeformalroleofthepractitioner.Thatis,thesystemsengineersusedsystemsengineeringstandardsalmostexclusivelyandtheprogrammanagersusedprogramandprojectmanagementstandardsalmostexclusively(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013).Theanalysisshowedthatthedegreeofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwassubstantiallylowerinorganizationsthatwerenotusingstandardsfromboththosedisciplines(Reiner,2015).NearlytwothirdsoftherespondentsfromthePhaseIVintegrationsurveyindicatedthattheirorganizationsusedatleastonestandardfromboththeprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdomains(Reiner,2015).Theanalysisfoundthatthoseorganizationsusingbothstandardsshowedgreaterintegrationperformancecomparedwithorganizationsthatdidnotusecombinedstandards.Oneprogrammanagerdescribedhisorganization'sapproachthisway:“[W]etookthebestpartof

141eachapproachtobuildourownapproachanddefinemethodstobecustomizedtoeverysingleprogram,”(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013).Theuseofmultiplestandardsfrombothdisciplinesshedslightonateam'sabilitytocreate“hybrid”methodologies.Inthiscontext,ahybridmethodologycanbedefinedas:Thecombinationofprinciples,practices,techniquesandtoolsfromdifferentmanagementapproachestodevelopasystematicprocessaimedtofitthemanagementcapabilitytothebusinesscontextandneedsandspecifictypesofprograms.Thegoalistomaximizeprogramperformanceandproductresults,andallowtheteamtobalancepredictabilitywithflexibility,reducerisksandincreaseinnovation,inordertodeliverbetterresultstothebusinessandaddedvaluetoallstakeholders(translatedfromConforto,Barreto,Amaral,&Rebentisch,2015).Morerecently,researchonorganizationalagilityshowedthathybridmanagementframeworksareemergingtodealwithincreasinglydiversesetsofprogramchallengesandcontexts,andmorecomplexandinnovativeprogramenvironments(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Amaral,2014).Teamsmustbeabletocombineandtailorstandards,managementapproaches,practices,andtoolstocreatehybridmethodologiesspecificallydesignedtotheirprogram'sneedsandchallenges.Establishingclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilitiesforbothprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersemergedasoneofthemainfactorsthatcontributedtointegration(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Significantoverlapbetweentheprimaryresponsibilitiesofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerswasobservedinafewareas(e.g.,riskmanagement,lifecycleplanning,externalsupplierrelations).AsdiscussedinChapter5,however,thelackofclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerswasreportedasaprimarysourceofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.ThePhaseIstudy(Conforto,Rossietal.,2013)showedthatalmosthalfoftheorganizationshadclearlyandformallydefinedprogrammanagerjobpositions,whereasonlyonethirdhadformallydefinedchiefsystemsengineerpositions.Usingregular,formalassessmentsoftheprogrammanager'sandsystemsengineer'spracticesandcapabilitiesisanotherelementthatimprovesintegration.Morethantwothirdsofthe“fullyintegrated”organizationsinthePhaseIresearchindicatedthattheyusedassessmentsregularlytoensureintegration,ultimatelyreducingunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Thesamesurveyshowedthatsixoutoftenorganizationsusedtheresultsoftheassessmentstomakeprocessimprovementsfocusedonspecificareasofcompetency(Conforto,Rossietal.,2013).Theseassessmentsareassociatedwithaformalizedapproachtointegration,whichwasalsolinkedtogreaterlevelsofintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.ThePhaseIstudy(Conforto,Rossietal.,2013)didnotfocusindetailonspecificprocesses,practices,andtoolsusedbyprogramsandorganizationstoimproveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.However,subsequentinterviewswith16

142professionalsfromvariousindustrysectorsrevealedthatprocesses,practices,andtoolswereanessentialpartoftheireffortstobetterintegratethosedisciplines(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Awidevarietyofpracticeswerementioned—eachselectedandtailoredforthetaskbeingperformedbythespecificorganization.Theseincludedintegratedplanningandproblemsolvingstrategiesandtheuseofintegratedperformancemeasurementsystems(i.e.,keyperformanceindicators).Acommonthemeinthesetoolsandpracticesisthattheystructureprogramactivitiesinawaythatnaturallyspansboundariesandbringstogetherdifferentperspectivesanddisciplinesduringthecourseoftheworkoftheprogram.Chapter8providesamorewiderangingdiscussionandpracticalexamplesofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationtools,processes,techniques,andmethodsthathelpspandisciplineboundariesinprograms.6.2.2DimensionII:OrganizationalEnvironmentThePhaseIIandIIIresearch(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014)foundcleardifferencesbetweenhighlyintegratedandlessintegratedorganizationsondimensionsassociatedwiththe“organizationalenvironment.”Organizationalenvironmentisabroadconceptthatencompassesadiversesetofvariables.Forinstance,somedescribeorganizationalcultureasthewaybywhichorganizationsindicatetoorganizationalparticipantswhatisimportantfororganizationaleffectiveness(Deal&Kennedy,1982;Schneider,1987).Itdefineswhatthecompanyrewards,supports,andexpects.Integrationorientedorganizationalcharacteristicsdefinethesetofelementsthatarerelevanttoachievinggreaterdegreesofintegration.Figure63summarizessomeofthekeyelementsoftheorganizationalenvironmentdimensionbasedonmultipleresearchfindings(Becerril,Rebentisch,Chucholowski,Conforto,&Lindemann,2016;Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013;Conforto,Rossietal.,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).

143Figure63:KeyelementsoftheorganizationalenvironmentdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkOneoftheelementsoftheorganizationalenvironmentdimensionisto“promotetherightculture”regardingintegration.Thismeansdevelopingacultureoftrust,openness,andcollaborationandsharedresponsibilitybetweenprofessionalsfromdifferentareasoftheorganization.Discussionswithprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineershighlightedthepotentialforconflictsrelatedtotheirrespectivegoalsandresponsibilities.Bothmayhavesimilarinformationandbeworkingsidebyside,buthaveverydifferentresponsibilitiesandpriorities.Whilethesystemsengineeringprioritymaybetodeliverasystemthatcanbeverifiedagainstitsrequirementsandvalidatedbythecustomer,programmanagementisfocusedondeliveringthatsystemwithinoptimizedcostandscheduleandallprogramrequirementsinordertoachievethebenefitsandresultsexpected.ThePhaseIIandIIIresearch(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014)identifiedtheseelementsofaculturethatpromotesintegration:clearandsharedgoals;aworkingenvironmentbasedontrust,respect,andcollaboration;empoweringboththeprogrammanagerandthesystemsengineerwithacertaindegreeofautonomy,butprovidingstrongsupportforacollaborativedecisionmakingprocess;andclearlystatingthatbothresponsibilitiesarecentraltointegrationandprogramperformance.Acriticalthreadthatrunsthroughtheseelementsisknowledgesharing.Itisaprimaryenableroftrust,collaboration,andshareddecisionmaking.Italsoisnecessaryiftheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineeraregoingtobeabletoworkwithadegreeofautonomyintheirowndomainswithoutcreatingconflicts.Knowledgesharingisthelifebloodofacollaborative,

144multidisciplinaryenvironment.However,thereareanumberofchallengestothefreeflowofknowledgeinorganizations.Veryoftenorganizationshavetodealwithissuesrelatedtothetendencyofteamsandpeople,departments,andbusinessunitstofocusinward.Inpotentiallyeveryorganization,theremaybebehaviorsthatnegativelyimpactintegration,therebypreventingtheorganizationfromestablishingtherightenvironment.Amongthosemostcommonlyidentifiedintheresearchwere:Culturaldifferencesbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Thisresultsfromdivergentbackgroundsandassignedrolesandresponsibilitiesintheprogram.Conflictsofinterestorhiddenagendas,suchasdepartmentsorgroupshavingdiverseprioritiesthatarenotcleartoeveryparticipantintheprogram,especiallytheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer.Lackofprocessownershipwithautonomytomakedecisionsfromtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringperspectives.Lackoftrustorrespectforeachother'sdisciplineorrole.Participantsnotvaluingtheothers'contributionstoachievingthebestoutcome.Itistheresponsibilityoftheorganization'sleadershiptoactivelypromoteintegrationandshapetheculture.Rewardandrecognitionaswellasstrongexecutivesupportmaybemanifestinmanyways.Forinstance,howleadersrespondtochallengesorunforeseeneventsinprogramscanprofoundlyshapetheorganizationalenvironment.Notdiscouragingorpunishingpeoplewhoraiseissues,problems,orriskssendsaclearsignalthatknowledgesharingishighlyvalued.Integrationcanbehamperedifproblemsorissuesarenotproperlycommunicatedandaddressed.ThePhaseIVresearchresultsshowedthatthedegreeofintegrationcorrelatedwithhowactivelyanddirectlytheleaderswereinvolvedindevelopingandpromotingcollaborativebehaviorsamongprogramteammembers(Reiner,2015).Byidentifying,rewarding,andrecognizingactionsthatleadtogreaterintegration,theorganization'sleadersshowthatintegrationisimportantandrelevantfortheprogram'sperformanceandbusinessresults.Inadditiontostrongexecutivesupport,havingaclearstrategyforincreasingintegrationwillcontributetocreatingtherightenvironmentandtheorganizationalconditionstopromoteandincreaseintegration.Promotingtheappropriateculture,valuingknowledgesharing,rewardingandrecognizingpeople,andpromotingstrongexecutivesupportarejustasnecessaryashavingtherightprocesses,practices,andtoolstohelpimprovethedegreeofintegrationintheorganization.Chapter9providesanindepthdiscussionandpracticalexamplesregardingtheelementsrelatedtotheorganizationalenvironmentdimension.6.2.3DimensionIII:PeopleCompetenciesAccordingtorecentresearch,talentdeficienciessignificantlyhamper40%ofstrategyimplementationefforts(PMI,2014,p.3).Helpingindividualsdeveloptheirskillsandabilities

145isacomplexandcontinuoustaskforcompanies.Itrequireslongterminvestmentandstrongleadershipandmanagementsupportinordertoreachoutstandinglevelsthatwillhelporganizationscreatesocalled“highperforming”teams.Individualcompetenceisgenerallyrecognizedasthecombinationof:Knowledge,experience,andinformationSkills,includingtechnicalcapabilitiestoperformacertainjobactivityAttitude,whichmeansbeingabletoapplytheknowledgeandskillstosolveaproblemorperformagiventaskThepeoplecompetenciesdimensionfocusesonhoworganizationsdevelopcompetenciesinpeoplesotheycanparticipateinandenabletheintegrationoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Peoplecompetencies(seeFigure64)inthiscontextfocusonelementsfoundintheintegrationresearchthatarerelevanttodevelopingintegrationcapabilitiesinprogramteams.Individuals,includingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringteammembers,musthavetheproperskillsandbackgroundinordertofilltheroles;employtheprocesses,methods,andtools;andcocreatetheorganizationalenvironmentneededtointegratethevariousfunctionsanddisciplinesinaprogramandcontributetooverallprogramsuccess.Figure64:KeyelementsofthepeoplecompetenciesdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkExperienceinvariousrolesrelatestoone'sgeneralunderstandingofhowworkisdoneandwhatisrequiredforsuccessineachdomain.Inthecontextofintegration,thisdoesnot

146necessarilyimplythatprogrammanagersmusthaveworkexperienceasachiefsystemsengineerinordertoenabletheintegrationofthetwodisciplines.Insomeorganizations,anaturalcareerprogressionisfromengineertoprogrammanagerthroughaseriesofassignments,andindeedsomepeoplemayfunctionasbothprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineeroralternatebetweenthetwofunctions.However,itmaynotbepossibleinallcasestohaveonepersonfilltheroleofbothprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,orevendesirableinsometechnicallychallengingorcomplexprograms.ThePhaseIVstudyfoundthatonlyonequarteroftheprogrammanagershadservedasachiefsystemsengineerpreviously.Incontrast,71%ofthechiefsystemsengineersdeclaredtheyhadservedasaprogrammanageratsomepoint(Reiner,2015).ThePhaseIVresearchalsoshowedthatgreaterintegrationperformancecorrelatespositivelytotheaccumulatedyearsofprofessionalexperience,withmoreexperienceassociatedwithahigherdegreeofintegration(Reiner,2015).Generallyspeaking,withgreaterexperience,andperhapsincreasedexposuretodifferentperspectives,comesimprovedintegrationbetweenthedisciplines.Interviewshighlightedtheneedforlearningandskilldevelopmenttoenableprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerstohaveatleastaminimalunderstandingoftheprinciples,keyconcepts,andpracticesofeachfield(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Othercommonthemesthatemergedfromtheinterviewsassociatedwithgreaterdegreesofintegrationincluded:Opportunitiestoreceiveformaleducationandtrainingtohelpeachdisciplineunderstandtheother'sperspectiveSelectingthecoreprogrammanagementteamtocomprisepeoplefrommultipleskillandcompetencybackgroundstoincreasethelikelihoodofmakingbetterinformeddecisionsthroughoutthedurationoftheprogramFocusingoncommunicationskillsimprovementsothatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerscreateamorecollaborativeandparticipativeworkingrelationshipAprogrammanagerworkingforamanufacturingcompanyinthecapitalgoodsandmachinerysectorillustratedthechallengesthat,inmanycases,mustbeovercomebyskilledleaders.Generally,programsinthisorganizationhaveapproximately300professionalsontheteam,andatypicalprogramlastsforaminimumofoneyear.Itwaschallengingfortheprogrammanagertoreportprogresstoexecutivemanagement.Theprogrammanagerwasresponsibleforcarryingoutplanningrevisionsinordertoadjustthescheduletotheexecutionandprogramgoals.Thesystemsengineersseemedtoknowwhattheyhadtodoanddidnotappeartocaremuchaboutthestatusreporting.Theprogrammanagerfeltthatthechiefsystemsengineerdidnotunderstandthevalueofthereport,andthisbehaviorwasaffectingprogrammanagementactivities.Inthiscase,thecommunicationprocesswasnotdefined,andtherewaslittleunderstandingofeachother'sroleinandcontributionstotheprogram.Thismightbeduetoalackofunderstandingofeachother'sactivities(knowledgecontributions),orsimplyreflectanattitudeofdiscountingtheimportanceofeachother'sroleintheprogramthatledtoabreakdownincommunications.ThePhaseIIandIIIresearchfoundindividualcompetenciesthatcanimproveintegration

147betweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,includinggoodleadershipandcommunicationskills,comprehensiveunderstandingofthemainprinciples,concepts,andprocessesofeachdiscipline,andafastlearningattitude(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Developingtherightsetofcompetenciesfortheworkoftheprogramiskeytointegrationperformanceandprogramsuccess;therefore,organizationsshouldconsistentlypromoteformaleducationandongoingtraininginbothdisciplinessoparticipantsineachcanlearnfromtheotherandsharetheirdifferentexperiencesandknowledgemoreeffectively(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Chapter10discussesingreaterdetailthedevelopmentofintegrationcompetenciesinpeople.6.2.4DimensionIV:ContextualFactorsThefourthdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkcapturescontextualfactorsthatmaypositivelyornegativelyimpactthedegreeofintegrationinagivenprogramandbusinesscontext.Someoftheelementsofcontextualfactorsidentifiedduringtheintegrationresearchinclude:ProgramcharacteristicssuchasthesizeoftheprogramThenumberofentitiesinvolved(e.g.,suppliers,partners,clients)Theteamcharacteristicssuchasteamsize,location,andworkloadTheorganizationstructure,forexampleprojectorganizationstructure,matrix,orfunctionalorganization(PMI,2013b)Elementsrelatedtostakeholders,suchasthedegreeofalignmentbetweenthestakeholdersintheprogramTheseelementsaresummarizedinFigure65.

148Figure65:KeyelementsofthecontextualfactorsdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkBecausetherearepotentiallymanyfactorsthatinfluenceintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines,andsubsequentlyimpactprogramperformance,identifyingthemisimportanttodevelopingandtailoringanappropriatestrategyforintegration.Thisshouldbedonethroughoutthelifeoftheprogram,but,moreimportantly,beginningintheearlystagesofanewprogram.Eveninthesameorganizationthesefactorsmayvaryfromoneprogramtoanother.Theresearchrevealedseveralprogramcharacteristicsthatmaybeassessedinordertodevelopatailoredapproachtointegrationforaspecificprogram.Forexample:Useofemergingtechnologies.Whatarethechallenges,unknowns,andknowledgenecessarytoaddresstheprogramspecificproblems?Whatdisciplinesmustcontributeandhowwilltheirknowledgebeintegratedwithintheprogram?Programpace.Howurgentlydoestheprogramneedtobecompletedandatwhatpacethebenefitsdelivered?Doestherelativedegreeofurgencyrequireclosecoordinationacrossdisciplineorstakeholderboundariesoranadaptationoftheprogramstrategy?Programstability.Doproductorclientrequirementschangefrequentlyduringthecourseoftheprogram,orarethereunclearandfrequentchangesintheobjectivesandgoalsoftheprogram?Numberofstakeholdersorentitiesinvolvedintheprogram.Willthecomplexityoftheactivitiesandthevolumeoftechnicalandmanagementdecisionsbecomeanimportant

149considerationindefininghowtherelationshipsbetweenfunctionsaredefined?Relevanceoftheprogramasapartofthecompany'sportfolioinfulfillmentofitsstrategicplan.Isthisprogramparticularlyimportantwithinitsportfolio,andhowmightthataffectthewaytheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerapproachdevelopinggreaterdegreesofintegration?ThePhaseIVresearchfoundcorrelationsbetweenanumberofteamcharacteristicssuchasprogrammanagers,chiefsystemsengineers,andthecoreteamworkinginclosegeographicalproximity,“positiveattitudetowardschallenges,”“sharedandcommonvisionofwhatshallbecreatedintheprogram,”andhowquicklythe“PM[programmanager]receivesrequestedinformationfromtheteammembers,”withfactorsassociatedwithgreaterintegration,suchas“efficiencyofcommunicationbetweenPM[programmanager]andCSE[chiefsystemsengineer]”(Reiner,2015).ThisisillustratedbyaprogrammanagerfromaglobalITsolutionsproviderforgovernmentanddefensewhoobservedthat,dependingonthesizeoftheprogram,thecompanyexecutiveswillassignoneprogrammanagerandonesystemsengineer,andtheyusuallyworktogetheras“oneteam.”Theywillbelocatedinthesameofficetofacilitatemorefrequentinteractionstodiscussprogramrelatedissues,tomakemorerapiddecisions,and,ultimately,positivelyimpactintegration.Theimportanceofteamcharacteristicsmayvaryfromoneorganizationtoanother,andhoweachcharacteristicisexpressedinformationoftheteammayinfluence(positivelyornegatively)howintegratedthedisciplinesare.Somegeneralteamcharacteristicstoconsiderwhentailoringtheapproachtoincreasingintegrationincludeteamsize,(co)location,workloadandtimeallocationtotheprogram,teamstructure,anddegreeofleadershipinvolvementintheworkoftheteam.ThevehiclemakerTeslaaddressesanumberoforganizationalfactorsinthewayitorganizesthedevelopmentofitselectriccars.First,thecompanyhiresprofessionalswithdemonstratedabilitytosolvecomplexproblems(apeoplecompetenciesdimension).Thenthecompanyorganizestheseprofessionalsinsmallandcolocatedteams(acontextualfactorsdimension).Thisimprovescommunicationandallowsthemtomakedecisionsfaster.Forexample,theteaminchargeofcreatingthedesignoftheTeslaModelSwasformedbythechiefdesignerandateamofthreedesignerssittingnexttotheirteammateengineers.Teslaleadershiparguesthattheir“communicationallowsthemtomoveincrediblyfast”(Dyer,Gregersen,&Furr,2015).Informationsharing(i.e.,communication)isoneofthekeyelementsofeffectiveintegration.Theorganizationalstructure,thethirdelementinthecontextualfactorsdimension,mayaffectthespecificapproachusedtoincreaseintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwithinaprogram.Thelevelandtypesofcommunicationandcollaborationbetweenthedisciplines,andtheircounterpartsacrosstheorganization,maybeshapedbythefollowingcharacteristics:Thenumberofentities(e.g.,suppliers,partners,clients,otherorganizations)thataredirectlyinvolvedintheprogramTheprogramdependenceonotherprogramsthatmustbeexecutedsimultaneously

150ThenumberofemployeesallocatedtoworkfulltimeintheprogramversusthenumberworkingparttimeThealignmentbetweentheorganization'sstrategicgoalsandtheclientrequirementsforthespecificprogramStakeholderalignmentisinmanywaysrelatedtoandcomplementarywithorganizationalstructure.Itinvolvescoordinatingtherespectivegoalsandactionsofthevariousprogramstakeholderssothattheyconstructivelyproducetheprogrambenefits.AnexamplethatillustratesthisistheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration's(NASA,2011)MarsScienceLaboratory,partoftheMarsExplorationProgramandperhapsbestknownforitsCuriosityRovercomponent.Aprogramofthissizeandcomplexityisimpossibletobeexecutedwithouttheinvolvementandcontributionofmanyinstitutions.Theentireprogramwasstructuredwithmultiplepartnersandsuppliers(multipleteams)workinginatightlycoordinatedprocess.TheJetPropulsionLaboratoryandNASAservedastheprogrammanagementofficewithmanyprofessionalsorchestratingmultipleprojectsacrossdifferentinstitutions(governmentandprivate)tobuildalloftheequipmentnecessarytoaccomplishthemission.Theseexamplesillustratetheintegrationfactorsthat,dependingontheprogramcontext,maypositivelyornegativelyimpacttheoveralllevelandapproachtointegrationandwillaffectoverallprogramoutcomes.Becausetherearemanyaspectsthatcaninfluenceintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,theorganizationmustbeabletoproperlyidentifyandmanagethevariouscontextualfactorsthatmayinfluenceintegration.ThecontextualfactorsofintegrationarediscussedandillustratedinexamplesacrossmultiplechaptersinthisbookincludingChapters11and14.6.2.5DimensionV:EffectiveIntegrationEffectiveintegrationisthecoredimensionoftheframework;itisthe“heart”ofthemodel.Integrationisindustryagnosticandappliestoalltypesofprograms,albeitindifferentformsdependingonthecontextoftheprogram.Intheprevioussections,thefourdimensionsoftheIntegrationFramework,includingprocesses,practices,andtools;organizationalenvironment;peoplecompetencies;andcontextualfactors,weredescribed.TheEffectiveIntegrationdimensionisaresultofacombinationofthesefourdimensions.Itisimportanttounderstandthateffectiveintegrationcomprisesthreekeyelements,showninFigure66:rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing.Thesethreeelementsarepresentinvaryingdegreesineveryprogramwhetheritissmallorlarge,irrespectiveoftheobjective(aproduct,abuilding,adam,abridge,oraspacecraft),andregardlessoftheindustrysector.

151Figure66:KeyelementsoftheeffectiveintegrationdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkThePhaseIIandIIIresearchidentifiedthatprogramswitheffectiveintegrationhavearapidandeffectivedecisionmakingprocessbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringprofessionals.Inthisprocessbothprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineershavetheauthorityandautonomytoexecutetheirrespectiveresponsibilitiesandthenproducedecisionscollaboratively.Rapidandeffectivedecisionmakingalsoresultsfromanumberofotherbehaviors,suchas:Theinvolvementofallmembersoftheprogramexecutionteam,aswellastheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerinthedecisionmakingprocess.Thismeansthatallteammembersaredirectlyengagedandactivelyparticipatinginthisprocess.Theprogrammanagertakesintoaccounttechnicalgoals.Besidesmanagementgoals(i.e.,cost,time,programbenefits,businessvalue,etc.),theprogrammanageralsoconsiderstechnicalgoalsascriticaltotheprogram(e.g.,requirements,specifications)whenprioritizingtasksormakingdecisions.Thechiefsystemsengineerconsidersmanagementgoalswhenprioritizingtasksormakingdecisions.Identificationandalignmentofthefinalauthoritytoconfirmadecision.Forinstance,asindicatedbysomewhoparticipatedintheresearch,theprogrammanagermademostofthefinalprogrambusinessdecisions,especiallythosethatdirectlyimpactscheduleandbudget.Thechiefsystemsengineerwasmainlyresponsiblefortechnicaldecisions.Rapidandeffectivedecisionmakingalsodependsonhavingclearlydefinedauthorityintheprogram.Thelackofacleardefinitionofauthoritywasthesecondmostcitedsourceofunproductivetensionbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers(Conforto,Rossi

152etal.,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014).Insomeorganizationsonlytheprogrammanagerhasthepowertomakedecisionsrelatedtotheprogram.Eventhoughthedecisionmaybelargelytechnical,theprogrammanagerwillstillhavethefinalcall.Thesecondkeyelementofeffectiveintegrationiseffectivecollaborativework.Acocreationattitudeandsharedaccountabilitycharacterizeacollaborativeworkenvironment.Valuingandpromotingcollaborationovercompetitionwasoneofthemostcitedcharacteristicsbyprofessionalswhodescribedtheirprogramsaswellintegrated.Thismeansthatbothprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerhaveasharedsetofobjectivesdefinedbythesuccessoftheoverallcombinedeffort.Itdefineswithclarityandunderstandingeachmember'sroleandhowtheycollaborativelycontributeinordertoachieveagreaterresult.Finally,itmeansrespectingthevalueofothers'roleandcontributiontoachievingtheobjectives.DuringthePhaseIIandIIIresearchinterviews(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014),achiefsystemsengineerinanaerospaceprogramnotedthathefacedamajorproblem.Theprogrammanagerwaspushingtheprogramtoadecisiongate,buttheteamneededmoretimetodetailandcompleteallthespecificationsrelatedtoasupplier.Eventhoughtheprogrammanagerwaspushinghardtomeetthedeadline,theteamhadagreedthatmoretimewasneededtocreategoodspecifications.Intheend,theprogrammanagerunderstoodthatitwasnotagoodideatoforceadeliverableoutandjeopardizequalityoverschedule,whichmightresultinmassivereworkandadditionalcosts.Someofthekeyfactorsrelatedtocollaborativeworkthatcanimproveintegrationperformanceinclude:Broadinterestandinvolvementoftheprogrammanagerintechnicalaspectsoftheprogram.Theprogrammanagerispositivelyengagedinandcommittedtoresolvingtechnicalissues.Thesameappliestothechiefsystemsengineerwhoispositivelyengagedinandcommittedtoresolvingprogrammanagementissues.Teammembersembracechallenges.Theycollaborativelytackleproblemsandchallengeswithenthusiasmandcommitment.Theteammembershaveasharedandcommonvisionofwhatshouldbecreatedbytheprogram.Theyhaveasharedsetofprioritiesanddesiredresults.Thethirdelementoftheintegrationdimensioniseffectiveinformationsharing.Informationsharingisrelatedtothetypeofcommunicationandexchangeofinformationordatanecessarytoplan,execute,andsuccessfullydeliveraprogram.AccordingtoConway'sLaw(Conway,1968)anorganizationthatdesignsasystem(broadlydefined)willproduceadesignwhosestructureisacopyoftheorganization'scommunicationstructure.Forsuchanorganization,Chase(1974)suggeststhatfacilitatingcommunicationsisanessentialfunction.Traditionally,thetaskofensuringcommunicationsamongstakeholdersisconsideredtobearesponsibilityoftheprogrammanager(PMI,2013a).Informationsharingisrelatedtoprocessindicatorssuchastimetoretrieveinformation,accesstoinformationwhenitisneeded,informationavailabilitytoallteammembers,etc.,which,whenimproved,canleadtogreaterintegration.BasedonthePhaseIVresearch(Reiner,2015),theeffectiveinformationsharing

153dimensionincludes:Theeffectivenessofthecommunicationsbetweentheprogrammanagerandthechiefsystemsengineer.Howeffectiveisthecommunicationbetweenthesetworolesandbetweenteammembers?Timeforacquisitionofnecessaryinformationforbothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Forexample,howlongdoesittypicallytaketorequestandreceivenecessaryinformationaboutanyaspectoftheprogram,whethertechnicalormanagementrelated?Informationtransparency.Doallteammembershaveaccesstoallprogramrelatedinformationthattheyneedtoperformtheirjobssuccessfully?Insummary,thethreeelementsofeffectiveintegration,rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing,areindicatorsofthestateofintegrationintheprogram.Eachelementhasitsrespectivesetofindicatorstobedefinedinorganizationsandprograms.Chapter12providesamoredetaileddiscussiononhowintegrationismeasuredanditsimpactonoverallprogramperformance.6.2.6DimensionVI:ProgramPerformanceAnimportantprincipleoftheIntegrationFrameworkistheimportanceofdefiningcleargoalsforintegration.Whatarethekeyoutcomestheorganizationexpectsfromachievinggreaterintegration?Itcouldbetoreducescheduleoverruns,improvethequalityofbudgetmanagement,increaseclientsatisfaction,raisetechnicalquality,etc.ThisdimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkdealswiththeperformanceoftheprogramintermsoftangibleandintangiblemanagementandtechnicalindicatorsandoutcomesaswellastheoverallprogrambenefitsandresults.Intheresearchonintegration,noneoftheprofessionalsinterviewedrevealedthattheyhadclearlydefinedobjectivesrelatedtointegrationitself.Inotherwords,theseorganizationsdidnothavespecificgoalsforintegrationanddidnothavedefinedmetricstomeasureintegration.Manyorganizationsmeasuresuccessbasedonschedule,budget,andscopeforbothprojectsandprograms.Researchshowsthatoneofthekeychallengesintheprogrammanagementdomainisbenefitsrealization.Unlikeprojectsthathavedefineddeliverableswhosevalueisgenerallylinkedtocustomersatisfaction,scope,budget,andtime,programsaredesignedtodeliverabroaderarrayofbusinessbenefits.Thosebenefitscanrangefromnewcapabilitiestofinancialreturntoopeningnewmarkets.Butthosebenefitsareoftendeliveredthroughoutthelifeoftheprogram,whichcanlastformanyyears.Itisimportantalsotodefinespecificgoalsrelatingtothedevelopmentofintegration(i.e.,itsassociatedcapabilities,andhowitistobemeasured)andthenputtingtherightprocessesandmeasuresinplacetocapturethosebenefits.Programperformancecanbemeasuredusingvariousperspectives.Oneperspectivedealswiththeperformanceoftheproductandtheresultingoutcomeoftheprogram.Measurescanvaryfromtheproductfeaturestobenefitsfortheusers.Anotheristheprogramperformanceaccordingtoitsmanagementperspective,includingcompany'sshareholders,executives,andsoon.Forexample,theprogramwascompletedontime,withinbudget,producedtheexpected

154financialreturn,anddeliveredtheexpectedtangibleandintangiblebenefits.Figure67showsfourprogramperformanceindicatorsusedtoexploretheimpactofgreaterintegration(Reiner,2015).Theindicatorsproposedarefairlygenericandcouldbeusedforawiderangeofprogramtypes.However,itisrecommendedthateachorganizationdevelopitsownsetofoutcomerelatedperformanceindicatorsbasedonitsownobjectives,andthenfromthoseidentifylinkstointegration.Figure67:KeyelementsoftheprogramperformancedimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkTheanalysisofthePhaseIVresearch(Reiner,2015)foundapositivecorrelationbetweengreaterlevelsofintegrationandbetterprogramperformance.Oftwogroups,onewithgreaterlevelsofintegrationandanotherwithlesserlevelsofintegration,thegroupwithgreaterlevelsofintegrationalsohadhigherlevelsofprogramperformance.Chapter12describesindetailthekeyvariablesrelatedtorapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,collaborativework,andinformationsharingthatwillimpactprogramperformanceandhowtheseelementsarecorrelatedwiththeotherdimensionsoftheIntegrationFramework.Figure68providesacompleteoverviewoftheIntegrationFrameworkwithitssixdimensionsandallkeyelementsasdiscussedinthischapter.Thefollowingchaptersofthisbookaddressindetailthecoredimensionsofthisframework.Chapter8describespractices,tools,andtechniques(DimensionI)relatedtoimprovedintegration.Chapter9discussestheorganizationalenvironmentelementsrelatedtoimprovedintegration(DimensionII).Chapter10describesthepeoplecompetenciesthatpositivelyimpactintegration(DimensionIII).The

155contextualfactors(DimensionIV)arediscussedacrossmultiplechaptersandaresupportedbymultiplecasespresentedinthisbook,includingtheonesinChapters7,12,and14.Chapter12specificallyaddresseshoweffectiveintegration(DimensionV)impactsprogramperformance(DimensionVI).Figure68:ThecompleteIntegrationFrameworkwithalldimensionsandkeyelements6.3SummaryTheframeworkpresentedinthischaptershowsthekeyfactorsassociatedwiththeintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesinprogramsandorganizationsbasedonresearchconductedoverathreeyearperiod.Integrationisnotsimplythecombinationofstandards,practices,tools,andtechniquesanddefiningrolesandjobresponsibilities.Instead,itisabroadconceptthatencompassesmultipledimensionsoftheorganizationandtheprogram,anditisgroundedinthreekeyelements:Rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking

156EffectivecollaborativeworkEffectiveinformationsharingInordertodevelopthiscapability,organizationalleaderswouldbewisetoinvestindevelopingpeoplecompetencies;nurturingtheappropriateorganizationalenvironment;theadoptionoftherightpractices,tools,andtechniques;andtheimplementationofprocessestoidentifyandimprovecontextualfactorsthatmayimpactintegrationand,consequently,programperformance.Thereareafewactionsthatmightbeusefultoorganizationsthataredealingwithavarietyofprograms:Firstandforemost,understandandclearlydefineintegrationwithinaspecificorganizationalcontext.Integrationmustbeclearlyformalizedandunderstoodbyallparticipantsintheprogramandtheorganization.Definecleargoalsforintegration.Identifymetricsandmechanismstomonitorresultsfromintegrationanditsimpactonotherareasoftheorganization.Theresearchindicatedthatorganizationsgenerallydonothaveclearprocessestotrackandimproveintegration.Consideraframeworktoproperlyaddressintegrationanditskeydimensionstoenablegreateroverallperformance.6.4DiscussionQuestions1.WhatarethekeydifferencesbetweentheIntegrationFrameworkandframeworksthatdescribeeitherprogrammanagementorsystemsengineeringpractices?2.Whyisadoptingastandard(ormultiplestandards)forpractices,tools,andtechniquesvaluableforimprovingintegration?3.Whyisitimportanttodefinecleargoalsandobjectivesforintegration?4.Usingtheframeworktoevaluateyourownorganization,inwhichdimensionsisyourorganizationstrongestandweakest?5.WhatarethegapswithinyourorganizationhighlightedbytheIntegrationFrameworkthatyoubelieve,ifclosed,wouldhelptoimprovethelevelofintegrationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement?6.Whoarethekeystakeholdersinsideyourorganizationwhocanprovideadditionalinsighttosupportevaluationoftheorganizationalandbehavioralcompetencesthatsupportintegration?6.5ReferencesBecerril,L.,Rebentisch,E.,Chucholowski,N.,Conforto,E.C.,&Lindemann,U.(2016,May16–19).Asimulationbasedanalysisontheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystems

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158UAE.Reiner,T.(2015,May).Determinationoffactorstomeasuretheeffectiveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,RheinischWestfälischeTechnischeHochschule(RWTH)AachenMaster'sthesis.Schneider,B.(1987).Thepeoplemaketheplace.PersonnelPsychology,40(3),437–453.doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1987.tb00609

1597INTEGRATIONINPRACTICEINTHEF/A18E/FSUPERHORNETPROGRAM7.1IntroductionWhatdoesitlooklikewhenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersworktogetherinanintegratedfashion?Chapter6spelledoutthebroadelementsofintegrationinanorganization.Buthowdotheelementsofintegrationactuallywork,andhowdotheyworktogetherinaprogram?Thecasestudydetailedinthischapter1providesanexampleofaprogramthatwassuccessful,but,moreimportantly,thatsuccesswasdecisivelyenabledbyemployingtheprinciplesdescribedintheIntegrationFramework.Thissuccesswasachievedinasettingwheretherewerenumerouscompetingdemandsforattentionandresources;wheretheproductrequirementswerecomplexandfailurecouldbebothpunishingandaneverpresentpossibility;andwheremultiplespecializedinterestspresentedchallengestosuccessfulintegration.TheF/A18E/FSuperHornetshowninFigure71isatwinengineaircraftdesignedtoflyfromNavyaircraftcarrierstoperformbothairtoairandairtogroundcombatmissions.TheprimecontractorwasMcDonnellDouglasCorporation(nowBoeingCorporation).Northrop(nowNorthropGrumman)wastheprinciplesubcontractorandbuilttheaftfuselage.GeneralElectric(GE)wasresponsiblefortheengines(Bailey,Nash,&Woolsey,1999,p.3).TheF/Adesignationrepresentsitsdualroleasafighterandanattackaircraft.TheE/FisanevolutionarydesignderivedfromtheF/A18C/Dstillinservice.The“E”versioncarriesacrewofonewhilethe“F”isatwoseatconfiguration.Asacarrierbasedaircraft,itisoftenthegotoplatformformilitaryairoperationsinregionsoftheworldwherelimitedmilitarybaseinfrastructuremightinhibitotheraircraftfromoperating.

160Figure71:ThetwinengineaircraftF/A18ESuperHornet(U.S.Navy,2006)PhotobyPhotographer'sMate3rdClassChrisThamann.PublicDomainItsdevelopmentprovidesanexampleofaprogramthatembodieseffectiveintegration.Itholdsararefiedpositionasoneofthefewcomplexmilitaryprogramstocompleteitsdevelopmentphaseaheadofschedule(adherencetotimeline)andwithinbudgetedcost(adherencetobudget),asshowninFigure72.Inaddition,thisprogramprovidedseveraladditionalbenefits.Theaircraftcompleteditsdevelopmentphaseweighing1,000poundsunderitsspecification(clientrequirementsfulfillment)withonethirdfewerpartsthanpredecessoraircraft,aheavierpayload,longerrange,increasedreliability,andmarginforadditionalgrowthincapabilities(White,1997).Notonlyisitmeetingitsprogramrequirementsregardingquantityofaircraftdelivered,butitisalsoexpandingintonewapplicationsthatboosttheoverallproduction.Thisisincontrasttothenorminmilitaryaircraftdevelopmentprogramswherecostescalatestothepointthattheoverallfleetbuyistruncatedtoafractionoftheoriginalspecification.Buildingthefullprogramrequirementofaircraftbenefitstheworkforceandsupplybasebyhavingastableproductionprogramoverthespaceofmanyyears.TheoverallprogrambenefitstotheNavyareevenmoreimpressivefromthestandpointofsignificantreductioninthesystem'stotalcostofownership(factoringinoperationsandmaintenance,logistics,andsustainmentcostscomparedwithoperatingthediversearrayofaginglegacyaircraftthatthistypereplaces).Thesepointsmakeittrulyuniqueamongmilitaryaircraftprograms.

161Figure72:F/A18E/Fmetitsdevelopmentcosttargets,unlikeother,similaraircraftdevelopmentprogramsYounossietal,2005,p.10.ReproducedwithpermissionofRANDCORPORATIONviaCopyrightClearanceCenter,Inc.Whenviewedthroughthelensofthekeydimensionscharacterizingeffectiveintegration,theSuperHornetprogramrepresentedashiftawayfromfunctionalstovepipestoembracerapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,collaborativework,andinformationsharing.Programmanagementandsystemsengineeringbecamemoreintegratedinthisprogram.Byvirtueoftherelationshipbetweenthegovernmentcustomeranditscontractorbase,italsopresentsamorecomplexintegrationcasebecauseboththegovernmentandthecontractorseachhadprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinestobeintegratedintoalarge,unifiedprogram.Effectiveintegrationattheprogramlevelincludedintegrationacrossthecontractualboundary,oftenamorechallengingintegrationtaskthanbetweendisciplineswithinasingleorganization.Consideringallthestakeholdersthatneededtobeintegratedtomaketheprogramasuccess,thispresentedasignificantchallenge.ThetransitionawayfromtraditionalstovepipemindsetstowardamoreintegratedapproachwasinitiatedbythetoplevelsofleadershipwithintheNavy'sNavalAirSystemsCommand(NAVAIR)andMcDonnellDouglasCorporation.Thiscasestudytracesthehistoryoftheprogramasitmadethistransition.Itillustratestheprinciplesofintegrationinpracticeandconveysasenseofwhatitisliketobeinaprogramwhereintegrationispracticedandprioritized.MuchoftheinformationabouttheF/A18E/FinthischapterdrawsextensivelyfromtwocasestudiespublishedbytheInstituteforDefenseAnalyses:TheF/A18E/F:AnIntegratedProductTeam(IPT)CaseStudy(Bailey,1998)andIntegratedProductandProcessDevelopmentCaseStudy:DevelopmentoftheF/A18E/F(Baileyetal.,1999).Both

162casestudiesareusedherewithpermission.7.2F/A18E/FSuperHornetProgramBackgroundandtheContextofIntegrationInmid1990,afteronlytwoyears,theU.S.NavyprogramtodevelopanewstealthyattackaircraftknownastheA12wasalreadyatleastUS$1billionovercostand18monthsbehindschedule.InJanuary1991,theU.S.SecretaryofDefensecanceledtheprogram.TheA12wastohavereplacedthe1960seraA6attackaircraft,whichwereagingandincreasinglyvulnerabletonewthreats.StillstingingfromtheA12cancellation,theNavychoseasareplacementalowercost,lowerriskderivativeoftheF/A18C/Dalreadyoperatinginthenavalairfleet.TheobjectiveoftheF/A18E/Fprogramwastodevelop,test,produce,anddeployanupgradedF/A18withincreasedmissionrange,increasedaircraftcarrierrecoverypayload,additionalgrowthpotential,andenhancedsurvivability.TheF/A18E/FwasdesignedasamultirolefightertoperformthesametypeofmissionsandcounterthesamethreatsasearliermodelsoftheF/A18,butwithsomeincrementalincreaseincapability(Younossi,Stem,Lorell,&Lussier,2005,pp.2–3).TheF/A18E/F,orsimply“E/F,”wasimmediatelycriticaltonavalairplanningandtheNavyoverall.ModernizationwasessentialforbothcombateffectivenessandoperationalaffordabilitybecausetheexistingfleetofF/A18C/Dsconsistedofagingaircraftwithlimitedoptionsforcapabilityimprovement.Moreover,inthewakeofthecancellationoftheA12,theU.S.CongresshadmandatedthattheE/FcouldnotexceedthecostoftheC/Dbymorethan25%.TheNavy'sreputationasanagencycapableofeffectiveaircraftprocurementwasatstake.InhearingsonthefollowonaircrafttotheA12(eventuallycancelledaswell),SenatorJohnGlennsaid,“TheNavy'sabilitytomanagesuchaprogramisatrocious.”CongressionalsentimentslikethishelpedfocustheNavy'sattentiononschedule,cost,andrisk(Baileyetal.,1999,pp.3–4).7.3TwelveDaysofAugust:AStartontheIntegrationJourneyInearlyAugust,1991,CaptainCraigE.Steidle,theNavyProgramManagerfortheF/A18,helda“miniprogramreview”oftheproposedconceptfortheE/F.Duringtheninemonthspriortothisreview,teamsfromMcDonnellDouglas,Northrop,GE,andtheNavyhadbeenworkingtodefinetheconfigurationandhighlevelrequirementsfortheE/F.Whentheycametogetherforthereview,itwasclearthattherewasnoagreementacrossteams.InthewordsofMcDonnellDouglas'sIntegratedProductTeam(IPT)Manager:

163Everybodywasprotectingtheirownricebowls.Theelectronicwarfareteamwantedthebestofthebest.Thelowobservablesteamwantedthemoststealthyaircraftpossible.Thecockpitdisplaysteamwantedtheverybestandsoon.Theresultwasaweaponsystemthatwasoverweightandovercost.CaptainSteidle'sconclusionduringthisreviewwasthat“Wedon'thaveaprogramhere.Whatwehaveisamess.”LarryLemkewastheMcDonnellDouglasVicePresidentandGeneralManageroftheF/A18atthattime.HeandCaptainSteidleworkedthroughoutthenightoutliningwhattheythoughthadtobethenextstepsiftherewastobeaviableE/Fprogram.AstheMcDonnellDouglas'sIPTManagerdescribedit:TheydecidedtobringtogetherpeoplewhowereknowledgeableinallthemanyareasneededtodefinetheE/Fconfigurationandhighlevelrequirements.SotheyconvenedatwelvedaymeetinginSt.LouiswhichbeganthefollowingMondayandendedaweeklateronaFriday.TheNavyhad35to40peopleatthattwelvedaymeeting.TherewerealsopeoplefromMDC,NorthropandGeneralElectric.Theideawasthatattheendofthetwelvedays,theywouldeitherhaveaviable,affordableprogramortherewouldbenoprogram.Atthebeginningofthe12days,CaptainSteidle,alongwithMikeSears,McDonnellDouglas'sDeputyF/A18ProgramManager,outlinedforeveryonethehighlevelobjectivesfortheE/F.IncomparisontotheC/D,theE/Fhadtohave:Morerange(flyfartherwithoutrefueling)ImprovedsurvivabilityMorebringback(weightofstoresthatcouldbebroughtbackandlandedonacarrier)Morecarriagecapability(couldcarrymorebombstoatarget)Moregrowthcapabilitybuiltin(extraphysicalspaceforfuturegrowth)CaptainSteidleinstructedeveryoneatthemeetingthattheseweretheessentialobjectivesagainstwhichtradeoffswouldbemade.However,becauseCongressmandatedthattheE/FcouldnotexceedcostsoftheC/Dbymorethan25%,adifferentapproachwascalledfor.IntheMcDonnellDouglas'sIPTManager'swords:Beforethismeeting,theapproachwastothroweverythingonthetableandseewhatitcost.Thistime,affordabilitywasanissue.Eachgroupwastaskedtothinkaboutwhatcouldbedonedifferently.GiventhehighlevelobjectivesoftheE/F,wewereaskedtoidentifywhathastobeintheaircraftandwhatwasn'tessential.Weweretoldtoquestionthewhatandthehowofeverythingwedid.Whatcouldwedotoreduceweightandcostwithoutimpactingthehighlevelrequirements?Duringthe12days,thelargergroupbrokeintoteamstoaddressspecificareas;theteamswouldconveneatthebeginningandendofeachday.Otherwise,eachteamworkeditsarea.Overthe12daystheyhadtotradeoffweight,fuelcapacity,volume,materials,thesizeoftheradarcrosssection,andcost.Operationalanalysiswasgoingonthroughoutallofthisin

164ordertounderstandwhatwasbeinggainedatasystemlevelwiththechangesthattheteamsweremaking.ItwasduringthisperiodthattheconceptforaNavycontractorIntegratedTestTeamduringDevelopmentalTest&Evaluationemerged.Northropproposedchangestothebulkhead(thecriticalinterfacebetweentheMcDonnellDouglasandNorthropsectionsoftheairplane)thatresultedinalargeweightsavings.McDonnellDouglasproposedsavingsbygoingwithamodestavionicsupgradeinwhich90%oftheavionicswerecommonwiththeC/D.Attheendof12days,thebasicairvehiclerequirementswereinplace.InMcDonnellDouglas'sIPTManager'swords:Thiswasafocusedefforttodefinetheconfigurationsowecouldproceedtothenextstep.Wecameoutofitwithsomethingthatwasgoodenoughtobecosted.Anditbroughteveryonealongatthesametime(customerandcontractor).Wecameoutwithaverycleardirection.Therewasnotmuchdebateafterthataboutwhatwasintheaircraft.Butwestillhadtoguardagainstrequirementscreep.Inthefallof1991,McDonnellDouglas,Northrop,andGEworkedwithNavalAirSystemsCommand(NAVAIR)tofleshouttherequirements.AstheMcDonnellDouglas'sIntegratedProductTeamManagerdescribedit:Wehada“specjamboree.”Webrokeintothesameteams.WetooktherequirementsandtheconfigurationfromthetwelvedaysandusedtheC/Dspecasastartingpoint.WetookthatspecificationapartandreassembledittoreflecttheE/Fwehaddefined.Wheretherewerestilldisagreements,theywerenoted,andassignedtoteamsforresolution.Mostofthesewereclosedinthenextcoupleofweeks.Withthisprocess,wewereabletohammerouttheimportantdetailsoftheE/Fspecification,includ[ing]inputfromawiderangeofstakeholders,anddoitinaveryshorttime.Duringthese12days,theE/Fchangedfromsomethingthatwas“goldplated”withspecificationsandfeaturesthatwerenotcriticaltoperformanceandovercosttosomethingthatrepresentedanaffordableevolutionfromtheC/D.Thiswasachievedbymaintainingacustomerfocusandmakingappropriatetradeoffs,andsetthestageforsuccess.7.4EnablingIntegrationbyReducingProgramComplexityThetechnologyrequirementsfortheaircraftweredeliberatelycraftedtocontroltechnologicalriskandtoconstraincost.InOctober1991,theNavyformallyrequesteddesignationoftheE/Fasamajormodificationeffortratherthanasanewprogramstart.AlthoughthenewE/Fdesignentailedmajorairframemodifications,theNavyintendedtoincorporateexistingC/Davionicsandaderivativeoftheexistingengine(Younossietal.,2005,pp.22–23).Rightfromthebeginning,theprogramaimedforanintegratedsolution,balancingtheprogrammanagementconcernsofcostandschedulewithsystemsengineeringtradeoffstoreduceriskandcomplexity.TheformalEngineeringandManufacturingDevelopmentphaseoftheprogram

165beganinJuly1992(Younossietal.,2005,pp.xv–xvi).TheE/Fis4.2feetlongerthanthelegacyplatform,hasa25%largerwingarea,andcancarry33%additionalinternalfuel.Theairframedesignwaslargelynewwithverylittlecommonalitywiththeoriginaldesign,butaerodynamicallysimilartotheC/D.Itincorporatedsomelimitedradarcrosssectionreductiontechniques,suchasnewinletsandattentiontodoorandpaneledges.Italsohad42%fewerpartsthanitsC/Dpredecessoreventhoughtheairframewasapproximately25%larger.Byreducingpartcount,costsfrommanysourceswerereduced(Baileyetal.,1999,p.11).Nevertheless,theE/F'sairframecostgrewby12%duringthedevelopmentprogram.ItwasoffsetbythedeclinesinothercostcategoriessuchasSystemEngineeringandProgramManagement,SystemTestandEvaluationthroughtheuseoftheNavycontractorIntegratedTestTeam,andsupport.Thenetresultwasnocostgrowthoverall(Younossietal.,2005,pp.33–34).TheE/FusedaderivativeenginebasedontheenginecoredevelopedfortheF412engine,whichhadbeenplannedtopowertheA12aircraft.TheF414enginealsobenefitedfromitsdesignlineagefromtheF404,whichpowerstheC/D(Younossietal.,2005,p.46).TheE/FavionicsfortheinitialreleaseoftheE/FincorporatedthesuitefromtheC/Dmodel,withmorethan90%oftheE/F'selectronicsintheinitialproductionaircraftcommonwiththeC/D(Younossietal.,2005,p.40).Someupgradestothesubsequentproductionaircraftwereincludedaspreplannedproductimprovementsfromthebeginningoftheprogram.Becausetheavionicssystemisafederatedsystem,theseupgradescouldbeeasilyincorporatedwhenavailable,withoutanysignificanteffectontheoverallweaponsystemavailability(p.43).OneprogrambenefitresultingfromtheextensivereuseoftheavionicsfromtheC/DmodelwasthattheE/Fprogramcertifiedtheaircrafttoemployovertwodozenweapons.ThismeantthattheE/Fhadfullcombatcapabilityveryearlyinitsinitialoperations,whereastypicalaircraftdevelopmentprogramsmayrequireyearstoaccumulatethatfullrangeofcapabilities(p.31).TheF/A18ProgramOfficemanagedapproximately2,000fulltimeequivalentstaffatanumberofsites.TheF/A18programwasaboutaUS$5billionayearprogram,distributedbetweentheoperationalsupportofexistingaircraft,productionoftheC/Dmodel,EngineeringandManufacturingDevelopmentoftheE/Fmodel,andsalestoforeigncustomers(Bailey,1998,p.3).TheE/FusedanexistingworksharebreakoutbasedonthehistoryofcontractsontheF/A18A/B/C/Ddevelopmentandproduction.McDonnellDouglaswasconsideredtheprimecontractorandNorthropwasamajorsubcontractorontheeffort.TheE/FteamofMcDonnellDouglasandNorthrophadsubstantialexperienceontheC/D.Bothcontractorshadexperienceddesignteamsinplaceanddrewheavilyfromexistingsuppliersandtheindustrialbase(Younossietal.,2005,p.24).TheoutcomeofthesedesigndecisionswasthattheoverallcomplexityoftheE/Fprogramwasreducedconsiderably.Thisreducedthescopeoftheprogramandallowedtheparticipantstofocusrelativelymoreoftheirattentionontheirapproachestoworkingtogethermoreeffectivelyandefficiently.Thiswasimportantbecausebyearly1992,theseniorNavyleadershiphadmadeitclearthattheE/Fprogramwouldnotproceedunlessthecostestimatesforthedevelopmentprogramandfortheaverageunitflyawaycostsremainedunderstrict

166ceilingsdictatedbylikelyfundingrealities(Younossi,2005,pp.22–23).7.5AParallelProcessinNAVAIRtoImproveIntegrationWhiletherequirementsfortheE/Fwerebeingdeveloped,NAVAIRwasundergoingamajorreorganizationtointegratethevariousdisciplinesrequiredtodeveloptheaircraft.Intheearly1990s,NAVAIRwasorganizedaroundstrongfunctionalstovepipes,eachreportingwithinitsownorganizationalstructure.InthewordsoftheformerCommanderofNAVAIR,ViceAdmiralJosephDyer,“Wehadstrongfunctionalmanagementandweakprogrammanagement.Eachpersonreporteduphisorherownfunctionalchainofcommand.Theprogrammanagersubcontractedworktoeachofthefunctionalorganizationsandwasleftherdingcats.”Disagreementsbetweenfunctionalorganizationswereraisedupthefunctionalchaintoberesolvedatthetoplevelratherthanatthelevelatwhichtheysurfaced.Notonlywasprogrammanagementrelativelyweak,butunderthisorganizationdecisionmakingcouldnotbecharacterizedasrapidandeffective.Workproceededinaserialfashionacrossfunctionalorganizationsleadingtoagreatdealofrework.Forexample,thedevelopmentofaRequestforProposal,inwhichtheNavyproducesaformal,documentedrequestforcontractorstobidonadefinedsetofrequirements,wouldbeginwithanoperationalconceptproducedbyonefunctionalstovepipe.Itwouldthenmovetoengineeringforamoredetaileddelineationofrequirements.Itwouldthenmovetothelogisticsorganization.Fromthereitmightgotocontracting,thenfinance,andthenthelegaldepartment.InDyer'swords,“Astheactivitymovedfromonefunctionalareatothenext,itwouldbeclearthatadecisionmadeearliercouldnotbeimplementedbythenextarea.Sothingsweresentback,reworkhadtobedone.Thiswasexpensiveandcauseddelay.”Notonlywasthisinefficientwithalotofrework,buttheappropriatetradeoffsamongfunctionaldisciplineswerenotbeingmade.Dyerdescribedthisas“settingouttodesignaracehorseandendingupwithacamel.Everyorganizationtriedtooptimizefromtheirperspective.”Thiswasclearlynotanexampleofeffectivecollaboration.In1992,thethenCommanderofNAVAIRcommissionedateamofninepeopletodevelopanewconceptofoperationsforacquisitionmanagementwithinNAVAIR.ThisteamrecommendedthatNAVAIRmoveawayfromfunctionalstovepipestoaproductorientationwhereallfunctionalareasworkedtogetherasateam.Thisrecommendationfollowedaseriesofbriefingsfromindustrialorganizationsthathadmadethistransition.TheseincludedHughes,GE,Chrysler,Ford,Boeing,andMcDonnellDouglas.7.6TheE/FProgramPilotsaNewWayofWorkingTogetherAhighlevelplanwasdevelopedtotransitiontoIPTs.TheE/FprogramwasselectedtobeaprototypeforimplementingIPTs.In1994,(then)CaptainJoeDyer,whohadbeenpartoftheteamthatwrotetheconceptofoperations,wasappointedastheprogrammanager.

167OneoftheearlydecisionsoutlinedintheconceptofoperationswastomatrixthefunctionalorganizationsacrosstheIPTs.Ratherthanservingasfunctionalstovepipesinasequentiallyorganizedworkflow,theywouldnowserveasresourcesofexpertiseinstaffingIPTs.Fromthishighlevelvision,thereweremanydetailsremainingtobeworkedout.Dyer'sfirststepinbreakingdownthefunctionalboundarieswastocolocatethesystemengineersandtheprogrammanagerwithinthesamebuildinginCrystalCity(Arlington),Virginia.Whenlookingbacktothisperiod,Dyerpointedtotheimportanceofcolocationnotingthattheheadofengineeringprotestedbysaying“You'regoingtodiluteourengineeringresources.You'llhaveourengineersworryingaboutcontractingandfinance.”TowhichDyerresponded,“You'reright”—becausethatwasthepurposeofthecolocation.Onekeyenablertoeffectiveintegrationofprogrammanagementandengineeringwastheorganizationalstructurethatwasputintoplaceonboththegovernmentandcontractorside.During1994and1995,aseriesofmeetingswereheldtodefinetheIPTstructurefortheprogramandtodevelopthedetailedproceduresforhowtheIPTswouldworkinpractice.Ina1996symposium,Dyermadethefollowingobservation:WhenwefirststartedputtingtogetherIPTs,allofourfunctionalgroupswantedtheirownIPT—theTestandEvaluationpeoplewantedaTestandEvaluationIPT,thelogisticianswantedaLogisticsIPT,thecontractingofficerswantedaContractingIPT.Bythetimeyougotthrough,thislookedjustlikewhereyoucamefrom.SoweappliedatestforIPTs—ithadtobesomethingthefleetaskedfor.Thefleetnever,evercalledmeupandsaid“GetmesomeT&Eoverhereinahurry”or“Boy,wouldweliketohavesomelogistics.”WefocusedourIPTsonproductandthenasked“Whatdoesittaketodelivertheproduct?”ThesearethedisciplinesthathavetocomeintoeveryIPT(Dyer&Conger,1996).TheIPTstructurecorrespondedtotheproducthierarchy,asshowninFigure73.

168Figure73:ProductarchitectureoftheF/A18E/FSuperHornetismirroredintheprogramorganizationAdaptedfromMcDonnellDouglasCorporationgraphicFigure73showstheentireWeaponSystembrokendownintoproductdefinition,production,businessoperations,andsupport.Productdefinitionisfurtherbrokendownintoairframe,propulsion,andsoon;eachoftheseisfurtherdecomposed.Theexampleshowsthebreakdownforairframeandthenforwings/horizontaltail.ThereareIPTleadsateachleveldowntothelowestlevel(Level5)productcomponents.Thissamestructureformsthebasisfortheworkbreakdownstructure(WBS),theearnedvaluemanagementsystem(EVMS),andanumberofkeytechnicalperformancemeasuresasdescribedinmoredetailbelow.Itisworthnotingthatthisstructureservedasthevehicleforintegratingprogrammanagementconcerns(i.e.,costandscheduleperformance)withsystemsengineeringconcerns(i.e.,technicalperformancemeasures)inawaythatprovidedvisibilityandaccountabilityovertheentireaircraft.TheIPTleadsonthecontractorsidehadaNAVAIRcounterpartonthegovernmentside.Thisalignmentoforganizationalstructuresfacilitatedgovernmentcontractorcommunicationandjointproblemsolving.During1994and1995,aseriesofmeetingswereheldtodefinetheIPTstructurefortheF/A18programandtodevelopthedetailedproceduresforhowtheIPTswouldworkinpractice.TheDeputyProgramManagerfortheF/A18programatthetimewasCaptainGibGodwin.InGodwin'swords:

169ThereweretwomeetingsthatIcanonlydescribeaswatershedevents.ThefirstwasinAlbuquerqueinSeptember1994.ThiswasaoneandahalfdaymeetingduringwhichwedefinedtheIPTstructure.Wehadabout20peoplethere—thewholeleadershipteamconsistingofthetoplevel(Level1)IPTleaderspluscompetencyspecialists(e.g.,engineering,contracting).ThentherewasasecondmeetingatKeyWestinFebruary1995thatlastedfortwodays.WebroughtinpeoplefromdifferentfunctionalareasthatwerenotwiththeF/A18programsothattheywouldbeobjective.WedefinedinsomedetailhowtheIPT/CompetencyBasedOrganizationwouldwork.Therewerealotofissuesthathadtobeaddressedsuchaswhowoulddoperformancereviews,whosignstimecards,andsoon.Atthispoint,therewasalotofresistance.AsGodwinnotes,Peoplesaidit'stoohardtodo.Itrepresentedabigredistributionofpowerwithintheorganizationawayfromengineeringtomoreofabalanceacrossfunctionalareas.Engineeringhadthedollarsbefore.NowthedollarsaredistributedprettyevenlyamongthethreeLevel1IPTs.Idon'twanttogiveanyonetheimpressionthatthiswaseasy.Itwasdifficult,frustrating,andgutwrenching.Inlookingbacktothisearlierperiod,Godwinpointedoutthatafewkeypeoplewereenergizedandworkedveryhardtobringaboutthetransition.ThisincludedkeypeoplewithinthefunctionalorganizationsaswellastheearlytoplevelIPTleaders(Bailey,1998,p.5).7.7ImprovedDecisionMakingOneofthekeytenetsoftheprogramwastocreateacultureofrapidandeffectivedecisionmaking.Thiswasaccomplishedthroughseveralmechanisms.ThefirstwasthecreationofcrossfunctionalIPTsthatencompassedmultipleperspectivesforbetterdecisions,moreeffectivetradeoffs,andlessrework.Anumberofpeopleontheprogramexpressedtheviewthatnooneperson,nomatterhowsmart,canmakedecisionsaswellasateamofpeoplewiththerightskillsandattitudes.Thishighlightstheimportanceofinvolvingteammembersinthedecisionprocess,andfacilitatingthecommunicationbetweenthesemembersbydesigninganorganizationalstructuretailoredtotheprogram'sneedsandcharacteristics.Asecondmechanismwasthroughaculturethatencouragedearlyidentificationofrisks.Thatculturepermeatedtheentireprogrambothonthecontractorandthegovernmentside.InthewordsofoneofMcDonnellDouglas'IPTleads,“Ourdefinitionofgoodmanagementisrecognizingproblemsandaskingforhelpearlyon.Anybodycandefinearisk.It'sokaytohaverisks,wejustneedariskmitigationplan.”Hewentontodelineatethreenecessarycomponentsforaneffectiveriskmanagementsystem:

170First,youwanttoidentifypotentialproblemsearly.Secondly,you'vegottohavemanagementthatdoesn'tshootthemessenger.It'scriticalthatyourcustomerhasthesameopinion.Youhavetohavepeoplewhodon'tgoballisticwhentheyhaveaproblem.Andthird,you'vegottohavemanagementthatwillprovidehelpwhenasked.Thepersonatthetophasgottohavethatattitude.Andinaskingforhelp,youhavetobeabletosaywhatyouneed.Severalpeoplenotedthatteammemberswerenotpunishedforbringingbadnews,butdidgetintotroubleforholdingbackinformation.Athirdmechanismwasthroughdecisionmakingandproblemsolvingatthelowestpossibleleveloftheorganizationratherthancontinualescalationofdecisionstothehighestlevelsoftheorganization.ThiswasachievedthroughclearIPTrolesandresponsibilities,budgetauthority,andaccountability.Inthisscenario,itiscriticalthatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersunderstandandconsidertechnicalaswellasmanagementgoalsandaspectswhenprioritizingandmakingdecisions.TheresponsibilitiesoftheteamleadersweredocumentedintheformofIPTcharters.Therewereclearboundariesforwhatwasandwasnotwithintheirscopeofresponsibility.Theyweregivenauthoritythroughcontroloftheirownbudgets.Theyalsowroteperformanceappraisalsfortheirteammembers.InthewordsofoneMcDonnellDouglasIPTleads,“Teamleadershavetobalancecost,quality,andschedule.Theyhavetobegoodbusinessfolksaswellasengineers.”7.7.1TheWBSAlignedwiththeProductTheWBSwasalignedwiththeproductbreakdownstructure,orthestructureoftheproductitself,toprovideacommonframeworkforintegratingprogrammanagementconcernswithengineeringconcerns.TheorganizationalstructureputintoplaceontheF18E/FprogramcorrespondstotheproducthierarchyshowninFigure73:AtLevel1istheF/A18ProgramManagerwhoseresponsibilitiesincludetheA/B,C/D,andE/Fmodels.AlsoatLevel1istheDeputyProgramManagerfortheE/F.AtLevel2,thereistheIPTManager,responsiblefortheproductdefinitionactivities.AlsoatLevel2arethemanagersforProduction,Support,andBusinessOperations.AtLevel3,undertheIPTManager,therearethetwomajorpartsoftheaircraftforwhichMcDonnellDouglasisresponsible:theAirframesubsystemsandtheAvionics/WeaponsIntegration.Level4(underAirframesubsystems)includesfiveteams:Wing/HorizontalTail;ForwardFuselage;Hydromechanical/Mechanical;Armament,Crew,Electrical;andSupportEquipment.Level5(underWing/HorizontalTail)includesthreeteams:Inner/OuterWing;WingControlSurfaces(leading,trailingedgeflaps,andaileron);andHorizontalTail.

171EachoftheTier5integratedproductteamswasallocatedadollarandschedulebudgetandatechnicalperformancebudget(definedasallocationsofweight,power,cooling,etc.).ThisWBSbecametheintegratingframeworktobalanceprogrammanagementconcernswithmoresystemsengineeringconcerns.EachWBSelementwasdecomposedintomultipleworkpackagesthatwerefurtherdecomposedintoadetailedsetoftasksandassociatedresources(laborhoursanddollars).Resourcesexpendedwerecomparedwithprogressachievedonaweeklybasis.Thetechnicalperformancemeasures(e.g.,currentestimatedweight,power,andcoolingrequirements)wereupdatedatthesametime.Ifatechnicalrequirementwasnotbeingmet(e.g.,theweightallocationfortheinnerwingstructureexceededthethresholdallocated)solutionsweredevelopedbeingmindfulofthecostandscheduleconsequences.Tocontinuetheexample,perhapsalighterbutmoreexpensivematerialwouldsolvetheweightproblemorperhapsanotherteamwasunderrunningitsweightallowanceandcouldadjustitsweightbudgettocompensatefortheoverrunintheinnerwing.Regardless,decisionscouldbemadeconsideringtradeoffsacrossallteamsandconsideringcostandscheduleimpacts.Thislevelofveryclosemonitoringandcontinualadjustmentcontributedtotheaircraftbeingdevelopedwithincostandschedule,andunderweight.TheearlystructuringoftheorganizationintoIPTsbroughttogetheranumberoffunctionaldisciplinestoperformthenecessarysystemsengineeringtradeoffsthatwererequiredtobuildanaffordableaircraft.Assemblingtheseteamsearlyachievedmoreeffectivetradeoffs,butrequiredafundingprofilethatincludedhigherearlyexpendituresthanthoseseeninpreviousprograms—butwithsmallerexpendituresoccurringlater.TheE/Fprogram'sabilitytodeviatefrompreviousfundingprofileswasabenefitoftheNavyprogramoffice'scloseandcooperativeinvolvement.Onebenefitfromthiswasthemorethan50%reductioninthenumberofDrawingChangeNoticesorEngineeringOrdersperproductiondrawingwhencomparingE/F'sratetoA/B'srate:Atfirstflight,theE/FhadlessthanoneDrawingChangeNoticeorEngineeringOrderperproductiondrawing.TheE/F'spredecessor,theA/B,hadwellovertwochangesperdrawingatthesamepointintheprogram(Baileyetal.,1999,p.17).Theproductandteamstructurewerenotstaticbutcontinuallyevolving.AstheE/Fmovedfromdevelopmentintoproduction,theproductdefinitionteamsbecamesmallerwhiletheproductionteamsgrew.Bothtypesofteamsremainedmultidisciplinary.TheLevel4leadfortheWingIPTstated:TheguywhoistheteamleadfortheproductionofthewingwasamemberofmyProductDefinitionTeamsixmonthsago.Nowhehashisownteamandwesitnexttoeachotherintheproductionbuilding.7.7.2PromoteCollaborativeWorkAnotherhallmarkoftheE/Fprogramwaseffectivecollaboration.Thisincludedcollaboration

172withinteams,acrossteams,andacrosstheboundarybetweencontractorandgovernment.Inthewordsofonegovernmentteamlead,“Wesaytopeople,putyourE/Fhaton,jointheteam,andlearnallperspectives.I'mafacilitatorandaconsensusbuilder.Teamleadersarenotdefendingtheirstovepipe,butworkingtogether.”Collaborationbetweengovernmentandcontractorpersonnelcan,perhaps,beseenmostclearlyintheIntegratedTestTeam(ITT),whichcarriedouttheflighttestingoftheE/FmodelduringtheDevelopmentTestandEvaluation(DT&E)phase.Onmostprograms,theearlyDT&Ephasesareconductedbythecontractorwithkeytestingactivitieswitnessedbygovernmentpersonnel.LaterinDT&E,thebulkoftestingisperformedbythegovernment.TheITTwasagovernmentcontractorteamworkingtogetherintesting,reporting,andanalyzinganomaliesandtrackingstatus.AswithalltheF/A18IPTs,thereweremultipledisciplinesonthetestteamincludingengineerswhowereinvolvedinthedesignoftheaircraftandwhowereavailabletoanalyzeproblemsdiscoveredduringflighttest.TheflighttestswereperformedbothbythecontractorandbyNavypilots,andtheresultsofthetestsweresharedacrosstheentireteam.Oneoftheadvantagesofthisintegratedgovernmentcontractorteamapproachwasmorecosteffectiveuseofthetestaircraft.Undertheoldway,therewereperiodsduringflighttestingwhentheNavywouldberunningtheirowntests.Thiswasnonproductivetimeforthecontractor.AccordingtoCaptainBobWirt,GovernmentFlightTestDirector,thecontractorcostsperaircraftwereUS$50,000perday.Thus,thesenonproductiveperiodswereverycostly.“Noweverydayisadevelopmenttestwiththecontractorproductive.Becausethisisajointgovernmentcontractorteam,theNavyisanalyzingtheresultsbothaspartofthetestteamandasacustomer.”TheITTwentbeyondintegratingthecontractorandNavytestteamsandincludedNavypersonnelfromtheOperationalTestandEvaluation(OT&E)Force.Typically,DT&EandOT&Ewereserialactivitiesandstovepipesoftheirown.AtthecompletionofDT&E,theprogramwouldthrowtheproduct“overthewall,”sotospeak,totheOT&Estaff.ThestovepipebetweenDT&EandOT&EwassupportedbytheOT&Ecommunitywhobelievedthatthishelpedtomaintaintheirobjectivity.Thisalsomeanttheylackedknowledgeoftheaircraftanditscapabilities.InthewordsofDyer“someofusbelievedthattheimpartialityofignorancewasoverrated.”ThecommanderoftheOT&EForcefortheNavy,RearAdmiralJackZeer,believedthathavingmembersoftheOT&EForcebepartoftheITTwouldbeapositivechangebecausetheycouldlearnabouttheaircraftwhilestillmaintainingtheirobjectivityandprofessionalism.Notonlydidtheymaintainobjectivity,butthisprovedtobeanothermeansofreducingthescheduleandcost,andultimatelyledtoabetteraircraft.WhenaskedhowtheF/A18programhadmanagedtofosterrealteamworkbetweengovernmentandcontractorpersonnel,Dyer(Dyer&Conger,1996)responded:

173Leadershipmattersandpersonalitiesmatter.MikeSears,whowastheVicepresidentforF/A18atMcDonnellDouglas,andIgrewupworkingtogetheronearliermodelsoftheF/A18.Wehadatrustandanopennessandacommunicationwithoneanotherthatweknewwecouldbuildon.Weknewthatwecouldflowitdowntoothersandthatwewouldbothinsistonit.Weengendered,empowered,andinsistedthatwegetcommunicationbetweengovernmentandindustryand,inthosefewcaseswherethatdidn'twork,werolledheads.Dyermadeitveryclearthatitiseverybody'sjobtobeateamplayer.Asanexample,herelatedthefollowingscenario:Wehadanewgovernmentguyjoinusfromanotherlocation.Hestoodupatameetingandbeganbysaying“Thecontractorhasfailedtoprovide.”Youcouldhaveheardapindrop,theothermembersweresoquiet.Werealizedthatwehadn'theardthatkindoflanguageforalongtime.AndItoldhim“Whatyoujustsaidisnotacceptable.Ifthecontractorhasn'tprovidedsomething,it'syourproblemtoo.Whatareyoudoingaboutit?”Dyerconcludedthestorybyadding,“Therereallyisaculturalchangerequired.We'renottaughttobeteamplayers”(Bailey,1998,p.12).7.7.3EmpowermentofTeamsEmpowermentofIPTspermitteddecisionmakingtobedriventothelowestpossiblelevel.Moreover,resourceswereallocatedtolevelsconsistentwithriskassessmentauthority,responsibility,andtheabilityofpeople.Theteamsweregiventheauthority,responsibility,andresourcestomanagetheirproductanditsriskcommensuratewiththeteam'scapabilities.Theauthorityofteammemberswasdefinedandunderstoodbytheindividualteammembers.Theteamacceptedresponsibilityandwasheldaccountablefortheresultsofitsefforts.Managementpracticeswithintheteamsandtheirorganizationswereteamorientedratherthanstructurally,functionally,orindividuallyoriented.ThewordsoftenheardinreferencetotheE/Fteamleaderswere“responsibility,authority,andaccountability.”TheteamleaderswereresponsiblefordeliveringtheproductandformaintainingfrequentandopencommunicationwiththeirNAVAIRcounterparts.Theyweregivenauthoritythroughcontroloftheirownbudgets.Theyalsowroteperformanceappraisalsfortheirteammembers.Everyteamwasallocatedabudgetfordollars,schedule,weight,andotherrelevantperformanceparameterssuchaspowerandcoolingrequirements.Accountabilitywasachievedthroughtheweeklyreportingofthesemeasures.CostandscheduleperformanceweretrackedthroughweeklyearnedvaluereportsdowntotheLevel5teams.TheLevel4leaderfortheWingIPTdescribedtheleaders'responsibilitiesthisway:

174Teamleadershavetobalancecost,quality,andschedule.Theyhavetobegoodbusinessfolksaswellasengineers.AsaLevel4teamleader,Iamrunningmyownbusiness.It'snecessarytodefinethebusinessboundaryandwhatIneedtorunthatbusiness.WehadcasualtiesamongtheLevel4and5leadsintheearlydays.IPTleadershavetohaveadifferentsetofskills(Baileyetal.,1999,pp.21–22).OneofthekeyobjectivesintransitioningtoIPTswastobreakdownbarriersacrossfunctionalareas,doingworkconcurrentlythatwaspreviouslydoneinasequentialfashion.Asecondobjectivewastosurface,address,andsolveproblemsearlyandatalowlevel.IPTleadershadalotofflexibilityandautonomytoaddressissuesaslongastheyoperatedwithinclearlydefinedboundaries.Theywereinchargeoftheirownresources.Dyermadethefollowingpoint:Weusedtohaveresponsibilityforthequalityoftheproductdistributedalloverthecommand.Nowwesay“Mr.ProgramManagerandMr.Level1IPTLeader,you'reresponsiblefortheproduct.”Thatwastheshiftthatmadeus.Becauseallofthesudden,peoplewhousedtobeadversaries—T&E,logistics—becamethefolkswhoaregoingtosaveyouandkeepyoufrombeingembarrassed,whoaregoingtokeepyoufrombuildingaproductthatdoesn'twork(Bailey,1998,pp.12–13).7.7.3.1ATeaminAction:TheEngineStatorProblemTheE/FhastwoGeneralElectricF414GE400engines.InNovember1996duringflighttest,astatororstationaryairfoilfractured.Thedebrisfromthestatorcausedsignificantdamagetothedownstreamcompressorstages,leadingtoatotalfailureinStage6andahighpressurestall.Thetestpilotlandedsafelyandtheproblemwasreported.TheenginewasshippedbacktoGEandaninvestigationwasbeguntodeterminethecauseofthefracture.Overtheweekend,conferencecallswereheldbetweentheprogramofficeandGE,andonSundaythedecisionwasmadetohaltflighttesting.Atthispoint,itwasclearthattheproblemwasrelatedtohighcyclefatigue,buttheexactcausewasnotknown.Thenextstepwastodismantleallexistingenginesintheremainingtestaircraft.Theseengineswereinspectedinordertodeterminewhethertheproblemappearedinmultipleengines,indicatingthatthefracturingwasagradualprocess,orwhetherthefracturewasonlyintheoneengine,suggestingthatitwasaresultofaspecialcombinationofconditionsthatthetestaircraftmetduringthisoneflight.Theformerwasthecase,thatis,fracturingwasfoundinmorethanoneengine.InthewordsoftheE/FLevel2IPTLeaderforPropulsion,

175Undertheoldwayofdoingthings,GEwouldn'tcommunicateissuesuntiltheyhadaplantogoforward.Theyfeltthatproblemsandtheirsolutionswereentirelytheirresponsibility.Now,ifthere'sanissuewe'rethefirsttoknow.ThisactuallyworkstoGE'sadvantagebecausewehavetalentedpeopleherewhocanhelp.Ifthere'saproblem,we'veprobablyseenitbefore.Undertheoldway,thingswouldn'thavebeensoopen.GEwasinfavorofbringinginoutsidepeople.WebroughtinexpertsinhighcyclefatiguefromtheAirForce'sArnoldEngineeringDevelopmentCenter,theNavalResearchLaboratory,MIT,PurdueandtheDepartmentofEnergy.Twoweeksaftertheproblemfirstsurfaced,ameetingwasheldinwhichalldatawerediscussed.Fiftyseparateactionitemswereidentifiedrelatingtovariousteststhatcouldbeperformedtoidentifythecauseofthefracturing.Oneofthehypotheseswasthenverifiedthroughtesting.Theproblemhadbeencausedbyaseeminglyminormodificationmadetothestatorforimprovedefficiency.Thesolutionwastoreturntoanearlierengineconfiguration.FourengineswerereadyfortheInitialSeaTrialsinJanuary1997.AccordingtothepropulsionLead:Injustsixweeks,wewentfullcyclefromhavingtheproblemsurfacetodiagnosingitandtoinstallingnewparts.Weworked24hoursaday,sevendaysaweek,rightthroughChristmas.Allofus—thePropulsionIPT,theIntegratedTestTeam,McDonnellDouglas,andGE—hadarealsenseofworkingasateam.Undertheoldwayofdoingthings,thiswouldhavetakenfiveorsixmonths(Bailey,1998,pp.13–14).7.7.4ProactiveIdentificationandManagementofRiskThefactthattheE/FwasanevolutionfromtheearlierC/Dmodelloweredtheriskoveranentirelynewdesign.IntheLevel2IPTManager'swords,“Weknewthatcost,scheduleandweightweredoablebecausewehadexperienceontheC/D.”Nevertheless,buildinganadvancedfighter/attackaircraftisacomplexundertakingwheremanythingscangowrong(Baileyetal.,1999,p.23).McDonnellDouglascreatedtheSystemsEngineeringandIntegrationorganizationtocontrolrisksandmanagetherequirementsallocationprocess.TheorganizationincludedaLevel2manageranddrewheavilyfromthelowerlevelproductteams.Thisteamtooktherequirementsdefinedinthesystemspecificationandbrokethemdownforallocationtotheproductteams.Thespecificationforaircraftweightrequirement,forexample,wouldbecomeweightrequirementsforthewingteam,theforwardfuselageteam,andtheverticaltailteam.Allsystemrequirements,includingsurvivability,reliability,cost,andschedule,wereallocatedinthisway.BythetimetheprogramreachedPreliminaryDesignReview,3,000specificationparagraphshadbeenallocatedtotheproductteams.ThefactthattheE/FevolvedfromtheC/Dalsoloweredtheriskoftheprogramfromtheoutset.However,proactiveidentificationandmanagementofriskwerestillessentialtotheultimatesuccessoftheprogram.Proactiveidentificationwasaccomplishedthroughtheoverarchingmanagementphilosophyofrecognizingproblemsearlyonandaskingforhelp.

176Weeklyreportingwasinstrumentalinthisprocess.Oncesystemrequirementswereallocatedtoteams,teamsusedMcDonnellDouglas'sformalriskmanagementprocesstodevelopriskmanagementplansthatidentifiedrisksandthenanalyzedthemintermsoftheirlikelihoodandconsequence(Baileyetal.,1999,pp.32–33).7.7.5MasterInformationSharingAhighvaluewasplacedonopencommunicationandonquantitativeinformation.Dyerpointedoutthat“withtheA12,therewastheperceptionthateverythingwasfineonedayandadisasterthenext.Clearly,therightinformationwasnotgettingtotherightpeople.”TheNavyLevelIE/FIPTCoLeader,madethepointthat:WithIPTs,wehavemuchmoredata.We'reweighingthingsthatweneverconsideredbeforebecausewehavesomuchmoreinformation.Thiscanbefrustratingtopeople.IPTsgiveyouknowledgesothateachdisciplineunderstandswhatotherdisciplinesreallydo.Thisisimportantbecausebuildingaircraftisallaboutcompromise(Bailey,1998,p.9).Alongwithcommunication,therewasaheavyrelianceondetailedquantitativeinformation.Oneoftheapplicationsofthiswasthecreationofacommon,centraldatabasethatwasusedbyboththegovernmentandcontractortomanagetheprogram.Thisdatabasecontainedhundredsofmetrics,includingfinancialdata.Inthisway,bothsideswereworkingfromthe“samesheetofmusic.”Asnotedearlier,eachoftheteams,rightdowntoLevel5,hadallocationsofdollars(whichtheteamcontrolled),weight,reliability,maintainability,operationsandsupportcost,electricalpower,growthvolume,andperformance.Eachteamreportedthesemeasuresonaregularbasis(dependingonthemeasure,weeklyormonthly).EarnedvaluedowntotheLevel5teamswasreportedweekly.Inthisway,problemswithcosts,schedule,ortechnicalperformance(e.g.,exceedingateamweightallocation)wereimmediatelyapparentandwithclearaccountabilityforwhoownedtheproblem.Detailedandfrequent(weekly)earnedvaluereportingwasusedthroughouttheprogramasamanagementandacommunicationtool.AccordingtoDyer:Earnedvaluehasbeenthecenterpieceofthewaywe'vemeasuredtheprogram.AtourCriticalDesignReviewfortheE/F,wehadthegovernmentandtheindustryIPTleaderforeachblockintheworkbreakdownstructure—airframe,landinggear,brake,brakesubassembly—presenttheircostperformanceindex,theirscheduleperformanceindex,andtheirweightmarginforthedesign.Andearlyinthedevelopmentwesetupweeklyreportingofthesemeasuresthroughouttheprogram.SoI'mnevermorethanaweekawayfromknowingwhenI'mintroubleandwhereI'mintrouble.…It'sveryhardtofindleadingindicatorsinthisbusinessbutwefoundthatgranularearnedvalueprovidesus,ifnotwithaleadingindicator,atleastacycletimetoidentifyproblemsthatwe'veneverhadbefore(Dyer&Conger,1996).McDonnellDouglasadditionallycreatedHornetWEB,IntegratedManagementInformation

177ControlSystem,andModularSixDegreesofFreedomtobettermanagerequirements,planning,resourceallocation,execution,andprogramtrackingovertheE/Fprogram'slifecycle(Baileyetal.,1999,p.25).7.7.5.1HornetWEBTheHornetWEBwasasecureinformationsystemhostedonMcDonnellDouglas'sintranetandaccessiblebyMcDonnellDouglas,theF/A18E/Fsubcontractors,andtheNavyprogramoffice.HornetWEBhelpedtoprovideallstakeholderswithrealtimeaccesstotechnicalandmanagementinformation.Itwasusedtoenhanceworkflowmanagement,systemdevelopment,actionitemcoordination,andelectronicdocumentsharing.Asasecuresystem,thedatawasprotectedwithadequatefirewalls,dataintegrity,andsecuritysafeguardingprograms.Specifically,theHornetWEBsupportedsharingofdatafrombothauser'sperspectiveaswellasanauthor'sperspective.Withtheaidofanetworkbrowseranddocumentviewer,usershaveaccesstointegrateddatabasesanddocumentsthatcontainthetypesofinformationdepictedinTable71.Table71TheHornetWEBsystemenabledaccesstodatafromacrosstheentireprogramBaileyetal.,1999HornetWEBExamplesSitesBusinessContractdocuments,specifications,newproductdevelopment,NavyAcquisitionprograms,internationalprogramsProgramConfigurationmanagement,datamanagement,humanresources,programManagementdirectives,measurementprogram,metricsSystemsCALS/CITISinformation,reliabilityandmaintainability,survivability,riskEngineeringmanagement,supportabilityassurance,managementplan,readinessprogramProductIPTs,controlsanddisplays,flightcontrols,transitionDevelopmentVerificationFlightlimitations,operationalevaluationpreparednessProductionQualityassurance,suppliermanagementandprocurement,trainingsystems,variabilityreductionProductSupportengineering,publications,technicalmanual,ILSmanagementteamSupportinterface,maintenanceengineeringinvestigations,supportabilityassurancereadinessprogramCALSContinuousAcquisitionandLifeCycleSupportCITISContractorIntegratedTechnicalInformationServiceILSIntegratedLogisticsSupport

1787.7.5.2IntegratedManagementInformationControlSystemInadditiontoHornetWEB,therewasprobablynotechnologyorsoftwarethathadmoreimpactontheprogramthantheIntegratedManagementInformationControlSystem(IMICS).WheneverE/Fsuccessfactorsarediscussedbyeithercontractororgovernmentmanagers,IMICSinevitablyappearsnearthetopofthelist.Intheprogram'sfirstawardfeeletterfromthegovernment,thesystemwascitedasamajorstrengthoftheprogram.TheteamthatcreatedthesystemreceivedthehighestawardsatboththecompanyandcorporatelevelswithinMcDonnellDouglas.Mostimportantly,thesystemiswidelynotedasbeingcriticaltotheprogram'sopencommunicationandrigorousriskmanagement.TheseprioritiesweredemandedbytheNavyinresponsetothefailureoftheA12program,andMcDonnellDouglasformallypromisedthemfromtheverystartoftheE/Fprogram.Tomeettheseobjectivesofopencommunicationandrigorousriskmanagement,highlevelprogramofficialsbothinsideandoutsideofMcDonnellDouglashadtomonitoreffectivelytheprogramandcommunicateitsprogressevenwhiledecisionauthoritywasbeingpushedtothelowerlevelIPTs.ThiswasaccomplishedbyfirstallocatingtherequirementsasfardownasLevel5teams,asdescribedpreviously.Afterallocatingtherequirements,theteamshadtobeabletosystematicallymeasuretheirprogressagainsttheserequirementsandreportthisprogresstomanagement.Thesystemhadtobeconstructedsothatthemeasurementswereeasilyunderstoodbyawiderangeofpeoplenomatterwhatpartoftheprogramthereportsdescribed.E/FIPTscreatedspecificmetricsforschedule,cost,andriskstatus,aswellasfortechnicalperformance.Scheduleandcostresultswerereportedweeklywhilesupportabilityandtechnicalperformanceparameters—suchasreliability,maintainability,weight,andradarcrosssection—werereportedmonthly.IMICSprovidedsnapshotsintimeaswellastrendanalysis.SeparatechartsalsoallowedIPTleaderstorequesthelpwhenaperformanceparameterwasnotprogressingasplanned.IMICSmadethisreportingusefultomanagementbypushinginformationuptheorganizationinasystemthatwasconsistentinitspresentation,butflexibleinthelevelofdetailpresented.IMICStookdataforallmetricsandatalllevelsandrolledthemupatwhateverlevelamanagerwishedtoseethem.Ifinterestedinweight,forexample,managerscouldseetheoverallaircraftweightprogressandtrends.Theycouldthen“drilldown”tolowerlevelsandseehowweightwasprogressingintheLevel4wingteam,orevenintheLevel5controlsurfacesteam.AdditionalIMICSmeasuresincludecostandscheduleperformanceindicesasfollows:BudgetedcostofworkscheduledCostvarianceBudgetedcostofworkperformedCostperformanceindexActualcostofworkperformedBudgetatcompletion(dollars)SchedulevarianceEstimateatcompletion(dollars)

179ScheduleperformanceindexTocompleteperformanceindicesManagersatMcDonnellDouglasandinthegovernmenthadaccesstoIMICSinformationatalllevelsofgranularityasitwasupdatedeachweek.Itemsfallingbehindtheirgoalswereeasilyidentifiedandprogressagainstcorrectiveactionwaseasilytracked.Whenanitemdemandedupperlevelattention,Dyer,thegovernmentprogrammanager,andMikeSears,theMcDonnellDouglasprogrammanager,couldeachbringthesamedataupontheirscreensastheydiscussedtheproblem.Inmoreroutinesituations,themetricsandthepresentationchartsprovidedareadyformatfortheweeklymanagementmeetingsheldatMcDonnellDouglasandforprogressreportstoofficialsoutside.BecauseIMICSorganizedalargeamountofdataintousableform,andwaswidelyusedanddistributedbothwithinandoutsidethegovernment,itmadetheprogressoftheprogramunderstandabletoawidearrayofpeople.Thiswidecommunication,inturn,allowedtheteamstoeffectivelyidentifyandaddressareasthatputtheprogram'sobjectivesatrisk.7.7.5.3ModularSixDegreesofFreedomMcDonnellDouglasusedcommondatabasesandanalysistools,knowncollectivelyasModularSixDegreesofFreedom(ModSDF)(Baileyetal.,1999,p.28),tofacilitatetheexchangeofinformationacrosstheproductandthetechnicaldisciplinebasedtechnologyteamstoproducebalancedrequirementsanddesigns.Table72containsalistoftheModSDFdatabasesandtoolsusedbytheseengineeringteams.Table72ModSDFdatabasesandanalysistoolsBaileyetal.,1999TechnologyTeamsModSDFAerodynamicsFlightControlStructuralLoadsMaterialsandFlyingQualitiesandDynamicsStructuralDevelopmentDatabasesAeroDatabaseControlLawsLoadsDatabaseMaterialsDatabaseAnalysisMissionFlyingQualityDesignLoadsDesignAllowablesToolsPerformanceCriteriaCarrierSuitControlLawsDynamicCompositeAllowablesPerformanceEnvironmentWeaponAeroelasticFullScaleTestSeparationStabilityRequirementsRequirementsRequirementsInadditiontothetoolslistedinTable72,thetechnologyteamsreliedheavilyontheuseofsimulationssupportedbyModSDFtoanalyzetherequirements,softwarecode,andtheintegratedsubsystems.Asinthecaseoftheflightcontrolcomputersystem,simulationswereusedtoconductseverallevelsoftestingtoensuretheassemblycodeandflighthardwarewere

180operatingcorrectly.7.8ProgramDeliveryAsstatedpreviouslytheE/Fprogramcompleteditsdevelopmentphaseaheadofscheduleandwithinbudgetedcost.Further,theaircraftrealizedbenefitsbycompletingitsdevelopmentphaseweighing1,000poundsunderitsspecificationwithonethirdfewerpartsthanitspredecessoraircraft,aheavierpayload,longerrange,andincreasedreliability(White,1997).ItwasalsoprojectedtoimprovereliabilityorMeanFlightHoursBetweenFailurebyupto25%,and“Organizational”LevelScheduledandUnscheduledMaintenanceManHours/FlightHourbyover40%comparedwiththeC/Dfleet.AsshowninFigure74,veryfewscheduleslipsoccurredintheE/Fprogram,withtheexceptionoftheinitialoperationalcapabilitydate(Younossietal.,2005,p.6).Figure74:TheF/A18E/FprogramhadaverystablescheduleduringitsdevelopmentYounossietal.,2005,p.8.ReproducedwithpermissionofRANDCORPORATIONviaCopyrightClearanceCenter,Inc.Itisnoteworthythattheprogramcompletedwithinbudgetedcost,sincefundingcutswereimposedtwicebetween1990and2002.The1993defenseauthorizationbillauthorizedUS$944millionfortheE/Fprogram,US$190millionlessthanrequested.Thesamebillalsosetseveralconditionsthathadtobemetbeforeanyofthefundscouldbeobligated.TwooftheserequiredtheSecretaryofDefensetocertifythatmanagementsystemswereinplacetoensurethattotalEngineeringandManufacturingDevelopmentcostswouldnotexceedUS$4.88billion(in1990dollars)andthatthecostoftheE/Fmodelwouldnotexceed123%ofthe

181flyawaycostoftheC/DmodelunlesstheNavydemonstratedthatthehigherflyawaycostswouldproducegreaterwarfightingeffectiveness(Younossietal.,2005,p.65).Fundingcutsorinstabilityduringaprogram'sdevelopmentphasetypicallyresultsincostoverrunslaterintheprogram.However,theE/Fprogramwasabletoabsorbthoseearlyfundingcutsandstillcompletewithinitsplannedbudget.Thecloseintegrationacrosstheprogramresultedinbenefitsinareassuchasmanufacturing.Bycreatingproductionprocessesandhardwaredesignssimultaneouslyandcarefullyanalyzingthesourcesofvariationintheprocess,theE/Fprogramwasabletoreduceproductioncostsandcreateproductionprocessesthatreduceddefectsandrework.Forexample,concurrentdesigntradeoffsresultedinE/Fwingsparsofhigherqualityandcosting30%lessthantheC/Dwingspars.Numerousiterationsandearlytradeoffsmadewhiledesigningtheflightcontrolcomputersystemresultedinfewerrequirementschangesandchangememos(Baileyetal.,1999,p.32).Thecompletedaircrafthaveconsistentlybeendeliveredonoraheadofschedule.Inthe1996QuadrennialDefenseReview,theNavywasdirectedtoreducethetotalprocurementoftheE/Ffrom1,000to548aircraft.Thepeakannualproductionwasalsocutfrom60to48aircraft,andtherampuptofullproductionwasdelayedbytwoyears(Cohen,1997,p.45;Younossietal.,2005,p.68).Despitethissignificantchangetotheprogramplan,demandfortheairplanehasbeenstrongwith565SuperHornetsdeliveredbytheendof2015.BenefitstothemanufacturerofthestrengthoftheplatformincludeexportstotheRoyalAustralianAirForceandanewapplicationintheEA18GGrowlerelectronicwarfarevariant,with150aircraftscheduledtobedeliveredoverthelifeofthatprogrambeyondthestandardaircraftprogram.TheaircraftachievedinitialoperationalcapabilityintheU.S.NavyinSeptember2001,andenteredfirstcombatoperationsayearlaterinNovember2002.Ithasbeeninvolvedincombatoperationssemicontinuouslysincethen.TheintroductionoftheE/Fintothefleetreducedthenumberofaircrafttypesdeployedaboardcarriers,bringingsignificantbenefitsinoperationsandmaintenance,logistics,training,andequipping.InJune1996,theE/FSuperHornetprogramreceivedthefirstU.S.DepartmentofDefenseAcquisitionExcellenceAwardforexcellenceandsuperiorperformanceintheengineeringandmanufacturingdevelopmentphaseoftheE/F.In1999theE/FprogramwontheprestigiousCollierTrophyasarecognitionbytheaerospaceindustryofanexceptionalaircraftprogram.7.9IntegrationPracticesObservedintheF/A18E/FProgramTheE/FprograminitsplanningandexecutiondemonstratedtheapplicationofaremarkablenumberofattributesfromtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringIntegrationFrameworkpresentedinChapter6.Table73summarizesthekeyinsightsfromtheE/FcasestudyorganizedbythedimensionsintheIntegrationFramework.Table73IntegrationfactorsevidentintheF/A18E/Fcasestudy

182IntegrationF/A18E/FDimensionIntegrationClearrequirementsfortheprogramwereestablishedearlythroughaProcesses,collaborativeprocessinvolvingallprogramstakeholders.Practices,andKeytechnicalperformancemeasuresdefinedearlyandsharedacrossToolstheprogram.WBSwasbasedontheproductarchitecturetounitemanagementandtechnicalefforts.Commoncentraldatabase(HornetWEB,IMICS)withweeklyreporting.WBSlinkedtoEVMStomeasureprogressagainsttasks.ModSDFusedasacommonanalysisenvironment.Aggressiveriskidentificationandmanagement.FlowdownofvarioustechnicalandmanagementrelatedbudgetstotheIPTs.OrganizationalLeadershipatmultiplelevelsadvocatedandmodeledintegratedEnvironmentbehavior.StrongpushbyNAVAIRtoprioritizeintegrationinprogramteams.Program/productidentityprioritizedoverfunctionalidentity.UseofIPTstobridgefunctionalgroups.Colocationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering/engineeringdisciplines.Emphasisoneffectivecommunicationacrossfunctionalboundaries.CultureofsharedresponsibilityforoutcomesacrossNAVAIRandMcDonnellDouglas.PeopleSupportatNAVAIRtodevelopintegrationcompetencies.CompetenciesClearrolesandauthoritiesdefined.Leadershipselectionbasedonexperienceandabilitytofosterrelationships.Decisionsmadebycapablepeopleatthepointwhereworkisperformed.ContextualUrgentaircraftreplacementneededafterA12programcancellationFactorsandneedtouseexistingfunding.Priorhistoryofarmslengthrelationshipsseenasabarriertoeffectiveprogramexecution.

183Theprogrambudgetwasfixedbymultiplestakeholdersandtherewererequirementstostaywithinbudgetedcost.TheprogramwasfundedasneededtomeetitsexecutionrequirementsandreflectitspriorityintheNavyacquisitionportfolio.Programcomplexitywasreducedbyusingaderivativeproductstrategyandleveragingexistingorganizationalrelationships.Maturetechnologieswereselectedtolimitoverallprogramscope.Nonessentialupgradeswereplacedonaseparatedevelopmentpathforlaterintegrationintothesystem.7.10SummaryTheF/A18E/FSuperHornetcasestudyillustratesinsomedetailaprogramwhereintegrationwasacorephilosophy,drivenbyanunderstandingthatthecostofnotbeingintegratedwasunacceptablyhigh.TherewasawarenessthatthetraditionalwaysthatteamshadworkedtogetherinthepastwouldnothavemetacriticalscheduledrivenneedtoprovidekeystrikecapabilitiestotheNavyfleet.Whatemergedwasaprogramthatsubordinatedtheindividualfunctionalandorganizationalidentitiestotheneedsoftheoverallprogram.Themantraoftheprogramleaderswas“theairplaneistheboss”andwasusedtoensurethatindividualsandteamsworkedtomaketherightchoicesandactasneededtoensureoverallsuccess.ThiscasehistorynotonlyprovidesevidencetosupporttheIntegrationFramework,butalsoillustrateshowthevariouselementsareexpressedinanactualprogramandhowtheyinterrelate.Thenumerousorganizationsinvolvedintheprogramweredeliberateabouttheirintenttohaveamoreintegrated,highfunctioningrelationshipbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Anumberofpracticesandapproacheswereemployedtoencourageincreasedintegration.Seniorleadershipplayedadefiningroleinestablishingthevisionforgreaterintegrationandwerewillingtoexpendtime,resources,andleadershipcapitaloveranextendedperiodoftimetoensurethattheentireprogramparticipatedinenactingthatvision.Chapter10andPartIIIofthisbookexamineingreaterdepththecriticalrolethatleadershipplaysinadvancingintegrationbetweentheseprogramcriticalfunctions.7.11DiscussionQuestions1.Whatweresomekeysimilaritiesbetweenwhatyoureadaboutinthecasestudyandwhatyouexperienceinyourownwork?Whatweresomekeydifferences?2.WhichelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkdoyouthinkhadthegreatestimpactontheF/A18E/Fprogramoutcomes?Why?3.Whatpracticeorsetofpracticeswouldyouurgeyourorganizationtoadoptimmediately?

184WhatfactorsfromtheIntegrationFrameworkdoyouthinkwouldbeofbenefittoyourorganizationifadopted?4.Whatprinciplebarriersmightyouanticipateencounteringasyoutrytoreplicatesomeofthesepractices?Howchallengingmighttheybetoovercome?5.Basedonwhatyoulearnedinthischapter,wouldyouconsideryourcurrentorganizationalenvironmenttobeconducivetotheeffectiveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?Explain.Ifnot,whynot?6.Whatincentivesandmotivationalfactorswouldyourecommendtoyourownorganizationinordertobetterintegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?7.Whattechniquedidyouthinkwasmosteffectivetoensurethatstakeholderconcernswereaddressedearlyinthelifecycleoftheprogram?7.12ReferencesBailey,E.(1998,April9).TheF/A18E/F:AnIntegratedProductTeam(IPT)casestudy.InstituteforDefenseAnalyses.IDANSD8027.Bailey,E.,Nash,S.,&Woolsey,J.(1999,January).Integratedproductandprocessdevelopmentcasestudy,DevelopmentoftheF/A18E/F.InstituteforDefenseAnalyses.IDAD2228.Cohen,W.S.(1997,May).ReportoftheQuadrennialDefenseReview.Dyer,J.,&Conger,C.(1996).Theevolvingintegratedprogramteam.PresentedatProjectManagementInstitute1996AnnualSeminarsandSymposium,Boston,Massachusetts.U.S.Navy(2006,April24).Photobyphotographer'sMate3rdClassChrisThamann(RELEASED).Retrievedfromwww.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=33917White,J.W.(1997).ApplicationofnewmanagementconceptstothedevelopmentofF/A18aircraft.JohnsHopkinsAPLTechnicalDigest,18(1),21–32.Younossi,O.,Stem,D.,Lorell,M.,&Lussier,F.(2005).LessonslearnedfromtheF/A–22andF/A–18E/Fdevelopmentprograms.RandCorporation.ReportMG276.ISBN0833037498.Endnote1.ContributedbyElizabeth“Betsy”Clark,SCRAMPrincipal,President,SoftwareMetrics,Inc.

1858PROGRAMMANAGEMENTANDSYSTEMSENGINEERINGINTEGRATIONPROCESSES,PRACTICES,ANDTOOLS8.1IntroductionAllaspectsofintegrationareaboutindividualsandhowtheycoordinatetheapplicationoftheircollectiveknowledge,expertise,andcapabilitiestodeliverresults.Effectiveintegrationeffortsareaccomplishedthroughtheapplicationofprocesses,practices,andtoolsthathelptoenableseveralimportantabilities:Enablecommunicationandcommonunderstandingrelatedtothekeyobjectivesandactivitiestoaccomplishthoseobjectives.Provideframeworksfordefiningspecificworkactivities.Establishexpectationsofeachperson'scontribution.Documentapproachesforcoordinatingandtrackingworkefforts.Identifycriticalpointswhereindividualandgroupworkeffortsmustcometogether.Facilitateproblemidentificationandresolution.Applygenerallyacceptedapproachesthathavedemonstratedeffectiveresultsundersimilarcircumstancesinthepast.Supportandacceleratetheaccomplishmentofspecificworkactivities.Someprocesses,practices,andtoolsaredesignedforindividualusewhileothersmaybestructuredforgroupactivities.Bothuseshaveappropriateapplicationwithincomplexprograms.Itisincumbentontheuseroruserstoapplytheminawaythatfacilitatesintegrationacrossdisciplineswithinateam.Ifusersapplytheprocesses,practices,andtoolsinwaysthatfocusontheirrespectivefunctionsattheexpenseofcollaborationwithotherdisciplines,thenthereislikelytobeonlylimitedintegration.Ontheotherhand,ifprocesses,practices,andtoolsnotonlydefinetheworktodobutalsodoitinawaythatembedscollaboration,communication,andshareddecisionmakinginthetasks,thenintegrationismuchmorelikely.ThischapterusesvariousexamplesandalsoreferencestheF/A18E/FSuperHornetcasestudyinChapter7toillustrateprocesses,practices,andtoolsshowntoenablehigherlevelsofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringaswellasotherdisciplines.Nomatterwhichintegratingprocesses,practices,andtoolsareused,allwilllikelyneedtobetailoredtothespecificprogramcontext.Thischaptermakesthepointthatprocesses,practices,andtoolsshouldbedeliberatelydesignedandimplementedintheprogramaspartofeffortsto

186improveintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Theprocesses,practices,andtoolsmentionedinthischapterareorganizedbythetimelineoftheirimpactonintegration:episodicorpervasive.Episodicintegrationemergesastheneedrequires.Itisdrivenbyperiodicityinthatitarisesatpointsalongtheprogramtimelineandistypicallyaresultofoverlayprocessesgoverningtheprogramlifecycle.Pervasiveintegrationtendstobesynchronouswiththedaytodayworkoftheprogramoritscomponentprojects.Heretheopportunityforintegrationrunscontiguously.8.2EpisodicIntegrationMechanismsEpisodicintegrationmechanismsareappliedoccasionallytocertainactivitiesoratspecificintervalswithinaprogram.Thesemechanismsarenotdailydriversofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,butratherrepresentperiodicforcingfunctionsthatrequireprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerstoworktogethercloselytoproducesuccessfuloutcomes.8.2.1ProgramGateReviewsEngineeringprogramsoftenbeginwithahighlevelprogramconceptorideathatrepresentsastrategicopportunity.Whenexecutiveleadershipbelievesthattheconceptisworthexploring,theleadershipoftenappointsasponsorandassignsresourcestofurtherdeveloptheconcept.Oncetheconceptisfleshedoutandspecificapproachesareidentifiedforrealizingtheconcept,executiveleadershipconductsareviewtodeterminewhethertheconceptadvancestothenextphase.Manyorganizationsrequireprogramsandprojectstoundergoexecutivelevelgatereviewsthatdeterminewhethertheywill:Receiveapprovaltoproceedtothenextgate(Go);Repeatthereviewafteraddressingspecificquestionsorconcerns(Recycle);orBeterminated(NoGo).Thereareseveralvariationsofthegatedecisionprocess.Themajorityhavesomeformofthefollowingpoints(gates),drawnfromgenericproductdevelopmentprograms,whereinformationispresentedtoadecisionmakingbodyforago/recycle/nogodecision:Ideation:Ahighleveldescriptionoftheconceptwithveryroughrevenueand/orbenefitsanddevelopmentcostestimates.Marketrationale/opportunity:Sometypeofmarketresearchregardingtheconcept,whichmayalsoincludeacompetitiveenvironmentanalysis.Businesscase:Includescontentfrompreviousgatesessions,butisnowfurtherdefinedandscopedalongwithfairlydefinitiveinvestmentandrevenue/benefitsexpectations.Develop/build:Thismaybebrokenintoseveralgatedecisionswheretheideamovesto

187prototypeandthentowardafullproductionmodel.Test:Theproducthasmovedthroughacompletevalidationagainstoriginalrequirementsandperformanceobjectivesandisreadyforproduction.Launch:Fullproductionbeginsandtheproductispositionedinthemarket.Gatereviewsrequirethatallprogramaspects,suchascost,schedule,performance,risk,requirements,andtesting,bepresentedintheircurrentstateofmaturityateachindividualgate.(Notethatthesamegateprocess,albeitwithpotentiallyadifferentdecisionmakingbody,willlikelybeusedforeachofthecomponentprojectsastheymovefromideationtocompletion.)Thesedetailsallowthegovernancebodytoevaluatetheoverallprogramviabilityandmakeappropriatedecisions.Gatereviewsrequirethatprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersworktogethertopreparethecasefortheprogram'sadvancementtothenextgate.Gatereviewsare,therefore,oneofthefewintegrationmechanismsutilizedbymostorganizations.Inhigherperformingorganizations,thereviewsprovideasanctionedvehicleforclosecollaborationandsubjectmatterexpertreviewthatisembracedbythevariousfunctionstoassesswhereprogramperformanceisinrelationtoplan.Ideally,thereviewsarecoupledwiththeotherprocesses,practices,andtoolsdiscussedinthischapter.The“12daysofAugust”examplefromtheSuperHornetcasediscussedinsection7.3illustratesthebenefitsofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringworkingtogethertopreparetopasssuccessfullythroughamajorgatereview.Theprincipalchallengetotheprogramwasanundisciplinedsetofrequirementsthatrepresentedthesetofallstakeholders'desiresratherthanapragmaticsetofthemostimportantattributesofthesystem.Thegatereviewprovidedtheopportunitytogatherallthedisciplinestogethertomakethenecessarytradeoffsamongcompetingrequirementsandinterests.Thisresultedinatightsetofrequirementsthatcouldbeevaluatedforcostandturnedintosystemspecificationsforthesubsequentphaseoftheprogram.Inpreparingforgatereviews,theuseofsystemsengineeringtechnicalreviews(SETR)mayofferavaluableapproachforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration.SETRsareinitiatedbytheprogrammanageruponbeingsatisfiedthattheprogramhasmetthespecificreview'sentrancecriteriaandprovideprogrammanagerswithindependentassessmentsoftheirprogram'stechnicalhealthandmaturityatkeypointsinthedevelopmentlifecycle.Tailoredtoreflecttheuniquenessofeachsystem,SETRsareusedtoreviewandevaluatewhetherrequiredsystemsengineeringtaskshavebeensatisfactorilycompletedpriortoproceedingtothenextstageofdevelopment.Ledbyanindependent,experiencedtechnicalmanagerwithextensiveanddeepdomainexpertise,theSETRteamdocumentsitsfindingsandissuesaworklistcontainingdiscrepanciesthatmustberesolvedpriortothecompletionofthereview.Eachtechnicalassessmentculminatesinaformalmeetingthatdocumentsrisksandrecommendationstoprogrammanagementregardingthecontinuationofworktothenextstageofdevelopment.SETRsprovideaforumforcommunication,coordination,andintegrationacrossallprogramdisciplines,andthusaremosteffectivewhenfullyintegratedintotheprogramplanandalignedwithkeyprogrammilestonesandgates.

188UnitedTechnologiesCorporation(UTC)developedacustomizedversionofagatedecisionprocessnamedPassport,showninFigure81.ThecommonelementsofgatereviewprocessescanbeobservedinFigure81,buttheprocesswastailoredtotheneedsofUTCandintegratedintotheotherelementsofitsbusinessoperatingsystem.ThisneedfortailoringprocessesandtoolsisdiscussedlaterinSection8.4,butthepointhereisthatUTCusedtheconcept,adaptedtotheirenvironmentandculture,asameanstofurtherintegratevariousdisciplinesacrosstheorganization.Roth(2010)pointsoutthatatUTC,“ThePassportReviewBoardconsistsofamanagementchairandrepresentativesfrommarketing,finance,engineering,manufacturing,aftermarket,qualityandserviceorganizations.”(p.115).Whilethereviewboardservesanimportantfunctionintermsofdecisionmakingregardingtheinvestmentofresources,therealvalueisthecollaborationitencouragesacrossdisciplinespriortoeachgatereviewprocess.Theoutcomeisincreasedlikelihoodofsuccessfortheprogrambasedonthecrossdisciplineworkthathasgoneintotheprogramplanningprocess.Figure81:UnitedTechnologiesCorporation'sPassportgateprocessRoth,2010.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2010.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.8.2.2JointPlanningLucae,Rebentisch,andOehmen(2014)pointoutthatconceptdevelopmentandplanningforengineeringprogramscombinesthreecriticalcomponents,eachofwhichmustintegratewiththeothers:

189Theproductconceptattemptstodefinetheinterrelationshipsbetweenthevalueoftheprogram,customerneeds,andproductrequirementsassociatedwiththestrategicopportunity.Thebusinessplanvalidatesthestrategicopportunitybyevaluatingtheproduct'salignmentwithbusinessstrategy,themarketfortheproduct,thelevelofinvestmentrequiredfordevelopmentandproduction,andthereturntotheorganizationonitsinvestment.Programorganizationandprocessesoutlinehowtheorganizationwilldevelopandproducetheproduct,includingcriticalprogramactivities,theassociatedhumanandotherresources,stakeholderswhowillbeengaged,andgovernance.Inaddition,eachoftheabovecomponentsidentifiespotentialrisksthatcouldimpacttheprogrambothpositively,intermsofnewopportunities,andnegatively,intermsofthreatsthatcouldhindersuccess.Researchconsistentlyindicatesthateffectiveexecutionoftheseplanningandscopingactivitiesatthestartofaprogramcanimproveitsoverallperformanceanditsabilitytodeliverthedesiredbusinessbenefits(Oehmen,2012).Eventhoughcollaborativeplanningisrecognizedasacriticalpracticeforintegration,theactiveinvolvementofkeystakeholdersintheprogramisoftenneglected(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Amaral,2014).Thelackofinclusiveandcoordinatedplanninghasbeenrecognizedasoneofthemostcommonsourcesofproblemsinprograms,leadingtounproductivetensionsacrossdifferentareasandbetweenteammembersinvolvedintheproductdevelopmentprocess(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013,p.3).Thereareavarietyoftools,templates,andsoftwareapplicationsthatorganizationscanusetohelpsupportscopingandplanningactivities.Forexample,organizationsmaydeveloptheirowntemplateforprogramplanstocapturealloftherelevantartifactsthatneedtobeinthefinalprogramplansuchascustomerinformation,procurementneeds,programgovernance,andoperationcharts(Lucaeetal.,2014).Buttheimportantpointisthattheearlyplanningstagesofaprogramprovidearichopportunitytocollaborateandintegratedisciplines,andthispracticeincreasesthelikelihoodofsuccesswhileatthesametimeminimizingunproductivetensionlaterintheprogram.Thereareanumberofplanningrelatedpracticesthathelptointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,notonlyatthestartofaprogram,butalsothroughout.Theseinclude:Programkickoffworkshops:Aprogramkickoffmeetingbringstogetherallkeystakeholders,includingengineers,programmanagers,andfactoryteams,inthecaseofproductdevelopmentprograms,atthebeginningoftheprogramtogatherinsightandinformationfromeachstakeholderandidentifycriticaldependenciesasearlyaspossiblebeforecriticaldecisionsandcommitmentsaremade.Theassembledteammayworkthroughavarietyofactivitiestocapturetheimportantelementsofwhatwilleventuallybecomeadetailedprogramplan,including:actionitems,duedates,milestones,neededresources,andresponsibilities;documentationofthecommunicationneedsbetweenfunctionsandprogramcontributors;risksandopportunities;andtraceableandvettedassumptions(Lucae,2014).IntheSuperHornetcase,thefactthatdevelopmentteamsfrom

190McDonnellDouglas,Northrop,GeneralElectric,andtheNavycouldnotagreeonconfigurationmanagementandhighlevelrequirementsforcedarestartoftheplanningprocess.The12daymeetinginSt.Louispushedtheprogramleadershipandteamtodevelopasharedviewandcleardefinitionofwhattheywerecollectivelydeveloping.Thatsharedviewandcleardefinitionultimatelyresultedinaspecificprogramplanandestablishedagreedmeasurementsthroughtheuseofworkbreakdownstructure,earnedvaluemanagementsystem,andtechnicalperformancemeasuresforeachintegratedproductteam.ModelBasedProgramPlanning:Variousartifactsdescribingtheprogram,includingtheproductbreakdownstructure,workbreakdownstructures,systemsengineeringandbusinessprocessmodels,organizationbreakdownstructure,andcostbreakdownstructurecanbecombinedintoasinglemodelrepresentingtherelationshipswithinaprogramtodisplayitsoverallstructure,relationships,andcriticaldependencies.TheFrenchnuclearfirmAREVAin2014createdsuchamodeltomanagetheearlydesignphaseofanewnuclearpowerplanttobedevelopedwithfourpartnersoveraperiodof10years.Themodelwasbasedonhundredsoftasksandthousandsofdocumentsandcapturedtherelationshipsbetweentheproductbreakdownstructure,workbreakdownstructures,listofactivitiesofeachoftheprojects,organizationbreakdownstructure,costbreakdownstructure,andgenericsystemsengineeringprocesses.Theoutputwasanextensivedescriptionoftheactivities,deliverables,detailedlogsheets,andprojectcontrolindicatorsbasedondeliverablesandtheirstatus,gates,orcost.Themodelwasusedtoanalyzetheimpactofpotentialchangesinspecificareasintheprogramthroughoutitslife,andasabasisforestimatingcostandidentifyinginconsistenciesbetweentheorganizationandthesystemstructurethatcouldrendertheprogramtoocomplextomanage.8.2.3DedicatedTeamMeetingSpaceThecreationanduseofdedicatedteammeetingspaceandstandupmeetingsisaprovenprocessinavarietyofdomains.Toyotahelpedpopularizethisconceptformanagingprogramsinrecentyearsthroughitsuseofthe“obeya.”Thisapproachhasspreadacrossindustrysectorsandhasgainedevenbroaderacceptanceas“agile”approachesformanagingprogramsandprojectshasgrown.Anobeyaprovidesadedicated,commonspaceforteamsandsubteamstomeet.ThenamecomesfromaJapanesetermthattranslatesintoEnglishas“bigroom”or“warroom,”butrefersintraditionalpracticetoaroomwhereacrossfunctionalteammeetstofigurativelyorliterallybreakdowntheproductcompletelyandinvestigatechangestoitinrealtime.Thisallowstheteamtomakerapidtradeoffdecisionsthatareacceptabletothemultipleperspectivesoftheteam.Thetraditionaluseofobeyastimulatesthecreationofsharedawarenessoftheproductsystemasitexistsinreality,ratherthanonlyonpaperorinadatabase.Typically,anobeyahascriticalartifactsandresourcestosupporttheteamduringthemeetings.Itisflexiblesoeachteamcandecidewhatcomponentsandresourcesarecriticalfora

191particularprogram.Onthewalls,teamsusuallyaffixasummaryoftheprogramgoals,keymilestones,deliverables,andakeyperformanceindicatordashboardcontainingmetricsandgraphicswiththecurrentstateoftheprogram.Itisalsoquitecommontohaveprototypesoftheproductorpartsoftheproduct,drawingsoftheproduct,andchartsshowingthesystemarchitecture,risk,issues,actionsboards,andsoon.Itisquitecommontouseanobeyaforagroupofprograms,somultipleteamscanshareandbenefitfromthesameresources.Havingonecommonobeyapromotesinformationdisseminationthroughouttheorganization.Theobeyacanbeusedforeverythingfromdailystandupmeetingstosteeringmeetingstoexecutiveandcustomerreviews.Teamsandsubteamsareconstantlyupdatingtheprogramcontentanddisplaysothatitalwaysreflectsthecurrentstateoftheprogram.Obeyausecouldbeeitherepisodicorpervasive,dependingonthelevelofintegrationintheprogram.Theobeyathusservesasacommunicationschannelforalldisciplinesinvolvedinthedevelopmentactivitiesoftheprogram—again,encouragingintegrationofprocessesandmethods.SeveralexamplesofthededicatedspaceconceptareillustratedintheSuperHornetcase.First,theprogramleadershipclearlyunderstoodthatlackofagreementoverconfigurationandhighlevelrequirementscouldnotbesolvedthroughvirtualcommunicationortopdownleadership.SotheleadershipgroupassembledinSt.Louisfor12daystoworkinthesamespacecollectivelytosolvetheprogram'schallenges.Thatprocesswasrepeatedfordevelopingthestructurefortheprogram'sIPTs.Butalsoonadaytodaybasis,theIPTssharedspaceinCrystalCity,Virginiatofacilitatecommunication,jointproblemsolvingandrealtimedecisionmaking.8.2.4PulsedProductIntegrationandIterativeDevelopmentDrawingonconceptsfromAgiledevelopmentandthefastprototypingapproach,pulsedproductintegrationanditerativedevelopmentissometimesdescribedasthe“dailybuild”ofproductcomponentsintomorecomplexcomponentsorintocompleteproducts.Iterativedevelopmentcomprisestheuseofshortcyclestocreateanddeliverproductincrements,partsoftheproduct,orotherdeliverablesrelatedtoaprogram.Itistimeboxed,whichmeansthelengthoftheshortcyclesisthesamethroughouttheprogram.Organizationsusuallydefine2to3weeksforeachiteration.Eachiterationstartswithaplanningworkshopinwhichtheteamwilldefinewhathastobeaccomplishedinthenext2or3weeks,clarifythegoalandpriority(s)fortheiteration,andhowtheteamplanstodelivertheresults.Theplanningsessionisgenerallybasedonahighlevelprogramplan,whichcontainsthekeyproductcomponents,systems,andsubsystemstobedevelopedfollowedbyworkpackagesandgroupsofactivitiestobeperformed.Aftercompletingtheiteration,theteamalongwiththecustomerandkeystakeholderspresentanddiscusstheresults.Theintegrationwithothercomponentswillfollow.Iterativedevelopmentatitscoreisbasedonexperimentation,rapidfeedback,andcontinuousintegration.Asimilarapproachissetbaseddesign.Setbaseddesignbeginsbydecomposingtheproductconceptintosubmodules,whichthenrequirestheestablishmentofclearinterface

192parametersthatdefinetheconnectionsbetweenthesubmodules.Oncethesubmodulesaredefined,theteamthenbeginstoestablishdesignvariableswithinthesubmodule.EachteambringstheirsetofdesignvariablestoperiodicmeetingswheretheSetsarecomparedandfeasiblesolutionsareidentified,tradeoffsarenegotiated,andagreementsaboutthesubsequentareasoffocusmade.Thisprocessrepeatsthroughanumberofcycles,eachremovinginfeasibleorsuboptimaldesignsandincreasingthedetailoftheremainingdesignsuntilthebestdesignremains(Genta,2016).TheNavalSeaSystemsCommandusedthisapproachin2007tocompletepreliminarydesignandcontractdesignforareplacementLandingCraftAirCushiontransportinlessthan12months.Goingfromonlyveryhighlevelrequirements,thetechnicalteamswereabletoexplorealargenumberofoptionsbeforecreatingfunctionalrequirementsdocumentsandultimatelyspecificrequirementsforthereplacement.Theintegratedteamofprogrammanagement,systemsengineering,andotherengineeringfunctionsplayedacentralroleinthisprocessatperiodicmeetingsby“pruning”thenumberofoptionsunderconsiderationandsteeringtheanalysistowardthebestoverallsolution(Mebane,Carlson,Dowd,Singer,&Buckley,2011).Systemsengineeringensuredthatthediverseelementscametogethertoproduceviablesystems,andprogrammanagementensuredthattheviablesystemswillproducethebenefitsdesiredfortheprogram.8.2.5SummaryofEpisodicIntegrationMechanismsEpisodicintegrationprovidesopportunitiesforimprovedintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementthroughprocessesthatgeneratetouchpointsacrosstheprogram'slife.Gatereviewsforadvancingtheprogram,andpossiblythecomponentprojects,isaprimeexampleoftheuseofepisodicopportunitiesforintegration.Thegateprocessmustbetailoredtothetypeofinitiativesincethetimebetweengatescouldrangefromweekstoyearsdependingonthescopeandcomplexityoftheprogram.Nevertheless,thevalueisinsolidifyingandunifyingtheprogramteam,includingtheprojectandengineeringteammembers,aroundthesolutionasitunfolds.Missingthisopportunitycanleadtounproductivetensionandconfusionamongteammembers.However,whenallofthevariousdisciplinesareincludedinthegatereviewprocess,theretendstobeasharedownershipoftheoutcome.Jointplanningattheoutsetandreplanningastheprogramanditscomponentprojectsmoveforwardisanotheroneofthoseepisodicintegrationopportunities.Oneofthekeyvaluesofjointplanningistheearlycollaborationthatbringstogethermultipledisciplinesand,therefore,multipleperspectivesforrealizingprogramobjectives.Whenthisopportunityismissedandprogramplanningtakesplaceinisolation,itoftenleadstoreworklaterandmissedopportunitiesforinnovativesolutions.Teammeetingspacealsoprovidesopportunitiesforhigherlevelsofintegration.Regularlyscheduledstandupmeetingsalongwithacentral“warroom”locationprovidestheopportunityforensuringeveryoneontheteamandassociatedwiththeprogramworkhasasingleviewofthestatus.Withoutthisongoingcommitmenttobriefmeetingsonascheduledbasis,misunderstandingsandconflictincrease,leadingtoincreasedcost,redundantorconflictingworkactivities,andlowerteammorale.

193Episodicintegrationrequiresahighlevelofintentionalitysince,byitsverynature,itisperiodic.Gatereviews,forinstance,onlyhappenatafewspecifiedpointsinthelifeofaprogram.Reinforcingthevalueandimportanceofintegration,andinstitutionalizingtheadoptedprocessesaspartoftheculture,becomecriticallyimportanttosustainingtheintegrationeffort.Integratingactivitiesthatoccurinfrequentlyarelesslikelytohaveasustainedinfluenceonthedailybehaviorsandinteractionsoftheprogramteamthanthosethatareengrainedinthedailyworkandroutinesoftheprogram.Forthisreason,episodicintegrationmechanisms,whileimmediatelybeneficial,maybeweakeratproducingfundamentalchangesinhowanorganizationachievesintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringthanpervasiveintegrationmechanisms.8.3PervasiveIntegrationMechanismsThereareprocesses,practices,andtoolsintegraltoprogramdesignanddevelopment.Theyarecontinuousinnatureandthusare“pervasive.”Thedegreeofdepthassociatedwithuseofpervasiveintegrationmechanismsisreflectiveoftheextenttowhichexecutiveleadersandprogramteamsviewtheintegratedcapabilityasastrategicorbusinessdifferentiator.Asthesayinggoes,“leadersdemonstratewhattheyvaluebywhattheyinvestin.”Despitethefactthatprocesses,practices,andtoolsarenotasattractiveasanewproductorhighprofileoutcome,suchasahigherstockvalue,theyarekeyenablersofeverythingthatexecutivesmightconsiderashighprofileandofvaluetotheorganization.Developingandsustainingconsistencyinanyofthefollowingareascanleadtosuchpotentialbenefitsas:SpeedtomarketImprovedproductqualityAmorecollaborativeandengagedworkforceReductioninwastedfundsandeffortsTheapplicationofpervasiveintegrationmechanismscanhelpprogramteamsrealizesuchpotentialbenefitsfortheirorganizations.8.3.1Standards,Methodologies,andAssessmentsRecentstudies(Conforto&Rebentisch,2014;Reiner,2015)haveshownthatprogramswithgreaterintegrationandbetterperformanceoftenpresentcommoncharacteristicsrelatedtotheproperuseofstandardstobuildanintegratedprogramdevelopmentmethodology.Amethodologyisthemeansbywhichteamswithinanorganizationapplyalevelofconsistentdisciplinetotheiractivities.Amethodologyisadocumentedapproachforintegratinginteractingorinterdependentpractices,techniques,procedures,andrulestodeterminehowbesttoplan,develop,control,anddeliveradefinedobjective.Amethodologyusuallyincorporatesandintegratesthreeimportantelements:1.Howanorganizationconductsitsbusiness,includingitsrequirementsandprocesses

1942.Keyaspectsoftheorganization'scultureandcapabilitiesaswellastheenvironment,industrysector,andcontextwithinwhichtheorganizationoperates3.Proven,recognizedbestpracticesortechniquesforaccomplishingintendedresultsOrganizationsmaybenefitfromhavingamethodologyinmanyways.Amethodology:RepresentsarepeatableapproachthatcanbeusedacrosstheorganizationCentralizesrequireddocuments,templates,andtoolssotheorganizationdoesnothavetoconstantlyreinventitsapproachEnforcescontrolanddisciplinebydetailingtheexactstepstobefollowed;individualsauthorizedtomakekeydecisions;keyinformationtobereportedandtowhom;andotherrelatedcontrolsStandardizesrepeatableprocesses,whichthenallowsforconsistentreportingtoorganizationaldecisionmakersIncorporatesconstantimprovementandrefinementasthemethodologyisappliedthroughdocumentationoflessonslearnedfromitsuseIstailoredtothespecificanduniquecharacteristicsandcapabilitiesoftheorganization,andtothespecificactivitiesorprocessesforwhichthemethodologyisintendedProvidesaframeworkforstafftraininganddevelopmentsothatindividualsunderstandtheirrolesintheactivitiesorprocessesaswellascriticalinterfaceswithotherstaff,executiveleaders,contractors,suppliers,andotherstakeholdersProvidegreaterassurancethatthosestepsdeemedcriticalbytheorganizationarebeingcompletedAmethodologyiscustomizedtotheuniqueneeds,applications,andactivitiesofaspecificorganization.Astandard,ontheotherhand,reflectsbroadlyacceptedprinciplesofwhatrepresentsgoodpracticeorcommonguidelines.Standardsaddresswhatistobedoneatahighlevelwithoutspecifyingexactlyhow.Standardsalsoprovideacommonlanguagethathelpstoensureeffectivecommunication.TheInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO,2004)citestheAmericanNationalStandardsInstitute'sdefinition:Astandardisadocument,establishedbyconsensusandapprovedbyarecognizedbody,whichprovides,forcommonandrepeateduse,rules,guidelinesorcharacteristicsforactivitiesortheirresults,aimedattheachievementoftheoptimumdegreeoforderinagivencontext.Forcomparativepurposes,Table81highlightssomeofthekeydistinctionsbetweenastandardandamethodology.

195Table81KeydistinctionsbetweenstandardsandmethodologiesStandardMethodologyDevelopedbythediverseDevelopedbystaffwithintheorganizationorbycommunityofindividualsengagedinconsultantshiredbytheorganizationthedisciplineRepresentsgoodpracticeasdefinedRepresentsexpectedpracticewithintheorganizationbyconsensusPromotesuseofcommonPromotesuseofcommonterminologyterminologyDescriptive—illustrateswhichworkPrescriptive—outlineshowtheorganizationrequireselementsmaybeaccomplishedspecificworkactivitiestobeaccomplishedApplicabletomostworkeffortsCustomizedtothespecificorganization,itsindustry,acrossmostindustriesanditsrequirementssothereisabetterfitwiththeorganizationProvidesgeneralguidancerelatedtoMandatesspecificapproaches,tools,orrulesapproachesandtoolsAmethodologyreflectsthespecificactions,steps,tools,techniques,andreportstheorganizationdeterminesarerequiredfordesignatedactivities.Thoseactions,steps,tools,techniques,andreportsarecustomizedtothespecificneedsandpracticesoftheindividualorganization.Soinbuildingamethodology,aprogramteammayusecontentfromgenericstandardsandcustomizethatcontentbyexplicitlyincorporatinginternalrules,roles,andprocedureswithinthoseareaswheretheyintendtodrivecertainbehaviorsandpractices.Forexample,practitionersmaycombinesomeoftheprocessesandmethodsfromPMI's(2013a)TheStandardforProgramManagement,INCOSE's(2015)SystemsEngineeringHandbook,orothersintoitsmethodology.Theythendecidewhichspecificpractices,techniques,andtoolsbestsupportthestandardizedprocessesandmethods.Thosespecificationsarethenincorporatedasorganizationspecificrequirementsintoitsmethodology.Amethodologycanbestructuredtoscalebasedonspecificfactors.Forexample,businessactivitieswithhighlevelsofuncertaintyorcomplexitymayfollowamorerigorousapproach,whilemorepredictiveactivitiesmayuseonlycertainelementsofthemethodologythatareappropriateforthescopeofwork(PMI,2013b;PMI,2011).Theuseofcommonlyacceptedmethodologiesisespeciallyhelpfulincaseswhereaneffortinvolvesmultipleorganizations,aswhenaprogramanditssystemsinvolveteammatesorsubcontractors.Thisapproachtodevelopingamethodologycanfacilitateintegrationbetweenprogrammanagers,chiefsystemsengineers,andprojectmanagersacrossateamandhelpsthemtointegratetheirworkquicklyandeffectively.Sinceamethodologyisaliving,evolvingresource,asorganizationschange,mature,andevolve,sotoodoestheorganization'smethodology.Asthemethodologyisimplemented,executiveleadersandusersmustevaluatethespecificpracticesandtheextenttowhichthe

196companyisadheringtoitsmethodology.Suchassessmentsleadtocontinuousimprovementinthemethodologyasitsusercommunitymovesclosertobeing“bestinclass”performers.Similarly,themethodologymustalsobecontinuouslyadaptedandalignedwiththeorganization'sothertechnical,business,andmanagementprocessesaschangesoccur.TheSuperHornetcaseidentifiesseveralexamplesofintegratedmethodologiesandprocesses.TheNAVAIRCommandercommissioneda“newconceptofoperationsforacquisitionmanagement”thatshiftedfromastovepipementalitytoanintegrated,teambasedframeworkforprogrammanagement.Theintegratedproductteam(IPT)structurethatflowedfromthatnewconceptofoperationshaddetailedproceduresforhowtheIPTswouldworkinpractice.TheIPTsutilizedcommontoolsandpractices,suchasacharter,workbreakdownstructure,andmeasuresassociatedwithearnedvaluemanagementandtechnicalperformanceappliedacrosstheprogram.Standardizedinformationsystemsandtoolscreatedvehiclesformonitoringperformance,facilitatingcommunication,andidentifyingandmanagingrisksacrosseachoftheIPTs.8.3.2IntegratedProductandProcessDevelopmentIntegratedproductandprocessdevelopment,alsoknownassimultaneousengineeringordesignbuild,usesmultidisciplinaryteamsindesigntojointlyderiverequirementsandscheduleswithequalemphasisonproduct(i.e.,design)andprocess(i.e.,manufacturing)development.Thisapproachusesmultifunctional,integratedteamsthatarepreferablycolocated.Theintegratedteamincludestheprimaryfunctionsinvolvedinthedesignprocess;technicalprocessspecialtiessuchasquality,riskmanagement,andsafety;businessgroupssuchasfinance,legal,procurement,andothernontechnicalsupport;andcustomerormarketrepresentatives(oradvisors)thatwillbethe“voiceofthecustomer.”Thereare10keytenetsassociatedwithIPPD,butthesecanbecollapsedintofiveprinciples:CustomerFocus:TheprimaryobjectiveofIPPDistoidentifyandsatisfythecustomer'sneedsbetter,faster,andcheaper.Thecustomer'sneedsshoulddeterminethenatureoftheproductanditsassociatedprocesses.ConcurrentDevelopmentofProductsandProcesses:Processesshouldbedevelopedconcurrentlywiththeproductstheysupport.Itiscriticalthattheprocessesusedtomanage,develop,manufacture,verify,test,deploy,operate,support,trainpeople,andeventuallydisposeoftheproductbeconsideredduringproductdesignanddevelopment.Productandprocessdesignandperformanceshouldbekeptinbalancetoachievelifecyclecostandeffectivenessobjectives.Earlyintegrationofdesignelementscanresultinlowercostsbyrequiringfewercostlychangeslateinthedevelopmentprocess.EarlyandContinuousLifeCyclePlanning:Planningforaproductanditsprocessesshouldbeginearlyinthescienceandtechnologyphase(especiallyadvanceddevelopment)andextendthroughouteveryproduct'slifecycle.Earlylifecycleplanning,whichincludescustomers,functions,andsuppliers,laysasolidfoundationforthevariousphasesofaproductanditsprocesses.Keyprogramactivitiesandeventsshouldbedefinedsothat

197progresstowardachievementofcosteffectivetargetscanbetracked,resourcescanbeapplied,andtheimpactofproblems,resourceconstraints,andrequirementschangescanbebetterunderstoodandmanaged.ProactiveIdentificationandManagementofRisk:Criticalcost,schedule,andtechnicalparametersrelatedtosystemcharacteristicsshouldbeidentifiedfromriskanalysesanduserrequirements.Technicalandbusinessperformancemeasurementplans,withappropriatemetrics,shouldbedevelopedandcomparedwithbestinclassgovernmentand/orindustrybenchmarkstoprovidecontinuingverificationoftheeffectivenessanddegreeofanticipatedandactualachievementoftechnicalandbusinessparameters.MaximizeFlexibilityforOptimizationandUseofContractorApproaches:RequestsforproposalsandcontractsshouldprovidemaximumflexibilityforemploymentofIPPDprinciplesanduseofcontractorprocessesandcommercialspecifications,standards,andpractices.Theyshouldalsoaccommodatechangesinrequirements,andincentivizecontractorstochallengerequirementsandofferalternativesthatprovidecosteffectivesolutions.IPPDteamsoftenuserequirementsbreakdownstructures(RBS)andworkbreakdownstructures(WBS)tofacilitatetheirscopingandplanningactivities,and,again,theseareopportunitiesforintegrationbetweenandacrossdisciplines.RBSareusefulwherecomplexsystemsdictatesignificantattentionbepaidtorequirementsandwhenintegrationiscrucial.Thisexerciseengagesthecustomer,systemsengineer,programteam,andprogrammanagerinjointlycreatingavisionfortherequirementsatarelativelyhighlevel.TheRBShelpstovisualizetheintersectionofdeliverablesandrequirements,andnaturallyfeedsintoadetailedWBS.TheWBSservesasthekeyframeworkfororganizingtheprogramandthesystemsengineeringeffortaswellasforestimatingandallocatingcost,schedule,andperformancerequirements.TheWBSdecomposesboththetechnicalandprogrammanagementeffortinsuccessivelevelsofdetailwhiledescribingthetotalityofboththesystemunderdevelopmentandthescopeoftheprogram.TheWBSservesasakeyprogrammanagement/systemsengineeringintegrationpoint.Consequently,itmustbethoughtfullydesignedtoreflectthebalancedneedsofbothprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Itmustalsobetailoredtoreflecttheuniquenatureofthesystemandthemanagementapproach.IntegratedproductandprocessdevelopmentwasaprimaryorganizingprincipleintheF/A18E/Fprogramandtheintegrationofthevariousstakeholdersthatwasachievedthroughthisapproachdrovemuchofitssuccess.Becauseitwastheprimaryorganizingprinciplefortheprogram,manyofitspracticesmapdirectlytotheIPPDprinciplesdiscussedinthissummary.8.3.3WorkDesignProcessesWorkdesignprocessessuchasconfigurationmanagementcanhelptoincreasecommunicationandcollaborationacrosstheprogram.Configurationmanagementisaprocessformanagingversioncontrolofrequirements,specifications,andwork.Itisusedtotrackrequirementsor

198specificationsandanychangesthataremadethatsubsequentlyproduceanotherversionoftherequirementsorspecifications.Formalconfigurationmanagementincludesplanning,identification,changecontrol,andaudits/reviews.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersmustworktogethertodocumentaconfigurationmanagementplanthatidentifieswhichconfigurationitemswillbetracked,andhowchangeswillbemanagedtoensurethattheproperconfigurationitemsareupdatedandcoordinatedwithotherusers.Anotherworkdesignprocessisstandardizedwork.StandardizedworkisoneofthekeydifferentiatorsoftheToyotaengineeringprocess.Rigorousdesignstandardizationsupportsplatformreusability.ThisallowsToyotatosharecriticalcomponents,subsystems,andtechnologiesacrossvehicleplatforms,resultinginlowerproductcostandhigherquality.Toyotafocusesonharmonizingdesignstandardization,processstandardization,andengineeringskillsetstandardization(Oehmen,2012).AccordingtotheEncyclopediaofLeanEnablers(MITCEPE,2013),standardizedworkcanhelpimprovetheflowofworkwithinaprogram:Once[standardworkis]inplace,workisensuredtobedoneinaconsistentmannerandataconsistentratetherebymakingimpedimentsmoreobvious.[Standardwork]canbecapturedindifferentforms:inmanufacturingproductioncapacitysheets,combinationtables,workcharts;inengineeringchecklists,sharedcomponentsacrossproducts,productarchitecture,manufacturingprocesses,supplychains,testplans,designstrategies,asexamples.Theseformsarethenusedbyengineersandfrontlinesupervisorstoinnovate/designtheprocessesandbyoperatorstomakeimprovementsintheirownjobs.As[elementsofthestandardwork]areimproved,thenew[elements]becomethebaselineforfurtherimprovements.AircraftenginemanufacturerPratt&Whitney(P&W),adivisionofUnitedTechnologiesCorporation,builtitsreputationonhighquality,highperformanceproducts.Consistentlydeliveringonitsbrandpromiserequiresthatthecompanyhavehighlyintegratedteamswheresystemlevelteamleaders,functionalspecialists,andsubcontractorprogrammanagers,whoareinvolvedindesign,production,andfinalassembly,havealignedworkprocessesthatenablethemtoeffectivelycoordinatetheirwork.P&Wviewsitsintegratedteamsandcontinuousimprovementofitsstandardizedprocessesasacompetitiveadvantage.Infact,thecompanydevelopedandpatentedaprocesscalledEngineeringStandardWork,theevolutionandapplicationofwhichwascapturedinacasestudybyRoth(2010).

199Mostorganizationshavedevelopedtemplatesforstandardwork,whichrequirepeopledevelopingstandardworktoincludethewhat(taskbeingdescribed),who(personresponsibleforthework),when(sequenceandfrequency),thewhere(atwhatlocation),thehow(methodstobeusedintheirdescriptions),andwhy(reasonsworkisperformedasitis).Standardworkdescriptionsarekeptclosetowherethatworktakesplace.Inmanufacturingcells,binderswiththerelevantstandardworkdescriptionsarekeptintheworkareas.Inbusinessprocessandengineering,therearebinders,orcomputeraccessiblefileswithstandardworkdescriptions.Thegoalistoproduceworkinstructionsthataresimpleandvisual.AspecialcaseofstandardworkisPratt&Whitney'sdevelopmentofEngineeringStandardWork(ESW).Whiletheconceptissimilartowhatisdescribedabove,ESWisbasedonsixelementsofengineeringworkthataredocumented—workflowmaps,toolsandmethods,designcriteria,designstandards,lessonslearned,andpractitionerproficiencyassessments—eachofwhichhasassignedownerstoreviewandmakeESWchanges.Thedetail,focus,andmagnitudeofPratt&Whitney'sESWeffortsarenoteworthy.ThecompanyfacedengineeringknowledgeshortagesasmergersandmarketconditionscausedthecompanytocloseitsmilitaryengineoperationsinFloridaandmovethemtoConnecticutin2000.Manyengineersdidnotmakethismove,andPratt&Whitneyfoundthattheycouldnotrelyonengineerspassingexperienceonastheynormallyhaddone.Theyhadtocaptureanddocumenttheknowledgeanddevelopaprocessfocusinengineering,whichtheirESWeffortsaddressed.DifficultiesinmeetingdevelopingschedulesfortheJointStrikeFighterF135enginecausedthemtostopallengineeringdevelopmentactivitiesfortwomonthsin2001towriteengineeringstandardworkdocumentation.FromtheF135andGP7000programs,theycreated450workflowmaps,9,000activitypages,and17,000documentsoverallfortheirengineeringprocesses,Pratt&WhitneyrecoveredtimelostandexecutedtheF135programwithinbudgetandscheduletargets.Anassessmentin2002foundthatevery$1spentonESWpaidback$4incostsavings.Engineeringchangeordersdecreasedby50%from2001to2002(andcontinuedtodropin2003),andforalldesignqualityescapes,estimatedashavingcost$46million,70%wereattributedtoESWexecutionfailures.ThekeypointforthisdiscussionofworkdesignprocessesisthatworkprocessesmayeitherisolatefunctionaldisciplinesfromoneanotherorintegratethosedisciplinesasillustratedintheexamplesofToyotaandPratt&Whitney.Thebestexamplesdemonstratethatworkprocessesaredeliberatelydesignedsothatintegrationisanaturaloutcomeoftheworkitself.Thesetailoredworkprocessesshouldbeintimatelyconnectedwithstandards,methodologies,andassessments.8.3.4RequirementsManagementRequirementsmanagementisanotherpervasivemechanismthatforcesconversationbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Effectiverequirementsmanagementpracticeshelpprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersaligntheirworksothatcustomersreceive

200idealsolutionsanddesiredprogrambenefits,andvalueisrealizedforthebusiness.Requirementsmanagementisalsooneareaofpotentialconflictbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Theprogrammanagerispressuredtokeepactivitiesontrackandthechiefsystemsengineerischallengedtoelicit,document,andvalidategoodrequirementsfordesignanddevelopment.Ifthetwocannoteffectivelycollaboratewithcustomersandotherstakeholderstoensuretherearestablerequirements,bothmayshareresponsibilityforprogramfailuresassociatedwithcost,schedule,performance,andsolutions.AsshowninFigure82,manyrequirementsmanagementactivitiescascadeacrosseachofthedomainsofportfolio,program,andprojectmanagement.Requirementsoftenstartattheconceptorportfoliolevelasahighlevelviewassociatedwithinvestmentorbusinessopportunities.Thehighlevelviewiscapturedinaninitialbusinesscasethatiscascadedtoaprogramforfurtherexplorationandelaboration.Attheprogramlevel,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerbuildonthehighlevelviewbyeliciting,documenting,andvalidatinghighlevelrequirementsfromcustomersandotherstakeholders.Thosehighlevelrequirementshelptoframetheprogramroadmap,benefitsregister,andamoredetailedbusinesscase.Inturn,theprogrammayfurthercascadeelementsofthehighlevelrequirementstospecificprojectsformoredetaileddevelopment.Eachlevelofrequirementselaborationultimatelyhastodelivertheproduct,service,capability,orresultthatdeliversvaluefromtheprogram.Integratedapproachesaremandatestoaccomplishsuchanobjective.Figure82:Requirementsacrosstheportfolio,program,andprojectdomainsRequirementsManagement:APracticeGuide,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2015.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.Butrequirementsmanagementisasmuchartasitisscience.Inlargescaleengineeringprograms,therecanbethousandsofstakeholders,eachpromotingdifferentaspectsofvalueandofteninconflictwithotherstakeholders'definitionofvalue.Capturingavalueproposition

201reflectiveofthehighestlevelofvaluerequiresateaminwhichtheindividualscanapplytheirowncompetence,wisdom,andexperience,andthennegotiatewiththeteamtoreachconsensus(Roth,2010).Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersshouldconsidernotonlytraditionalrequirements,butalsoneeds,context,operations,interpretations,interoperability,andcompatibilitycharacteristics.Theyshouldalsohaveagoodunderstandingofcustomerculture(Oppenheim,2011).TherequirementsmanagementapproachesutilizedmayneedtobeadaptedbasedonthelevelofrequirementsstabilityasreflectedinFigure83.Figure83:LifecycletypesandrequirementsprocessRequirementsManagement:APracticeGuide,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2015.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.EffectiveandintegratedrequirementsmanagementwascoreintheSuperHornetprogram.Theprogramleadershipteamdevelopedinitialtechnicalrequirementstoutilizeasmuchrelevantexistingtechnologyaspossibletoreduceboththelevelofcomplexityandpotentialrisk.Thentheintegratedproductteamwasempoweredtocollaboratewithotherintegratedproductteamstonegotiatetradeoffsandtodevelopalternatesolutionswhentechnicalrequirementswerenotbeingmetintermsofcostandscheduleperformance.8.3.5RiskManagementEveryengineeringprogramfeaturessomelevelofuncertaintyandriskthatmustbemanagedsotheprogramdeliversthesolutionscustomersexpectwithinestablishedparameters.Effectiveriskmanagementmustalsoensurethatthesponsoringorganizationrealizesitsdesiredbenefits.

202Thatiswhyriskmanagementpracticesmustbepervasiveandintegratedattheprogramlevel.Butitisalsoimportantthattheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerworktogetherinidentifyingandmanagingrisks.Itiseasytofallintothetrapthattheprogrammanagerfocusesonbusinessriskandthechiefsystemsengineerfocusesontechnicalrisk,buttheserisksareofteninterrelatedsuchthatrisksinoneareamayhaveimplicationsforriskinothers.Usingriskmanagementasanopportunityforbetterintegrationwilloftenresultinsurfacingrisksthat,inisolation,maybetotallymissed.Thereisnoshortageofguidelinesandstandardstohelppractitionersmanageriskeffectively.Sometimesoneguidemayconflictwithanother,butmanyoftherecommendedapproachesalignorfillgapsintheothers.Whilealloftheguidelinesandstandardsprovidevaluableinsights,theprogrammanager,chiefsystemsengineer,andprogramteammusttailortheprogram'sriskmanagementapproachtoitsparticularneeds.Tailoringisessentialtoensurethatriskmanagementactivitiessupportoverallprogramgoalsratherthansimplycheckingaboxthatriskmanagementplansandmitigationapproacheshavebeendocumented.Whileriskmanagementrequiresongoingworkeffort,effectivetailoringandapplicationofriskmanagementapproachescanproducepositiveresults.Ideally,riskmanagementprocessesshouldbefullyintegratedintoallprogramactivities—management,technicaldesignanddevelopment,procurement,planning,andsoon—andatboththeprogramandprojectlevels.Theassessmentandreductionofuncertaintiesandriskmustbecomeanaturalpartofallprogramplanninganddecisionmakingandmustbeownedbyboththeprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer.Theprocesscanstartbyclarifyingtheeffectsthateliminatingorreducinguncertaintycanhaveonprogrambenefitsandvalue.Theremustalwaysbeaclear“lineofsight”betweenrisksandprogramobjectivesaswellascommonrulesforidentifyingandprioritizingrisks.Effectiveriskmanagementincludesengagingstakeholdersearlyintheprogramtodiscusstheirexpectationsregardingthemanagementofuncertainty.Thisengagementhelpsintegratestakeholders'expectationsregardingriskintotheprocess.Suchinsightscanhelptheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerevaluateandprioritizerisksanduncertaintiesmoreeffectively.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersmustensurethatriskmanagementtakescenterstageatgateandotherhighlevelreviews.Allprogramdecisionsshouldconsidertheuncertaintiesthatunderlietheinformationorassumptionsuponwhichthedecisionsarebased.Thisincludesplanningdecisionsaswellaschoicesregardingtechnologies,supplychainpartners,orrequirements.Indicatingthelevelofuncertaintyinvolvedinthesedecisionshelpsdecisionmakerstoqualifythechoicesandsubjectthemtotheappropriatefollowupreview.Thereisdebateastowhetherriskmanagementshouldbeperformedbyaspecificindividualwithcoreriskmanagementcompetencies,orwhetherprogramteamsshouldincludeteammemberswithexpertiseinarangeofriskmanagementpractices.Ratherthanan“either/or”proposition,itshouldbea“both/and”practice.Havingariskmanagementfunctionthatembodiesspecificriskmanagementtoolsandmethodscanbebeneficialifthatfunctionhelpsprogramandprojectteamsutilizethosepracticeseffectively.However,fromthestartoftheprogramtoitsconclusion,executionofriskmanagementactivitiesshouldbepartofthe

203programprocessesthatengageappropriateprogrampersonnel,includingprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Suchanapproachensuresthatriskmanagementremainsanongoingpartofdeliberationsanddecisionmakingprocessesatalllevels.Fundingforriskmanagementactivitiessuchasidentificationandquantificationshouldbeavailablesothateffectiveriskmanagementstartsatthebeginningoftheprogramplanningprocessandcontinuesthroughouttheprogram'slife.Inadditiontoexploringpotentialthreatsassociatedwithprogramrisks,theprogrammanager,chiefsystemsengineer,andprogramteammembersshouldexploretheopportunitysideofriskmanagementtouncoverpotentialimprovementstoprogramperformance,deliverables,andsolutions.IntheSuperHornetcase,riskmanagementwastheresponsibilityofeveryteammemberfromthestartoftheprogram.Thatresponsibilitywascollectivelymanagedwhentheprogramleadershipteamdecidedearlyontoreduceprogramriskbyusingasmuchexistingtechnologyaspossible.Programleadershipalsoemphasizedtheimportanceofearlyriskidentification,butalsoresponsibilityforidentifyingmitigationoptions.Theprogramteamcultureengenderedtransparencybyfacilitatingproblemsolvingandrejectingblamingbehaviorswhenproblemssurfaced.8.3.6TechnicalPerformanceMeasurementTherearenumerousdecisionmakingtools,processes,andmethodsforusebyprogrammanagersincollaborationwithchiefsystemsengineers,butveryfewtechniquescallforintegrationthroughtechnicalperformancemeasurement.Suchmethodsareusefulforidentifyingpotentialrisksinanintegratedandcollaborativeapproachusingvariousparameterssuchastechnical,cost,andschedule.Technicalperformancemeasurementisananalysisandcontroltechniquethatisusedto:Anticipatetheprobableperformanceofaselectedtechnicalparameter—generally,thekeyperformanceparametersorcriticalrequirementsthatwhennotmetputtheprojectorprograminjeopardyduetolackofbenefitachievementoveraspecificperiodoftime.Recordtheactualperformanceobservedoftheselectedparameter.Throughcomparisonofplannedversusactualperformance,assistthemanagerindecisionmaking.Whileprogrammanagersarebalancingtheprogram'sperformanceobjectivesandbenefits,chiefsystemsengineersaredevelopingasystemtomeettheprogram'sperformancerequirements.Thetechnicalperformancemeasuresserveasakeyprogrammanagement/systemsengineeringintegrationpointtoensureprogramsuccess—bothbusinessandtechnical.Performancemeasurementandmanagementderivesultimatelyfromthedefinitionofprogrambenefits.Technicalperformancemeasurementshouldflowfromtheprogram'sbenefitsregistertoallactivitiesandbetiedtotheoverallperformancemeasurementsystemoftheprogram.Awellthoughtoutprogramoftechnicalperformancemeasuresprovidesanearlywarning

204systemforreviewoftechnicalproblemsandsupportsassessmentsoftheextenttowhichoperationalrequirementswillbemetaswellasassessmentsoftheimpactsofproposedchangesinsystemperformance.Technicalperformancemeasurescanhelpidentifytradespacefortheprogrammanager,developtheprogram'stestplan,andprovidekeyinputsintomajorprogramdecisions.Theeffortrequiredtoperformtechnicalperformancemeasurementisnotinsignificantandcouldbeverycostly.Consequently,greatcaremustbetakenintheselectionofthetechnicalparameterschosentobemeasured,whicharethentailoredtothesystem.First,theparametersshouldbederivedfromoratleasttraceabletokeyprogramperformancerequirements.Second,processesmustbeinplacetotrackparametersthatareofhighrisktoprogramandsystemsuccess.Finally,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerwilllikelyconsiderincludingthoseparameterswhicharehighcostdrivers.TheSuperHornetworkbreakdownstructureprovidedtheintegratedframeworkfortheintegratedproductteams(IPTs)tomanagetechnicalperformanceatboththeprogramlevelandtheIPTlevel.EachIPThaditsownworkbreakdownstructure,technicalperformancemeasures,andallocatedbudgetsinspecifictechnicalperformancemeasuressuchasweight.ButtheyalsohadvisibilitytotheprogressofotherIPTsthroughsharedreportingandtrackingsystems.TheregularreportingandtrackingoftechnicalperformancemeasuresallowedtheIPTstoidentifyissuesandopportunitiesfortradeoffswithotherteams,ultimatelyreducingtechnicalandprogramchangeorders.8.3.7GovernanceGovernanceisastructuredmechanismthroughwhichindividualswithoversightresponsibilityandauthorityprovideguidanceanddecisionmakingforimportantorganizationalactivities.Withintheprogramandprojectdomains,anorganization'sgovernancestructurereinforcesanintegratedmanagementapproachbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.PMI'sGovernanceofPortfolios,Program,andProjects:APracticeGuide(PMI,2016)proposesthatgovernanceservesthefollowingkeyfunctions:OversightControlIntegrationDecisionmakingAsshowninFigure84,eachgovernancefunctionmaintainsspecificactivitiesforwhichthegoverningbodyisresponsible,suchasconductingreviews/auditsaspartofitscontrollingfunctionorresolving/mediatingrisksandissuesaspartofitsdecisionmakingfunction(PMI,2016).

205Figure84:ProgramgovernancefunctionsandactivitiesGovernanceofPortfolios,Programs,andProjects:APracticeGuide,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2016.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.Becauseprogramscanbelargeendeavorsthatconsumeconsiderableinternalandexternalresources,theintegrationfunctionsthatprogramgovernanceperformsrequirethatprogramteams,andespeciallytheprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerswholeadthem,collaborateeffectively.Iftheprogramgovernancebodyisstrong,itsoversightanddecisionmakingfunctionscanchallengeaweakteamorfacilitatetheworkofateamthathasstrongcollaboration.Weakprogramgovernancecanfailtoaddressineffectiveprogramleadership,potentiallyexacerbatingtheteam'sweaknessesandmakingsuccessfulprogramperformancethatmuchmorechallenging.Ontheotherhand,ahighlycollaborativeteamcouldinsulateitselfagainstweakgovernancethrougheffectivebottomupmanagementthatpushesthegovernancebodytofulfillcriticalfunctionsthatwillenabletheprogramteamtofulfillitsresponsibilities.

206Governanceprocessesshouldbetailoredtofitthescopeandlevelofcontrolnecessaryfortheprogramtofunctioneffectively.Programmanagementgovernancemodelsmayvarybyorganization—whethergovernmentorcorporateventures—aswellasbysize.BecauseitwasaprogramsponsoredbytheU.S.federalgovernment,theSuperHornetprogramhadtwolevelsofgovernance.ThehighestlevelofgovernancewastheU.S.Congress,whichestablishedspecificparametersthattheprogramhadtomeetsubjecttooversightbyCongressionalcommittees.Congressalsoimpactedtheprogram'sfundingthroughtheannualappropriationsprocess.Theprogramlevelofgovernanceinvolvedtheactualprogramleadership,whichwassharedbetweenthegovernment(Navy)anditsprimarycontractor(McDonnellDouglas).ThesecondlevelofgovernancewasnotonlyaccountabletoCongressbutalsoprovidedoversighttoensurethattheprogramachieveditsoverallmissionwithinestablishedparameters.TheSuperHornetcasefocusedspecificallyonhowprogramgovernancefunctionedtoensuretheprogrammetitsobjectives.Thecaseidentifiedhowthegovernancebodyensuredtheprogramusedahighlyintegratedteamstructureandmanagedachallengingchangeprocess.Thecasepointedoutthatdecisionmakingwaspushedtotheintegratedproductteamsandthatthegovernancebodymaintainedhighlevelsofengagementthroughouttheprogram,includingresolvingkeyissuesthatwerebeyondthescopeoftheintegratedproductteams.Thegovernancebodiesregularlymonitoredkeyprogressmeasuresthatreflectedhighlevelmanagementandtechnicalrequirements.8.3.8SummaryofPervasiveIntegrationMechanismsPervasiveintegrationmechanisms,likethosedemonstratedthroughouttheSuperHornetcasestudy,requireongoingcollaborationandalignmentamongprogrammanagers,chiefsystemsengineers,andtheirteams.Toolssuchasmethodologieshelpteamsorganizehowtheywillworktogetherandidentifykeyprogramconsiderationsthatmustbeaddressedinplanning,development,tracking,andreportingactivitiesthroughouttheprogram'slife.Themethodologymaydefinehowtheteamwillworkthroughouttheprogramtomanagerequirements,risk,andtechnicalperformance.Requirementsmanagement,processandworkdesign,andtechnicalperformancemanagementrequireongoingengagementwithintheprogramteam.Ascustomerneedsareelaboratedandtechnicalsolutionsformeetingthoseneedsareexplored,theteammusthaveconsistentmethodsfordocumenting,verifying,andtrackingthoseneeds,whileatthesametimeexploringalternativesanddevelopingspecificsolutions.Ongoingriskmanagementisusedtolookholisticallyatallprogramelementsthatcanimpactprogramperformanceandisthusacriticalpointofintegration.Risksmaysurfaceatanypointduringaprogram'slifesoriskmanagementactivitiesbythefullprogramteammustbeactive.Programleadershiprepresentstheinterfacebetweentheprogramteamandtheexecutiveleaderswhoarepartoftheprogram'sgovernancebody—thosewhomakecriticaldecisionsaffectingtheprogram.Thus,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineermustwork

207togethertoaddressthegovernancebody'sconcerns,providerelevantinformationtosupportgooddecisionmakingandreportbacktotheteamtoensureeffectivecommunicationandalignmentwithexecutivedirection.8.4ANoteonTailoringAsdiscussedearlier,moststandardsarenotintendedtobeusedasis.Thestandardsprovidethe“what”ofthediscipline,butthereisaneedtothendevelopaspecificmethodologycovering“thehow”usingthestandardsforguidance.Similarly,toolsandtechniquescanbeandareusefulfordevelopinganorganization'smethodology,butrequireadaptationandtailoringtotheorganization.However,moretailoringisoftenrequiredevenafterdevelopingthefoundationalmethodologyasallprogramsarenotthesame.Inrecognitionofthisfact,PMI'sTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013a)andAGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide)(2013b)discusstailoringconsiderationsrelatedtotheprogramandprojectdomains.Theabilitytotailorprogramdocumentationisessentialtosuccess.Themajorityofprogramprocesses,procedures,plans,andothergoverningdocumentationarebasedonindustry,organizational,orgovernmenttemplatesthatareprescribed,soasnottoreinventthewheeloromitcriticalinformationandlessonslearned.Forthesetemplatestocaptureallpertinentinformation,theyareoftenwrittentocapturetheneedsandgovernancerequirementsoflarge,highlyresourceintensiveprograms.Whenadaptingthesetemplatestosmallerprogramsorprojects,itisessentialtodeterminetheaspectsofthetemplatethatarenotapplicable,soastousewiselytheavailableresources(time,money,andpeople).Asmallprogrammaynothavetheresourcestoperformwiththesamedegreeofrigorasalargescaleprogram.Tailoringisnotonlyaboutcontentreduction,butincludestheadditionofvalueaddedcontentaswell.Ifitisdeemedbeneficialtoaddcontentregardingtheneedsofaparticularprogram,thatcontentshouldbeaddedwithexplanation.Aprogrammaticortechnicalconsensusmayberequiredfortheteamtoagreeuponthevolumeandscopeofthecontentthatcanbeaddedorremovedaspartofthetailoringprocess.Manyorganizationshavetailoringguidesdescribingthetailoringprocessforspecifieddocumentationbasedonthetypeanduseoftheproductunderdevelopment.Achallengetotheadditionofcontentduringthetailoringprocessmaycomeintheformofareviewbyafunctionalorganizationwhosefocusiscomplianceorientedreview.Functionalorganizationsthatareseparatefromprogramexecutionmaytendtoberesistanttotailoringattemptsastheymaylacktheperspectiveandinsightavailabletothosewhoareactivelyengagedintheworkoftheprogram.Whenpresentedwiththissituation,itisessentialthatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersengagefunctionalmanagers.Programsuccesswilldependonthecollaborationandwillingnessofallstakeholdersincludingthefunctionalmanagers.Itmaywellbethatthefunctionalmanagersdonothavethebackgroundrequiredtocomprehend,withoutadegreeofmentoring,howtailoringhelpstheprogramtomeetitsobjectives.Inthiscase,bothpartieswilloftengrowfromthisinteractioncreatingan

208organizationthatisultimatelymoreefficient.Thisinteractioncreatesalearningorganizationwithopendialogue.TailoringplayedanimportantroleintheSuperHornetcase.Whiletheprogramunfolded,itwasclearthat“businessasusual”structures,processes,andpracticeswouldnotyieldsuccessfuloutcomes.Sotheprogramestablishedauniqueframeworkthattailoredeachofthoseelementsforthespecificcharacteristicsoftheprogram.Theintegratedproductteamstructure,theproceduresthatdetailedhowtheyworked,andthetoolsthatenabledintegratedplanningandreportingwereallselectedandadaptedtomeetspecificprogramobjectives,whetherthoseobjectiveswereperformancerelatedorrelatedtoenablinganintegratedenvironment.Whileittooktimeandefforttoestablishtheprogramframework,intheendthatinvestmentpaidoff,asevidencedinthestrong,integratedteameffortsthatdeliveredsolidprogramperformance.Insummary,tailoringfacilitatescustomizationofreviews,processes,andotherdecisionsupportinformationtoaccommodatetheuniquenatureofaprogramwhilestillmeetingthestatutory,regulatory,andothergoverningrequirementsfordecisionmakingandoversight.Additivetailoringshouldonlybeperformedwhenitaddsvaluetotheprogram'soutcome.Similarly,reductiontailoringshouldbedonecarefullysothatitdoesnotremoveanimportantaspectintheprocess.8.5SummaryAnumberofprocesses,practices,andtoolsexistandcanbeusefuladditionstothedevelopmentofcomplexprograms.Therearecertainlymanymorethanthosecoveredinthischapter.Oneofthekeyvaluesofthetoolsandtechniquesdiscussedistheopportunitytheyprovideforintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.Whileeachcouldproveusefulforeitherdiscipline,thefullvalueisachievedwhenusedincollaborationratherthaninisolation.Whetherepisodicorpervasive,theseintegrationprocesses,practices,andtoolsserveto:Structuretheworkthateachdisciplinedoesintheprogram.Providecommonnorms/rulesofbehaviorthatencourageawarenessofandcollaborationwithotherdisciplinesbeyondjustsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.Linktoolstogethersothattheinformationandprocessflowisseamless,particularlyacrosshandoffsandboundaries.Provideincreasedunderstandingthroughacommoninformationandperformancemeasurementsystem.Engenderjointaccountabilityfromprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers(andotherdisciplines)foroutcomesthatachievetheprogram'sintendedbenefits.Finally,everyeffortshouldbemadetoinstitutionalizetheintegrationofdisciplinesenabledbytheprocesses,practices,andtoolsbydevelopingastandard,baselinemethodologyforthe

209organization.Themethodologymustbetailorednotonlytotheorganization,butalsototheuniquenatureandcharacteristicsofthespecificprogramtowhichthemethodologyisapplied—anddonesothoughtfullyandintentionally.8.6DiscussionQuestions1.Howmighttheprocesses,practices,andtoolspresentedherebeusefultoaprogramwithwhichyouarecurrentlyinvolved?2.Whatothertoolsandtechniqueshaveyoufounduseful?3.Howmightyouuseoneormoreoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdiscussedinyourorganizationasameansbywhichtoencouragegreatercollaborationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?4.Reflectingonprogramsyouhavebeeninvolvedwithinthepast,howmightyourorganizationhavebenefitedfromtailoring?5.Doyouseeevidenceofintegrationprocesses,practices,andtoolsthatarebeingpracticedbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinyourorganization?Ifyouransweris“yes,”whichtoolsdoyoufindmosteffectiveandwhy?8.7ReferencesConforto,E.C.,&Rebentisch,E.(2014).Executivereport:Improvingtheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering—Casestudyanalysis.Executivereport3rdphase.Cambridge,MA:ConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.Conforto,E.C.,Rebentisch,E.,&Amaral,D.C.(2014).Projectmanagementagilityglobalsurvey.Cambridge,MA:ConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.Conforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia,USA.Retrievedfromhttp://www.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxGenta,J.(2016).SetbaseddesignandU.S.Navydesignandacquisition.MITSMThesis.InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).(2015).Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.).D.Walden,G.Roedler,K.Forsberg,R.Hamelin,T.Shortell(Eds.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.InternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO).(2004).Standardizationandrelated

210activities:Generalvocabulary.Geneva,Switzerland:Author.Lucae,S.(2014).Improvingthefuzzyfrontendoflargeengineeringprograms—Interviewswithsubjectmatterexpertsandcasestudiesonfrontendpractices.Diplomathesis,Nr.1392.Retrievedfromhttp://cepe.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/SL_Improvingthefuzzyfrontendofengineeringprograms_print.pdfLucae,S.,Rebentisch,E.,&Oehmen,J.(2014).Understandingthefrontendoflargescaleengineeringprograms.ProcediaComputerScience,28,653–662.doi:10.1016/j.procs.2014.03.079MassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence(MITCEPE).(2013).Theencyclopediaforleanenablers.Retrievedfromhttp://cepe.mit.edu/encyclopedia_overview/Mebane,W.L.,Carlson,C.M.,Dowd,C.,Singer,D.J.,&Buckley,M.E.(2011).Setbaseddesignandtheshiptoshoreconnector.NavalEngineersJournal,123(3),79–92.doi:10.1111/j.1559-3584.2011.00332.xOehmen,J.(Ed.).(2012).Theguidetoleanenablersformanagingengineeringprograms,version1.0.Cambridge,MA:JointMITPMIINCOSECommunityofPracticeonLeaninProgramManagement.URI:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70495Oppenheim,B.W.(2011).Leanforsystemsengineeringwithleanenablersforsystemsengineering.Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2011).Thepracticestandardforscheduling(2nded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013a).Thestandardforprogrammanagement(3rded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013b).Aguidetotheprojectmanagementbodyofknowledge(PMBOK®guide)(5thed.).Newtown,Square,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2015).Requirementsmanagement:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2016).Governanceofportfolios,programs,andprojects:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.Reiner,T.(2015,May).Determinationoffactorstomeasuretheeffectiveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,RheinischWestfälischeTechnischeHochschule(RWTH)AachenMaster'sthesis.Roth,G.(2010).Unitedtechnologiescorporationachievingcompetitiveexcellence(ACE)operatingsystemcasestudy.Cambridge,MA:LeanAdvancementInitiativeandMITSloan

211SchoolofManagement.URI:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81998AdditionalResourcesKleinsmann,M.,&Valkenburg,R.(2005).Learningfromcollaborativenewproductdevelopmentprojects.JournalofWorkplaceLearning,17(3).doi:10.1108/13665620510588671MarkesetT.,&Kumar,U.(2003).IntegrationofRAMSandriskanalysisinproductdesignanddevelopmentworkprocesses:Acasestudy.JournalofQualityinMaintenanceEngineering,9(4).doi:10.1108/13552510310503240

2129THEORGANIZATIONALENVIRONMENT9.1IntroductionOrganizationalstructures,behaviors,andnormsshapehowprogramparticipantsworkandinteractwitheachotheranddeterminethenatureofrelationships.Muchoftheconfusionencounteredinproblemsolvingtodayresultsfrommisconceptionsaboutthenatureofchangeinorganizations,socialsystems,andtheirenvironments.Moreover,ithasbecomeevidentthattraditionalhierarchicalorganizationalforms,planningmethodologies,andresponsestrategiesareinadequateforaddressingcomplexproblems.Thisisespeciallytruewhenappliedtoemergingconditionshavinganincreasedrateofchange,increasedcomplexity,andincreaseduncertainty.Inanefforttounderstandhowtodevelopbetterorganizationalenvironmentsfortheintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement,thischapteranalyzestheorganizationalstructuraldimensionsoftheIntegrationFramework,theenvironmentalelementsinfluencingtheprogramswithintheorganizationincludingculturalfactors,leadership,andteambuilding,andthenatureoftheparticipants'relationships.9.2StructuralDimensionsofIntegrationAllorganizationsaredevelopedthroughanecosystemofrelatedandunrelatedandformalandinformalprojects,programs,networks,alliances,partnerships,andfunctionaloperations.Thisecosystemdefinestheorganization'sstructure.Becauseorganizationsareevolvingsystems,thestructureswithintheorganizationcontinuetogrowandchangeasthestrategicgoalsoftheorganizationchange.Significanttimehasbeenspentonthedevelopmentofneworganizationalparadigmsthatare“characterizedby…decentralizeddecisionmaking,greatercapacityfortoleranceofambiguity,permeableinternalandexternalboundaries,empowermentofemployees,capacityrenewal,selforganizingunits,andselfintegratingcoordinationmechanisms”(Campagnolo&Camuffo,2010).Inotherwords,emergingorganizationalparadigmsarealigningwithteambasedbehaviors.Thedifficultyofgoverningthesenewstructuralparadigmsleadstogreateruncertaintyandturbulencewithinthewiderorganization.Intheirstudyofprogramcomplexityfromasystemsengineeringperspective,Oehmen,Thuesen,ParraguezRuiz,andGeraldi(2015)definecomplexprogramsas“characterizedbyfeedbackloopsandunforeseenemergentbehaviorthatcanspiraloutofcontrol,butarefundamentallystilltractablebystructure(ifcostlyandtimeconsuming)analysis”(p.7).Thefollowingcasestudiesandresearchfocusesonthetransformationoforganizationstoproducegreaterintegrationacrossfunctionalboundariessuchasprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.

213Thestorythatbestillustratesthepowerofstrongcollaborativeorganizationalculturescomesfromtheworldofcomputeranimation.WalterIsaacson's(2011)biographyofthecomputerindustry'smostimaginativegenius,SteveJobs,describesthebusinessandculturalrelationshipbehindToyStory,theblockbusterfilmthatrevolutionizedtheanimatedmoviegenreandhelpedtoadvancetheorganizationalrelationaltransformationbetweenDisneyandPixar.WhenSteveJob'sPixarandDisneybegannegotiationsintheearly1990s,Pixarwasasmall,financiallyunstablesoftwarecompany,whileDisneywastheindustrygiant.Pixarhadnotrackrecord,whileDisneyhadthebrandanddistributionclout.ThisleveragedisparitymadethemergernegotiationsbetweenDisneyandPixarlengthy,tough,andcontentious.Disney'sEisner“showedlittlecuriosityabouttheartistryortechnologyatthe[Pixar]studio.SteveJobslikewisedidn'tspendmuchtimetryingtolearnfromDisney'smanagement”(Isaacson,2011,p.433).TherelationshipthatresultedfromtheseinitialnegotiationswasthatDisneywouldprovidemajorityfinancingtoPixartocreatethreemovies,whichDisneywouldownanddistribute.DisneyalsouseditspositiontotrytoexertcontroloverPixar'screativeprocess(Catmul,2014).Observedfromtheperspectiveoforganizationalrelationaltheory,theinitialarrangementbetweenPixarandDisneywastightlycontrolledandhierarchicaltomaintainDisney'sdominance,butastherelationshipevolved,controlbecamelessimportantandrelationalnormstookhold(Catmul,2014,pp.289–292).Inparticular,afterPixarproducedastringofblockbusterfilms,leadersatDisneyapparentlycametobelievethatachievingthefullcreativepotentialofPixar'sanimationrequiredanintimateunderstandingoftheirapproach.Asaresult,arejuvenatedrelationshipimplementedsuchvaluesascollaborationandtrust,creativerisktaking,andexperimentation,ensuringreinventionasthenorm,andacommitmenttobuildtherelationshipandnarrowtheculturalbarriers(Catmull,2014).Inspiteofanunbrokenstringof11blockbusterfilmsandbecomingtheleadinganimationstudioinHollywood,Pixar'sexecutivesstillexpressedconcernabouthowtobattlecomplacency(Catmull,2008,p.9).Howdoyoucreateaculturethatregularlyidentifiesandsolvesnewproblemstoavoidsuccumbingtoinertia?IndescribingPixar'sstringofblockbusterfilms,EdCatmull,cofounderofPixarAnimationstudiosandPresidentofPixarandDisneyAnimation,stated:“[w]hileI'mnotfoolishenoughtopredictthatwewillneverhaveaflop,Idon'tthinkoursuccessislargelyluck.Rather,Ibelieveouradherencetoasetofprinciplesandpracticesformanagingcreativetalentandriskisresponsible”(p.2).AfterPixar's2006mergerwiththeWaltDisneyCompany,aseriesofstepsweretakentomakesurethecreativevisionthatwasPixar'shallmarksurvivedthemergerofthesetwoleadingentertainmentgiants.Catmullinspiredtheideaofhavingteamsleadthroughhis“directordrivenstudio”modelwherestorytellingwasinthehandsofthefilmmakersthemselves(p.6).Employeescouldbeassignedtoprimaryandsecondaryteamsdependingontheirskillsandpassions.Teamschangeddynamicallyastheneedsofthestudiochanged,withoutrequiringtraditionaltopdownreorganization.Asevidencedinthischapter,anorganizationthatdevelopscreativeleaders,fostersteambuilding,andmergesthetechnicalandthecreativecultureswillhavefargreaterchancesofsuccessthanonethatexistsinatraditional,rulesbased,hierarchicalstructure.

214OneofthehallmarksofPixar'scollaborativeapproachtoteambuildingwastoengageemployeesacrosstheorganization.Catmullandotherexecutivessoughtfeedbackfromallstaff,regardlessoftheirposition,regardingcompanyoperationsaswellasitsworkinprogressfilms(Catmull,2008,p.6).Hierarchyandstatuswereoflessrelevance.“Everyonemusthavethefreedomtocommunicatewithanyone.Thismeansrecognizingthatthedecisionmakinghierarchyandcommunicationstructurearetwodifferentthings”(p.8).Thedirectoreventuallymadethefinaldecisions,butnotbeforeeveryonehadbeengivenavoiceintheprocess.Workingtogetherandhavingtheabilitytoshareworkinprogresswitheveryoneandreceivevaluablefeedbackalongthewaycreatedconfidenceintheindividual,whileenhancingthegroup'screativityandadvancingtheorganization'smission.DoesPixar'sexperienceapplytotheintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?TheparallelsbetweenPixar's“directordrivenstudio”modelandengineeringprogramsismoredirectthanmightinitiallybeapparent.ThedirectoratPixarisresponsiblefortellingagreatstory,leadingthecreativeteam,andarguablyfortheoverallsuccessofthefilm.Theproductionmanagerkeepstrackofallthedetailsofproductionandensuresthatthefilmisdeliveredontimeandbudgetwithhightechnicalquality.Bothareessentialtotheultimatesuccessofthefilm.Thereare,ofcourse,otherimportantrolesthatcontributetoasuccessfulfilm,suchastechnologydirectors,finance,andmarketing,whoseeffortsandcontributionsmustbecoordinatedduringtheproductionprocess.Bothdirectorandproductionmanagerrolesshareanumberofsimilaritieswithbothprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers;themappingofrolesbetweenthetwodomainsinvolvesanumberofoverlaps.ButthekeypointisthatPixarworkedhardtocreateanorganizationalclimatethatensuresthateveryvoiceisheardandcancommunicatetheirperspective,needs,andideastothefilmandthatnooneindividualorgroupdominatestheprocess.Catmull(2014)remarksthat“ifanyoneofthosegroups‘wins,’welose”(p.138).

215CreatingaTeamDrivenProcessforSolvingProblemsEdCatmull(2014),inhisinspirationalstoryCreativity,Inc.,setsthevisionandthesourcesofhisinspirationandhowPixarfostereditscreativecommunity,andhowtheseideaswerelatertransitionedtoDisneyAnimationunderhisleadership.SomeofthekeyprinciplesbehindCatmull'ssuccessfulstrategyare:“Giveagoodideatoamediocreteam,andtheywillscrewitup.Giveamediocreideatoagreatteam,andtheywilleitherfixitorcomeupwithsomethingbetter.Ifyougettheteamright,chancesarethatthey'llgettheideasright.”“Itisnotthemanager'sjobtopreventrisks.Itisthemanager'sjobtomakeitsafetotakethem.”“Thepeopleultimatelyresponsibleforimplementingaplanmustbeempoweredtomakedecisionswhenthingsgowrong,evenbeforegettingapproval.Findingandfixingproblemsiseverybody'sjob.Anyoneshouldbeabletostoptheproductionline.”“Don'twaitforthingstobeperfectbeforeyousharethemwithothers.Showearlyandshowoften.It'llbeprettywhenwegetthere,butitwon'tbeprettyalongtheway.Andthat'sasitshouldbe.”9.2.1TheShapingofProgramsPintoandWinch(2016),intheirrecentanalysisofprogramshapingresearch,callforabroader,moreinclusiveperspectiveonwhatittakestosuccessfullymanageprojectsandprogramsbyreorientingourframeofreferenceawayfromthelongacceptedexecutionbasedprogramdeliverymodelwithitsnaturalboundariestowardonethatembracesafullerandbetterunderstandingofthelinksbetweenprogramsandstrategythatsuccessfulprogramsrequire.Inhisresearchonprojectmanagement,Morris(2000)recognizedthatprojectmanagementconcentratestoomuchontools,techniques,andorganizationalissues,andnotenoughonthethingsthatdeliverrealbusinessbenefit.Programsareoftencreatedtomanagemultiplerelatedprojectsinacohesivewayandtoobtainbenefitsandcontrolnotavailablebymanagingprojectsindividually(PMI,2013a).Allorganizationsmustpossessaneffectivestructureformanagementthatwillleadtothelongevityandsustainabilityoftheorganizationtoachievestrategicobjectives.Thecomponentsoftheorganizationmaynotnecessarilybeinterdependentorhaverelatedobjectives,buttheorganizationmustensurethatthestrategiesofitscomponentparts—stakeholders,programs,teams,operations—alignwiththeorganization'soverall

216strategy.Portfoliomanagementservesasabridgebetweenorganizationalstrategyandprogram,project,andoperationsmanagement(PMI,2013b).Inessence,organizationsmustensurethattherightprogramsareselectedtoleverageitscompetitiveadvantageandtoenhancestakeholdervalue,and,mostimportantly,provideinputtothepotentialchangeofstrategicdirectionfortheorganization.Figure91showstherelationshipbetweentheorganization'sstrategyandtheorganization'sprogrambenefitsmanagement.Theinteractionamongthevariousinterestsinanorganizationisnotjusttopdown,butthegoalsineachcomponentpartoftheorganizationinfluencetheothers.AsdefinedbyTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013a),theprogrambenefitsmanagementdomaincomprisesanumberofelementsthatarecentraltothesuccessfulconductofprograms.Thepurposeofprogrambenefitsmanagementistofocusprogramstakeholders,includingprogramsponsors,managers,andteams,ontheoutcomesandbenefitstobeprovidedbythevariousactivitiesconductedduringtheprogram'sduration(p.33).Sinceorganizationalprioritiesaredrivenbythebusinesscase,itisimportanttoensurethatprogrambenefitsareidentified,analyzed,delivered,andtransitionedtotheoperationalareas,andaresustainedoncetheyaretransferred.Thesustainmentofbenefitsisnotjustofconcerntotheprogrammanager,butalsoamajordeliverableofthesystemsengineer.INCOSE(2015)describesthebusinessormissionanalysisofthesystemsengineeras“definingtheproblemdomain,identifyingmajorstakeholders,identifyingenvironmentalconditionsandconstraintsthatboundthesolutiondomain…anddevelopingthebusinessrequirementsandvalidationcriteria”(p.51).Theprocessofdevelopingbusinessmissionrequirementsalignswiththeprogrammanager'sgoalsofidentifyingandanalyzingbenefitsandopportunities,andensuringproductandprogramsustainability.Systemsengineeringandprogrammanagementshouldsupportoneanotherindefiningwhatmustbedoneandgatheringtheinformation,personnel,andanalysistoolstoelaboratethebusinessrequirements(PMI,2013a,p.55).

217Figure91:SharedownershipofbenefitsmanagementAdaptedfromTheStandardforProgramManagement,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.AsillustratedintheDisneyPixarcasestudy,fosteringsuccessinanorganizationrequiresafocusontheorganization'senvironmentalfactorsanditseffortstofostercollectivecreativity.Thereisnoapproachthatworksforallorganizations,butexperienceteachesthatcreatingavisionthenempoweringothersisanapproachthathasworkedwhereepisodicchangeisrequiredtosucceed(Kotter,1996).TherelationshipthatexistsinanorganizationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementisnotsignificantlydifferentfromthesophisticatedtechnicalandcreativerelationshipthatwascriticaltoPixar'sandDisney'sintegration.Mergingthetechnicalwiththecreativeisachallengefacedbyallprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Theprogrammanagerislikethedirector.Theprogrammanagerhastoseethingsthroughthelensoftheaudience(thecustomer)andis,therefore,responsibleforthecreativepart,theart,the“buildingoftherightthing.”Systemsengineersareliketheproductionmanager.Theyhavetoknowlighting,cameraangles,sound,detailsofeachscene,andthelikeandmanageallofthetechnicalpeoplethataremanningallofthatstuff;theyhaveto“buildthe

218thingright.”Theybothmustshareavisionofwhatthescenewilllooklikeintheend,asthedirector/programmanagerhastobeabletocommunicatethevisiontotheproductionmanager/systemsengineerinmutuallyunderstoodlanguageheorshecanunderstand.9.3OrganizationalEnvironmentalFactorsOrganizationalenvironmentalfactors,everythingoutsidetheprogram'sboundary,mayconsistofcorporate,environmental,andgovernmentalvariablesthatconstraintheabilityofaprogramtoachieveitsgoals.Someoftheinfluencesfromoutsidetheprogramareinternaltoalargerorganization,andsomecomefromcompletelyexternalsources.Organizationalfactorsoutsideoftheprograminfluencetheselection,design,funding,andmanagementoftheprogram(PMI,2013a,p.30).Externalenvironmentalfactorsmayincludethemarketandoveralleconomicconditions,politicalclimate,resources,healthandsafety,culturaldiversity,technology,legislationandregulations,andqualityandrisk.Understandingenvironmentalfactorsiscriticaltotheprogramteam'ssuccess.Forexample,ifprogramobjectivesarenotalignedwithorganizationalstrategicgoals,theprogramwilllikelybeboggeddownininternalorganizationalfriction.Externalstakeholdersupportisalsoessentialtoprogramsuccess.Customersandendusersarepartoftheprogramteam,andwithouttheircontinuousfeedback,itisunlikelythattheprogramwillproduce“therightthing.”Smartprogrammanagerswillalwaysassessthecompetitiveandregulatoryenvironment.Withoutcompetitiveawarenessandregulatoryalignment,programsuccessisimpossible.Threeorganizationalenvironmentfactors—culture,leadership,andinterdisciplinaryteams—canbeemployedtoencourageordiscouragetheteambehaviorsshowntobekeytointegrationandprogramsuccess.9.3.1CultureBringingtogetherdiverseculturesisaresponsibilityofallorganizations.Cultureistypicallydefinedasthecollectivevalues,philosophy,andpracticesoftheorganization'smembers.Culturecanalsohavemanymeaningswithinanorganizationsuchasthebusinessculture,thecorporateculture,thepeerculture,theteamculture,thecountryculture,andthecreativeculture.Catmull(2008)describedPixar'ssuccessasbeingbuiltonmergingtwoverydifferentcultures—thetechnicalandthecreative(p.3).“AtPixar,whenthetechnologyisstrong,itinspirestheartists.Andwhentheartistsarestrong,theychallengethetechnology”(p.3).Theresultisthattheyappreciateoneanother'stalentsandtheircommongoals.Thedevelopmentandfosteringofmutualunderstandingofstrengthsandweaknessesforprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerscreatesanunderstandingofindividualgoalsthatcanbevaluableinmovingtheprogramforward.Manymodelsoforganizationalcultureexist.Somemodelssuggestdescriptionsofculturalfactors(forinstanceHofstede,1994;Schein,2004)andothersclassifyculturetypes.Table91contrastsHofstede'sculturalfactorclassificationwithDisneyPixar'sculturalenvironment.

219Table91MappingofDisneyPixarculturalattributestoHofstede'sculturalfactorsAdaptedfromHofstede,1994CulturalFactorsDescriptionDisneyPixarPowerdistanceHighPower—TopdowncontrolLowPowerDistance—FocusonbetweenLowPower—ImpliesgreaterautonomyandpowerofteamsmanagementandequalityandempowermentteamsIndividualismvs.ThedegreetowhichindividualsFocusonhowateamisperforming,CollectivismareintegratedintogroupsnotonthetalentsoftheindividualswithinitUncertaintyToleranceforambiguityversusAcceptanceofdifferingthoughts/ideasavoidancepredictabilityLongversusFocusesontheextenttowhichtheLongTermOrientation:Valuesshorttermgroupinvestsforthefuturecontinuouschange,cooperativeorientationiteration,andreinventionasthenormShortterm:TraditionsarehonoredLongterm:Viewsadaptationandcircumstantial,pragmaticproblemsolvingasanecessityBest,Smit,anddeFaber(2013)researchedinterventionsandtheirrelationshiptoorganizationalcultureandprogrammanagement.Theirfindingscorroborateevidencefromexistingresearchthatorganizationalcultureisthemostimportantfactorinfluencingprogramculture.Loo(2002)studiedfactorsthatmayactasbarriersforbestpracticesandhighlightedorganizationalcultureassuchapossiblebarrier.InLoo'sstudy,culturalbarriersincludedtheneedtomanagethechangingcultureoftheorganization,pressuresforinnovation,themilddistrustbetweenexecutivesandstaff,andtoomuchfocusonthebottomline(pp.95–96).Superiorprogrammanagementisattainedwhentheorganizationalcultureisbasedoneffectivetrust,communication,cooperation,andteamwork(Kadefors,2004;Kerzner,2013,p.45).DisneyPixar'skeyprinciplesasdescribedbyCatmull(2014),areessentiallyalistoftrustbuildingbehaviors:empowerpeople,letthemmakemistakes,cooperativelyiteratetoperfection,anduserelationshipsnotrulestoencouragebehavior.Withoutthewillingnessofteammemberstoactuallyshareknowledge,theteamisnotabletointegratetheskillsandexperiencesfromdifferentdisciplines(Reiner,2015,p.41).TheimpactofcultureonanorganizationisdemonstratedinSiemens'sresearchanddevelopment(R&D)activitiesinIndiareportedinacasestudybyThomkeandNimgade(2001).Thereportillustratesthelogicofglobaldevelopmentstrategiesandtheoperationalchallengesofmanaginggloballydistributedprogramteams.Issuespresentedbythisapproachincludedtaskdivision,workprocesscontrol,incentives,andculture.

220TheSiemenscasestudyevaluatedthemanagementofglobalR&Dnetworksinachangingindustryaswellasprobingtheroleandsignificanceofculturalissuesacrosscountriesonthreedifferentcontinents—theUnitedStates,Germany,andIndia.Intheearly1990s,SiemenscorporationmadeastrategicdecisiontooutsourceitsR&DdevelopmenttoIndia.Centraltothecaseisthetensionthatarisesbetweenthethreedifferentdevelopmentsitesassomelargeandsignificantprogramsranintoreliabilityandschedulingproblems.Siemens'sleaderswerefacedwithachoice:eithermaintainmorecontrolatheadquartersinMunichbycontinuingtobringdecisionmakingbacktoGermanywheneverthereweremajorproblems,orgrantmoreautonomytotheregionalR&DcentersinIndia.RecognizingtheimportanceoftheirstrategiccommitmenttoBangalore,intheend,moredecisionmakingandprojectmanagementresponsibilitywasgiventotheR&DcentersinIndia.Fromtheprogrammanager'sperspective,manyissuessurfacedandlessonswerelearnedinthiscase,includingtheimportanceofdevelopingaclearstrategicplan,centralizedcontrolandmanagementofresources,establishmentofaplantodealwithlocalgovernments,managingvirtualteamsandculturaldifferences,allocationofresponsibilityforresearchanddevelopment,standardizedproceduresandflexibleprocesses,centralizeddecisionmaking,reductionofoperationcosts,establishedtrainingprograms,andplanningandmanagingpolitical,economic,andlegalrisk(Thomke&Nimgade,2001).Thiscaseechoesthelessonsfromothercasestudies,includingDisneyPixar:theimportanceoflettingthecreativitydevelopfromthebottomupwheretheexpertiselies(inthiscaseinsoftwaredevelopmentinIndia),ratherthanassumingthatalltheknowledgeandlegitimacyresidesatthetop.9.3.2LeadershipWhileleadershipisdiscussedasa“peoplecompetency”inChapter10,itisworthwhiletonoteherethatindividualleadershipskillsareessentialtocreatingintegrated,teambasedorganizations.ReviewingCatmull'slistofkeyprinciples,itbecomesclearthatthesetofbehaviorsthatcanonlybecollectivelydescribedas“leadership”areneededtoimplementthosepractices.Hissecondprinciple,“Itisnotthemanager'sjobtopreventrisks.Itisthemanager'sjobtomakeitsafetotakethem,”isanexampleofthisleadership.Theleadertakesownershipofrisksthatgosideways,protectstheindividualswhotakethem,andusesthefailureasalearningexperience.Inanyprogram,theopposingambitionsofmanagersandtheirteamscanbecomeunhealthy.Itisaleader'sresponsibilitytoseethisandguideit,notexploitit(Catmull,2014).Whenoneconsidersthatcomplexprogramsrequiretheabilitytoachieveintegrationacrossdisciplines,influencemultiplegovernancestructures,energizenumerousstakeholders,empowerprogramteams,andcreatethevisionforinnovation,theneedfortransformativeleadershipskillsbecomesmoreapparent(Greiman,2013,p.393).Tofosterintegrationandteamwork,topmanagementmustbeinvolvedinpromotingandsupportingteambehaviorsandcreatinganenvironmentthatencouragesteambuildingandtrustbuildingatalllevelsoftheorganization.Thecurrentrealityoftheprogramisaconstantlychangingphenomenon.Aleadermustbeabletoimproviseinordertocopewiththedynamicenvironment.Putsimply,improvisationis

221comingupwithsolutionstoaddressemergingchallengesquicklytocontinuetocreatevaluewithoutdisruptingtheoverallcadenceorflowoftheprogram.Improvisationhasbeenbroadlydefinedasthepracticeofreactingandofmakingandcreating.Improvisationislinkedwithaspectsoftimeand,particularly,pressuretoachieveagainstademandingorcompressedtimetable,whichisatypicalattributeofmostlargescaleinfrastructureinitiatives(Leybourne,2008).Programsthataresurroundedwithuncertaintyandcomplexityneedtoexplorenewwaysofdeliveryoutsideofthehierarchical,structuredapproachofmostprogrammanagementregimes.Improvisationasadevelopingtheoryofprogrammanagementisnotuniversallyadoptedbytheprofessionalbodies;however,itfitswithintheprogramtailoringapproach.Largescaleprogramsbytheirverynatureencounteragreatdealofcomplexityanduncertaintyrequiringcreative,innovative,andcustomizedapproachestomanagementandleadership.Boston'sBigDigwasdefinedbyuncertaintyduetotheextensiveunknownsubsurfaceconditions,thepotentialforcatastrophiclossduetohighriskinnercitytunneling,andthecomplexstakeholderandsociotechnicalenvironmentrequiringagilityandanimprovisationalapproach.Likeprojectandprogrammanagement,“[t]ruesystemsengineeringrequirestheabilitytoworkwithuncertaintiesandassumptions—notjustdeterminateinputs—andtohandlethedistincttradeoffsthatdifferentsetsofassumptionsgenerate(INCOSE,2012,p.7).Organizationalleadersmustunderstandthevalueandimplicationsofanimprovisationalapproachtointegratingsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement,andhowdecisionmakingandresponsibilitywillbeallocatedinthesenewermorecomplexteamenvironmentsthatarelessrulesbasedandmorefocusedoncollectivecreativity.9.3.3InterdisciplinaryTeamstoSolveLargeProblemsInterdisciplinaryteamslieattheheartofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementintegration,yetverylittleresearchfocusesonthestructure,role,andhowteamsareintegrated.Importantly,teamdynamics,humanbehavior,leadership,andthelikeareallrecognizedinTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013a)asbeingcriticaltoprogramsuccess,buttheStandardwouldbehugeifithadtoincludeeverythingthatwasrelatedtoeffectiveprogrammanagement.Tosolvelargeproblemsinscience,environment,medicine,andsocietaldevelopment,fundingagenciesintheUnitedStates,Europe,andAsiahavesponsoredawiderangeofinterdisciplinary,crossuniversityresearchprograms.ExamplesaretheEuropeanLargeHadronCollidertoinvestigateparticlephysics,themultinationalAntarcticDrillingprogramtoinvestigateclimatechange,andtheinformationsciences.Avisionfortheseprogramsistocreateinnovationthatisgreaterthanthesumoftheparts.Teambuildinghasbeendefinedas“theprocessoftakingacollectionofindividualswithdifferentneeds,backgrounds,andexpertise,andtransferringthemintoanintegrated,effectiveworkunit”(Cleland&Ireland,2002).AsdefinedpreviouslyinChapter5,integrationisareflectionoftheorganization'sabilitytocombineprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpractices,toolsandtechniques,experience,andknowledgeinacollaborativeandsystematicapproachinthefaceofdifferentchallengestobemoreeffectiveinachieving

222commongoals/objectivesincomplexprogramenvironments.Considerableresearchhasfocusedonhoworganizationscombinetheirexpertisethroughthedevelopmentofteams(Grant,1996;Nordhaug&Gronhaug,1994).Teamscollaborateindifferentwaysandfordifferentpurposes.Theemergenceoffieldssuchascomputationalbiologyandartificialintelligencesuggestsapositiverelationshipbetweenintegration,teamperformance,andinnovation.CatmullhighlightstheimportanceofteamworkindescribingthegestationofToyStory2andthemaincharacter'sdilemmatostayortogohisway:“Talentedstorytellershadfoundawaytomakeviewerscare,andtheevolutionofthisstorylinemake[s]itabundantlycleartomethat‘[g]ettingtherightpeopleandtherightchemistryismoreimportantthangettingtherightidea’”(Catmull,2014).9.3.4KeyObservationsonOrganizationalEnvironmentBasedontheabovediscussion,anumberofinsightsemergedwithrespecttoshapinganorganizationenvironmentsupportiveofintegration.Ofparticularnote:Adjustorganizationalboundariestoavoidsilothinkingandparochialinterests.Ensurethatthestrategiesoftheorganization'scomponentparts—stakeholders,programs,teams,operations—alignwiththeorganization'soverallstrategy.Takeintoaccountthesystemicstructures,culturalfactors,andtherelationshipoftheorganizationwithitsexternalstakeholders.Userelationships,notrules,toencouragebehavior.Focusonhowteamsperformandnotjustontheindividualswithintheteams.Teammembersmustbewillingandincentivizedtoshareknowledgeandintegratetheskillsandexperiencesfromdifferentdisciplines.9.4TheChallengesofIntegrationinLargeScalePrograms:SystemsFailureTherearemanychallengestointegrationdiscussedintheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringliteraturethatfocusonorganizationalfactorssuchasorganizationalstructure,governance,complexity,uncertainty,andtechnicaldifficulties.Organizationalleadersareconcernedthattheirorganizationspossessaneffectivestructureformanagementthatwillleadtothelongevityandsuccessoftheorganization.Eachofthefollowingcasestudiesdiscussestherelationshipbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringresponsibilities,howculturalandenvironmentalfactorsinfluenceprogramoutcomes,andwhatneedstochangewithintheorganizationtoimprovethechancesforsuccess.9.4.1TheHubbleSpaceTelescopeProgram

223WhenU.S.NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)launchedtheHubbleSpaceTelescope(HST)in1990,astronomersboastedthatHubblewouldprobetheuniversetoadegreeunparalleledbyearthboundobservatoriesandtheimagesitwouldcapturewouldbeofunrivaledquality.TheHubbleprogramfulfilledsomeoftheseclaims,butthefirstpicture—aseverelyblurredimageofastarclusterintheCarinaconstellation—fellfarshortofthecrystalrepresentationeveryoneexpectedandadifficulttruthbecamestrikinglyevident:thetelescopewasflawed(NASA,2011).HSTwaseventuallyrepairedthroughaservicingmissionfromthespaceshuttle,exceededitsoriginalperformancespecificationsby50%,andbecameoneofthelongestandmostsuccessfulsciencemissionsintheprocess.Toooftenprogramestimatesareapprovedwithoutunderstandingtherealimplicationsofaflawedcostcontrolprocess.Theofficialmishapinvestigationboardreportedthatthroughoutitsduration,theHSTprogramexperiencedcostandscheduleissuesof“crisisproportions.”Thesepressures,inevitably,wereimpartedtocontractors.Possiblybelievingthatsurfacingissueswithpotentialtofurtherincreasecostsordelayschedulescouldinstigatecontention,contractorsbeganreportingonlytheriskstheythoughtwerereal(NASA,2011,p.3).AccordingtoNASA'sofficialOpticalSystemsFailureReport(NASA,1990),themostunfortunateaspectoftheopticalsystemfailurewasthatthedatarevealingtheseerrorswereavailablefromtimetotimeinthefabricationprocess,butwerenotrecognizedandfullyinvestigatedatthetime(pp.iv–v).Reviewswereinadequate,bothinternallyandexternally,andtheengineersandscientistswhowerequalifiedtoanalyzethetestdatadidnotdosoinsufficientdetail(p.v).TheHSTprogramfailureisattributedprimarilytothefactthatprogrammanagementmaintainedanisolatedfocusoncostandscheduletomeetthebottomline.Theimportantlessonhereisthatwhenprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersareworkingtogethertosolveproblems,thereisagreaterlikelihoodthatthesystemsengineerwillhaveabetterunderstandingofthetechnology,andtheprogrammanagerwillhaveabetterunderstandingofthebudgetconstraints.Oncetheyare“speakingthesamelanguage,”theycanbetterconvincethesponsorswhychangesareneededtoaccommodatethechallengesthatevolvefromtechnologicalcomplexityandshiftingstakeholderexpectations.9.4.2TheHeathrowTerminal5ProgramTerminal5atLondonHeathrowairportisanexampleofaprogramdeliveredontimeandbudgetwithallthephysicalandelectronicinfrastructuresbuiltaccordingtospecifications.Thisaloneisaremarkablefeatintheworldoflargescaleinfrastructureprogramswherebeinglateandoverbudgetistheruleratherthantheexception.Nevertheless,onopeningday,duetoimperfectcommissioning,failureofintegration,andanuntrainedworkforce,thesystemsimmediatelycollapsedwithmissingbaggageeverywhereandhundredsofflightscanceled(Davies,Gaan,&Douglas,2009).Theoutcomecontradictedtheextensiveplanningandtheawarenessoftherisksinvolvedinnewlyconstructedairports.AjointBritishAirportAuthority(BAA)andBritishAirwaysteamworkedoverthreeyearstoensurethatsystems,people,andprocesseswouldbepreparedfortheopening.The“startfinish”teamworkedduringsixmonthsofsystemstestingandoperationaltrialspriortoopening,including72trial

224openings,eachinvolving2,500people,toprepareworkers,processes,systems,andfacilitiesforthepublicopeningat4:00amonMarch27,2008.(Davies,Dodgson,&Gaan,2009).Moreover,BAA'sT5deliverystrategywasinformedbyasystematicbenchmarkingstudyundertakenbetween2000and2002ofeverymajorUKconstructionprogramover£1billionundertakeninthepast10yearsandeveryinternationalairportopenedovertheprevious15years(Daviesetal.,2009b,p.114).BAA'sresearchspecificallyidentifiedpoorsystemsdeliveryandintegrationduringthefinalstageofprogramexecutionasamajorreasonwhyinternationalairportsfailedtoopenontime(p.115).Sowhatwentwrong?IntheHeathrowTerminal5casetheChiefFacilitiesManager,CatherineTann,summeduptheintegrationproblemthisway:WhenIstartedIthoughtitwasallaboutsystems,butaswegettotheendoftheproject,I'velearntactuallyit'sallaboutdisciplineandtryingtogetdifferentpeoplefromdifferentsuppliers,theT5Programme,BAandotherpartsofBAAtoworktogethertosolvetheinevitableproblems(Doherty,2008,p.155).ThekeylessonlearnedfromtheHeathrowTerminal5caseisthatintegrativeprogramsareessentialindevelopingstrategiesformaintainingsustainabilityoverthelongterm.Despitetheextensivepreparation,testing,andbenchmarking,therewasadisconnectbetweentheprogramteams,includingsystemsengineeringandtheoperationsteams.Programsustainabilityrequiresanorganizationalenvironmentthatpromotesintegrationtomaintainoperability,services,andbenefitsoftheprogramnotjustduringthelifeoftheprogram,butthelifeoftheprogram'sassetsaswell.9.5CharacteristicsofSuccessfulProgramIntegration9.5.1TheSystemsPerspectiveDespitenumerousfailures,theliteraturealsodescribessuccessfulprogramsresultingfromgoodsystemsgovernanceandintegrationsuchastheØresundBridgelinkingDenmarkandSweden(INCOSE,2015,pp.40–42),theNASAMARSPathfinderprogram(Nicholas&Steyn,2008),andtheI15ReconstructionPrograminSaltLakeCity(FHWA,2011).Governance,anditsrelatedorganizationalstructure,isanimportantenvironmentalfactorforachievingsuccess.Itrequiresthatindividualswithoversightresponsibilityandauthorityprovideguidanceanddecisionmakingforprogramsandprojects.MillerandLessard(2001)intheirstudyof60largecivilengineeringprogramsdescribetheorganizationalstructureoftheseprograms,theshapingofaprogram,theprogram'sinstitutionalframework,andthecapacityofselfregulationandgovernance.Theupfronteffortinvolvedinshapingtheprogramsoitcansurviveturbulenceimprovesthechancesofsuccess,butthisrequiresleadershipandsystemsthinking.Müller(2009)discussesgovernanceattheprogramandorganizationallevellinkingprogramandstrategicmanagement.AsnotedbyLocatelli,Mancini,andRomano(2014),forprogramsdeliveredincomplexenvironments,thegovernanceneedstobetransformedfromacorporate/programperspectivetoa“systemsperspective.”Astheauthorsdescribe,systemgovernanceincreasesthelikelihoodofprogram

225success.Themostbeneficialtimefordevelopinga“systemsperspective”occursduringtheupfrontplanningorearlieststagesoftheprogramplanning(IEEE,2005;Miller&Hobbs,2005).Forexample,intherecentplanningoftheCaliforniaHighSpeedRail,thegovernmenthasaddressedtheimportanceofastatutoryoversightauthorityandalegislativelymandatedriskmanagementplan.Closelyrelatedtosystemsgovernanceis“systemsthinking”—amethoddevelopedtounderstandhowsystemsinfluenceoneanotherwithinthewhole.Systemsthinkingiswhatdistinguishessystemsengineeringfromothertypesofengineering,andistheunderlyingskillrequiredtoperformsystemsengineering(Beasley&Partridge,2011).Duetothedegreeoftheimpactintheaboveexamples,programleadersandsponsorsmustfocusonresolutionthroughgreaterintegrationbetweenthetechnicalexpertsandtheprogrammanagerstoincreasethelikelihoodforsuccess.9.5.2IncentivesasaTacticforSystemsIntegrationIncentivesmustalignwithkeybusinesssuccessopportunitiesinordertoensureintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.Incentivesareusuallydefinedintermsoffinancialincentives,includingrewardsforearlydeliveryandpenaltiesforlatedelivery(INCOSE,2015,p.144).However,incentiveshavealsobeenhighlightedintermsofleadershipandvaluepropositions(p.9).Thequestionsarewhetherincentivesarelikelytoproducebetterproducts,causepeopletoworkharder,orgetworkdoneinasaferway.Incentivesshouldneverbebasedonspeedalone,unlesstherearedisincentivesorpenaltiesforbeinglate.Ironically,programleadersoftendonotconsiderthedownsideanddisincentivesforpoorperformance,andinsteadfocusonrewardsforbeingaheadofscheduleorunderbudget.Incentivesplayanimportantroleinintegrationbecausetheycreateopportunitiesfordevelopingamorecooperativerelationshipbetweenthevariousdisciplinesinvolvedinaprogramandtostrengthentheculturaldivisionsamongtheparties.Asanexample,ifthesystemsengineersandprogrammanagersarebothrewardedformeetingperformancestandards,therewillbeasharedcommitmenttomeettheserequirements.Ontheotherhand,ifprogrammanagersarerewardedforspeedwithoutacorrespondingrecognitionforsystemsengineers,schedulewilltaketheleadandengineersarefacedwithproducingaproductfasterandsometimescheaper,butnotnecessarilyabetterproduct,oronethatcompliesfullywithperformancerequirements.Toresolvethisdisconnect,incentiveplanningshouldbepartoftheprogram'sstrategyfrominception.Theincentivesshouldincludepolicyandcontractualobligationsthatfosterpositive,cooperativeoutcomesandencourageintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementgoalsandobjectives.9.5.3TheImpactofChangePracticesonSuccessfulOutcomesinProgramOrganizationsInaconnected,complex,andturbulentenvironment,organizationsthatarepreparedtochangetheirproducts,processes,anddeliveryatarapidpacelikelywillbethemostsuccessful.Theresponsibilityforleadingchangehasincreasinglyfallenupontheprogrammanager(Crawford,

226Aitken,&HassnerNahmias,2014;Turner,1996).Arecentstudysuggeststhatprogrammanagementprofessionalsareembracingchangeimplementationpractices,andthatthesepracticescanhaveamajorimpactonprogramsuccessandoutcomes(Crawfordetal.,2014).TheintroductionofManagingChangeinOrganizations:APracticeGuidebyPMI(2013c)emphasizestheneedforleveragingchangemanagementinherentinthestandardsforportfolio,program,andprojectmanagement.The2012PulseoftheProfession®InDepthReport:OrganizationalAgility(PMI,2012)concludedthatorganizationsachievinghigherthanaveragesuccessratesfromtheirportfolioofprogramsandprojectshavenotonlyincreasedtheiruseofstandardizedprogrampractices,buthaveadoptedrigorouschangemanagementtobetteradapttoshiftingmarketconditions.Arecentsurveyof148programpractitionersinvestigatedsomecontemporaryissuessurroundingtheoverlapbetweenprogrammanagementandchangemanagement,andlinkswithstrategicchange(Leybourne&Greiman,2015).Thereisevidencethatinvolvingprogramandchangemanagerstoinfluenceandinformdecisionsaboutstrategicdirectionattheorganizationallevelisbeneficial,especiallyastheyarethemanagerswhoaremoreinstrumentalinensuringeffectiveimplementationandexecutionofchangeinitiatives.Findingsalsosuggestthatnotonlyareprogrammanagersbuildinga“widerbusinessawareness”relatedtothewaychangeimpactsorganizationsgenerally,butalsothatprogramandchangemanagersareactingmorestrategicallytodealwithemergingissuesfromwithinandoutsideoftheorganization(Leybourne&Greiman,2015).Unfortunately,itisapparentthatthereisinsufficientknowledgeofthedifferencesintheskillsetsofprogramandchangemanagers.Thisisanareawherefurtherstudywouldbenefittheacademicandpractitionercommunities,andassistintheunderstandingofthesystemsengineerandprogrammanager'sroleinchangemanagement.9.6TheInternationalSpaceStation:AModelinSystemsIntegrationTheInternationalSpaceStation(ISS)isperhapsthemostfamousofallsystemsengineeringprogramsknownforitsconvergenceofscience,technology,andhumaninnovation.ItdemonstratesnewtechnologiesandmakesavailableresearchbreakthroughsnotpossibleonEarth.ThespacestationhasbeencontinuouslyoccupiedsinceNovember2000andduringthattimemorethan200peoplefrom15countrieshavevisitedthespacestation(Stockman,Boyle,&Bacon,2010).Thisprogramcrossesculturalbarriersandraisesmanyissuesrelevanttoanorganizationalenvironmentthatvaluesandpromotesintegrationofsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersincludingorganizationalintegration,knowledgesharing,leadership,andteamtrust.Inrelationtothemajorcostandscheduleissues,thesystemsengineeringchallengeontheISSwasequallymonumental.NASAhadtoquicklylearnhowtoadaptitssystemengineeringapproachestoincludeanawarenessofthoseoftheinternationalpartnership(Stockman,etal.,2010).

227NASAhasitsownchallengesmaintainingcenterseachwithitsownsystemsengineeringdifferencesandapproaches.Thesechallengesincludeenablingintegrationofdisciplineorienteddesigntoolsintosystemsmodelsthatcaptureperformancebehaviors,integrationofmultiorganizationalproducts,andidentifyingadvancedtechnologyrequirements.NASAhadtolearnhowtooperateasa“managingpartner”toaccommodateitsinternationalpartners,includingdifferentperspectivesonapproaches,designs,andoperationalriskandsafety.Amajoreffortwasinvolvedindevelopingthepartnershipagreements,allocatingcostsandusagerights,anddeterminingoperationalcontrol.UnderthenewISSpartnership,NASAleadershipwasconcernedaboutmaintainingscheduleandcostontheISSprogrambecausefailureswouldnotbetoleratedbytheU.S.Congress.Initialprogramstrategywasfornointernationalpartnertobeonthecriticalpath,whichwouldallowNASAmorecontroltoreducerisk.Asitturnedout,however,theRussiansendedupprovidingthefirsttwomajormodulesthatwereatthefrontofthecriticalpath.NASAwasthefirstinternationalpartneramongequals,witheachboardchairedbytheNASArepresentative.Incaseswhereconsensuscouldnotbereached,theNASArepresentativetechnicallyhadtherighttomakeadecisionfortheboard;however,thisrightwasrarelyusedinpractice.NASAbusinessleadersandengineershadtosolvemanymajorsystemsengineeringchallenges.Ithadtofigureouthowtocoordinateandintegratealloftheinternationalpartnersandtheirhighlyintegratedmodules.Whileitwasnoteasy,theyeventuallyworkedoutaprocessthataddressedtheconcernsofmultiplecountrieswithdifferingculturalandengineeringapproachestomajorprogramdevelopmentandexecution.NASA'slessonslearnedreportissuedthefollowingrecommendationsforNASAsystemsengineers(Stockman,etal.,2010):“Systemsengineeringinvolvescommunications,criticaltointernationalpartnerships,sobeforeworryingabouttechnicalinterfaces,makesuretheintegratedproductteamsandcommunicationbandwidthbetweenpartnersareoptimal.Thisfundamentallyincludesfacetofacemeetings,soregularinternationaltravelisalargeandessentialpartofthesystemsengineeringcost”(p.87).“InanInternationalSpaceStationlikeprojectwheresomanydifferentcountriesandcompaniescontributehardwareandsoftware,theinterfacesmustbeextremelysimple”(p.87).“Maintainingahighlevelofcompetentandexperiencedpersonneloveratwodecadelongprogramrequiresstrategiclevelplanningandexecutionofworkforceplanning”(p.87).Alloftheaboverequirednotonlyintegratedteams,butanintegratedorganizationalstructure,asshowninFigure92.Boeingplaysacriticalroleonthisteamastheleadsystemsengineerfortheprogram.BoeingprovidestheexperiencetocoleadwithNASAtheIntegratedProductTeams(IPTs)executingthesystemsengineeringmanagementthatisamajorchallengeonthisprogrambecauseofthemultipartnerintegration.ItisachallengingrolesinceBoeingcouldnotofficiallynegotiatewithothercountriesandoftenhadtoprovidethetechnicalleadwhileNASAprovidedofficialsignatureondetailedinternationalagreementsknownasProtocols.Currently,theoverallprogramteamismanagedthroughanISSControlBoardStructure

228(Figure92).TheISSteamusestoplevelcontrolboardsandpanelstomanagetheISShardwareandsoftwareconfigurationalongwithoperationalproducts.AttheverytopoftheprocessistheSpaceStationControlBoard(SSCB)thatmanagesthemultilateralcontroloftheconfiguration.ANASASpaceStationProgramControlBoardexercisescontrolovertheseverallayersofmoredetailedISSsubsystemcontrolboardsassociatedwiththeU.S.elements.ThisprocesswasalsointegratedwiththeSpaceShuttlecontrolboards.Eachpartnerutilizesasimilarcontrolmechanismfortheirelements.Figure92:HighlevelboardintegrationoftheInternationalSpaceStationprogramStockmanetal.,2010,p.19CoordinatingtheinclusionoftheinternationalpartnerswhosesystemengineeringapproachesdifferedsignificantlywasamajorchallengeoftheISSprogram.Theproblemwassummedupwellina1969speechbyRobertFroschpriortotheISSandpriortobecomingNASAAdministrator:

229Ibelievethatthefundamentaldifficultyisthatwehaveallbecomesoentrancedwithtechniquethatwethinkentirelyintermsofprocedures,systems,milestonecharts…reliabilitysystems,configurationmanagement,maintainabilitygroupsandotherminorpapertoolsofthe“systemengineer”andmanager.Wehaveforgottenthatsomeonemustbeincontrolandmustexercisepersonalmanagement,knowledgeandunderstandingtocreateasystem….Systems,evenverylargesystems,arenotdevelopedbythetoolsofsystemsengineering,butonlybyengineersusingtools(NASA,2010).Thelessonhereisthatwhetheryouareasystemsengineeroraprogrammanageryoucannotrelyontoolstounderstandhowprogramperformanceandorganizationalvalueismeasuredandcontrolled,butinsteadmustrelyonleadershipskillsthatencourageanenvironmentofinclusivity,collectivecreativity,sharedownership,andlargescaletransformation.9.7SummaryCreatinganorganizationalenvironmentthatnarrowstheculturaldivide,fostersteambuilding,developsrespectforeachothers'viewsandopinions,andbuildstrustbetweenexecutivemanagementandprogramteamsiscentraltodevelopingacommunitywherecollectivecreativitycanevolve.Involvingprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersattheorganizationalleveltoinfluenceandinformdecisionsaboutstrategicdirectionisbeneficial,especiallyastheyarethemanagerswhoaremoreinstrumentalinensuringeffectiveimplementationandexecutionofchangeinitiatives.Moreover,asnotedintheNASAHubbleSpaceTelescopeprogram,leadersmustpossess“softskills”toenhanceteambuildingandbetteridentifymanagerialshortcomingsbeforetheyresultinbrokenteaminterfacesandtechnicalmistakes.Thekeylearningsfromthischapterforbuildingasustainableframeworkforintegrationincludetheimportanceofdevelopingrelationshipcompetenciesinparticipantsthroughouttheprogram,creatingasharedsetofobjectives,clearroles,respectingthevalueoftheothers'roleandcontribution,andvaluingandpromoting“collaboration”overcompetition.However,thesefactorswillonlyberelevantiftheorganizationisabletodeveloppeoplecompetenciesaswell.Thischapterhasshownthatifonecreatesanorganizationalenvironmentforsuccessfulintegrationandeffectiveimplementationofchange,successfuloutcomesaremorelikelybecauseonewillhaveintegrateddividedculturesandaddedvaluetotheorganization.9.8DiscussionQuestions1.NamesomeofthekeyorganizationalfactorsdiscussedintheDisneyPixarcasestudythatwouldhelpfacilitatetheintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementwithinyourorganization.2.Whyistherelationshipamongorganizationalstrategyandprogrammanagementimportantindevelopingintegrationamongsystemsengineersandprogrammanagers?3.Whatismeantbyprogramcultureandhowcanadividedculturebebetterintegrated?

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23410DEVELOPINGINTEGRATIONCOMPETENCIESINPEOPLE10.1IntroductionWhilethepreviouschaptersaddressedDimensionsIandIIoftheIntegrationFramework:processes,procedures,tools,andtheorganizationalenvironment,thischapterdelvesintoDimensionIII,thepeoplecompetencies,andexplorestheissuesofleadership,followership,attitudes,andteamlearningwiththegoaloftheorganization'ssuccessanditsvaluepropositionattheforefront.ThechapterprovidesbackgroundontheNASASpaceShuttleprogramsandtheJSOC'sTacticalIntelligenceFusionforFires(TUFF)program,andtherelevanceofthesecasestothedevelopmentofprojectandprogramcompetencies.Theresearchshowsthat“thesourcesofunproductivetensionaremorelikelytobetheresultoforganizationandpeoplefactors”thananyotherfactors(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014,p.40).Finally,threepracticalmodels—CrewResourceManagement,ControlTheory,andDecisionTheory—arepresentedasguidanceforpractitionerstoimproveteamcompetenciestonavigatecomplexityeffectively.10.1.1Background/CaseStudyOnSeptember12,1962,U.S.PresidentJohnF.KennedyissuedanowfamouschallengetotheUnitedStates.Hesaid,“Wechoosetogotothemooninthisdecadeanddotheotherthingsnotbecausetheyareeasy,butbecausetheyarehard,becausethatgoalwillservetoorganizeandmeasurethebestofourenergiesandskills”(Kennedy,1962).Kennedy'sspeechprovidedasenseofpurposethatinspiredagenerationofscientists,engineers,managers,andleaders.Inalesserknownportionofthesamespeech,Kennedynotedthat“thegrowthofourscienceandeducationwillbeenrichedbynewknowledgeofouruniverseandenvironment,bynewtechniquesoflearning…bynewtoolsandcomputersforindustry,medicine,thehomeaswellasschool”(Kennedy,1962).Oneofthemanynewtoolsinvented,oratleastmatured,duringthe1960sspaceprogramwasthedisciplineofsystemsengineering.In1963,inresponsetoslippingschedules,NASAnamedGeorgeMuellertothepositionofAssociateAdministratoroftheOfficeofMannedSpaceFlight(OMSF).UnderMueller,OMSFwasreorganizedinto:amanagerialnervoussystem…[wheremanagersandengineers]whowereusedtooperatingintheconfinesoftheirownsiloswererequiredtocommunicatedailywiththeirfunctionalcounterpartsatotherfieldcentersandonotherteams…[and]therewasanalmostironlikedisciplineoforganizationalcommunication(McChrystal,Collins,Silverman,&Fussell,2015,p.100).AccordingtoGeneralStanleyMcChrystal,“WhatMuellerinstitutedwasknownas‘systems

235engineering’…[an]approach,contrarytoreductionism,[that]believesthatonecannotunderstandapartofasystemwithouthavingatleastarudimentaryunderstandingofthewhole”(p.101).Inthemid2000s,McChrystalusedNASA'ssystemsengineeringmanagerialconceptstotransformtheJointSpecialOperationsCommandintoa“TeamofTeams”(McChrystaletal.,2015).Mostmanagersaren'tfortunateenoughtohaveaGeorgeMuelleroraStanMcChrystalontheirteamsorleadingtheirorganizations,nordotheyhaveaccesstothebillionsofdollarsthatwerepouredintotheApolloProgramorthe“Surge”inIraq.Typically,mostmanagersdealwiththedaytodayproblemsofconstrainedbudgets,somewhatdysfunctionalorganizations,andrealpeople.Thus,beginsthetruestoryoftheTUFFprogram.TUFFisamultipleintelligenceprocessthatintegrateselectronicsupporttargetlocation,identification,andimageryintoafusedintelligencedataproductthatsupportsthemilitary'stargetingandfiringprocesses.Inotherwords,TUFFsupportstheFindFixFinish“KillChain”processbyfindingandidentifyingthetargetwithelectronicsupport,fixingthetargetwithimagery(adronebasedcamera),andfinishingthetargetbyprovidingafusedintelligenceproducttodecisionmakerswhoapplyeffects(e.g.,bombs)onthetarget.Thecontractorproduceselectronicsupportequipment,andalsoservesastheleadsystemsintegratorforTUFF.ThiscasestudydescribestheevolutionofoneprojectundertheTUFFprogramumbrella,TUFFforSmallUnmannedAerialSystem(TUFFSUAS).Thecustomer'sgoalwastodeveloptheTUFFcapabilityonawidelydeployedSUAS,akadrone.Theenduserconceptofoperations,usecases,andphysicalsystemsweredefinedduringananalysisofalternativesphase,whichcapturedtheoperationallevelrequirements.Theprojectplanningteam,whichconsistedoftheportfoliomanager,programmanager,andsystemsengineer,embarkedonarequirementsdecompositionefforttodevelopasystemslevelrequirementsdocument.TheportfoliomanagerwhooversawtheTUFFprogramalsomanagedthecontractor'slargersoftwarearchitecturecalledLinebacker.Theportfoliomanager'svisionwastoextendLinebackertoincludetheTUFFusecase.Theprogramteam,whichnowincludedspecialtyengineersfromboththesoftwareandsystemsintegrationdivisionsofthecontractor,embarkedonadesignphasetodecomposethesystemslevelrequirementsandcreateadetailedsystemspecification.Thisiswheretheprogramranintoproblems.Duringthesystemspecificationprocess,itbecameclearfromthesystemsengineer'sperspectivethatLinebackercapabilitiesdidnottracetoTUFF'soriginatingrequirements.Italsobecameclearthat,fromtheprogrammanager'sperspective,extendingLinebackertoaddressTUFFrequirementswasbeyondthescopeoftheprogram.Theserealizationscausedtensionbetweentheportfoliomanagerandprogrammanagerbecause,fromtheportfoliomanager'sperspective,TUFFnolongeralignedwitheitherhisvisionorhisportfolio.Intheendcustomerrequirementsprevailedbecausetheprogrammanagerwasabletoshowtraceability,orlackthereof,betweenLinebackercapabilitiesandTUFFrequirements.Whentheteamconductedapreliminarydesignreviewwiththeexternalstakeholders(customersandendusers),theextendedprojectteam,consistingofbothinternalandexternalstakeholders,

236agreedthatutilizinglegacyelectronicsupportcapabilitiesinsteadofextendingLinebackerwasanachievablegoalgivencostandscheduleconstraints.BecauseTUFFnolongerfitwithintheportfoliomanager'sportfolio,itwasmovedtoadifferent,morealignedportfolio.Also,sincetheLinebackersoftwarewasnolongerrequired,theleadsystemsengineeringroletransferredfromthesoftwaredevelopmentteamtothesystemsintegrationteam.TUFF'snewleadsystemsengineerhadexperienceasaprojectmanager;waswellversedinexternalsystemsintegration,hardware/softwaredevelopmentandintegration,andtestandevaluation;andhadextensiveindustryexperienceworkingwithendusers.Theprogrammanagerhadanoperationalbackgroundandamaster'sdegreeinsystemsengineeringandsohadadeepunderstandingofandrespectforthesystemsengineeringrole.Systemsengineersarenotglorifiedspecialtyengineers;systemsengineeringrequiresuniqueskillsandaparticularmindset,systemsthinking,whichwillbeexploredindepth.Thismutualunderstandingenabledtheprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerto“speakthesamelanguage.”Itshouldbenotedthat,inthecontractor'sorganizationstructure,thesystemsengineeralsoservesastheprojectmanager.Basedonthenewdirectionreceivedatthepreliminarydesignreviewandthenewalignmentstrategy,theprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerrewrotethesystemrequirementsdocument,whichwasquicklyapprovedbyallstakeholders(internalandexternal)duringthefollowingquarterlyProgramManagementReview.Theprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerwerespeakingthesamelanguageasoneanotheraswellasthesamelanguageasthecustomer.Thismutualunderstandingfloweddowntothespecialtyengineeringteamwhodevelopedthesystemspecificationdocumentthatwasimplementedflawlesslyoverthefollowingyear.Throughmutualunderstanding,iterativeprocesses,andgoodcommunication,theprojectteamandexternalstakeholdershadasharedawarenessofboththeproblemandthesolutionateverystageoftheproject.Theteamdeliveredanadvancedprototypeinahandsondemonstrationenvironment.Theprojectwasbelowbudget,aheadofschedule,andexceededcustomerexpectations.SincetheTUFFSUASdeliveryinAugust2015,thecontractorhasreceivedfollowonfundingtosupportthesystem'sdeployment.ThecontractorhasalsoreceivedfundingtodevelopTUFFcapabilitiesontwoadditionalSUASsystems.InthetimesinceTUFFSUASinception,theLinebackercapabilitieshavebeenextendedsuchthattheyarenowcompatiblewithTUFFrequirementstobedesignedintocurrentandfutureTUFFinstances.Throughexcellentprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration,TUFFexpandedthecontractor'sbusinessbothhorizontallyandverticallyandbecameanimportantsourceofnewcustomeracquisition.ThesuccessofTUFFSUASwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheorganizationalenvironmentdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.Theflat,teambasedorganizationalstructureandcollaborativeculturefacilitatedseamlessportfoliorealignmentwhenthetensionbetweenLinebackerandTUFFbecameapparent.Moreover,thecontractor'shiringpracticesproducedabroadpoolofmultidisciplinarytalentthatenabledtherightsetofpeopletocometogetherasateam.Theprogrammanagerbelievedintheprogram,workedthroughtheinitialadversities,

237andhadaninnateappreciationfortheroleandvalueofsystemsengineering.Thesystemsengineerhadasystemsthinkingmindsettoviewtheproblemasawhole,theleadershipskillstomanageadiversetechnicalteam,andthetechnicalprowesstomanagetheoverallprojectexecution.Thesecompetenciesandotherswillbeexploredanddevelopedinthischapter.Thebalanceofthischapterfocusesonthebuildingofcompetenciesbyrespondingtothefollowingquestions:Whataretheindividualcompetenciesthatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersshouldhavetoleadaprogramtosuccessfuloutcomes?Howdoesanorganizationidentifyanddevelopthesecompetencies?Howdoorganizationsintegratetheskillsetsintoeffectiveteamingrelationshipsonaconsistent,repeatablebasis?10.2IdentifyingIntegrationCompetenciesThePhaseIresearchidentifiedtheindividualcompetenciesthatprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersthoughtwereimportanttotheirroles.AsshowninFigure101,programmanagersidentifiedcommunicationskills,leadershipskills,andstakeholdermanagementasthemostimportantcompetencies,whilechiefsystemsengineerssaidthatsystemsthinking,requirementsmanagement,andconflictresolutionweremostcriticaltotheirjob.TheseskillsarealsohighlightedintheTUFFcasestudy.Forinstance,theprogrammanagerclearlydemonstratedleadershipandstakeholdermanagementskillsbydrivingtheprogramforwarddespitetheobstaclesandchallenges,whilethechiefsystemsengineertookaholisticviewoftheproblemsanddemonstratedtechnicalleadershipandsystemsthinking.

238Figure101:SurveyresultsidentifyingperceptionsofcriticalskillsforprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersConforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013,p.20.10.2.1LeadershipWhatiseffectiveleadership?Thisquestionhasbeenansweredinmultiplewaysacrossinstitutionsandcultures.Leadershiphasbeendescribedasbothanartandascience,dependingonpersonal,global,andculturalcontexts(Nahavandi,2012).MüllerandTurner's(2010)comprehensiveresearchonprojectleadershipexaminestheleadershipcompetencyprofilesofsuccessfulprojectmanagersacrossprojectenvironmentsusingthe15dimensionsofleadershipcompetency(Dulewicz&Higgs,2005).MüllerandTurner(2010)considered400responsestoaleadershipdevelopmentquestionnairetoprofiletheintellectual,managerial,andemotionalcompetencies(IQ,MQ,andEQ,respectively)ofprojectmanagersofsuccessfulprojects(pp.440–441),whichidentifiedoneIQsubdimension,criticalthinking,andthreeEQsubdimensions,influence,motivation,andconscientiousness,insuccessfulmanagersacrossalltypesofprojects(p.440),ashighlightedinTable101.

239Table101SuccessfulleadershipcompetenciesMüller&Turner,2010,pp.447.ReprintedfromInternationalJournalofProjectManagement,28(5),Müller,R.,&Turner,R.,Leadershipcompetencyprofilesofsuccessfulprojectmanagers,pp.437–448,2010,withpermissionfromElsevier.LeadershipDefinitionDimensionCriticalThinkingTheleadergathersrelevantinformationfromawiderangeofsources,probesthefacts,identifiesadvantagesanddisadvantages,makessoundjudgmentsanddecisions,anddevelopsawarenessoftheimpactofanyassumptionsmade.InfluenceTheleadercanpersuadeotherstochangeaviewpointbasedontheunderstandingoftheirpositionandtherecognitionoftheneedtolistentothisperspectiveandprovidearationaleforchange.MotivationTheleaderhasthedriveandenergytoachieveclearresultsandmakeanimpact.ConscientiousnessTheleaderdisplaysclearcommitmenttoacourseofactioninthefaceofchallengesandmatches“wordswithdeeds”inencouragingotherstosupportthechosendirection.SuccessfulleadershipcompetencieswerealsoaddressedinaGallup(2015)report,TheStateoftheAmericanManager:AnalyticsandAdviceforLeaders.Thereportidentifiedfivedimensionsthatcollectivelydescribea“talented”managerandcontributetoemployeeengagement:motivator,assertiveness,accountability,relationships,anddecisionmaking(p.15).ThesedimensionsalignwiththecompetenciesidentifiedbyMüllerandTurnerand,asawhole,theycanbeviewedasadefinitionforthequalityofleadershipthatwasidentifiedbyprogrammanagersasacriticalskill.Forexample,theEQcompetencyconscientiousnesscapturesthetalentdimensionsofassertivenessandrelationships.Fromthesedefinitions,onecanseethattheotherprogrammanagercriticalskills,communicationandstakeholdermanagement,areembeddedinandareaspectsoftheleadershipcompetenciesanddimensions.ThePhaseIIandIIIresearchfoundfromtheperceptionofsomechiefsystemengineerstheneedforprogrammanagerstohaveadequatetechnicalknowledgeoftheirprogramsandabackgroundinsystemsengineeringsothattheycould“speakthesamelanguage”(Conforto&Rebentisch,2014,p.17).Whilespecialtyengineeringexperienceisnotrequiredforprogrammanagementeffectiveness,domainexpertiseandtheabilitytorelatetoandempathizewithteammembersmustbeaprogrammanagerprequalificationandcorecompetency.Withcomplexprograms,chiefsystemsengineersalsoneedtorecognizeandappreciatetheprogrammanager'sresponsibilitiesandpressures,andconsidertheimplicationsthattheirtechnicaldecisionswillhaveontheprogrammanager'sobjectivesofcontrollingcost,meetingschedule,anddeliveringbenefits.EmpathyandethicalbehaviorarereflectedintheEQqualityconscientiousnessandtalentdimensionrelationships.Empathyandethicalbehaviorresultintrustbasedrelationshipsthat

240arecrucialtoteameffectiveness.Thisideaisreflectedinvariouscodesofethicsandprofessionalconduct(IEEE,n.d.;INCOSE,n.d.;PMI,n.d.).Fromaprogrammanagementperspective,ethicalconsiderationsimpacteveryaspectofaprogram'soperationsandareacriticalcomponentofthesuccessfulcompletionofmostprograms.Sincethesuccessofaprogramdependsuponhighethicalstandards,itmustbeconsideredacorecompetencyinallprojectandprogramframeworks(PMI,2007).Ethicalbehaviorbyprogrammanagers,systemsengineers,andindividualcontributorsisfoundationaltotrust,andeffectiveteambasedorganizationsarefoundeduponit.Teamsdonotworkwithouttrust.Finally,interculturalcommunicationsandrelationsaswellasanabilitytounderstandandappreciateculturaldifferencesandworkhabitsshouldbeconsideredasimportantfactorsinknowinghowtolead.10.2.2SystemsThinkingInthePhaseIresearch,systemsengineersidentifiedsystemsthinkingastheirmostimportantskill(Confortoetal.,2013).Systemthinking,likeleadership,isabroadconcept.AccordingtoINCOSE(2015,p.19),PeterSengeidentifiedsystemsthinkingasakeydisciplinewithhisbookTheFifthDisciplineanddevelopedthelanguageandgraphicalrepresentationstructuresneededtocommunicatesystemsengineeringconcepts.Senge(2006)writes,“Systemsthinkingisadisciplineforseeingwholes.”Specifically,systemsthinkingisneededtoresolvedynamiccomplexity,whichexistsin“situationswherecauseandeffectaresubtle,andwheretheeffectsovertimeofinterventionsarenotobvious”(p.71).Itisaframeworkforseeinginterrelationshipsratherthanthings,forseeingpatternsofchangeratherthatstatic‘snapshots’”(p.68).Sengegoesontosay,“[t]oday,systemsthinkingisneededmorethaneverbecausewearebecomingoverwhelmedbycomplexity”(p.69).Systemsthinkers'attitudesarecriticalalsotoprogrammanagersparticularlyfordecisionmaking,forrisksmanagement,andprogrammanagement.Eventhoughsystemsthinkingdefinitionsdiverge,thereisconsensusontheprimarymechanismsthatenableorobstructsystemsthinkingdevelopment.InafieldstudyfocusedontheU.S.aerospacesector,themechanismsthatweredeterminedtoenhancesystemsthinkingincluded:Experientiallearning(onthejoblearning)Individualcharacteristicssuchasopenmindednessandcuriosity,risktaking,andhumilityAsupportiveenvironmentinwhichtodevelopsystemsthinkingAccordingtotheresearch,asupportiveenvironmentwouldincludesystemstrainingincoordinationwithworkenvironment,managementofscheduleandcostconstraintstodevelopsystemsthinking,jobsandopportunitiestoseethesystemview,andclearcommunicationonhowthestrengthofsystemsthinkingisassessed(Davidz,2006,pp.194–195).INCOSE(2015)notesthatBarryRichmonddevelopedsimulationlanguagestomodelsystemsthinkingbehaviorsandalsopostulatedeightthinkingtracksthat,combined,constitutesystemsthinking.Forexample,“10,000meter”thinkingisahighlevelskillthatallowsonetosee

241the“the‘bigpicture,’butrelinquishtheopportunitytomakefinediscriminations”(Richmond,2010,p.3).Similarly,“systemascause”and“dynamic”thinkingarealso“‘filteringskills’thathelpto‘filter’ournonessentialelementsofrealitywhenconstructingmentalmodels”(p.3).ConstructingmentalmodelsisonehalfoftheactivitythatRichmonddefinesas“thinking;”theotherhalfissimulatingthem(p.2).Thementalexerciseofconstructingmentalmodelsrequiresthethreeaforementionedthinkingskillsaswellas“operational”and“closedloop”thinking,bothofwhichareneededtocommunicatethestockandflowlanguageofsystemsthinking(p.7).Simulatingthebehaviorofmentalmodelsrequires“scientific,”“empathic,”and“generic”thinking(p.7–8).GenericthinkingisreflectedinSenge'seight“systemsarchetypes,”whichare“patternsofstructurethatrecuragainandagain”insystemsacrossdomains(Senge,2006,p.93).Bystudyingthesystemarchetypes,theirassociateddynamics,andleveragepoints,practitionerscanidentifythestructureofcomplexsystemsandapplyeffectiveinterventions(i.e.,makegooddecisions).Thesystemarchetypesareessentiallyheuristicsforunderstandingcomplexsystemconstructs.MaaniandMajaraj(2001)indicatethat“heuristiccompetenceishighlyanalogouswiththenotionsofsystemicthinkingtypes.”InSection10.4.3below,asystemsthinkingheuristicfordecisionmakingisproposed—Boyd'sOODALoop.Thedecisionmanagementprocess,alongwithriskmanagement,willbeshowninSection10.3.1.3tobeahighleverageintegrationactivityforresolvingunproductivetensionandreleasingcreativeenergyinprogramteams.10.3DevelopingIntegrationCompetenciesOrganizationsareincreasinglydefiningmoreoftheiractivitiesasprojectsandprograms.ItisimportanttorecognizethatwhilethePhaseIresearchfocusedonprogrammanagers,theresearchonprojectmanagementoftenrefersto“project”intheglobalsensewhereitencompassestheentirefieldofprojectmanagementincludingprogramandportfoliomanagement.Thedemandforprojectmanagersandtheinterestinprojectmanagementcompetenciesisincreasing(Bredillet,Tywoniak,&Dwivedula,2015;Crawford,2007).Thisevolutionintheoryandpracticehasplacedtheprojectmanagerandhisorhercompetenciesatthecenterofaproject'sand,therefore,anorganization'ssuccess.However,theprojectmanagementresearchmainlyaddressesindividualcompetenciesheldbyprojectmanagersratherthanorganizationalcompetencies(Bredilletetal.,2015;Crawford,2005;Medina&Medina,2014;Morris,Crawford,Hodgson,Shepherd,&Thomas,2006;Stevenson&Starkweather,2010).Asaresult,theprojectmanagerisseenasa“hero”whocarriesonhisorhershoulderstheheavyloadofresponsibilityforaproject'ssuccessorfailure(LoufraniFedida&Missionier,2015).The“hero”attitudeisalsohighlightedintheresearchfindingsshowninFigure101,wherebothprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersratedteambuildingskillsaslowontheirlistofimportantskills.Leadersineveryorganizationmusthavetheabilitytocreateavision,asenseofpurpose,andatensionthatunleashescreativeenergy(productivetension).Incontrasttotheresearchtrendsandcommonlyheldbeliefs,rareisthesingularleader,lonegenius,or“heroic”projectmanager.AsJoshuaWolfShenk(2014)discussesinhisbookPowersofTwo,“thepairisthe

242primarycreativeunit.”LikethefictionalSherlockHolmesandDr.Watson,theprogrammanagerandsystemsengineercomprisethatcreativeunit.Researchsupportsthisconclusion.OnethinksoflargerthanlifecharacterslikeSteveJobsandBillGatesashavingsinglehandedlybuiltboththetechnologyandtheircompaniesandoneviewsthesehighlypublicizedandoverdramatizedindividualsastheembodimentsofsuccessandtheiractionsthemodelsforhowtobesuccessful.Thelessdramatictruth,though,isthatthesemenandothersuccessfulmenandwomenlikethemdidnotactalone,butbuiltteams.Scholarsofprojectmanagementhavedefinedsuccessfulprojectsasthoseinwhichthe“peopleside”hasbeenwellmanaged(Morris&Pinto,2007,p.17).Recentresearchreflectsthatthedomainofpeoplefactorsimpactingintegrationofthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementrolescomprisesexperience,education,andprofessionaldevelopmentthroughonthejobtraining(Reiner,2015).Forcomplexenvironments,theliteraturesuggeststhatprogrammanagersdeployhighlyexperiencedsystemsengineersinordertosetupaneffectiveandefficientsystemsengineeringcapabilityintheirprojects(Ansorge,2004).Therelationofexperienceofteammembersontheperformanceofprojectsandprogramsisconsideredasafieldofinterestofongoingresearch(Kovacic,Filzmoser,&Denk,2014).Theworkexperienceofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersisexpectedtobehighlyrelevantforintegrationanditseffectsonprogramperformance(Reiner,2015,p.45).ThePhaseIIandIIIresearchfoundthatunproductivetensioncanbeovercomebyviewingintegrationasa“teamcompetencyandbyimplementingprovenintegrationpracticessuchasthefollowing”(Rebentisch&Conforto,2014,p.37):Developanintegratedcareerpathforprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Promoteformaleducationandtraininginbothdisciplinessotheycanlearnfromeachother.Recognizethevalueofmultidisciplinaryteams—multiplecompetenciesandskills.Createandcommunicateanoverarchingvisionoftheprogram—itschallengesandgoals.Overcomepersonalassumptions,listencarefully,andconsideroneanother'sexperienceandknowledge.Havingestablishedtheimportanceofeffective,integratedteams,thequestionbecomes“Howdoesonedeveloptheintegrationcompetenciesthatcreateeffectiveteams?”Thefollowingdiscussionwillcovertheintegratedcareerpath,educationandtraining,andmultidisciplinaryteampractices.Vision,communication,andempathyareconsideredtobeskillsthatfallundertheleadershipcompetency.10.3.1IntegratedCareerPathFighterpilotsandU.S.footballteamshavetrulyintegratedcareerpaths.Fighterpilotsneverflybythemselves.Theyarealwayspartofaformationorpackageofsupportingandsupportedaircraftthatareinterdependent—bombersarecoveredbyfighterswhoarecoveredbyelectronicattackwhoarecoveredbyfightersandalsosupportthebombers.Quarterbacks

243alwaysneedreceiverstothrowto,andwouldgettackledwithoutagoodoffensiveline.Theoffenseissupportedbythedefensewhoseroleistopreventtheotherteamfromscoring.Programs,though,don'thavesuchobviousinterdependencies.Itisoftenlefttothepersonalityoftheprogrammanager,theprogram'sleader,todriveteamorientedbehaviors(teamwork)(Senge,2006,p.93).TheseobservationsareinlinewithGallup(2015)findingsthatshowthatonly30%ofU.S.workersreportthattheyareengaged,andthatlowengagementcoststheU.S.economy$319billionto$398billionannually(p.8).ThePhaseIresearchfoundfourconditionsinsuccessfulorganizationsthatcreateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationandteamorientedbehaviors:Usestandardsfrombothdomains.Formalizethedefinitionofintegration.Shareresponsibilitiesinkeyareas.Developintegratedengineeringprogramassessments.10.3.1.1UseStandardsfrombothDomainsThePhaseIresearchfoundthatprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerstendtousestandardsfromtheirowndomainsexclusively.Theresearchalsofoundthatarelativelyhighnumberofprofessionalsdonotusestandardsatall,especiallyinengineeringfirms.Figure47inChapter4showsthedistributionofrespondentswithrespecttostandardsthattheyuse.Intheprevioussectiononindividualcompetencies,itwastakenasagiventhatprofessionalswouldpossessandmaintaincompetencyintheirfield.Theresearchdatashowthatthisassumptionmaynotholdinmanycases.Moreover,thesedatashowthatmostprofessionalshavelittletonoknowledgeoforappreciationforthecompetenciesoftheirteammembers.Incontrast,fighterpilotsknowexactlywhattheirwingmenwilldoandquarterbacksknowexactlywhattheirreceiverswilldoindynamicsituations.Theyknowoneanother'sjobsandtheytrustoneanother.Giventheimportanceofplanningandmanagingthetechnicalaspectsofprograms,aneffectivechiefsystemsengineerwillhaveastrongfoundationinprogrammanagementaswellasdepthintheirowndomain.Thechiefsystemsengineer'srolerangesfromdevelopinganddefendingthebasisofbudgets,planningandmonitoringtechnicalactivities,identifyingandmitigatingtechnicalrisk,andengagingstakeholderstobecominganintegralpartoftheprogram'smanagementteam.Similarly,programmanagersmusthavesufficienttechnicaldepthtoeffectivelycommunicatewithsystemsengineersandtherestofthetechnicalteam.Inordertointegratetheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringroles,organizationsdesiringahighlevelofintegrationandteamorientedbehaviorsshouldconsidercrosstrainingprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerstoprovideanappreciationforandfamiliarizationwiththeotherprofessional'sjob.10.3.1.2FormalizetheDefinitionofIntegrationSuccessfulorganizationshavebeenshowntoformalizewhatintegrationmeansforthem.These

244definitionsofintegrationvarywidely,andthisbookisanattempttoprovideaunifieddefinitionbyproposingleadingpracticesforintegration.Onewaytoviewformalizingintegrationisfromtheperspectiveofrolesandresponsibilities.ThePhaseIresearchinvestigatedthisaspectbyaskingprofessionalswhichjobresponsibilitiesfellundertherespectiverolesofprogrammanagement,systemsengineering,orboth.Fromthisdataset,theresearchersconcludedthatprofessionalsbelievedthatprogrammanagersgenerallyhaveresponsibilityforoverallprogramresultsandforthegoalsandobjectivesoftheprogram.Theyalsothoughtthatchiefsystemsengineerswereprimarilyresponsiblefortechnicalrequirementsandsystemsdefinition.Theserolesandresponsibilitiesareconsistentwithpreviousdiscussionsandwithotherresearch.Themajorityofprofessionalsidentifiedprogram/projectriskasanareaofsharedresponsibility(Confortoetal.,2013,p.10).Otherformalizedapproachestointegrationinvolvetheapplicationofmethodologiesandotherprocessesandtools,asexploredinChapter8.Ideally,definedanddocumentedrolesforprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerswouldbealignedwithandcontributetothoseotherelementsoftheintegrationframework.Perhapsmostimportantly,aformalapproachtointegrationwouldbepartofthewaytheorganizationoperates,andassuchwouldenjoytopdownsupportfromtheorganization'sleaders.10.3.1.3SharedResponsibilities:CreativeTensionAccordingtoINCOSE's(2015)SystemsEngineeringHandbook,“Systemsengineersandprojectmanagersbringuniqueskillsandexperiencestotheprogramonwhichtheywork…[and]thereisa‘sharedspace’wheresystemsengineersandprojectmanagershavetocollaboratetodrivetheteam'sperformanceandsuccess”(p.104).That“sharedspace”isthetechnicalmanagementprocess,whichincludesplanning,assessmentandcontrol,decisionmanagement,riskmanagement,configurationmanagement,informationmanagement,measurement,andqualityassurance(p.104).Riskandtheriskmanagementprocessaresimultaneouslyasharedresponsibilityandanopportunitytoproductivelyresolvethenaturaltensionbetweenthetworoles(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013,p.20).Programmanagersandsystemsengineers,bythenatureoftheirrolesandresponsibilities,viewriskdifferently.Thesedifferentperspectivescausetension,whichcanberesolvedeitherproductivelyorunproductively(Confortoetal.,2013,p.5).Inhisseminalwork,TheFifthDiscipline,PeterSenge(2006)describescreativetensionasthegapbetweenthecurrent“asis”realityandanindividualororganization's“tobe”vision(p.140).Thatgap,ifaddressedandmanagedproductively,isthesourceofcreativeenergy.Aformalizedriskmanagementprocesscouldprovideaforumforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationandthereleaseofcreativetension.TheSystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE,2015,pp.114–122)providesathoroughoverviewoftheriskmanagementprocess,andriskwasdiscussedinChapter8.Nothighlightedintheresearchisthesharedresponsibilityofdecisionmanagement.AccordingtoINCOSE(2015),“itcanbearguedthatallSE[systemsengineering]activitiesshouldbe

245conductedwithinthecontextofsupportinggooddecisionmaking”(pp.110–111).TheSystemsEngineeringHandbook(pp.121–122)alsooutlinesopportunitymanagementasanalogoustoriskmanagement,butconsiderspotentialpositiveoutcomesinsteadof,orinadditionto,negativeones.INCOSE(p.110)alsoreferstoopportunitiesas“decisionsituations.”Togetherthedecisionmanagementandriskmanagementprocessesaretheessenceofprogrammanagementinallthreedimensionsofcost,schedule,andperformance.Whereasdecisionmanagementisfocusedonopportunities,riskmanagementforcestheprogramteamtotakeadisciplined“trustbutverify”outlooktowardthoseopportunities.Thetwoprocessessynergisticallycreatetensionandprovideanopportunityforintegrationthroughteambaseddecisionandriskmanagementprocesses.10.3.1.4DevelopIntegratedEngineeringProgramAssessmentsThedecisionandriskmanagementprocessesprovidehighleverageopportunitiesforregularmanagementreviewsandassessments.ThePMBOK®Guide(PMI,2013a)RiskManagementKnowledgeProcesses,thePracticeStandardforProjectRiskManagement(PMI,2009),TheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013b),andINCOSE's(2015)SystemsEngineeringHandbookcontainsimilarstandardswithregardtoriskmanagementandprovideanexcellentopportunityforintegrationofthesystemengineer'sandprogrammanager'sriskmanagementresponsibilities.ThePhaseIresearchfoundthatthelackofanintegratedplanningprocess,asshowninFigure102,wasthelargestsourceofunproductivetensionaccordingtopractitioners,whichprovidesanotherhighleverageintegrationopportunity.NotethatFigure102alsoshowsthatmostsourcesofunproductivetensionarerole/responsibilityissuesandstandardpracticeissuesasaddressedabove.

246Figure102:SourcesofunproductivetensionConfortoetal.,2013,p.3.Integratedplanningisanopportunitytobuildteambasedbehaviors,overcomeunproductivetension,andreleasecreativeenergy.Sowhydomanagers,teams,andorganizationsnotdomoreintegratedplanning?Experiencereflectsananswerthatissimpleandpragmatic:programplanningisanindirectcostthat,forprojectbasedorganizations,cannotbechargeddirectlytoacontracttaskandmustbedeductedfromcorporateprofit.Inprojectbasedorganizations,thebidandproposalprocessisledbythebusinessdevelopment(sales)team,whichcapturesbusinesswithverylittleinputfromthetechnicalprogramteams.Theprogramteamisengagedoncedirectchargestoacontractlineitemareestablished,wellafterthescopeofworkhasbeendefined.Thiscostdrivenenvironmentnotonlyundermines“buyin”orcommitmentfromthetechnicalcontributors,but,aswillbeseenintheupcomingdiscussiononcrewresourcemanagement,eliminatesanopportunityfortraininganddevelopingtheteamcompetenciesdiscussedthusfar.10.3.1.5ControloverProgram/ProjectLaunchandPlanningAsidentifiedinTheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehmen,2012),integratedplanningcanbeinhibitedwhentheprogramteamispushedtostartdevelopmentprematurely.TheFutureCombatSystemexampleinChapter2revealedthatleaderswithintheU.S.DepartmentofDefensepushedthestartofdevelopmentofthatverycomplexsystembeforetechnicalrequirementsandcomponentshadbeenvalidatedthroughsystemsengineering(Perninetal.,2012).TheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOfficecitedtherusheddevelopmentandlimiteduseofsystemsengineeringascontributingfactorstotheprogram'sfailure(GAO,2007).Findingthat“Redesigningmajorprojectswhilethey'rebeingdeliveredisamajorcauseofdelayandcostsoverrunning”(UKCabinetOffice,2015),theUnitedKingdom'sMajorProjects

247Authorityinstitutedacomprehensivereviewandassessmentprocess.TheAuthority'sprocessrequiresrigorousfrontendplanningonallprojectsandprogramsoveraspecificfinancialthresholdbeforefundscanbereleasedtostartdevelopment.Thelevelofrigorensuresthatplanningactivitiesarebothcomprehensiveandintegrated.Thenatkeypointsthroughouttheprojectorprogram,detailedperformanceassessmentsandevaluationsarerequiredbeforeadditionalfundsarereleased.Betweenitsfoundingin2011and2015,theAuthorityhadconductedmorethan200assessmentsonactiveprogramsandprojects.Theoutcomesofthosereviewsshiftedmanyprogramsandprojectsfrombeingatriskoffailuretoimprovedperformance(UKCabinetOffice,2015).10.3.2EducationandTrainingUnfortunately,mostresearchisfocusedonprojectmanagementratherthanprogrammanagement.However,becauseoftherelationshipbetweenprojectsandprograms,projectmanagementresearchiscitedhereandinotherchaptersinsupportofcompetenciesrequiredforprogrammanagers.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatthereisacausallinkbetweenprojectmanagercompetenceandprojectsuccess(Morris&Pinto,2007).Inadditiontoanyareaspecificskillsandgeneralmanagementproficienciesrequiredfortheproject,effectiveprojectmanagementrequiresthattheprojectmanagerpossessthreeareasofcompetence:(1)knowledgeofprojectmanagement,(2)performanceasaprojectmanager,and(3)theprojectmanager'spersonaleffectiveness,whichencompassesattitudes,corepersonalitycharacteristics,andleadership(PMI,2013a,p.17).PMIinitsProjectManagerCompetencyDevelopmentFramework(PMI,2007)identifiedfiveperformancecompetenciesforprojectmanagers—initiating,planning,executing,monitoringandcontrolling,andclosingaproject;andsixpersonalcompetenciesforprojectmanagers—professionalism,communicating,leading,managing,cognitiveability,andeffectiveness.Researchershavenotedamovefromprojectmanagementresearchthatfocusesonprocesstoresearchthatfocusesonpeople(CookeDavies,2002;Leybourne,2007,p.189).Organizationsareincreasinglylookingforprojectmanagersabletodealwith“soft”issuesrelatedtopeopleandrelationshipswhonotonlymanageprojectsbutalsodrivevalue(Gerush,2009).Researchhasshownthatsystemsengineeringinvolvesapplyingmultipledisciplinestothesystemdevelopmentprocess(INCOSE,2010;Keatingetal.,2003).Systemsengineeringhasalsobeendescribedasamanagerialandtechnicalmethodologydevelopedinthelast60yearstoimprovethegovernance(andhencetheperformance)ofprojectsdesignedanddeliveredincomplexenvironments(Locatelli,Mancini,&Romano,2014,p.1407).Toachievetheseresults,governancemustbetransformedfromtheprojectandpure“projectmanagement”toamoreholisticsystemviewof“systemmanagement”(p.1407).Thisrequirestechnicaldisciplinetoensurearigorousexecutionofthedevelopmentprocessandmanagementdisciplinethatorganizesthetechnicaleffortthroughoutthesystemlifecycle.Thisallrequiresleadershipskillsthatincludeahighdegreeofemotionalintelligencethatenablethebestleaderstomaximizetheirownandtheirfollowers'performance(Goleman,1998).Golemaninhisdefiningworkonemotionalintelligencedescribeditintermsofthefollowingfiveskills:

248selfawareness,selfregulation,motivation,empathy,andsocialskill.Otherresearchershaveconfirmedthatthepresenceofemotionalintelligencenotonlydistinguishesoutstandingleaders,butcanalsobelinkedtostrongperformance(Barry&duPlessis,2007;McClelland1998;Mem,Elahi,Bhatti,&Khalid,2006).INCOSE(2012),initsreportPathwaystoInfluence:TheEmergingRoleoftheSystemsEngineerinanIncreasinglyComplexWorld,includedthe“abilitytoinfluence”asasignificantskillofthesystemsengineer,withsuccessmeasuredbymanagement'sanswertothequestion:“CanIputmysystemsengineerinfrontofthechiefexecutivesofmyorganization?”(p.2).Thisrequiresthedevelopmentofabroadsetofmanagementandleadershipskillsinadditiontotechnicalcompetency.Similartoprojectandprogrammanagers,theabilitytoinfluenceincludesthedevelopmentofsoftskills,anunderstandingofthehumanelementsofthesystems,andtheorganizationalsystemsthatdevelopthem,andanabilitytotranslatesystemsthinkingintolanguageandnomenclaturethatmakessensetothesetoplevelleaders(p.5).KeysandCase(1990)suggestthatonepowerfulmethodfordevelopingabaseofinfluenceistofirstestablishareputationasanexpertintheprojectdomainthatisbeingundertaken.Aprojectmanagerwholacksthenecessarytechnicalskillorcompetencycannotcommandtheabilitytouseinfluenceasamechanismtosecurethesupportofotherimportantstakeholdersorbeperceivedasatrue“leader”oftheprojectteam(Mangenau&Pinto,2007).10.3.3DevelopingMultidisciplinaryTeamsThehighlevelrolesofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers,theiroverlappingresponsibilities,andtheideaofutilizingintegrationbestpracticesforovercomingunproductivetensionandunlockingcreativeenergywerediscussedinSection10.3.1.3above.Butwhatiftheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerwerethesameperson?Wouldthatnotimmediatelyrelieveunproductivetension?ConfortoandRebentisch(2014,p.9)foundthatinsomeorganizations,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerwerethesameperson.LoufraniFedidaandMissionier(2015)intheirrecentstudyofcriticalcompetenciesfromamultilevelapproachinfourprojectbasedorganizations(IBM,HewlettPackard,Arkopharma,andTenex)recommendedthatbothpractitionersandcurrentacademicresearchersstoplookingfortheperfect,“ideal”projectmanagerwhowouldpossessallofthenecessarycriticalcompetenciesforprojects.Instead,managersshouldconsidersharingresponsibilitybetweentheindividualandorganizationalcompetenciesandnotexpectaprojectmanagertopossessalltherequiredcompetencies.Thisresearchsupportsthepreviousdiscussiononthefallacyofthelonecreativegeniusordramaticheroicfigure,whichwasdebunkedbyShenk(2014)inPowersofTwo.Theresearchalsofurthersupportstheoverallthemeofthischapterthatcreativetensionisanecessityforworldclassprogramexecution.10.3.3.1NASAChallengerCaseStudyTheNASAChallengercasestudyhighlightstheconflictsinrolesandtheethicalcrisisthatcanarisewhenakeymemberoftheengineeringteamalsofunctionsastheprogrammanager(Boisjoly,2006).OnFebruary25,1986,duringtheRoger'sCommissionHearingsonthe

249SpaceShuttleChallengerdisaster,testimonyfromoneofMortonThiokol's(MTIs)chiefengineers,RogerBoisjoly,revealedthatoneofthekeyparticipantsinthego/nogodecisionontheeveningbeforetheflight,MTI'sVicePresidentofEngineering,Mr.RobertLund,wasaskedtotakeoffhisengineeringhatandputonhismanagementhat.Mr.Lund'sperspectiveasaprogrammanagerresultedultimatelyinadifferentdecisionthanhehadmadeasanengineer(RogersCommission,1986,p.1420).Duringthehearings,Mr.Lunddivulgedhisreasonforchanginghismind:CHAIRMANROGERS:“Howdoyouexplainthefactthatyouseemedtochangeyourmindwhenyouchangedyourhat?”(p.1456)MR.LUND:“Iguesswehavegottogobackalittlefurtherintheconversationsthanthat.Wehavedealtwith[NASA's]Marshall[SpaceFlightCenter]foralongtimeandhavealwaysbeeninthepositionofdefendingourpositiontomakesurethatwewerereadytofly,andIguessIdidn'trealizeuntilafterthatmeetingandafterseveraldaysthatwehadabsolutelychangedourpositionfromwhatwehadbeenbefore.ButthateveningIguessIhadneverhadthosekindsofthingscomefromthepeopleatMarshallthatwehadtoprovetothemthatweweren'tready….Andsowegotourselvesinthethoughtprocessthatweweretryingtofindsomewaytoprovetothemitwouldn'twork,andwewereunabletodothat.Wecouldn'tproveabsolutelythatthatmotorwouldn'twork.”(pp.1456–1457)CHAIRMANROGERS:“Inotherwords,youhonestlybelievedthatyouhadadutytoprovethatitwouldnotwork?”(p.1456)MR.LUND:“Well,thatiskindofthemodewegotourselvesintothatevening.Itseemslikewehavealwaysbeenintheoppositemode.Ishouldhavedetectedthat,butIdidnot,buttheroleskindofswitched.”(p.1457)Boisjoly(RogersCommission,1986)stated:Fromthispointonmanagementformulatedthepointstobasetheirdecisionon.Therewasneveronecommentinfavor,asIhavesaid,oflaunchingbyanyengineerorothernonmanagementpersonintheroombeforeorafterthecaucus.Iwasnotevenaskedtoparticipateingivinganyinputtothefinaldecisioncharts.Essentially,“NASAplacedMTIinthepositionofprovingthatitwasnotsafetofly,insteadofprovingthatitwassafetofly”(Boisjoly,2006).Thesestatementsshowadecisionprocessthatisoutofbalancewithacomplementaryriskmanagementprocessandadisruptionofthenaturaltensionbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Intheyearssince

250thePresidentialCommissionmadeitsreportontheSpaceShuttleChallengeraccident,NASAhasprosecutedanintensive,acrosstheboardeffortdedicatedtoreturningtosafe,reliablespaceflight.Thisrecoveryactivityhasthreekeyaspects:thetechnicalengineeringchangesbeingselectedandimplemented;thenewprocedures,safeguards,andinternalcommunicationprocessesthathavebeenputinplace;andthechangesinpersonnel,organizations,andattitudesthathavecomeaboutincludingthatastronautsbeencouragedtomakethetransitionintomanagementpositions.Importantly,theNASAChallengercasestudyhighlightstheseriousnessofdecisionmakingwhereassumingonerole,inthiscasetheroleoftheprogrammanager,hadadevastatingimpactonthefinaloutcomebecauseofthedifferingapproachestodecisionmakingasaprogrammanagerversusasystemsengineer.Thoughintegrationoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringroleshasbenefits,itisimportanttorecognizethatresponsibilityforfinaldecisionmakingmustbeclearlyallocatedbasedonastrategicallyplannedgovernancesystemthatfocusesonthedeliveryofsustainablebenefits,inthiscaseasuccessfulspacemission.AsshowninFigure103,itisalsoimportanttorecognizethatthenaturaltensionbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringresponsibilitiesisbeneficialtodecisionmakingandriskmanagementwhenintegrationpracticesarefollowedandthetensionistreatedproductively.Figure103:SystemsengineerandprogrammanagerrolesoverlapandcreatepotentialforunproductivetensionAfewkeytakeawaysfromtheNASAcasestudyinclude:

251Therespectiverolesofthesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanagermustbeclearlydefinedandallocatedbasedonexperienceandcompetency.Dualrolesforsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersmustbeunderstoodinthecontextoftheorganization'sdecisionmakingprocess.Integrationbestpracticescanbeausefultoolforovercomingunproductivetensionandunlockingcreativeenergy.Thesystemsengineers'abilitytoinfluencemustbebalancedagainsttheirresponsibilityandauthority.10.4ManagingIntegrationCompetenciesAsshowninthecasestudiesinthischapter,competencyisanunderlyingcharacteristicofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andincludesasetofskills,attributes,andknowledgethatresultsineffectiveperformance.Competenciesmustbemeasurableandarerequiredforsuccessfulindividual,team,andorganizationalperformance.Theyreflectanorganization'svalues,culture,andbusinessstrategies.Allorganizationsmusthavecompetencymodelsthatdescribesuccessfulperformancefororganizations,programs,andaparticularroleorposition.Threeexamplesofcompetencymodelsforintegrationdescribedbelowhaveprovensuccessfulinthetrainingofhighlysuccessfulteams.10.4.1CrewResourceManagementasaModelforIntegrationAprovenmodelforintegratingasetofhighlytrainedindividualsintoahighperformanceteamistheaviationindustry'sCrewResourceManagement(CRM)program.TheneedforCRMandthestoryofitsevolutionaregermanetointegrationandcompetencybecause,paradoxically,asaircrafttechnologygotbetterandmorereliable,theaccidentrateincreasedandairtravelgrewlesssafe.Accidentinvestigationsconcludedthattheincreasedcomplexityofthemodernaircraftsystemwasbeyondthecapacityforasinglepersontomanage,andthatthehierarchicalcrewstructurewasineffectiveforhandlingsuchcomplexity.Similarly,intheeverincreasingcomplexityoftheinformationage,hierarchicalmanagementstructuresarealsoineffective.CRMwasdevelopedinthe1980sinresponsetoanincreasingnumberofmajoraircraftaccidentsattributableto“humanerror.”TwodeadlycrashesofU.S.airlinersinthe1970sinparticularspawnedthebirthofCRM.EasternAirlinesFlight401flewintotheground(controlledflightintoterrain)December29,1972.Crewmemberswerepreoccupiedwithaburntoutlandinglightanddidnotnoticethattheautopilotaltitudecontrolfunctionhadbeenturnedoff.Thecrewthoughttheywereon“altitudehold,”buttheairplanewasinaslowdescent.Sinceitwas11:30pmovertheFloridaEverglades,theyhadnovisualindicationthattheyweredescending.Theaccidentwascompletelyattributedto“humanerror.”UnitedAirlinesFlight173crashedDecember28,1978nearPortland,Oregon,duetofuel

252starvation.Thecrewwasalsopreoccupiedwithalandinggearmalfunction.Despiterepeatedremindersbytheflightengineeraboutthefuelstate,thecaptaincontinuedtotroubleshootthelandinggearproblem.TheinvestigationofFlight173bytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB)resultedinarecommendation(PriorityAction)to:Issueanoperationsbulletintoallaircarrieroperationsinspectorsdirectingthemtourgetheirassignedoperatorstoensurethattheirflightcrewsareindoctrinatedinprinciplesofflightdeckresourcemanagement,withparticularemphasisonthemeritsofparticipativemanagementforcaptainsandassertivenesstrainingforothercockpitcrewmembers(CRM,2015).In1981,UnitedAirlinesbegantrainingitscrewsinCRM;therestofthecommercialindustryaswellastheDepartmentofDefenseaviationcommunityfollowed.Today,myriadCRMtrainingprogramsexist.Themajoraircarriershavetheirown,internalCRMprograms,whilesmallercarriersreceiveCRMtrainingasacontractedservice.Regardlessofthesource,CRMtrainingisrequiredbytheFAAforcommercialaircarriersandisdescribedinFAA(2004)AdvisoryCircular(AC)12051E,CrewResourceManagementTraining.SinceCRMwasimplemented,potentialdisastershaveturnedintostoriesofheroism.TwopropertiesofCRMarenotableandgermanetoprogrammanagement/systemsengineeringintegration.First,“CRMtrainingfocusesonsituationalawareness,communicationsskills,teamwork,taskallocation,anddecisionmakingwithinacomprehensiveframeworkofstandardoperatingprocedures(SOP)”(FAA,2004,p.1).ThisnotionofastandardsbasedframeworkisreflectedinthePhaseIresearch(Confortoetal.,2013),whichfoundthattheuseofindustrystandards(e.g.,PMIPMBOK®Guide,INCOSESEBoK)washighlycorrelatedwithorganizationsthatreportedhighlevelsofintegrationandlowlevelsofunproductivetension(p.14).Akeyfindingfromtheresearchwasthattoimproveintegration,organizationsshouldusestandardsfrombothareas,butbe“flexible”andadaptthemwhennecessary(p.15).Havingasetofcomprehensivestandards,then,isaprerequisitetoteambasedlearning.ThesecondnotablepropertyfromCRMisthat,“CRMtrainingisbasedonawarenessthatahighdegreeoftechnicalproficiencyisessentialtosafeandefficientoperations.DemonstratedmasteryofCRMconceptscannotovercomealackofproficiency.Similarly,hightechnicalproficiencycannotguaranteesafeoperationsintheabsenceofeffectivecrewcoordination”(FAA,2004,p.5).ArelatedfindinginthePhaseIIandIIIresearchwasthat“ThePM[programmanager]usuallydoesnothaveatechnicalbackground,”whichresultsinpoorcommunicationsbetweentheprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerandtherestofthetechnicalteam.Akeytakeawayfromtheresearchisthat,forcomplexprograms,familiaritywithsystemsengineeringisessentialsothattheprogrammanagerandsystemsengineerspeakthe“samelanguage”(Conforto&Rebentisch,2014,p.17).Inconsideringaprogrammanagement/systemsengineeringtrainingprogram,itisworthwhiletoconsidertheessentialpropertiesoftheFAA'sCRMimplementationpolicies.FAAAdvisoryCircularAC12051E(2004)notesunderthebasicconceptsofCRMthat“whiletherearevarioususefulmethodsinuseinCRMtrainingtoday,certainessentialsareuniversal”(p.6).CRMtrainingshouldfocus

253on:Atrainingprogramcenteredonclear,comprehensivestandardoperatingproceduresThefunctioningofcrewmembersasteams,notasacollectionoftechnicallycompetentindividualsInstructionofcrewmembersonhowtobehaveinwaysthatfostercreweffectivenessDevelopmentofopportunitiesforcrewmemberstopracticetheskillsnecessarytobeeffectiveteamleadersandteammembersExercisesthatincludeallcrewmembersfunctioninginthesamerolesthattheynormallyperforminflightEffectiveteambehaviorsduringnormal,routineoperationsCRMisallwellandgoodfordiscretesituationslikeanairplaneflight,butwhataboutthedaytodaygrindofprojectsandprograms?Projectsandprogramscanbenefitfromdiscrete“phases”byusingcontroltheoryandagileapproaches.10.4.2ControlTheoryDrivingacarlookslikeacontinuousoperationthattakesverylittlethought.However,tothecontrolsengineerwhobuildsthesteeringandstabilitysystemincars,itisnot.Drivingacar,infact,isacontinuousseriesofverysmallandfastbutdiscreetinputsbythedriverthatkeepthecarmovingintherightdirectionatthecorrectspeed.Perceptualcontroltheory(PCT)suggeststhatpurposefulbehavioristhe“abilityoforganismstoproducepreselectedresultsinadisturbanceproneworld”(Marken,2010).Whenappliedtoteams,PCTisathreestepprocesswhere,oncefocusedonagoal,theteam:1.Talksaboutthegoaldailytokeepitattheforefrontofteammembers'minds2.Reviewsperformanceregularlytoensureinformationisshared3.RecognizesthevaluecontributionofindividualteammembersTheleadershipcoreoftheteammustspendtimeandpaypersonalattentiontoeachindividual.Thisthirdstepistheindividualnurturingthataleadermustbeabletodosothatpeoplecare(Forssell,2014,p.61–62).10.4.3DecisionTheoryandtheOODALoopBusinessdecisionmodelsaboundanddecisiontheoryisanimportantsubjectinunderstandingorganizationalcompetencies.AusefulheuristicfordecisionmakingisJohnBoyd'sOODALoop(Boyd,1976).JohnBoydwasanAmericanfighterpilotwho,whenanalyzingAmericansuccessinairtoaircombatduringtheKoreanWardespiteinferiorequipment,foundthatitwasthesuperiordecisionmakingabilityoftheU.S.pilotsthatwontheday.BoydfoundthatthedecisionmakingboileddowntoacontinuouscycleofObserving,Orienting,Deciding,andActing(OODA)andthattheoutcomeofacompetitiveengagement,beitfightercombator

254business,wasdependentuponwhoseOODAloopwasfasterandmoreaccurate.Twoconceptsareimportant:accuracyandspeed.Aswasshowninthediscussiononcreativetension,creativeenergyisderivedfromthegapbetweencurrentrealityandacompellingvision.Fortheensuingefforttobeproductiveandsuccessful,bothcurrentrealityandthevisionitselfmustbeclearlydefined.Oneofthegreatexamplesofbridgingthegapbetweenvisionandrealitytoimprovethequalityoflifeofpeoplecomesfromthedevelopingworld.In2012TheWorldBankestablishedtheGlobalPartnershipforSocialAccountability(GPSA)withthepurposeofbridgingthegapbetweenwhatcitizensexpectandwhatgovernmentsdo.TheGPSAworkswithcivilsociety,governments,andtheprivatesectortohelpsolvechallengesthroughstrategicsocialaccountabilitymechanisms.TheGPSAhighlightsthebenefitsofconstructiveengagementinwhichcitizensandcivilsocietyorganizationscanengagewithpolicymakersandserviceproviders,generateinformation,andalignincentivestobringaboutgreateraccountabilityandresponsivenesstocitizens'needs.TheGPSAsupports23projects,throughgrantsandcapacitybuildingincountriesrangingfromBangladeshtoGhanatoParaguay.Inaddition,anextensiveknowledgeandlearningagendaallowsGPSAgranteesandotherpartnerstoenhancetheimplementationofsocialaccountabilityinterventions(WorldBank,2015).Thekeytakeawayisthesignificanceofusingcreativeenergytoalignstrategicgoalsthroughpartnershipandteamingeffortsthatprovidebenefitsforall.Onemustclearlyobservecurrentrealityandorienttothatrealitybeforedecidingandactingonacourseofaction.Intoday'scomplexenvironment,currentrealityisaconstantlychangingphenomenonsotoday'sleadermustbeabletoimprovise.ImprovisationasacompetencywasdiscussedinmoredetailinChapter9,butisrecognizedhereasanimportantmethodologycriticaltounderstandingcompetenciesinintegrationaswell(Jaafari,2003;Leybourne,2007;Snider&Nissen,2003).10.5SummaryTheoverarchingthemeofthischapteristhattensionisnotonlyagiven,butisalsoanecessityforachievinggoalsandrealizingvisions.Theconceptofcreativetensionasacatalystforreleasingcreativeenergyhasbeendiscussedatlength.Whennotmanagedproperly,though,tensioncanbeunproductiveand,asinthecaseoftheChallenger,havecatastrophicresults.Byapplyingintegrationpracticestotheprogrammanager/systemsengineerteamingrelationship,tensioncanbeacreativeforcetowardworldclassresults.Theprogrammanagement/systemsengineeringteamcanandshouldbeviewedasacreativedualityasdescribedinThePowersofTwo(Shenk,2014).TheApolloandSpaceShuttleprogramswerethearchetypesofcomplexityintheIndustrialAgeofthetwentiethcentury.InthetwentyfirstcenturyInformationAge,everythingiscomplex.Organizationsandbusinessmustmasterthiscomplexityinordertosurvive.BlockbusterVideoandMySpacewerehouseholdnamesattheturnofthetwentyfirstcentury.Bytheendofthefirstdecade,theydidn'texist.Countlessotherexamplescanbefound.PMI's

255(2014)PulseoftheProfession®reportemphasizestheneedfororganizationalleaderstotakeactiontobecomehighperformersinthetwentyfirstcentury.Leadershipandsystemsthinkingarecompetenciesthatmustbedevelopedandmanagedfororganizationstobesuccessful.Proventoolsandtechniqueswerepresentedthat,ifadopted,wouldfosterthemultidisciplinaryteamsneededtodealeffectivelywithcomplexityinanydomain.Workingtogether,thesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanagercanestablishbetterstrategiesandsolutionsintheprogramsinwhichtheyareinvolved,andthusinthegreaterworld.10.6DiscussionQuestions1.Whataresomeleadershipskillsneededforcreatingandcommunicatinganoverarchingvisionoftheprogram,itschallenges,andgoals?2.Whatisasourceofcreativeenergyinyourorganizationandhowcanitbeusedtoreleasecreativetension?3.Whatissystemsthinkingandhowcanitbeusedtobetterintegratetherolesofthesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanager?4.WhataretheimportantlessonslearnedfromthesuccessoftheTUFFcasestudyintermsofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementintegration?5.WhatwastheconflictdiscussedintheNASAChallengerCaseStudyandhowwouldyoustructureyourprogramstopreventthisproblemfromhappening?6.Describethree“sharedspaces”wheresystemsengineersandprogrammanagerscancollaborateanddriveprogramsforward.7.Whydoestheprojectmanagementresearchmainlyaddressindividualcompetenciesheldbyprojectmanagersratherthanorganizationalcompetencies?Whyareorganizationalcompetenciesimportantindevelopingsuccessfulprograms?10.7ReferencesAnsorge,W.R.(2004).Systemsengineering:Abenefitorballastinastronomicalinfrastructureprojects?ModelingandSystemsEngineeringforAstronomy,11.doi:10.1117/12.550926Barry,M.L.,&duPlessis,Y.(2007).Emotionalintelligence:crucialhumanresourcemanagementabilityforengineeringprojectmanagersinthe21stcentury.AFRICON2007,1–7.IEEE.doi:10.1109/AFRCON.2007.4401530Boisjoly,R.M.(2006).Ethicaldecisions:MortonThiokolandthespaceshuttleChallengerdisaster.Retrievedfromonlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/PPEssays/thiokolshuttle/shuttle_telecon.aspxBoyd,J.R.(1976).Destructionandcreation.Retrievedfromwww.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf

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26211INTEGRATIONTHROUGHOUTTHEPROGRAMLIFECYCLE11.1IntroductionThischapterintroducesthelifecyclesofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringandtheimpacteachhasonthedeliveryofbenefitsandsustainableoutcomes.Casestudiesfromvariousbusinessandindustrysectorsillustratehowtheintegrationfocusevolvesfromonestageoftheprogramtoanother.Differentintegrationprinciplesandactionswillbeemphasizedduringtheevolutionofaprogram.Theprogram'slifespansfromthedevelopmentofthestrategicintentoftheprogramthroughthedeliveryofsustainablebenefits.Researchillustratesthatintegrationthroughoutthelifeofaprograminfluencestheultimatesuccess.Tounderstandtheimportanceoflifecyclemanagement,thischapterfocusesonthedistinguishingcharacteristicsoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycles,theactivitiesthatoccurduringeachcycle,theoptimalbehaviors,andhowtheconvergenceoftheselifecyclesmightbetterenhanceoutcomesofprogramsinthefuture.11.2IntegrationandtheGenericLifeCycleMeredithandMantel(2011)pointout,“Likeorganicentities,programshavelifecycles.Fromaslowbeginningtheyprogresstoabuildupofsize,thenpeak,beginadecline,andfinallymustbeterminated.Also,likeotherorganicentities,theyoftenresisttermination.”Researchonlargescaleglobalprogramshighlightsthesignificanceoftheinterconnectednetworkofbusinesses,organizations,andgovernmententitiesparticipatingintheprogramacrossthelifeoftheprogram(Meredith&Mantel,2011;Miller&Lessard,2001;Morris&Hough,1987).Theprogramnetworkisatemporarystructurethatincludesdistinctstagesandchangingstakeholdersandgovernancestructures.Programsprovidetheimportantlinkagebetweenthesponsoringorganization'sstrategicgoalsandtheindividualprojectsandotherworkthatarethespecificmeansforachievingthem(PMI,2013,p.19).Integrationhasbeenreferredtoasanupfront,strategydrivenactivityandalsoasanessentialelementofcommissioningcommonlyreferredtoinprogrammanagementastheprogramdeliverystage.A2007studyofoutcomesofintegrationasaprogrammanagementconceptinindustrialprogramsconcludedthatbycoordinatingtheenddimensionofintegrationwithcommonrulesandacustomercentricapproach,theprogramisaddingvaluetothecommissioningprocessasitthusrevealsthepurposeofit,andinthatwaylimitsitsdiversity(Kirsilä,Hellström,&Wikström,2007).Greaterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemengineeringreducesunproductivetension,acauseofprogramdelays,costincreases,and,sometimes,evenprogramfailure.Thereductionoftensionisimportantasprograms

263proceed.Thedurationofprogramscanvarywidelydependingonthestrategies,policies,andgoalsoftheorganization.Someprogramscanlast30–40years,suchasoilandgasconcessions,orasshortasayearorlessforresearchanddevelopmentofsoftwareorothertechnologyproducts.Programstypicallyconsistoffourstages:1.Concept2.Development3.Production4.UtilizationFigure111showsthegenericlifecyclestagesforavarietyofprojectsandprogramsfromstandardsorganizationstocommercialandgovernmentorganizations.Althoughthesestagesdifferindetail,theyallhaveasimilarsequentialformatthatemphasizesthecoreactivitiesofconcept,development,production,andutilization.TypicaldecisiongatesarepresentedinthebottomlineofFigure111.Researchrevealsthatindividualprogramcomponentsmaynotfollowthissequence,butmaybestartedandthenstopped,improved,reformed,adjusted,orreauthorizedandrestarted.Itisalsopossiblethatindividualprogramcomponentscanbefoundtonotcontributetotheoverallstrategyorgoalsoftheorganizationortheprogramandbeabandonedcompletely.Asindicated,largepublicprogramsconductedbytheU.S.DepartmentofDefense,DepartmentofEnergy,andNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationtypicallyhavelonglifespansthatrequirelongerupfrontsetupandplanning,involvenumerousstakeholders,anddictateearlyfinanceandacquisitiondecisions.Softwareandtechnologycompanies,ontheotherhand,tendtofocusmoreoncustomerinterfaceandproductrequirementsdevelopmentintheearlystages.

264Figure111:Genericlifecyclesystemsengineeringstages,theirpurposes,anddecisiongateoptionsINCOSE,2015,p.29.JohnWiley&Sons,2015.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofJohnWiley&Sons.Largescalepublicprogramsareoftenyearsintheplanningduetothedynamiccharacteristicsofpublicpolicymakingandconstantlychangingstakeholderexpectations(Greiman,2013,pp.12–24).Forexample,Boston'sCentralArtery/Tunnel(akatheBigDig)programwasplannedoveralongperiodoftime,fromtheinitialapprovalofthecostestimatein1975untilitwassubstantiallycompletedin2007.Duringthistime,ittransitionedthrougheightstategovernorsandnumerouschangesinrulesandregulationsregardingthefinancingandmanagementoftheprogram.11.3LifeCycleStagesforSystemsEngineering

265Fromasystemsengineeringperspective,INCOSE(2015)notes:Asystem“progresses”throughacommonsetoflifecyclestageswhereitisconceived,developed,produced,utilized,supported,andretired.Lifecyclesforsystemsengineeringvaryaccordingtothenature,purpose,useandprevailingcircumstancesofthesystem.Eachstagehasadistinctpurposeandcontributiontothewholelifecycleandisconservedwhenplanningandexecutingthesystemlifecycle.Thestagesthusprovideorganizationswithaframeworkwithinwhichorganizationmanagementhashighlevelvisibilityandcontrolofprogramandtechnicalprocesses”(p.27).Table111depictsthebroadsystemsengineeringlifecyclestages,theirpurposes,anddecisiongateoptions.Lifecyclestagesforsystemsengineeringoverlapthelifecyclestagesforprogrammanagementintheearlystageofconceptdefinition.Buttheydivergeintheexecutionstagesofdevelopmentandproductionwhensystemsengineeringfocusesonthetechnicaldetailsofdesign,verification,andvalidation,andtheprogrammanagerfocusesontheoverallprogramperformanceanddeliveryofbenefits,includinghighlevelfinanceandbudgetaryrequirements.Somestagesmayoverlapintimesuchastheutilizationandsupportstages.Theprogramexecutionprocessincludesactivitiesrelatedtofourstagesofthesystemsengineeringlifecycle:development,production,utilization,andsupport.Table111SystemsengineeringlifecyclestagesINCOSE,2015,p.28LifeCyclePurposeDecisionGatesStagesConceptRefine,identify,anddefineDecisionoptions:stakeholders'needsProceedwithnextstageExplorefeasibleconceptsProposeviablesolutionsProceedandrespondtoactionitemsDevelopmentRefinesystemrequirementsCreatesolutiondescriptionContinuethisstageBuildsystemReturntoprecedingstageVerifyandvalidatesystemReformandadjustprojectProductionProducesystemsactivityInspectandverifyUtilizationOperatesystemtosatisfyusers'needsPutaholdonprojectactivitySupportProvidesustainedsystemcapabilityTerminateprojectRetirementStore,archive,ordisposeofthesystem11.4ProgramManagementLifeCycleCharacteristicsTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013)describesthethreeoverarchingphases

266thatprogramsmovethroughastheprogramlifecycle:ProgramDefinition,ProgramBenefitsDelivery,andProgramClosure.Thesephasesincludesubphasesandanumberofsupportingactivities,asshowninTable112.Whilethephasesandsubphasesaredefinedinthestandard,therelatedactivitiesvarydependingontheneedsoftheprogram.Table112TheprogrammanagementlifecyclephasesandactivitiesBasedonPMI,2013ProgramProgramProgramLifeCycleActivitiesManagementManagementLifeCycleLifeCyclePhasesSubphasesProgramProgramFormulatevisionandgoalsDefinitionFormulationIdentifybenefitsEngagestakeholdersDevelopscenariosestablishbenchmarksEmployexpertsProgramConductcost/benefitsanalysisPreparationDevelopbusinesscaseIdentifyactivitiestobeintegratedProgramComponentDevelopfeasibilitystudiesBenefitsPlanningandDevelopdeliverymethodologyDeliveryAuthorizationReviewenterpriseenvironmentalfactorsConductPhaseGatereviewComponentFormcrossfunctionalteamsOversightandIntegrateprogramorganization—people,processes,andIntegrationsystemsIntegratechangecontrolprocessesIntegrateprojectactivities,(i.e.,procurement,scope,risk,quality,budgets,schedule,delivery,etc.)ComponentConductcomponentplanningandauthorizationTransitionandConductoversightandintegrationClosureCompletecomponenttransitionandclosureIntegrateprogram,customer,andoperationalfunctionsandteamsProgramProgramPlanfortheoperational,financial,andbehavioralchangesClosureTransitionnecessarybyprogramrecipientstocontinuemonitoringperformanceImplementtherequiredchangeeffortsMonitortheperformanceoftheproduct,service,capability,orresultsfromareliabilityandavailabilityforuseperspectiveProvideondemandsupportandrespondtocustomerinputs

267Developbusinesscasesandthepotentialinitiationofnewprogramstorespondtooperationalissues,political,social,andeconomicchanges,culturalshifts,orlogisticalissuesProgramConductprogramfinancialclosureCloseoutTransitionbenefitsCompileanddisseminatelessonslearnedEnsurecontinuedbenefitssustainabilityTable112listsafewoftheactivitiespresentinmostprograms.Inprogramswithahighnumberofprojectsandotherrelatedwork,thereisacyclicprocessintheProgramBenefitsDeliveryphasewhereprojectsareinitiatedatvariouspointswithinthephase.Initiationofsomecomponentsoftheprogrammayoccurverylateinthelifeoftheprogram,whileclosurehasalreadybeenachievedonothercomponentsoftheprogram.Forexample,ifacityisbuildingalarge,innercityinfrastructurewithmultipleprojectsthatincluderoads,bridges,tunnels,interchanges,housing,andutilitysystems,thebridgeprojectmaybecompletedmonthsoryearsbeforethetunnelprojectbegins.Thevariousactivitiesofplanninglargepublicprogramsinclude:Theformationandstructureoftheowner/sponsorscoalitionTheengagementofstakeholdersandthelocalcommunityThepublicdialogueandreviewofthealternativeconceptsoftheprogramThedevelopmentoftheregulatory,environmental,andgovernanceframeworkChangesinthepoliticalenvironment,financing,andgovernmentalapprovalsEachoftheaboveactivitiesinvolvecollaborationandintegrationbetweenthesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanager.Thedeliveryoflargescaleprogramsrequiresafocusnotonlyonthelongupfrontplanningprocess,butalsoonthelongtermoperationsandfinance,“particularlysinceinitialdesignandinitialchoiceoftechnologycommittheownerofthefacility(publicorprivate)totheresultantcostofmaintenanceandoperationsforthreetofivedecades”(Miller,1997).Programlifecyclesaregenerallyconsiderediterativeoradaptiveratherthanpredictive.Inanadaptiveoriterativelifecycletheproductisdevelopedovermultipleiterationsanddetailedscopeisdefinedforeachiterationonlyastheiterationbegins(PMI,2013,p.38).Therearealsonotabledifferencesinthelifecyclecontentofprogramsacrossindustriesandproducts.Aresearchanddevelopmentprocessisgoingtohaveaverydifferentlookthanalargeinfrastructureorspaceprogram.Forexample,inonestudyofthelifecycleofresearchanddevelopmentinthelifesciencesindustry,therewereimportantdifferencesamongtheventurecapitalistsinhowtheyviewedtheprocessitselfandthebehaviorstheyemphasizedduringthecourseofproductdevelopment(Unger,Greiman,&Leybourne,2010).Insomecompaniestherewasmoreemphasisoncreativeinterventionssuchasvisits,calls,andothermeetingsanduseofexternalsourcesofinformationsuchasmarketconsultantswithallparties

268andtheirfullorganizationsandstaff.Thegoalsoftheinterventionincluded:Creatingvaliddatabyfosteringrealitytestingandawarenessofeachother'sbiasesBuildingaconsensuswherepossibleamongandwithinfirmsinthesyndicateaboutfuturestrategyandmanagementBuildingpsychologicalcapacityandcommitmentwithinone'sownventurecapitalfirmtobreakwithsyndicateperspectivewhenconsensuswasnotreachedonanewroundofdecisions(Ungeretal.,2010)Asdescribedbyoneventurecapitalist,“itisnotdifficulttoproducevaliddata,thehardpartiswhatyoudowithit”(Ungeretal.,2010).Thoughalmostallofthecompaniesinthestudyusedprojectandprogrammanagementmethodologiestocoordinatecomplexprocesses,unpredictableperformance,andchangingconditions,duringthelong5–7yearholdtimefortheinvestmenttheprojectorprogramrequireduseofmoreiterativeprocessesandsoftskillsmakingithardtopredictmilestonesandfuturerisksandprobabilities,thuscausingdisruptiontothetraditionalcostbenefitlifecycleanalysis(Ungeretal.,2010).11.4.1BrokenLifeCyclesandBenefitsManagementTheHeathrowTerminal5andNASA'sMiniatureSeekerTechnologyIntegrationcaseshighlightedinthischapteraretypicalexamplesofabrokenlifecyclewhereintegrationofthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementdisciplinesmighthavepreventeddisconnectsbetweenthevariousstagesandthusreachedstakeholderexpectationsalotsoonerintheprocess.ThePhaseIresearchfoundthatwhilerespondentsusesystemsengineeringandprojectmanagementstandardsinparallel,almostnoneusesystemsengineeringstandardsinparallelwithprogrammanagementstandards(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013).Thebalanceofthischapterfocusesonareasforintegrationoftheorganization,people,processes,andsystemsusedbyprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerstofulfilltheirresponsibilitiesandensuretherealizationofbenefits.Asdiscussedinearlierchapters,programmanagersoftenhavedifferentroles,responsibilities,andgovernancestructureswithinanorganizationthandosystemsengineers.Whilesystemsengineersfocusonbuildingthetechnologicalingredientsfortheprogram,theprogrammanagerisconcernedaboutthehighlevelinterfacesbetweentheprojectstheycoordinateandtheultimatedeliveryofbenefits.Themanagementofbenefitsisbyfarthemostimportantroleoftheprogrammanageranditisintegraltoeveryaspectoftheprogrammanager'sresponsibilities.Toevaluatetheprogram'sprogress,theprogramgovernanceteamemploysphases,milestones,anddecisiongatestoassesstheevolutionofasystemasitscomponentprojectscompletetheirrespectivelifecycles.Theactivitiesperformedseektoachieveprogramgoalsandservetocontrolandmanagethesequenceandtransitionsbetweeneachcomponentproject.Programsdifferfromsystemsengineeringinthatthefocusisonthedeliveryoftheprogrambenefitsratherthanjusttheperformanceoftheunderlyingprojects.Inprogrammanagement,thetermbenefitisoftenusedtodescribeaconceptsimilartothatofvalue.Benefitsinprogrammanagementaretypicallydefinedastheachievementofexplicitobjectivesandchangethatis

269specifiedandapprovedbycustomerstakeholders.Thiry(2010)explains,“[t]hefullcollaborationbetweenthebusinessmanagersandtheprogrammanagerisessentialforsuccessfulbenefitsrealizationsinceoneofthemainreasonsforusingprogrammanagementistointegratethehorizontalstrategicdecisionmanagementprocess.”However,onemustnotoverlooktheimportantroleofthesystemsengineerinsupportingthebenefitsdeliveryphasethroughbetterintegrationwithprogrammanagementfromprogramconceptiontobenefitssustainment.Ironically,ifaprogramdeliverswhatitpromised,thefactthattheprogramisoverbudgetorlateisnotdeterminativeoftheultimatesuccessoftheprogram(Greiman,2015).Recognizingthatprogramsdifferwidelyintheirorganizationalstructure,soalsodothestagesanddecisiongateschosenforaparticularprogramanditscomponents.11.4.2HeathrowTerminal5CaseStudy:AFailureinSystemsIntegrationAnimportantexampleofintegrationinprogramdeliverythatisoftenoverlookedistheintegrationoftheprogramteamwithoperations.Onecanbuildtheperfectprogramonschedule,withinbudget,andpoisedtodeliverintendedbenefits;however,ifonefailstointegratetheprogramwiththeoperatingorganization,theprogramcanultimatelybedeemedafailurewhenthebenefitsarenotfullyrealized.Asanexample,HeathrowTerminal5(T5)wasaprogramthatwasonscheduleandonbudgetfromthetimeconstructionbegan,defyingallthetrendsofprevioussimilarinitiativesintheUnitedKingdom(Davies,Gann,&Douglas,2009).T5wasseenasthefirststepintheregenerationofLondon'smainairportinpreparationforthe2012Olympics.However,onthedaytheterminalopened,whatwastobeagrandcelebrationinsteadturnedintoadisasterduetobaggagedelays,temporarysuspensionofcheckin,andthecancellationof68flights.Thisfailurehasbeenattributedto,amongotherthings,alackofsystemsintegrationandcoordinationbetweentheprogramandtheoperatingorganization—eachoperatingasseparatesystems.OncetheprogrammanagementteamworkingonT5thoughttheysurmountedtheconsiderableissuesrelatedtobuildingsuchavastandtechnologicallysophisticatedterminal,theysufferedfromtechnologicalhubrisandforgotaboutthepeopleissuesrelatedtothesuccessfulfunctioningofanylargetechnicalsystem(Brady&Davies,2010).WhatreallyfailedintheT5casewasIntegratedProjectDelivery(IPD).TheconceptofIPDasdefinedbytheAmericanInstituteofArchitects(AIA),isadeliveryapproachthatintegratespeople,systems,businessstructures,andpracticesintoaprocessthatcollaborativelyharnessesthetalentsandinsightsofallparticipantstooptimizeresults,increasevaluetotheowner,reducewaste,andmaximizeefficiencythroughallphasesofdesign,fabrication,andconstruction(AIA,2007).Ifthereislittleintegrationbetweentheprogramandoperationsthefinaloutcomeisalmostcertaintofail.Ironically,T5wasamodelinsystemsintegrationinmanyways,yettheoutcomewasafailureduetothediscontinuityinoneofthemostimportantareasofintegration—programdelivery.Integrationisimportantinallaspectsofaprogrambecauseitfosterscollaboration,andcollaborationfostersknowledgeandtrust—keyelements

270ofprogramsuccess.Ineveryprogramthereisaneedtointegratetheprocessesandsystemsrequiredtodelivertheprogrambenefitswiththoseinvolvedintheoperationsoftheprogram'sendresult(Daviesetal.,2009).RecognizingthecomplexityofthedeliveryprocessinT5,theCEOinhistestimonybeforetheHouseofCommonsstated:[W]iththebenefitofhindsightwemighthaveadoptedamorehumbleposition,giventhetrackrecord,(ofotherairportopeningdisasters)anditwasunfortunatethatwecreatedanexpectationofperfectioninwhatwasanextremelycomplicatedprogramme(Matthews,2008).Thesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementlifecyclessharemuchincommon,includingtherecognitionthatprogramsmustalignwiththestrategyoftheorganization,engagebusinessstakeholders,andtransitionprogramresultsintooperationsinordertodeliverbenefits.Thisrequiresrecognizingandimplementingtheelementsoforganizationalchangemanagementaspartoftheprogrammanagementthroughouttheprogram.ThelinkbetweentheprogramlifecycleandorganizationalchangehasbeenrecognizedbyPMI(2013).ManagingChangeinOrganizations(PMI,2013,p.67)providesevidencethatprogrammanagementincludesorganizationalchangemanagementandisacyclicprocessthatrequirescontinualreevaluationinordertoachieveitsobjectives.Changecanbeinternal,external,planned,oremergentthroughoutaprogram'slifeandrequiresacapabilitytodealwithsituationsthatarebothambiguousanduncertain(p.67).KeyTakeawaysfromtheT5caseinclude:Systemsengineeringistheemergingparadigmincomplexenvironmentstotransferthegovernancefromprogrambasedtosystembasedgovernanceandtherebyincreasethechanceofholisticsuccess(Locatelli,Mancini,&Romano,2014).Integrationbetweensystemsengineering,theprogrammanagementteam,andtheoperationsteamshouldtakeplaceduringtheearlieststageoftheprogramandcontinuethroughouttheprogram.Integrateddeliveryisanapproachthatintegratespeople,systems,businessstructures,andpracticesintoaprocessthatfosterscollaborationandtrust.Systemsintegrationisaformofgovernancethatcansurfaceproblemsandsolvethemlongbeforetheyspiraloutofcontrol.Thesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanagerhaveoverlappingrolesthatbenefitfromsharedresponsibilityandcollaboration.11.5LargeScaleInfrastructureProgramsLargescaleinfrastructureprograms(LIPs),includingrail,transportation,highways,tunneling,energy,wastewatertreatment,andgasandoilextractionanddistribution,haveuniquestructuralanddeliverymethodologiesthatcandiffersignificantlyfromthetraditionalprototypedevelopedintheaerospace,defense,andtelecommunicationsindustries.Sincethese

271programsareheavilyfinancedandgovernedbypublicauthorities,thedesignandengineeringoftheseprogramsaresubjecttostringentstandardsandcodes.Forexample,allfederallyfundedprojectsandprogramsintheUnitedStatesaresubjecttoprocurementprocessesthatmayincludealowbidordesignbidbuilddeliveryapproach,andbecharacterizedbylowchangeallowance.Theseprogramsarealsosubjecttocomplexinterfaces,extensiveoversight,progressivedesigndevelopment,andconstantlyevolvingstakeholderinterestsandinfluences.Forexample,intherecentplanningoftheCaliforniaHighSpeedRail,thegovernmentaddressedtheimportanceofastatutoryoversightauthorityandalegislativelymandatedriskmanagementplan.Theprogramcostsincludeallaspectsofmanaging,designing,andbuildingtheproposedhighspeedrailsystem.Thisincludesconstructionofthehighspeedtrainsystem(track,stations,buildings,bridges,tunnels,powersystems,signaling,etc.),rightofway,environmentalstudiesandmitigation,design,valueengineering,management,rollingstock(trains),testing,commissioning,operations,andallworkrequiredtoprovideacompletelyoperationalsystemreadyforrevenueservice.Duetotheseuniquedesigncharacteristicsandthesizeofundertaking,theCaliforniaHighSpeedTrainProject(CHSTP)hasbeendividedintoeightregionalsectionstoallowformoreeffectiveprogrammanagement.Largescaleprogramstypicallyarebrokenintoseparatesmallercontractsknownasworkpackages(i.e.,projectsandoperationalactivities)andconsistofvariousstagesofcompletion.Typically,constructioncommencesbeforedesigniscompletecreatinggreatercomplexitiesandinterfacechallenges.Consistencyacrossthenetworkiscrucialinthedesignofsystemwideelements.Thisincludeselementssuchasthetractionpoweranddistributionsystemsandtraincontrolsystems.Designcriteriaandstandardsarerequiredtoguidethepreliminaryengineering,finaldesign,construction,maintenance,andoperationalapproaches.ThelifespanofLIPstendstobemuchlonger,sometimesaslongas20to30years.LIPsalsorequireconsiderablecommunityconsultation,extensivestakeholderengagement,andlargescalepolicymaking.Theyhaverepetitiveandrecurringlifecycles,drawpublicscrutiny,requireinnovativeprocurementprocesses,consistoftechnologicalcomplexity,andproducesocioeconomicimpacts(Greiman,2013,pp.12–24).INCOSE's(2012)GuidefortheApplicationofSystemsEngineeringinLargeInfrastructureProjectsprovidesadetailedoverviewoftheuniqueframeworkandprocessesinvolvedinthestructureandmanagementoftheselargescaleinfrastructureinitiatives.Forexample,sinceLIPsareapartofaninfrastructuresystem(e.g.,railsystems,electricitydistributionnetwork,andhighwaysystem)theinterrelationshipsbetweensystemsengineering,programmanagement,andassetmanagementarekeyfactorsforsuccessfulimplementation(p.37).WhensettingupaLIP,itisnecessarytomakesurethesethreefundamentaldisciplinesworktogethertoproducesuccessfuloutcomes.Therearevariousmodelsanddeliveryapproachesthatcanbeusedonlargescaleprogramstoimprovetherelationshipbetweentheprogramowners,sponsors,contractors,designers,regulators,andthelocalcommunitiesinwhichtheprogramsaredeveloped.Thesedeliverymodelsincludepublicprivatepartnerships,thedesignbuildmodeltodeliveracomponentprojectinwhichthedesignandconstructionservicesarecontractedbyasingleentity,andthe

272designbidbuildmodelusedtoseparatetheprocurementofthedesignersfromtheprocurementofthecontractors.11.5.1LargeScaleInfrastructureLifeCycleModelsAsdiscussedabove,programactivitiesarerepetitiveandrecurringthroughouttheprogram.Programsrequireregularadjustmentandrealignment,preventingasequentialorlinearprocess.AsdiscussedinChapter8,organizationsuseiterativeapproachestomanagetheoverarchingfactorsinlargeorganizationsthatimpactastepbystepprocess.Withtheincreaseinuncertainty,whichevolvesfrommanyfactorsincludingchangesinrequirements,technology,stakeholderexpectations,organizationaldesign,thelaworregulatoryenvironment,andorganizationalchangesinpolicyorphilosophy,thereisaneedtoreviewandadjustfrequently.Mostlargescaleprogramshaveanextensiveprocessofperformancereviewatseverallevelspriortotheacceptanceandpaymentofanycontractasoneiterativemechanism.Thisincludesoveralltechnicalcompliancewithscopeandschedulespecifications,startup,testing,andtestdataapprovalactivities.Failuretocomplycouldresultinwithholdingofpayments,denialofincentivepay,orterminationofthecontract(Greiman,2013,p.29).ThelifecycleofonelargescalepublicinfrastructureprogramisshowninFigure112andisverysimilartotheINCOSE(2015)genericlifecycleshowninFigure111.Theupfrontplanningphasecanoftentakedecades,asillustratedbymanylarge,civilengineeringprograms.Projectmanagementresearchasfarbackasthe1970sshowsthattheabilitytoinfluencetheoutcomeofaprojectisthegreatestandcostsareleastintheearliestphases(Paulson,1976).Otherresearchreflectsthesamedynamicforprogramsinthatthefrontendofprogramsareverylong—sevenyearsonaverage—andoftenveryexpensive,representingupto33%ofthetotalbudget(Miller&Hobbs,2006).

273Figure112:LifecycleoftheCentralArtery/TunnelprojectGreiman,2013,p.191.JointlycopyrightedbyJohnWiley&Sons,andProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ReproducedwiththepermissionofJohnWiley&Sons,andProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.Figure112highlightsthecyclicalnatureoftheBostonBigDigprogramlifecycle,butitdoesnotshowtheimpactofthefasttrackmethodologywhereconstructionwouldbeginonacomponentprojectbeforetheentireprogramdesignhadbeencompleted.Forexample,constructionmayhavestartedonthetunnelwallsbeforethefinaldesignoftheelectricalandventilationsystemswascompleted.Sometimes,thiscanresultindelaysandadditionalcostswheretheconstructionmethodsmustbechangedinordertoaccommodateanewdesign.Thiscanalsorequiresubstantialrework,thuseliminatinganybenefitsthefasttrackmethodologymayhaveintended.Thereareotherimportantdisruptionstotheprogramlifecyclediscussedinthecaseexamplesinthischapterandtheliterature,includingunexpectedevents,catastrophiclosses,changingstakeholderexpectations,discontinuitybetweenprogramphases,politicalrisk,andeconomiccollapses.

27411.6LifeCycleIntegrationIncomplexprograms,programmanagersandsystemsengineersneedtoworkcloselytogether,especiallyindefiningthesystemslifecycleandplanningkeydecisiongatestomeettheirspecificneeds.SystemsengineersmaybeguidedbytheSystemsEngineeringHandbookINCOSE(2015),whileprogrammanagersmaybeguidedbyTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013).Thoughprogrammanagementhasoverallaccountabilityforthedeliveryofbenefits,systemsengineeringhasaccountabilityforthetechnicalandsystemselementsoftheprogram(Langley,Robitaille,&Thomas,2011).Theexactroleoftheprogrammanagerandthesystemsengineermayvaryfromorganizationtoorganization.Moreover,sometimesthesystemsengineeralsoservesastheprogrammanagercreatingconflictsthatcannotalwaysbereconciled,andmayleadtoseriouscatastrophicloss(NASA,1986).Systemsengineeringtasksareusuallyconcentratedatthebeginningofthelifecycle,butbothcommercialandgovernmentorganizationsrecognizetheneedforsystemsengineeringthroughoutthesystemslifespan,oftentomodifyorchangeasystem,product,orserviceafteritentersproductionorisplacedinoperation.Subsequently,systemsengineeringisanimportantpartofalllifecyclestages(INCOSE,2015,p.25).Programmanagersandsystemsengineersarebothconcernedwithmanagementissuessuchasplanning,assessmentandcontrol,meetingrequirements,leading,andmanagingrisk.Inthecaseofprogrammanagers,theprogramattributestobemanagedincludeprogrambenefits,plans,milestones,finance,resources,infrastructure,andqualityassurance.Programmanagersworktoensurethattheoverallprogramstructureandprogrammanagementprocessesenabletheprogramanditscomponentteamstosuccessfullycompletetheirworkandtointegratethecomponents'deliverablesintotheprogram'sendproducts,infrastructure,results,andbenefits.Systemsengineeringattributesincluderesponsibilitiessuchasrequirementsallocationandflowdown,systemarchitecture,structureofandinteractionsamongtechnicalteams,specialtyengineering,integration,verification,andvalidation.Theexactallocationofthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementdutiesdependonmanyfactors,suchascustomerandstakeholderinteractions,organizationalstructureoftheparentorganization,andrelationshipswithaffiliatecontractorsandsubcontractors.Onlargescaleinfrastructureprograms,partnershipsbetweentheengineers,contractors,andownerareusedtoimprovescheduleadherence,quality,safety,andprogramperformance,aswellastoreducecosts,claims,disputes,andlitigation(Greiman,2010).11.6.1GenericModelforIntegrationoftheProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringLifeCycleWhiletherearemanyimportantdistinctionsthatmustbeconsideredtounderstandthesimilaritiesanddifferencesofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycles,gainingacompleteunderstandingofthesefactorsismorethancanbecoveredinthischapter,oreventhisbook.Nevertheless,Table113isusedtoshowareaswhereintegrationmaybepossibleand,moreimportantly,whereintegrationmaymakeacontributiontotheultimatesuccessoftheprogram.Table113illustratesagenericmodeloftheintegrationofthe

275programmanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycles.Theunshadedboxesrepresentthestagesintheprogrammanagementlifecycle,whiletheshadedboxesrepresentthestagesinthesystemsengineeringlifecycle.Column1ofthetableshowsthegenericlifecyclesforbothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Column2summarizesthegeneralpurposeandactivitiesforeachofthestages,andcolumn3showssomeoftheapplicableprocessesandproceduresnowusedinbothdisciplines.Thismodelisnottosuggestthatitistheidealapproachtointegration,butinsteadtocreateawarenessandencouragedeeperresearchintotheareasforintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementconcepts,standards,processes,andpracticesinprograms.Table113GenericprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycleintegrationProgramLifeCycleActivitiesPurpose/ActivitiesProcessesandProceduresConceptandSetupProgramsetup;benefitsandPMI(2013)1.1–businesscaseanalysis1.7,2.1–2.5,3.1–3.3,4.1–4.4.2,7.1PreliminaryconceptConceptINCOSE(2015)selection2.1–2.11,3.1–3.6,4.1–4.3DefinitionandPlanningIdentifyorganizationalstructuresPMI(2013)4.3,andactivitiestobeintegrated5.1–5.3,6.1–6.6,7.1.1,8.3.1–8.3.5Refinestakeholders'needs;DefineINCOSE(2015)requirementsforproduction,4.4–4.8,5.1–5.3training,andsupportRequirementsandSpecificationsIntegrationofcomponents(cost,PMI(2013)8.1–Developmentschedule,risk,safety,quality8.9assurance,testing,validation)SystemanalysisisperformedINCOSE(2015)Specify,analyze,anddesignsystem5.4–5.8,6.1–6.2,Planningandexecutionofactivities7.1–7.6Controls,Inspection,andControlrisk,safety,qualityPMI(2013)8.5,Verificationassurance,testing,andverification8.7,6.6.4Producesystems;InspectandverifyINCOSE(2015)4.9–4.12,8.1–8.6BenefitsDeliveryandTransitiontoMonitorperformanceofbenefitsPMI(2013)4.3,Operations;LeanSystems7.1.2,7.1.4Engineering;InteroperabilityOperatesystemtosatisfyusers'INCOSE(2015)Analysisneeds9.1–9.9,10.1–

27610.7Sustainability,Reliability,andEnsurecontinuedsustainabilityofPMI(2013)4.4–Resiliencebenefits4.5,8.3.6ProvidesustainedsystemcapabilityINCOSE(2015)10.8–10.14Closure,Archive,andBenefitsEnsurebenefitssustainmentandPMI(2013)7.1.3,Sustainmentdocumentlessonslearned8.3.6,8.3.7Store,archive,ordisposeoftheINCOSE(2015)system4.13–4.14Programsponsorsneedtounderstandtheevolutionarynatureofprogramsandrecognizethatmanylargescaleinfrastructureprograms,andtheplans,projects,andotherrelatedworktheyspawn,willoftenneedtoevolveinresponsetochangingcontextualinfluencesthatexertthemselvesovertheoftenlengthylifeofaprogram(OmegaCentre,2012).11.6.2OpportunitiesforIntegrationAcrosstheProgramLifeCycleEmergingresearchinsystemsengineeringisfocusedonthebroaderpracticeasanintegratedsystematthestrategicleveloftheorganization.Asdescribedinthischapter,programmanagementandsystemsengineeringbehaviorsoftenoperateinseparatesilosduetoseparatelifecycles,standards,missions,goals,influences,cultures,andperspectives.Thegoalofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationinthebroadercontextistounderstandthesystemasawholefromtheinitialconceptandsetupofaprogramtoprogramclosureandsystemsretirement.Recentliteratureinprogrammanagementfocusesontheneedforbenefitssustainmentmanagementwellbeyondprogramclosureandtransfertooperations.TheoptimalbehaviorsinTable114areidentifiedtoemphasizetheimportanceofintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementtoenhancethelikelihoodofoptimalbehaviorateverystageofanintegratedsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementlifecycle.Table114OptimizingthebenefitsofintegrationProgramProgramSystemsOptimalBehaviorsManagementManagementEngineeringandSystemsBehaviorsBehaviorsEngineeringIntegratedLifeCycleConceptandDefinesthepurposeIdentifiesSeesthewholesystem,Setupandgoalsofthestakeholders'understandstheprogramandsecuresneedsandinterrelationshipsofthesystemsauthorizationfromtheexploresideasandengineeringandprogramprogramsponsorstechnologiesmanagementcomponentsandpatternsofchange

277DefinitionandIdentifiesprogramRefinessystemProactivebehaviorinductionbyPlanningbenefits,processes,requirements,integrationofsustainabilityinandintegrativeidentifiesbusinessstrategicmanagementactionscrucialtoalternatives,andprogramcompletioncreatessolutiondescriptionRequirementsDevelopsIdentifiestheSeesthetechnicalrequirementsandspecificationstotechnicalandprogrammaticbenefitsasSpecificationtrack,review,andrequirementsandonesystemDevelopmentregulateprogresstorecognizesmeetperformanceuncertaintyobjectivesControls,VerifiesbenefitVerifiestechnicalAppliescomplexsystemsInspectionandsustainmentsustainmentandprinciplestoverifybenefitVerificationcustomersustainmentsatisfactionBenefitsCoordinatestransitionOperatessystemtoSeesbenefitsholisticallyandtheDeliveryandtooperationswithsatisfycustomerconnectionbetweendeliveryandTransitiontosponsoringneedsandoperationsOperationsorganizationandexpectationsstakeholdersSustainabilityProvidessustainedProvidessustainedIntegratessustainedbenefitsandSupportsystemsupportandsystemcapabilitysupportwithsystemcapabilityensuresbenefitssustainabilityClosure,ProgramprocurementFocusisontheIncorporatescontinuanceofArchive,andfinancialclosure,storage,archive,benefitssustainmentthroughoutRetirement,benefitstransition,orretirementoftheprogramlifecycleBenefitsandproductlifetimethesystemSustainmentsustainmentThoughthesystemsengineerswillbeimbeddedinthetechnicaldetailsofthecustomers'needswhiletheprogrammanagerwillbefocusedontheinterdependenciesamongtheprojectswithintheprogram,anintegratedapproachcreatesgreaterawarenessinthedevelopmentofoptimalbehaviors.11.6.3WholeSystemOptimization:TheMSTICaseOptimizingthewholesystemandnotsuboptimizingisaconceptpopularizedinrecentyearsbythelateW.E.Deming(1982).Theimportanceof“wholesystemoptimization”intheintegrationofthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementisbestillustratedbyNASA's

278MiniatureSeekerTechnologyIntegration(MSTI)program.MSTIwentintoorbitonNovember21,1992.Thespacecraftwasthefirstofitskind—arapiddevelopmentspacecraftdesignedandlaunchedinoneyear.PhillipsLaboratories,NASA'sJetPropulsionLaboratory(JPL),andSpectrumAstro,thepartnersintheendeavor,knewtheyhadmetthefaster,better,cheapercriteriatheyhadcommittedtoattheonsetoftheprogram(Grenville&Kleiner,2011,p.1).Fiveyearslater,theMSTIteamreflectedonthelonglastingeffectsandsomeofthechanges,bothsubtleandmonumental,thatcameaboutineachoftheirorganizationsasaresultofMSTI.TheMSTIexperiencechangedJPL'sculture,aswellasitsapproachtospacecraftdevelopmentandmissions'management.PriortotheMSTIexperience,JPLwasunfamiliarwithlifecyclebudgeting.WorkingcloselywiththeprogrammanagementteammembersenabledJPLtounderstandtheabilitytoevaluatecostovertheentirelifecycleratherthanjustataparticularstageoftheprogram.Thelevelofrolesharingalsowaspartoftheteam'ssuccess.Althougheachoftheparticipatingorganizationsfocusedontheirexpertiseoncetheyhaddeterminedtheirareasofresponsibility,theyeachhadasharedresponsibilityineveryfunction.Thefollowinglistsafewoftheobservableresults.FasterprocurementdevelopedintoanapproachJPLnowcalls“FastTrackProcurement.”HardwareacquisitionteamsareusedofteninJPLprograms.TheHardwareintheLooptestbedwastheprecursortoJPL'snewFlightSystemTestBedthatemploysmuchofthesamephilosophytosimulatetestintegrationusedonMSTI(Grenville&Kleiner,2011).TeammembersmovedupquicklyinJPLduetotheincreasedresponsibilityandauthoritytheyweregivenontheMSTIprogram.Afewexamplesoftheprocessesthatindicateanintegrationmindsetinclude:Theschedulewasmaintainedonlyatahighlevelintheprogrammanagementoffice,andthecostsweremanagedusingacostreportingtechniquefor“costtocompletion.”Ratherthanreportonpastspending,theResponsibleEngineeringAuthorities(REAs)wereexpectedtocontinuallyevaluatetheirabilitytocompletetheirtaskswithinprojectedcosts.FasterprocurementwasachievedusingtheHardwareAcquisitionTeam,whereatechnicalteammemberwasmatchedwithaprocurementrepresentativeforeachdesignfunction.Thispairwrotethespecificationstogetherandinitiatedthepurchaserequisitions.Fromtheorganizationalperspective,increasedresponsibilityandaccountabilityweregiventoeachteammember.Individualstookownershipoftheirworkandthedecisionprocesswasstreamlined.Theteammademore“good”decisions,ratherthanoptimaldecisions.Theteamwascolocated,anddailymeetingswereusedtoassigntasksandkeeptheteamfocusedonthelaunch.ThestandardProblemFailureReport(PFR)wasstreamlinedandelectronicreportsprovidedsnapshotsoftheresolvedandoutstandingPFRs.ThereporthelpedREAsstayon

279topofpotentialproblemareas.REAswereresponsibleforlookingforwardontheprogram'shorizonandnotifyingtheteamofanypotentialproblemareas.ThefirstsatelliteintheMSTIseries,MSTI1,waslaunchedonNovember21,1992.Thespacecraftweighed150kgandwasbuiltforUS$19millioninlessthan12months.Over200,000photographswerereturnedfromthespacecraft.Fromaprogrammanagementstandpoint,allmissionobjectivesweremet.KeytakeawaysfromtheMSTIcaseinclude:Optimizethewholesystemandnotjustpartsofthesystem.Colocateteamsandholddailymeetingstostayfocusedonthekeyissuesandholdteleconferenceswhencolocationisnotpossible.Increaseresponsibilitytoteammembers.Developreportingsystemsthatshowallfailuresandresolutions.Enhancecommunicationchannelsbothverticallyandhorizontallywithintheorganization.Engagestakeholdersateverystepoftheprocesstoensureexpectationsaremet.11.7LeadershipStylesfortheBigDig'sFiveStagesofProgramManagementBecauseleadershipstylescanevolvethroughouttheprogramdependingupontheprogram'sgoals,requirements,stakeholderexpectations,andchangesingovernance,itwasessentialtorecognizethedifferentstylesofleadershipnecessarytothevariousprogramphasesoftheBigDig.Table115illustratesthevariousapproachestoleadershipusedonBoston'sBigDigprogramthroughoutitslifecycleandhowknowledgewasgainedandsharedamongtheprogram'snumerousstakeholders.TheseleadershipstylesarenotuniquetotheBigDig,andcanbeappliedonanyprogramrequiringadaptationtothechangingneedsoftheprogramenvironmentaswellastheevolutionofthesponsoringorganization.

280Table115LeadershipfortheBigDig'sfivestagesofprogrammanagementGreiman,2013,p.399.JointlycopyrightedbyJohnWiley&Sons,andProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.Allrightsreserved.ReproducedwiththepermissionofJohnWiley&Sons,andProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.StageFocusStyleGainsKnowledgeByConceptualInnovativeideasVisionaryResearchRealisticoptionsInspirationalHistoricaldataStrategiesInclusiveExpertadviceLimitations/constraintsPublicparticipationRelationship/partnershipbuildingStartupProgramstructureStrategicStakeholderfeedbackGovernanceOrganizationalPublicinvolvementAlliancesEnablingBrainstormingGoalsNegotiatingConsensusbuildingPlanDemocraticContractsImplementationTeambuildingEmpoweringListeningManagingchangeFacilitatingQuestioningGettingresultsCoachingProblemsolvingEnergizingEngagingMediatingAchievingMonitoringandAssessingprogressDirectiveInvestigatingControlEnforcingcontractsBureaucraticRootcauseanalysisAuditingInterventionistLessonslearnedResolvingdisputesResolutionsClosingDeliverablesTransformativeTeamevaluationsOwner/sponsorProductverificationCriticalinputAssessmentofachievementsLessonslearnedanalysisBenefitanalysisAdministrativecloseout11.7.1InsightsonLeadershipCompetencyProgrammanagersshoulddevelopacompetencyframeworkattheinceptionoftheprogramtoidentifythevariousstagesandtheleadershipcompetenciesneededforeachstage.Chapter10focusedonleadershipcompetenciesandhowtodevelopthesecompetencies.Inaddition,therearemanyresourcesthatprovideguidanceondevelopingaleadershipcompetencyframeworkthroughouttheprogram(INCOSE,2015,pp.21–24;PMI,2007;PMI,2015).Thoughitmaybedifficulttofindasystemsengineerandprogrammanagerthatpossessallofthesecharacteristics,itisimportanttounderstandthevariousleadershipskillsthatwillbeneededthroughoutthelifeoftheprogramtoguide,inspire,andmotivateallstakeholderstomanage

281andovercomeissuestoachieveprogramobjectiveseffectively.11.8SummaryThelifecycleofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringsharecommoncharacteristicsandgoalsandprovideanopportunityforintegrationthatcouldprovidesignificantbenefitstoanorganizationintermsofimprovingquality,schedule,cost,andlongterminvestmentreturnsandstakeholderbenefit.Integrationoftheprogramandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesshouldbeconsideredatallstagesoftheprogram;but,mostimportantly,attheinceptionoftheprogramwhentheapproachtoprogrammanagementisbeingdeveloped,andalsoduringthetransitionfromtheprogramtooperations,whenintegrationwillhelptoensureasuccessfuldeliveryofbenefitsandlongtermsustainability.11.9DiscussionQuestions1.Howcanthestrategicplanningphaseofprogramsbeusedtointegratethedisciplinesofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement?2.Howareinvestmentappraisaltoolssuchascostbenefitanalysisusedtoshapeinvestmentdecisionoutcomesratherthanmerelyprovidingobjectivecriteriaforselectionbetweenalternatives?3.Whatistherelationshipbetweenintegrationandchangemanagement?Howcanintegrationbeusedtobringaboutchangethroughouttheprogramlifecycle?4.Howcanthebenefitsofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationbeoptimizedthroughouttheprogramlifecycle?5.Whataretheleadershipqualitiesneededtooverseetheintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementthroughoutthelifecycle?6.Whatismeantbydiscontinuityduringtheprogramlifecycleandhowcanitbeprevented?11.10ReferencesAmericanInstituteofArchitects(AIA).(2007).Integratedprojectdelivery:Aguide.Retrievedfromwww.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aiab083423.pdfBrady,T.,&Davies,A.(2010).Fromherotohubris:ReconsideringtheprojectmanagementofHeathrow'sTerminal5.InternationalJournalofProjectManagement,28(2),151–157.doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.11.011Conforto,E.,Rebentisch,E.,&Rossi,M.(2013,October27–29).Casestudyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.PresentedatPMIGlobalCongressNorthAmerica,NewOrleans,Louisiana.

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28512THEIMPACTOFEFFECTIVEINTEGRATIONONPROGRAMPERFORMANCE12.1IntroductionThemultipleresearchphasesdescribedinthisbook(Becerril,Rebentisch,Chucholowski,Conforto,&Lindemann,2016;Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013;Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014;Reiner,2015)foundconsistentevidenceofthepositiveimpactandcontributionofgreaterintegrationtoprogramperformance.Programperformanceisvitaltomostorganizationssinceitdirectlyimpactstheorganization'sabilitytogeneratebusinessvalue.Itspansmultipledimensionsandmetricsfromtechnicalperformancetoprogrambenefits.Theevidencesupportstheclaimthatorganizationsshouldembraceintegrationasacatalystforimprovingprogramperformance.Programperformanceisabroadconceptandthereisavastbodyofliteratureregardingthetypeanduseofmetricstomonitorandcontrolperformance.Organizationstypicallydeveloptheirownsetofmetricsaccordingtotheorganization'sspecificbusinesscharacteristics(e.g.,industrysector,typeofproduct,programenvironment).Organizationswouldalsobenefitfromdevelopingameanstotrackandimproveintegrationandtomeasurehowintegrationiscontributingtoimprovingtheoutcomesandresultsofagivenprogram.Inthischapterthemainfocusisonhoweffectiveintegration(anditsthreemainelements)impactsprogramperformance.Thefirststepistounderstandprogramperformanceitself.12.2ProgramPerformanceProgramsareamechanismforimplementingthecorestrategyofanorganizationtomaximizevalueandbenefitstothebusiness,clients,stakeholders,andsociety.Theyareexecutedthroughatemporaryorganizationwithintheenterpriseandconsistofmultiplerelatedprojectsorganizedandexecutedinsuchawayastomaximizeresourceutilizationandgains(Oehmen,Rebentisch,&Kinscher,2011,p.9).Assuch,trackingandvalidatingprogrambenefitsdeliverycanbeacomplicatedundertaking.Successfullycompletinganddeliveringresultsthroughprogramsdependsonacombinationoffactors.Adiversesetofperformancemetricsensuresthatmultipleaspectsofprogramperformancearebeingcoveredproperly(e.g.,technicalperformance,management,business).Asystematicviewofprogramperformanceismostlikelytoprovideamorecompletepictureoftherealprogressoftheprogramaswellastheoutcomesandexpectedbusinessresults.Inanygivenprogramtherearekeyelementsrelatedtogovernanceandperformancethatmustbewellunderstood,defined,andcontrolled.Forinstance,effectiveprogramgovernance

286includesthealignmentoftheprogramgoalswiththestrategicvisionandthedefinitionofhowprogramperformanceismonitoredandtheoutcomesachieved.AccordingtoTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013),programperformanceisdeliveredthroughfivekeyperformancedomains:programstrategyalignment,benefitsmanagement,stakeholderengagement,governance,andprogramlifecycle.Inprograms,“successismeasuredbythedegreetowhichtheprogramsatisfiestheneedsandbenefitsforwhichitwasundertaken”(p.8).Inotherwords,itshouldproperlymeetallexpectationsforthosedimensions.Measuringtheperformanceofaprogramwillrequireasystematicapproach,commitment,collaboration,andsharedresponsibilitiesbetweenprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers.Someprogrambenefitsare“tangible,”quantifiable,andeasytoidentify,suchasfinancialbenefitsorthereleaseofanewproduct.Othersareintangibleanddifficulttomeasureindetail,suchastheimpactofanewproductoncustomersatisfaction(PMI,2013).Ingeneral,successfulprogramsmeetseveralgoalsrelatedtobothtypesofbenefits,andsuccesscanbemeasuredbythedegreetowhichtheprogramsatisfiestheneedsandbenefitsforwhichitwasundertaken(p.7).Someprogrambenefitsaredefinedbytheorganizationexecutingtheprogram(e.g.,increasedmarketpresence,improvedfinancialperformance,reducedproductioncosts),andothersmaybedesignedbytheprogram'sclient(e.g.,newproductplatform,newrevenuestreams,increasedoperationcapability)(p.33).Acomprehensiveprogramperformancemanagementapproachwillincludekeymetricsfromboththemanagementandtechnicalperspective.Thesemetricsshouldbedesignedtoensureprogrambenefitsdelivery,asillustratedinFigure121.Programbenefitscanbedefinedasthefoundationalprogrammanagementperformancedomainthatdescribeshowtheprogram'splannedandintendedbenefitswillbeachieved(PMI,2013,p.149).Thisincludesalltechnicalandmanagementplans,processes,activities,andmetricsassociatedwithbenefitsachievement(p.149).

287Figure121:Integratedprogramperformance:CombinedmanagementandtechnicalmetricsProgramperformancemanagementincludestheexpectedresultstoberealizedbytheprogramandhowthebenefitswillbeachieved(PMI,2013).AtthebottomofFigure121areboththemanagementandtechnicalprogramperformancemetricsthatencompassthesetofmeasuresusedtomonitor,evaluate,andimprovetheefficiency,effectiveness,andresultsofaprogram(p.167).Thetechnicalmetricsillustratetheperformanceandbehaviorofthesystem(orproduct)duringitsdevelopment.However,itisimportanttomeasureandtracktechnicalperformancemetricsthatwillensuretheresultsandoutcomesofthesystemwhenitislaunched,andtheproperalignmentwiththesystem'srequirements.Thesystemsengineeringmeasurementprocesshelpsdefinethetypesofinformationneededtosupportprogrammanagementdecisionsandimplementsystemsengineeringleadingpracticestoimproveperformance(INCOSE,2015,p.130).Thereareanumberoftechnicalmeasurestoconsiderwhendesigningaperformancemeasurementsystemforprogramsthatinvolvecomplextechnicalproducts.BasedonworkdonebyRoedler,Rhodes,Schimmoller,andJones(2007)thesemeasuresmaybedescribedas:MeasuresofEffectiveness,whichaccountforthemeasuresusedtomonitortheachievementofthemissionoroperationalobjectivesofthesystem,orhowwellthesolutionachievesitsintendedpurposeMeasuresofPerformance,whichdescribephysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicsorattributesrelatedtothesystemoperationconsideringoperationalenvironmentconditionsTechnicalPerformanceMeasures,whichaccountforattributesorcharacteristicsofasystemelementaccordingtothedefinedrequirementsorgoalsThereareanumberofgenericframeworksfordevelopingtechnicalperformancemetricsandmeasurestoaddressavarietyofprogramsandindustryneeds.Figure122illustratessome

288examplesofmanagementandtechnicalmetricscommonlyusedinprograms.Italsohighlightssomeofthekeystepstodevelopasystematicprocesstoplanandmonitorprogrambenefitsdelivery(PMI,2013).Figure122:ExamplesofmanagementandtechnicalmetricsPMI,2013,&2013;Rhodes,Valerdi,&Roedler,2009;Roedleretal.,2007.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersworkinginamoreintegratedenvironmentshouldalsoconsiderotherfactorsthatmightinfluenceprogrambenefitsrealizationaswellasprogramperformance.TheIntegrationFrameworksuggeststhatgreaterintegrationperformancewillsignificantlycontributetoimprovedprogramperformanceand,therefore,thisdimensionshouldbeincludedinandalignedwithprogrammetricsandmeasurement.Thischapterfocusesontherelationshipbetweenintegrationandcommonprogramperformancemetrics.Programperformanceisimportantforboththeprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Therearegenerallyacceptedpracticesandtools;therefore,itisnotthecorefocusofthischaptertoexplainhowtodevelopaprogramperformance

289managementsystemorsetofmetrics.Nonetheless,itisimportantthattheorganizationdevelopacomprehensiveunderstandingofbothareas,includingpractices,tools,andtechniquestodefine,implement,andtrackperformancemeasures,leadingtobetterdecisionsandensuringprogramresultsandbenefitsrealization.12.3MeasuringIntegrationinPrograms12.3.1WhyMeasuringIntegrationMattersIncreasinglevelsofintegrationhelpsteamsdeliverbetterprogramresults.Integrationiscomposedofthreemainfactors:rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing.Organizationsshould,therefore,developprocessesanddedicateresourcestoidentify,develop,andmonitorthesefactorstoassesswhetherthesebehaviorsarepresentinprograms.Figure123illustratestherelationshipbetweeneffectiveintegrationandabroadoverviewofprogramperformance.Figure123:ThepositiveimpactofeffectiveintegrationonprogramperformanceDespiteitsimportance,measuringandmonitoringintegrationperformanceisnotacommonpractice.NoneoftheprofessionalsinterviewedduringthePhaseII&IIIintegrationresearch(Conforto,Rebentisch,&Rossi,2013;Rebentisch&Conforto,2014)indicatedtheyhadwelldefinedandsystematicprocessestomeasuretheeffectivenessoftheintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.12.3.2TheKeyElementstoMeasureIntegrationHowshouldintegrationbemeasured?Thefirststepistodevelopaclearunderstandingofwhatconstitutesintegration(seeChapters5and6),acompositelistoftheintegrationelements,

290andsomeperformanceindicatorsfortheseelements.TheindicatorsdescribedinthissectionaresummarizedinFigure124,andwillbeexplainedinmoredetailinthefollowingsections.Theyareintroducedheretoprovideanoverviewanddevelopanawarenessofwaystoassesswhethertheseelementsofintegrationarepresentintheprogram.Thisthensetsthestageforimprovementeffortstoincreasethedegreeofintegrationintheorganization,whichiscoveredingreaterdepthinPartIII.Figure124:SynthesisofthekeyindicatorsofeffectiveintegrationPMProgramManagerCSEChiefSystemsEngineer12.3.2.1RapidandEffectiveDecisionMakingDecisionmakingisamultistageandcomplexprocess.Ingeneral,adecisionprocessinvolveschoicesfromasetofalternativesandconstraints,producingresultsthatareassociatedwiththosechoices,whichcouldeithermeanagainoraloss,orapositiveoranegativeoutcome(Bellman&Zadeh,1970,p.147).Betterprogramdecisionsaremadewhenthereare

291empoweredprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerswhoshareacommonvisionoftheprogramgoalsandexpectations.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersmustdevelopaclearandshareddecisionmakingapproachtodealwithchanges,problems,risks,andopportunitiesduringthecourseofaprogram.Decisionsmustbemadeintherighttimeframeandleadtotheexpectedoutcomes.Thisisthecaseforalltypesofprograms,regardlessoftheindustrysectororbusinessenvironment.Forexample,thedecisiontoselectasuppliertodevelopacriticalpartoftheproductmustbecompletedinatimeframethatallowsfortheinvolvementofthesupplierintheinitialdesignprocessinordertoavoidrework,additionalcosts,andscheduledelays.Foreveryprogram,thereareindicatorsofhowdecisionsaremadethatcanbeperiodicallyassessedtoevaluatehowthedecisionmakingprocessoverallalignswithprinciplesofintegration.ThefollowingindicatorsofanintegrateddecisionmakingprocessareadaptedfromindicatorsusedinthePhaseIVresearch(Reiner,2015):Allcoreprogramteammembersactivelyparticipateinprogramdecisionprocesses.Programmanagerstakeintoaccounttechnicalgoals(e.g.,requirements,specifications)whenprioritizingtasksormakingdecisions.Chiefsystemsengineerstakeintoaccountmanagementgoals(e.g.,time,cost,businessvalue)whenprioritizingormakingdecisions.12.3.2.2EffectiveCollaborativeWorkTheorganization'sleadership,alongwiththeprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers,shouldstrivetocreateacollaborative,trustfulworkenvironmentthatisfocusedonworkingtogethertoachieveclearlydefinedgoals.Teammembersshouldworkcollaborativelyandproactivelytosolveproblemsasquicklyaspossible.Theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineershouldnurtureanddevelopamutualunderstandingofbothtechnicalandmanagementissues.Thisisafundamentalelementoftheirprogramleadership,andaddressingthismayrequireconsiderableattentionfromthemasitrunscountertotheprevailingcultureofspecializationandcompetitioninmanyorganizations.ThePhaseIVresearchidentifiedanumberofattributesofcollaborativeworkfromabroadrangeofsources.Thesewereusedtocollectdataandassesstheimpactofcollaborationonintegrationaswellasprogramperformance.ThefollowingindicatorsofcollaborativeworkintheprogramareadaptedfromindicatorsusedinthePhaseIVresearch(Reiner,2015):Theprogrammanagerispositivelyengagedandcommittedtoresolvingtechnicalissues.Thechiefsystemsengineerispositivelyengagedandcommittedtoresolvingprogrammanagementissues.Teammemberscollaborativelytackleproblemsandchallengeswithenthusiasmandcommitment.Teammembersshareacommonvision(setofpriorities,benefits,andresultsofthe

292program)ofwhatwillbecreatedbytheprogram.Theteammembersshowcommitmentinexecutingandachievingoverallhighprogramperformanceinsteadofjustfocusingontheirownindividualperformanceandresults.12.3.2.3EffectiveInformationSharingHavinganeffectiveinformationsharingprocessisthethirdelementofintegrationinprograms.Collecting,analyzing,andcommunicatingrelevantinformationisachallengeinmanyorganizations.Tremendousamountsofdata,knowledge,andexperiencearegenerated,andperhapsnotproperlydocumentedinawaythatbenefitsotherteammembers.Inaddition,poorcommunicationmayhinderthedevelopmentofeffectiveinformationsharing.Effectiveinformationsharingbeginswithprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers,butultimatelymustenableallteammemberstohaveaccesstoinformationtheyneedtoperformtheirtasks.Thesebehaviorsshouldbeassessedandjointlymanagedbytheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer.ThePhaseIVresearchfocusedonactivitiesthatsignificantlycontributedtoimprovinginformationsharingcapabilitiesinprograms.ThefollowingindicatorsofeffectiveinformationsharingintheprogramareadaptedfromindicatorsusedinthePhaseIVresearch(Reiner,2015):TheamountoftimerequiredoftheprogrammanagertorequestandreceivenecessaryinformationfromteammembersortheorganizationTheamountoftimerequiredofthechiefsystemsengineertorequestandreceivenecessaryinformationfromteammembersortheorganizationTheeffectivenessofcommunicationsbetweenprogrammanagerandthechiefsystemsengineerTheeffectivenessofcommunicationsbetweentheprogrammanagerandteammembersTheeffectivenessofcommunicationsbetweenthechiefsystemsengineerandteammembersTheeffectivenessofcommunicationsamongprogramteammembersTheprogrammanagerhasfullandeasyaccesstoallprogramrelatedinformationneededtoperformthejobsuccessfully.Thechiefsystemsengineerhasfullandeasyaccesstoallprogramrelatedinformationneededtoperformthejobsuccessfully.Allteammembershavefullandeasyaccesstoallprogramrelatedinformationneededtoperformtheirtaskssuccessfully.The17indicatorsdescribedintheprecedingsectionswereusedtodevelopan“integrationindex”thatservedasasingleindicatoroftheoveralldegreeofintegrationforaprogram(Reiner,2015).Thisindexwasusedintheanalysistoidentifyandcompareprogramswith

293greaterandlesserdegreesofintegration,respectively.Itprovedtobeareliablemeasureofintegrationandwasemployedacrossalltheanalyses(p.63).Thefollowingsectiondiscussestheresultsoftheanalysis,indicatingthatgreaterintegrationdoesindeedcoincidewithsuperiorprogramperformance.Section12.5presentsacasestudythathighlightspracticalexamplesofhowintegrationanditskeyelementscontributedtoimprovedprogramperformance.12.4IntegrationasaCatalystforProgramPerformance12.4.1GreaterIntegrationLeadstoImprovedProgramPerformanceTounderstandhowincreasedintegrationimpactsprogramperformance,asurveywasconductedwith157professionals(programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineers)fromadiversesetofcompaniesaroundtheglobeoperatinginsome18differentindustrysectors(Reiner,2015).Eachparticipantcompletedaquestionnairecoveringtheconceptofintegrationanditskeyelementsandindicators,alongwithotheraspectsoftheprogramsuchascontextualandorganizationalcharacteristicsandperformance.Theintegrationindexwasusedtoidentifytwomaingroups:programswithgreaterintegration(n=90)andprogramswithlesserintegration(n=67).Thesetwogroupswereusedintheanalysistounderstandhowintegrationrelatedtoprogramperformance.Theperformanceoutcomesusedincluded:Programschedule:Theoverallprogramresultswereobtainedwithintheexpectedtimeline.Programbudget:Theoverallprogramresultswereobtainedwithintheexpectedbudget.Clientrequirements:Thefinalproductoftheprogrammettheclient'soverallrequirements.Clientsatisfaction:Theoverallclientsatisfactionwiththeprogramresultsmetorexceededexpectations.Theresultsofthisanalysis,presentedinFigure125,showsthecomparisonbetweenthegroupswithgreaterandlesserdegreesofintegrationinprogramsalongwiththeirassociatedprogramperformanceoutcomes.

294Figure125:Thedifferentiationofgreaterandlesserintegrationonprogramperformance;greaterintegration(n=90),lesserintegration(n=67)Reiner,2015.CourtesyofThomasReiner,RWTHAachenUniversity.Thegroupofprogramswithgreaterintegrationissignificantlymorelikelythanprogramswithlesserintegrationtohavebetterperformanceinscheduleandbudgetperformance,aswellasclientrequirementsandsatisfaction.Amoreindepthinvestigationwasperformedatthelevelofindividualindicatorstoidentifypotentialrelationshipsbetweenintegrationpracticesandprogramperformancemetrics(programschedule,programbudget,clientrequirements,andclientsatisfaction).Thiswasdonebyexploringcorrelationsbetweenthe17integrationvariablesandthefourprogramperformancevariables.Thefindingsindicatingstrongandsignificantcorrelationsarepresentedin(Table121).

295Table121IntegrationelementswiththehighestcorrelationcoefficientswithprogramperformancemetricsIntegrationIntegrationVariablesProgramProgramClientClientFactorsScheduleBudgetRequirementsSatisfactionRapidandInvolvementofallmembersEffectiveofthecoreprogramteaminDecisionthedecisionmakingMakingprocessEffectiveTeammembersCollaborativecollaborativelytackleWorkproblemsandchallengeswithenthusiasmandcommitmentTeammembershaveasharedandcommonvision(setofpriorities,benefits,andresultsoftheprogram)ofwhatshallbecreatedintheprogramTheteammembersshowcommitmentinexecutingandachievingoverallhighprogramperformance,insteadofjustbeingfocusedontheirownindividualperformanceandresultsEffectiveTheefficiencyofInformationcommunicationsbetweentheSharingchiefsystemsengineerandtheteammembersTheefficiencyofcommunicationsbetweentheprogrammanagerandteammembersAllteammembershaveaccesstoallprogramrelatedinformationthattheyneedtoperformtheirtaskssuccessfully

29612.4.2TheImpactofIntegrationBehavioronProgramPerformanceAlthoughtheseresultsareconsistentandalignedwiththeideathattherearepositiveresultsfromgreaterintegrationinprograms,itdoesnotprovidemuchintuitionforthesensitivityofprogramperformancetointegration,noraclearpictureofhowintegrationworksduringprogramexecution.Tofurtherdevelopinsightabouthowintegrationimpactsprogramperformance,SystemDynamicsModelingtechniqueswereusedtocreateasimulationmodelofagenericprogramtoinvestigatehowthedifferentelementsofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinfluencesprogramexecution(Becerriletal.,2016).SystemDynamicsModelingisasimulationtechniqueusedtoanalyzecomplexanddynamicsystemsthathavemultiplerelationshipsbetweenthesystemelements(endogenousandexogenous)andthatdisplayfeedbackbetweenthedifferentelementsinthesystem.Itisafairlywellestablishedtechniqueandisbasedoninformationfeedbacksystemsanddecisionmakingprocesses(Browning,Fricke,&Negele,2006;Forrester,1961;Sage&Rouse,2009).Thesemodelsareusefultoexploreandunderstandcorrelationsandpotentialcausalrelationshipsincomponentpartsofprogramsandprojects(e.g.,betweenphases,scheduleandbudget,workflow,andrework)(Ford,2009).SystemDynamicsModelinghasbeenappliedinlargeprogramstoassessdecisionsandevaluatetheirimpactonoutcomes(Becerril,etal.,2016;Sterman,1992,2000).Becerriletal.(2016)focusedontwomainareas:(a)howintegrationregulatestheexchangeofinformationamongprojectsinagivenprogrambyaffectingthecommunicationandcollaborationcapabilitiesoftheorganization;and(b)howintegrationinfluencestheresourceallocationprocessbyregulatinghowtheprogrammanagerandthechiefsystemsengineermakedecisionstogether.Themodeldevelopedwasbasedonawelldocumentedmodelofaproject(amodelofaprogramwouldaddunnecessarycomplexitytothisanalysis)withtaskstocomplete,handoffsbetweenphases,delaysintaskcompletion,imperfectqualityandreworkandthelike,andaddedelementsfromtheIntegrationFrameworkandresearch.ThedataidentifyingrelationshipsbetweenelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkandperformanceinprogramscollectedbyReiner(2015)wereusedtoconstructthemodelandcalibrateit.Thoughthissimulationanalysisisbasedonaprojectmodel,itisseenasareasonableabstractionofaprogramorganization.Tobeconsistentwiththeconventionsusedinthisbook,theterm“program”willbeusedwhendescribingthemodelanditsoutcomes.Oneaspectofprogramperformanceexploredbythesimulationwasscheduledeviationrelativetotheinitiallyplannedcompletiondeadlinefortheprogram.Figure126showsthescheduledeviation(inpercent)relativetothedegreeofintegration,whichinthissimulationcanvarybetween0and3,with3indicatingthehighestlevelofintegration.

297Figure126:IntegrationindexversusscheduledeviationBecerriletal.,2016.©LuciaBecerril.Usedbypermission.Theresultsclearlyindicatethatundertheparametersconsideredinthissimulation,thescheduledeviationtendstobelowwhentheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerfunctionsaremorehighlyintegrated.Thestandarddeviationorvariationintheaveragescheduleperformancealsodeclineswithgreaterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering(Becerriletal.,2016).Theinitial,verylowstandarddeviationreflectsthesimulatedprogramreworkingeverytaskuntilitiscompleted—everytaskconsumesasmanyresourcesasrequiredtocompletewhenthereislowintegration,butthepricetotheprogramishighintermsofscheduledelay.Inreality,mostoftheprogramsthathavethoseveryhighscheduledeviationswouldprobablybecanceledorsignificantlyrestructured.Inbroadterms,themodelindicatesthatastheprimaryelementsofintegration—rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing—increase,theamountoftimeneededtocompletetheprogramisreducedsubstantially,andprogramexecutionbecomesmorepredictable.Additionalsimulationswerecarriedoutusingdifferentparameters,withresultsconsistentwiththeevidencethatprogramswithgreaterintegrationwillhavehigherperformance.Inoneanalysis,highexternalschedulepressuretocompletetheprogramontimewasappliedtothesimulatedprogramtounderstandwhetherhigherlevelsofintegrationofferedanybenefittoprogramperformance.TheresultoftheanalysisisshowninFigure127.Thispressuremightbeinterpretedasconstraintsleviedduringtheprogramdefinitionphasebystakeholderstocompletetheprogramaheadofschedule(Becerriletal.,2016).Inthistest,thebasecasehadaninitialspecifieddurationof32weeks,comparedwith25.6and19.2weeksrequiredofthehighpressureandveryhighpressureschedulecases,respectively.Theresultsare

298consistentwiththoseoftheoverallsimulationpresentedinFigure126.Evenasschedulepressuretocompletetheprogramincreasesbeyondthebaseline,morehighlyintegratedprogramstendtohavelowerscheduledeviationandapproachtheefficiencyofthebaselinecase.Figure127:IntegrationindexversusschedulepressureandscheduledeviationBecerriletal.,2016.©LuciaBecerril.Usedbypermission.Thisanalysisalsohighlightsthatevensomedegreeofintegrationcanbringasubstantialimprovementtooutcomes.AsshowninFigure127,thecurvedisplayingtherelationshipbetweenintegrationandscheduledeviationinitiallydeclinesfairlyrapidly.Thatimpliesthatprogramswithevenamoderatedegreeofintegrationmayachievesignificantbenefitsfromintegrationcomparedwithprogramshavinglesserlevelsofintegration(Becerriletal.,2016).TheanalysisofthePhaseIVsurveydatashowedthatvariablesrelatedtocommunicationefficiencyandthequalityofinformationexchangeshowedpositivecorrelationswithbetterprogramperformance.Thissuggeststhataminimumlevelofqualityofinformationsharingisnecessarytomaintaintheinformationflowatalevelthatpositivelyimpactsprogramoutcomes.Thatisoneaspectofthereinforcingloopthatcharacterizeshowerrorswithintheinformationresultinerrorsintheworkbeingdone,whichinturnleadstoadditionalerrors,ultimatelyresultinginpoorprogramperformance(Becerriletal.,2016).Insummary,theresearchevidence,analysis,andconclusionshaveshownthatincreasinglevelsofintegrationcanhaveasignificantbeneficialimpactonprogramperformance.Theprimarybehaviorsinaprogrambywhichthisisaccomplishedarerapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing.

29912.5CaseStudy:ElectronicSupportUpgradefortheRoyalAustralianNavy'sAnzacClassFrigateHowdotheseperformanceimprovementsfromintegrationplayoutinaprogram?Thefollowingcasestudy1examinesarecentprogram,highlightingsomeofthekeyelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkandtheoverallcontributionofgreaterintegrationtoprogramperformanceandbenefitsdelivered.ItconsiderstheinterconnectedresultsofaprojectthatwasundertakenaspartofamajorprogramwithintheAustralianDepartmentofDefense.Theterm“project”wasadoptedindescribingthisefforttobeconsistentwiththeterminologyusedbytheAustralianDepartmentofDefence.12.5.1IntroductiontotheCaseStudyTheScheduleComplianceRiskAssessmentMethodology(SCRAM)wasdevelopedbytheAustralianDepartmentofDefence'sCapabilityAcquisitionandSustainmentGroup(CASG),whichisresponsibleforpurchasingandmaintainingmilitaryequipmentandsuppliesfordefense.SCRAMentailsaminimallydisruptive,independentreviewofcomplexprojectsandprogramsexperiencingscheduleslippageinordertoidentifyrootcauses,recommendremedialactions,andforecastfuturemilestonedates.SCRAMteamsintegratesystemsengineeringandprojectandprogrammanagementexpertise.Thereviewsidentifyrisksandissuesregardlessoftheirsource(i.e.,customer,contractor,orelsewhere)andproviderapidturnaroundinnomorethantwoweeksfromstarttopresentationoftheresults.Todate,morethan30differentCASGprojectswithinAustralia,theUnitedStates,andtheUnitedKingdomhaveundergoneSCRAMreviewswithseveralbeingreviewedmultipletimesattheirownrequest.Applicationdomainsincludeaerospace,maritime,communications,aircrewtraining,satellitegroundstations,andcommandandcontrol.Afterreviewinganumberofprojects,theopportunityarosetostudyaprojectthatwasanoutstandingsuccess,deliveringaheadofschedule,withincost,andwithminimaldefectsfoundinitsfirstofclasstesting.Ratherthanlookforrisksandissues,thisSCRAMreviewfocusedonidentifyingthecontributorstoachievingexceptionaloutcomes.Whatemergedwasaprojectthatclearlydemonstratedeffectiveintegrationbetweenprojectmanagementandsystemsengineering.Fromthebeginningoftheproject,thefoundationwassetforeffectiveandongoingcollaboration,continualinformationsharing,andempoweredrapiddecisionmakingcombinedwithanunwaveringfocusondeliveringaneffectivecapabilitytothecustomer,inthiscasetheRoyalAustralianNavy.Thiscasestudychronicleseventsastheyunfoldedandthensummarizesthethreekeymeasuresofeffectiveintegrationastheyweremanifestonthisproject.12.5.2ProjectBackgroundThepurposeoftheproject,referredtowithinCASGasSEA1448Phase4A,wastoprovidetheAnzacclassfrigateswithanimprovedtacticalElectronicSupport(ES)capabilitybyreplacingtheexistingESsystem.ThisisoneoftheRoyalAustralianNavy'shighestpriority

300projectsandhasoperatedunderadirectivefromtheChiefofNavytofieldthecapabilityasrapidlyaspossible.TheAnzacclassisaNavyfrigatefirstcommissionedin1996(Figure128).Atotalof10shipswerebuiltinAustralia,eightfortheAustralianNavyandtwoforNewZealand.Theyarewellsuitedtosecurity,patrol,andmilitaryoperationsinlittoral(coastal)areas.Since2002,theyhavecompletedmultipledeploymentsintheMiddleEast.Figure128:HMASWarramunga:ThefirstAnzacshiptoreceivethefullESsystemupgradeSource:ImagecourtesyoftheAustralianDepartmentofDefence.Usedwithpermission.ESsystemsgatherinformationthroughpassiveanalysisofelectromagneticradiationsinordertodetectanddistinguishbetweenfriendlyandadversaryemissions,andprovidewarningifanattackappearsimminent.Incombinationwithradarsystems,EScanidentifythesourceofelectromagneticradiationsandassistindeterminingtheirdirection,distance,andtrajectory.ESisonecomponentofalargerdomainreferredtoasElectronicWarfare(EW),thescopeofwhichisbeyondthiscasestudy.MaritimeEWisatechnicallycomplexarea.Agreatdealofelectromagnetic“noise”mustbesortedthroughtoidentifyfriendlyandadversaryelectronicemissions.ASystemsProgramOffice(SPO)wassetupwithintheCASGtomanageallacquisitionandsustainmentofmaritimeelectronicwarfareprojectsacrossallclassesofshipsintheRoyalAustralianNavy.ThisfunctionformerlyresidedwithintheindividualSPOsresponsibleforaspecificclassofship(e.g.,submarine,destroyer,frigate).InformingtheMaritimeElectronicWarfareSystemsProgramOffice(MEWSPO),therewasanacknowledgmentofthetechnicalcomplexityinherentinthisareaandtheneedforaspecializedfocusintheacquisitionandsupportofmaritimeEWsystems.Asnotedabove,thepurposeoftheSEA1448Phase4AprojectwastoupgradetheElectronic

301Support(ES)capabilityontheAnzacclassships.TosaveoncostsintheuseandsustainmentoftheAnzacESsystem,thedecisionwasmadetoacquireacommonESsystemonselectedshipclassesacrosstheNavy.Thisapproachwasintendedtosavecostsintrainingusersandinsystemsustainmentintermsofproductmaintenanceandsupport.TheteamofcontractorsselectedtoprovidethecommonESsystemconsistedofthefollowing:ExelisintheUnitedStates,nowpartofHarrisCorporation,servedastheEShardwareprimecontractorandprovidedawidebandreceiverandantennas.AustraliancompanyJenkinsEngineeringDefenceSystems,orJEDS,providedalowbandradiofrequencyreceiverandsystemassemblyinAustraliapriortoinstallationontheships.AustraliancompanyUltraElectronicsprovidedanarrowbandRFreceiver.UnitedStatescompanySouthwestResearchInstitute,orSwRI,providedantennasandtheantennamast.TherearethreeadditionalcontractorswhoseactivityorsystemswererequiredtointegratewiththeESsystem,namely:BAESystemsAustraliaorBAESA,responsibleforinstallingtheESsystemontheAnzacshipsAustraliancompanyCEATechnologies,theAnzacclassphasedarrayradarOriginalEquipmentManufacturerSaabAustralia,responsiblefortheCombatManagementSystemThesesevencompanieshadtoworktogethertoproduceaseamless,fullyintegratedsuiteofsystems.TheMEWSPOSEA1448Phase4AprojectofficemanagedtheoverallsystemsintegrationandworkedcloselywiththeAnzacSystemProgramOffice,whichwasresponsibleforschedulingandcoordinatingshipmaintenanceandupgrades.12.5.3SettingtheStageforEffectiveProgramManagementandSystemsEngineeringIntegration:PrecontractRiskReductionWorkshopsAtthetimethiseffortbeganinearly2011,theExelisteamofcontractorshadbeenselectedtoprovidethecommonESsystemsolution.TherewasatwoyearriskreductionperiodbetweenthisselectionandgovernmentapprovalforfundingacquisitionoftheESsystemfortheAnzacclassofships.TheAnzacESprojectwasfortunatetohavehighlyexperiencedpeopleinkeymanagementroles.Theprojectdirector,DanKeleher,hadanextensivebackgroundinmanagingmaritimeprojectsandisaprofessionalengineer.GaryCrawford,theengineeringmanagerfortheproject,wasanexperiencedmaritimeelectronicwarfaresystemsengineerandformerRoyalAustralianNavyofficerandEWoperator.Crawford,therefore,combinedtechnicalexpertisewithoperationalexperience,givinghimanindepthunderstandingofissues,risks,and

302tradeoffsthatareimportanttotheoperationalperformanceofESsystems.Inmid2011,theprojectreceivedearlyfundingtoundertakefacetofaceriskreductionworkshopsovera12monthperiodpriortotheawardofthefullcontract.Theseworkshopsbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromalltheinvolvedcontractororganizationstoidentifythetechnicalriskstotheprojectandtodevelopstrategiestoaddressthoserisks,workingtogetherasoneteam.Inadditiontothecontractorsdirectlyinvolvedinimplementingthesolution(Exelis,JEDS,UltraElectronicsandSwRI),KeleherfundedSaabandCEAtoparticipateintheseworkshopssincetheirsystemshadtointegrateseamlesslywiththeESsystem.BAESAustraliawasincludedaswell.Theseworkshopshadtheaddedbenefitofmaintainingthecontinuityoftheexpertiseneededfortheprojectacrossboththepreandpostcontractawardperiods.Inearly2013,theprojectreceivedfullfundingtoacquireandinstallESsystemsontotheeightAnzacshipsandinanonshorelaboratoryfacilitycontainingthefullsuiteofhardwareandsoftwareforoperatortrainingandsystemstroubleshootingwithouthavingtotakeuptimeonanactualship.Asnotedearlier,theESupgradefortheAnzacshipsisaffordedahighprioritybytheChiefofNavy.InKeleher'swords,“Allalongwekeptfocusingonhowwecouldgetthecapabilityonboardmorequicklywithoutsacrificingqualityorsafety.”Theentireteam,governmentandcontractors,steppeduptothechallenge.JEDS,forexample,doubleditsproductioncapacitybysettingupasecondproductionfacility.Oneconstraintinimplementingmajorupgradestoshipsisthattheupgradesarelimitedtoawindowoftimewheneachshipistakenoutofthewater.Duringtheseperiods,anumberofparallelactivitiesoccur,includingsimultaneoussystemupgradesaswellasrepairsandmaintenancetotheship'shullandsystems.Accessholesarecreatedintheship'shulltoallowequipmentandmaterialstobebroughtonboard;inaddition,spacesbehindbulkheads,underdecksanddeckheads(ceilings)areremovedtoprovideaccesstoelectrical,water,andothersystems.Astheprojectteamlookedforwaystoacceleratethework,astrategywasadoptedtopreinstallsystemcomponentsintotheAnzacshipsbeforetheESsystemwasfullydevelopedanddelivered.Thisconsiderationincludedthecabling,themast,foundationsforequipmentracks,andanewmultifunctionconsole.Thisapproachsavedhavingtoreopenships'spacesatalatertimeandwasmadepossiblebytheriskreductionandearlysystemsdesignactivitiesundertakenearlier.Parameterssuchasthenumberandlengthofcableswereknown.Theinitialinstallationisreferredtoas“fittedforbutnotwith”theESsystem.Bytakingadvantageoftheperiodthattheshipswereinrefit,theremainingsystemcomponentscouldbeinstalledwhentheybecameavailablewithoutrequiringtheshipstobetakenoutofoperation.Asthe“fittedforbutnotwith”activityproceeded,itbecameclearthatthecompletionofmaintenanceandotherworkbeingperformedontheshipsoutsideoftheESupgradeprojectwasfallingbehindschedule.TheshipthatwasplannedforinstallationofthefirstcompleteESsystem(i.e.,firstofclass)wasalmostsixmonthsbehinditsdeliveryschedule.Inordertofieldthecapabilityasquicklyaspossible,theprojectswitchedtheinstallationofthefirstsystemtoanothershipthatwouldbereturningtothewatersooner.Theprojecthadthisflexibility

303becauseofthe“fitforbutnotwith”strategythathadbeenimplementedonotherships.InMarch2015,thefirstESsystemfortheAnzacshipscompleteditsintegrationandfactoryacceptancetestatExelisintheUnitedStatesandwastransportedtoAustralia.ItsinstallationontheAnzacclassshipHMASWarramungawascompletedaheadofscheduleinthethirdquarterof2015.Perhapsevenmoreimpressive,minimaldefectswerefoundduringtheinitialoperationofthatsystemduringtheship'sseatrials.Theoutcomefocusedattitudeoftheprojectiswellsummarizedinthewordsofoneoftheteammembersinterviewed:WeknewthattheChiefofNavywantedthiscapabilityasquicklyaspossible.Whenweranintoproblems,suchasthefirstshipslippingschedule,wedidn'tsay“tough,it'snotourfault.Wecan'tinstallthesystem.”Rather,weasked“whatcanwedoinstead?”Andwedidit.ThefollowingsectionsdiscusshowtheESprojectdemonstratedthethreekeymeasuresofeffectiveintegration.12.5.4PromotingCollaborativeWorkTheriskreductionworkshopssetthegroundworkearlyonintheprojectformutualrespectanddirectcommunicationsbetweenthegovernmentandcontractorsandamongthevariouscontractors.Inthewordsofoneofthecontractorsinterviewed:Onthisproject,wewereempoweredtotalktoeachotherdirectlywithnocommunicationbottlenecks.Alltheplayersparticipatedintheworkshops.Weweredrawingboxesonawhiteboardandtalkingabouthowtointegratethemwithoutgettingtoomuchintotheweeds.Thesoftwareguyswouldgettogethertodiscusssoftwareinterfaceissues.Dansatbackandletithappenbecausehecouldseeitwasahealthything.We'dallgetbacktogetherattheendofthedayandkeptanongoingrisklog.Thetwogovernmentprogramofficesinvolved,MEWSPOandtheAnzacSPO,workedconstructivelyandcollaborativelywitheachother,facilitatedbyaProjectImplementationPlanthatclearlydefinedtherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachoftheSPOs.12.5.5EffectiveInformationSharingInformationsharingamongcontractorswasessentialinordertofieldacapabilityrequiringseamlessintegrationbetweenthephasedarrayradar,theESsystem,andtheCombatManagementSystem.Amajorpurposeoftheearlyriskreductionworkshopswastogatherallcontractorstogetherfacetofacetoshareinformationaboutsysteminterfacesandtoaddressjointlyissuesandrisks.Throughouttheproject,directcommunicationsamongallparticipantswasencouraged.Inadditiontotheworkshopsanddirectcommunications,informationwassharedviacomputersimulationsofeachoftheinterfacingsystemsprovidedbythesystemdevelopers.Oneoftheenduringlessonsfromsystemsandsoftwareengineeringisthevalueoffindingproblemsearly.

304Thesecomputersimulationsallowedanyinterfacingcomponentorsystemtobetestedagainstthesimulatedinterfacesearlyinitsdevelopment.Thisprocessresultedinarelativelysmoothintegrationandtestoftheactualsystemsandallowedthe“fittedforbutnotwith”strategycitedearliertobeadopted.12.5.6RapidandEffectiveDecisionMakingRapidandeffectivedecisionmakingwasdemonstratedbytheprojectteam'sabilitytoadapttochangingcircumstances,allwhilemaintainingalaserlikefocusondeliveringthecapabilityasearlyaspossible.Thechangeinshipsoundslikeasimplematter;however,atthetimethatdecisionwasmadebytheprojectteam,therewasafairamountofactivitygearedtowardtheoriginalshipthatwastobefirstinclassaswellasassociatedcontractualoverhead(includingpaymentmilestones).Theteamsteppeduptothechallengeofachangeinshipsanddeliveredthesystemseveralmonthsaheadofschedule.12.5.7Outcome:DeliveryofCapabilitytotheNavyaheadofSchedule,withinBudget,andwithMinimalDefectsinSeaTrialsItisimportanttomentionthatamajorcontributortothepositiveoutcomeoftheSEA1448Phase4Awasthestrong,consistent,andtirelessleadershipprovidedbybothKeleherandCrawford.Typicalcommentsincludethefollowing:DanKeleherunderstandsthathisroleistosetexpectationsandletusdoourwork.Heencouragesanoutcomeattitude.Helistenstousanddoesn'tjusttelluswhatweshoulddo.Throughouttheentireproject,Danhasworkedwithusratherthanagainstus.Therehavebeentimeswe'vecalledhimat11:00atnight….GaryCrawfordhasanamazingamountofexperienceandcompetency.He'sveryhardworkingbutalsorelaxed.Whenhewalksin,everyonecalmsdown.WecanalwaystalktoGaryortoDanaboutanything.OnJune6,2016,theEScapabilityinstalledontheAnzacclasswasapprovedforinitialoperationsbytheChiefofNavyaftercompletingasuccessfulseriesofseatrialsandoperationaltesting.12.6SummaryIntegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringhasnotbeenaspecificareaoffocusformostorganizations,butitsimpactonprogramperformancesuggeststhatitshouldbe.Indeed,itshouldbesystematicallydefined,measured,andimprovedaspartofthepracticeofprogrammanagement.Programscanbenefitinmanywaysfromgreaterintegration,includingscheduleandbudgetcompliance,andmeetingclientsatisfactionandrequirements.Oneofthefirststepsinmanagingintegrationbetweenthesetwodisciplinesistodefineasetofvariablesandasystematicapproachtoassesstheirintegrationwithintheprogram.TheelementsassociatedwitheachintegrationfactordiscussedinSection12.3.2isagoodstartingpoint.Contextualvariablesthatarespecifictoeachtypeofprogramandindustrysectorwill

305helptotailorthemeasurementapproachtoitsspecificapplication.Underavarietyofconditionsintegrationmaymanifestitselfdifferently.Thiswillshapethespecificmanagementpracticesandtechniquestobemonitoredforintegrationbehaviors.Thefollowingpointsmayhelporganizationstobepurposefulinimprovingintegrationthatleadstobetterprogramperformance:Understandintegration.Thefirststeptomeasuringintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringproperlyistodevelopaclearunderstandingofthemeaningofintegrationfortheteamandtheorganization.ThegeneraldefinitionofintegrationinChapter6,alongwiththethreekeyelementsshowninFigure123,isaninitialreferencepoint.Developanapproachtoassessandimproveintegration.Measuringintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringcanbeacomplicatedtaskduetoitsvariouselements.Definingformalprocesses,tools,techniques,andmetricsisimportantifthisistobepartofadeliberatechangeprogramtoimproveintegration.Theintegrationimprovementinitiativeshouldbelinkedwiththeoverallprogrambenefitsachievementapproachtodemonstratebothquantitativeandqualitativeevidenceofthevalueofgreaterintegrationforprogramsandbusinessresults.Integrationmayhavedifferentlevelsofintensityandmayimpactprogramsinawiderangeofways.Considerotherdimensionsandvariablesasdriversofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinaparticularcontext,includingprogramtype,industrysector,andorganizationalenvironmentandculture,aspartoftailoringtheapproachtoassessingandimprovingintegration.Treatintegrationasacompetence.Integrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinvolvesattitudesandskillssupportedbyacarefullydesignedsetoftools,managementpractices,andorganizationalfactors.Thisbroadperspectiveshouldbeconsideredtodevelopsuccessivelyhigherlevelsofintegrationofthesetwodisciplinesinprograms.Integrationrequiresstrongleadershipfrombothamanagementandatechnicalperspective.Particularlywithincomplexprograms,programmanagersbenefitsignificantlyfromhavingsometechnicalbackgroundorexperience.Chiefsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersshouldrecognizeandappreciatetheirrespectiveindividualresponsibilitiesandpressures,andconsidertheimplicationsthattheirmanagementandtechnicaldecisionswillhaveontheoverallprogramobjectivesandresults.12.7DiscussionQuestions1.Whatstepswouldyoutaketoimprovetheawarenessoftheimportanceofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringtoprogramperformanceinyourorganization?

3062.Howhasintegrationimpactedperformanceinyourorganization(basedonaprogramonwhichyouhaveworkedinthepast)?Inwhichspecificareasofprogramperformancewasitrelevantfortheprogrammanagerorthechiefsystemsengineer?3.WhichoftheintegrationelementsdiscussedinSection12.3.2andFigure123weredemonstratedinaprogramonwhichyouworkedinthepast?Whichofthesevariableshadthegreatestimpactonprogramperformance?4.Basedontheelementsofintegration(Section12.3.2,Figure123),canyouidentifyadditionalvariablesthatmightberelevanttomeasuretheseelementsinyourorganizationorprogramcontext?5.IntheAnzaccasestudy,canyouidentifyorinferthepresenceofadditionalvariablesfromtheintegrationdimensionthatwerenotdiscussedinmoredetail?12.8ReferencesBecerril,L.,Rebentisch,E.,Chucholowski,N.,Conforto,E.C.,&Lindemann,U.(2016,May16–19).Asimulationbasedanalysisontheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.ProceedingsoftheInternationalDesignConference,Dubrovnik,Croatia.Bellman,R.E.,&Zadeh,L.A.(1970).Decisionmakinginafuzzyenvironment.ManagementScience,17(4),B141–B164.doi:10.1287/mnsc.17.4.B141Browning,T.R.,Fricke,E.,&Negele,H.(2006).Keyconceptsinmodelingproductdevelopmentprocesses.SystemsEngineering,9(2),104–128.doi:10.1002/sys.20047Conforto,E.,Rebentisch,E.,&Rossi,M.(2013,October27–29).Casestudyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.PresentedatPMIGlobalCongressNorthAmerica,NewOrleans,Louisiana.Conforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia.Retrievedfromhttp://www.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxFord,D.N.(2009).Systemdynamicsforlargecomplexprojects,Cambridge,MA:MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.Forrester,J.W.(1961).Industrialdynamics.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).(2015).Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.).D.Walden,G.Roedler,K.Forsberg,R.Hamelin,T.Shortell(Eds.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.Oehmen,J.,Rebentisch,E.,&Kinscher,K.(2011,December).Programmanagementfor

307largescaleengineeringprograms.LAIWhitepaperSeries“LeanProductDevelopmentforPractitioners.”MIT,Cambridge,MA.Retrievedfromhttp://18.7.29.232/handle/1721.1/79839ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013a).Thestandardforprogrammanagement(3rded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013b).Aguidetotheprojectmanagementbodyofknowledge(PMBOK®guide)(5thed.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.Rebentisch,E.,&Conforto,E.C.(2014,May).Integrationmeansresults:Whysystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementmustalign.PMIGlobalCongress,EMEA,Dubai,UAE.Reiner,T.(2015,May).Determinationoffactorstomeasuretheeffectiveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,RheinischWestfälischeTechnischeHochschule(RWTH)AachenMaster'sthesis.Rhodes,D.H.,Valerdi,R.,&Roedler,G.J.(2009).Systemsengineeringleadingindicatorsforassessingprogramandtechnicaleffectiveness.SystemsEngineering,12(1),21–35.doi:10.1002/sys.20105Roedler,G.,Rhodes,D.H.,Schimmoller,H.,&Jones,C.(Eds.).(2007).Systemsengineeringleadingindicatorsguide(INCOSETP200500103).Version2.Cambridge,MA:MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.Retrievedfromwww.psmsc.com/downloads/other/seliguiderev201292010industry.pdfSage,A.P.,&Rouse,W.B.(2009).Handbookofsystemsengineeringandmanagement.Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.Sterman,J.D.(1992).Systemdynamicsmodelingforprojectmanagement.Cambridge,MA:MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.Sterman,J.D.(2000).Businessdynamics:Systemsthinkingandmodelingforacomplexworld.Boston,MA:Irwin/McGrawHill.Endnote1.ContributedbyElizabeth“Betsy”Clark,SCRAMPrincipal,President,SoftwareMetrics,Inc.;AdrianPitman,SCRAMPrincipal,DirectorAcquisitionEngineeringImprovementCapabilityAcquisitionandSustainmentGroup,DepartmentofDefence,Australian;andAngelaTuffley,Director,RedBayConsultingPtyLtd.,AdjunctSeniorLecturer,GriffithUniversity,Australia.

308PartIIIDEVELOPINGINTEGRATIONCOMPETENCIESINYOURORGANIZATIONHavingdemonstratedthebenefitsofintegratingtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesinaprogram,thechallengeformanyorganizationswillbewhattodonext.PartIIIfocusesonthischallengewithanexplorationofhowtobringabouteffectivechangeincomplexorganizations.Thefocusisspecificallyontheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines,buttheprinciplesofchangediscussedinthispartcanbegeneralizedtootherareas.Chapter13beginswithanoverviewofwhatisrequiredtoproducesustainedchangeincomplexorganizations.Theseorganizationswillrequireasystematic,concerted,anddeliberateefforttoadoptandmastertheseprinciplesofintegration.Theprinciplespresentedherewillhelporganizationstobetterunderstandthescopeofactivitiesandlevelofeffortinvolvedindevelopingtheirintegrationcompetencies.Chapter14illustratestheseprinciplesofchangewithcasestudyexamplesfromorganizationsthathavedemonstratedperformanceimprovementthroughtheintegrationoftheirtechnicalandmanagementdisciplines.Theirexamplesillustratetheelementsandworkingsofadeliberateapproachtoandsystemofchangeinrealandoftencomplexorganizationalsettings.Chapter15concludesthispartbyofferingpracticaladvicetothosewhowishtoestablishachangeprogramtoimprovetheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintheirorganization.Thisincludeshowtokickofftheinitiative,theprincipalroles,andhowtosustainandmaintainthenewstatedevelopedthroughthechangeefforts.

30913INTEGRATIONMEANSCHANGE13.1Introduction:TheCaseforChangeChapter12illustratedhoweffectiveintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesproducesvaluefortheorganization,notonlyintraditionalmeasuresofprogramperformancelikerequirementsfulfilmentandclientsatisfaction,butadditionaltangiblebenefitsthatincludeamorereliableperformancewithfewerdeadlineoverruns.Thesechangesfosterlongtermcompetitiveagilityandadvantage.Whenanorganizationisabletoachieveeffectiveprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration,thebenefitsareconcrete.Integrationofdisciplinesandfunctionswithinanorganizationwhereithasnotpreviouslyexistedis,however,atransformativechangefortheorganization.Inadynamicglobaleconomy,organizationsthatareresistanttochangeoftenlosegroundtothosethatembraceit.AsJackWelchisreportedtohavesaid,“Iftherateofchangeontheoutsideexceedstherateofchangeontheinside,theendisnear”(Allison,2014).Ifyourcompetitorsaretransformingataratethatisgreaterthanyoursandarereapingtheresultingperformancebenefits,thenadoptingnewwaysofmanagingworkbecomesanorganizationalimperative.Anorganization,andparticularlyanorganizationthatemployssystemsengineers,programmanagers,projectmanagers,andsophisticatedtechnicalexperts,isacomplex,interdependentnetworkofresources,processes,andtechnologiesthatcreatevaluefortheorganizationanditsbeneficiaries(clients,customer,receivers)throughtheworktheyproduce.Achangeprogrammust,therefore,takeintoaccountthemultipledimensionsoftheorganization,includingstakeholderneedsandvalues,theorganizationalstructureandculture,andtheinterconnectivityoffunctionswithin.Organizationaltransformationmodifiesanorganizationwhileitisinactionandmovesitfromitscurrentstatetoanenvisionedfuture—aprocessthatrequiresasignificantchangeinapproach,mindset,theadoptionofaholisticviewofhowtheprogramwillwork,andacomprehensiveplanforexecution.Integrationwillrequirechangeandchangeisdifficult.Mostorganizationswillrequireconcertedanddeliberateefforttoeffectivelyimplementandmanagethechangetorealizebenefits.AsRothandDiBella(2015)pointout,“Unfortunately,discretechangeeffortsfailbecausetheydonottakeintoconsiderationthebroadsetoffactorsthataffectorganizationsintoday'sdynamic,interconnectedworld.”Transformationalchange,suchastheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,isnottrivial—itrequiresrealwork.Further,sustainingchangeovertimerequiresongoingefforttoreinforceandsupportthenewwayofworkingtogether.Harrington,Voehl,andVoehl(2015)proposedamodelfortakinganintentionalapproachtochangethathassustainmentofthechangeinviewfromtheoutset.This

310model,showninFigure131,usestheacronymSUSTAINtodrawattentiontothecentralelementsthatmustbeincludedinthepreparationandexecutionofchange.AsHarringtonetal.(2015)pointout,themodel“isnotintendedtorepresentaseriesofactions,orastepwiseapproach.Rather,theintentisthatallelementsofthemodelreceiveongoingattentionand,infact,theelementsarehighlyinterrelated”(p.5).Figure131:ThemodelforsustainablechangeModelforSustainableChange,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2015.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.13.2TheNeedtoBeThoughtfulaboutChangeWhyaresomeorganizationsmoreeffectiveatchangethanothers?Whydosomeachieveorexceedtheirstrategicgoals,whileotherswhomaybeworkingjustashardorharderconsistentlyflounder,missingdeadlines,andexceedingcosttargets?Manyorganizationshaveextensivechangeinitiativesbutoftenfailtoachievetheirobjectivesorareunabletosustainthechange.Researchhasfoundthataholisticsystemsapproachisrequiredtoachievelasting,effectivechange(Nightingale&Srinivasan,2011).Manyorganizationscanbethoughtofascomplexsystems.Theyexistinahighlydynamicenvironment,havetosatisfytheneedsofadiversesetofstakeholders,andareoftenlargeandgeographicallydistributed.Suchorganizationsareoftentermedenterprises.

311Anenterpriseisacomplex,integrated,interdependentsystemofpeople,processes,andtechnologiesthatcreatesvalueasdeterminedbyitskeystakeholders(customers,suppliers,employees,etc.).Achangeprogrammust,therefore,takeintoaccountthemultipledimensionsoftheenterprise,includingitsvariousstakeholderneedsandvalues,thecultureoftheorganization,andtheinterconnectivitiesofdifferentfunctionsoftheenterprisesuchasdesign,manufacturing,andthesupplybase.Implementingchangeinacomplexsystemrequiressystemsthinking—afundamentalconceptforsystemsengineers.Systemsthinkinginvolvesunderstandingthatasystemexistswithinawidercontextorenvironment,andthatasystemismadeupofpartsthatinteractwitheachotherandthewidercontext.Systemsthinkersconsideranissuefully,resisttheurgetocometoaquickconclusion,andconsiderbothshortandlongtermconsequences(INCOSE,2015).Manywhoseektoimplementchangeinanorganizationrushintoimplementationbeforefirstlayingthegroundworkforsuccess.Theupfrontefforttoconsiderhowtheorganizationwillrespondtothechangeandhowbesttonurturethechangehassignificantpayoffs.Organizationsareoftendrivenbyscheduleandcostconstraintsanda“firefighting”mentalitythatresultsinthelaunchofinitiativeswithoutfirstcompletingthenecessaryupfrontplanningandconsideringthefollowthroughthatwillbeneededtosustainthechangelongterm.Successfulandsustainedchangeincomplexorganizationsrequiresasystemofchangethatworkshandinglovewiththeorganization'sobjectives,businesssystems,leadership,culture,anddailyoperations.13.2.1StumblingBlockstoChangeUnfortunately,manyenterprisetransformationeffortsarenotsuccessful.Combe(2014)notes,“Changeisdifficult,individuallyandorganizationally.Individually,humansseekstability,andresearchhasshownthatevenwhentheyacceptandinternalizethevalueofchange,theyfrequentlyfailtochange”(p.8).Thereasonforfailureoftencanbetracedtosomeformofresistancetothechange.Resistancetochangeistypicallythoughtofintermsofindividualsnotsupportingthechange—eitherpassivelyoractively.Whileindividualsareonesource,resistancecanbedefinedasanything—peopleorsystems—thatpushesagainstthechange.Forcefieldanalysis,thecentralconceptinLewin's(1947)earlyworkonchange,isabetterwayofthinkingaboutchangeresistance.Inforcefieldanalysis,forcespushingforthechangeandforcespushingagainstthechangeareidentifiedandanalyzed.Whentheforcespushingforthechangeexceedtheforcespushingagainstthechange,then,andonlythen,willchangehappeninanysustainableway.Therefore,itisusefultobeawareofcommonsourcesofresistancesothattheirforceisminimizedoreliminated.NightingaleandSrinivasan(2011)identifiedeightcommonfailuresoftransformationalchangeexhibitedinTable131.Onekeyelementcommontoallofthesefailuresistheabsenceoftakingasystemsapproachtochange,whichresultsinsomeformofresistance.Takingacloserlookatafewexamplesfromthelistillustrateshowthesetypesoffailuresmightemergeasasourceoffailureinintegrationefforts.

312Table131TypesofenterprisetransformationfailuresNightingale&Srinivasan,2011,p.30.ReproducedwithpermissionofAmericanManagementAssociationviaCopyrightClearanceCenter.FailureTypesResultsFrom…OnlyinmyUndertakingonlylocalprojects,withnoconsiderationfortheirimpactbackyardacrosstheenterpriseActivityFeelingtheneedto“dosomething”andmeasuring/valuingactivityratherthanprogressLowhangingFocusingeffortsonwhateveristheeasiestproblemtoaddressfruitPetprojectWorkingonwhateveraleaderorleaderswant,whetheritistherightthingoraddressesrootissuesNewleadershipHeadingdownthepathsetbyanewleaderwithnoregardforwheretheorganizationis/hasbeengoingLeaderswhoDelegatingalltransformationworktounderlings,withleaderstakingnodon'tleadpartintheeffortsHireBringinginoutsiderstodevelopandimplementtransformation,wholeavetransformersbehindnoplanFlavorofUndertakingtransformationeffortsthatshiftfromonemethodologytothemonthanother,againandagainThefirstfailuretypelisted,“onlyinmybackyard,”referstowhenonepartoftheorganizationmakeschangestoimproveitsoperationwithoutgivingdueconsiderationtotherestoftheenterprise.Thiscanrefertoasituationwheretheintegrationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementisinitiatedwithoutconsiderationforotherdisciplinesthatwillbeaffectedsuchasfinanceorsupplychain.Ofcourse,changesinanengineeringdesigncanhavemajorimplicationsonthemanufacturabilityorcostoftheproduct.InthecaseofamajorU.S.defensemanufacturer:[T]heengineeringfunctionhaddecidedtodownsizesignificantlythenumberofitsengineersworkingwiththeprocessengineersinmanufacturing.Why?Theengineeringleaderssawnovalueaddedfromanengineeringperspective.Onlyafterthedecisionhadbeentranslatedintoactiondidanyonerecognizethecriticaldownstreamimplicationsintermsofdelaysinproductionandassociatedcostoverruns(Nightingale&Srinivasan,2011,pp.30–31).Thisisillustrativeofalackofsystemsthinkingthatcanleadtofailureinimplementingchangesintendedtoimproveprogramperformance.The“lowhangingfruit”failuretyperepresentsthosechangeeffortsthatfocusonlyonthe“easy”problems,andnotnecessarilytheonesthatwillhavethebiggeststrategicimpact.Forexample,itmaybeeasiertointegratetheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering

313disciplinesincertainsmallprogramsthatareisolatedfromtherestoftheenterprise.However,theimpactandperformancebenefitsmaylikewisebesmallandisolated.Thisdoesnotmeanthatgrassrootseffortsshouldbediscouraged.Actionorientedapproachesthatcapturelocalknowledgeandenergytomakechangehappencanbeleveragedindemonstratingthepotentialforsuccess,establishingstrategicurgencyforchange,andbringingstakeholdersonboardtoimplemententerprisetransformation.Eventually,however,effortstochangetheorganizationwillhavetobecomewidespread,particularlyintheprimaryprogramsandbusinesslines,iftheyaretohaveasystemicandsustainedimpactonperformance.Thechangemustbecomepartoftheorganization's“DNA.”The“newleadership”failuretypeoftenresultsfromalackofcontinuityofprioreffortsandstrategicplans.Thisfailuretypeiscommonlycitedinmilitaryorganizationswhereleadersareonshortrotationschedules.Newleadersmaywantto“maketheirmark”ontheorganizationandinitiatesweepingchanges.Ratherthanbuildontheeffortsofthepreviousleader,thenewleadermaytaketheorganizationinanewdirectionwithoutdueconsiderationforthestakeholdersvestedinthepriorstrategicplanfortheorganization.Forexample,acompanysellingmiceformedicalresearchwasundergoingatransformationfromaproductbasedorganizationtoaservicesbasedorganizationthatofferedanimalhousingservicesandprovidedmicewithspecifictraitstopharmaceuticalcustomerstohelpacceleratetheirtimetomarketofnewdrugs.However,thiscompanywassoldtoanotherorganizationthatdidnotsupportthestrategyshifttoservices.Thisstalledthetransformationofthecompanyforaboutadecadeuntilthecompany'smanagementwasabletoretakethereinsandcompletethetransformation,afterwhichservicesdominatedthecompany'sofferingsandthemouseproductlinedeclinedtoonlyaquarterofthecompany'srevenues.(Srivastava,2012,pp.11–13).Frequentlychanginginitiativeswithoutastrongtietooverarchingstrategyleadstochangefatigueforallinvolved.Ogburn(1957)capturedthedangerofimplementingchangeactivityforthesakeofdoingsomethinginhisreflectiononexperiencesinthearmedforcesduringWorldWarII.Heobserved:Wetrainedhard,butitseemedthateverytimewewerebeginningtoformupintoteamswewouldbereorganized.Presumablytheplansforouremploymentwerebeingchanged.Iwastolearnlaterinlifethat,perhapsbecausewearesogoodatorganizing,wetendasanationtomeetanynewsituationbyreorganizing;andawonderfulmethoditcanbeforcreatingtheillusionofprogresswhileproducingconfusion,inefficiency,anddemoralization(pp.32–33).Twocautionsarecapturedinthisobservation.First,constantchangedoesnotsupportlongterm,sustainablechange.Second,simplychangingtheorganizationalstructurefailstoevaluatetheorganizationfromasystemsperspective;oftentherootcauseofanissueisinadifferentpartoftheorganizationfromwheretheconsequencesareseen.Usingaframeworkforchangeplanningcanhelptoensuretheissueshavebeenconsideredfullyandacomprehensiveplanforchangedeveloped.

31413.3FrameworksandModelsforChangeTherearemanyapproachestoandframeworksformanagingchange.OnewellknownapproachisKotter's(1996)eightstepprocessforleadingchange.However,changeincomplexorganizationsoftenrequiresmorethantherotefollowingofamodel.Amoresystematicapproach,alongwiththerequisitecapabilities,isrequiredduetothesysteminterdependencies(Roth&DiBella,2015).Thissectionisnotprescriptiveofaparticularchangemanagementmodel;instead,thissectionintroducestwochangeframeworksandhighlightscommonelementsusefulforthinkingthroughandplanningfororganizationalchange.ThefirstistheChangeLifeCycleFramework(PMI,2013),showninFigure132.ThesecondistheEnterpriseTransformationRoadmap(LAI,2012)showninFigure133.Thetwoexamplechangeframeworksprovideleadershipwithadecisionaidforconsiderationofcultural,organizational,andchangemanagementconsiderationsinthestrategicanalysisandtransformationoftheenterprise.Thedevelopmentofframeworksliketheseismotivatedbythefactthatmosttransformationeffortsfailinthattheyareoftennotsustainableordonotachievethedesiredstrategicobjectives.Theframeworksserveasaguideforenterpriseleadersastheyconsiderstrategic,cultural,andoperationalchanges.

315Figure132:ChangelifecycleframeworkManagingChangeinOrganizations:APracticeGuide,ProjectManagementInstitute,Inc.,2013.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofPMI.

316Figure133:Enterprisetransformationroadmap(LAI,2012)LAIenterpriseselfassessmenttool(LESAT)version2.0:Facilitator'sguide.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2012.Copyrightandallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.Bothframeworkscanbegroupedintothreephases,witheachtakingaslightlydifferentbutcomplementaryfocus,asshowninTable132.

317Table132ThreephasesofthetransformationalchangeframeworksandtheprimaryfocusofeachBasedonPMI,2013;LAI,2012.ChangeLifeEnterprisePrimaryObjectiveCycleTransformationFrameworkRoadmapStrategicFormulateDetermineStrategicThebusinesscasefortransformationisPhaseChangeImperativemadealongwiththeengagementofEngageLeadershipinstakeholdersTransformationPlanningPlanChangeUnderstandCurrentAnalyzeanddefinethecurrentandfuturePhaseStatestate,alongwithatransformationplantoEnvisionandDesignachievethefuturevisionFutureEnterpriseAlignEnterpriseStructureandBehaviorsCreateTransformationPlanExecutionImplementImplementandPuttheplanintopracticeandmonitorresultsPhaseChangeCoordinateManageTransformationPlanTransitionNurtureSustainTransformationandChangeEmbedEnterpriseThinking13.3.1StrategicPhaseThechangeprocessbeginswiththeestablishmentofthedrivingbusinessreasonforchange.Thisisshowninthe“Identify/clarifyneedforchange”arrowinFigure132,and“Articulatethecasefortransformationandconveyurgency”boxinFigure133.Thisfirststrategicstepcanhelpleadersavoidmanyofthetransformationfailuremodesdescribedabove;therefore,theStrategicPhasebeginswithidentifyingthestrategicimperativeforchangeand,atahighlevel,statingthestrategicobjectiveofthechange.Thisisaboutdevelopingthehighlevelbusinesscaseandansweringthequestions:Whydoweneedtodothis?Whatisthebusinessvaluewearetryingtoachieve?Whatifwedonotintegrate?Leadershipisengagedbyfurtherdevelopingthebusinesscaseinbusinessterms,notprogram

318managementorsystemsengineeringterms.Alackofexecutivesupportleadstominimalvaluerealization.Executivebuyinisnotjustaboutobtainingresourcesforthework,butitistheenablingactivitythatwilleffectculturalandprocesschange.Theremustbeunifiedsupportattheexecutivelevelwithanactivesponsorasalinkbetweentheleadershipandtheworkundertaken.TheChangeLifeCycleFrameworkspecificallycallsoutconductinganassessmentoftheorganization'sreadinessforchange.Thisisanimportantstep,discussedinmoredetaillaterinthischapter,inthatattemptingchangethatimpactsorisimpactedbyorganizationalculturecanquicklyderailthechangeprocessandleadtofailure.13.3.2PlanningPhaseBothframeworksemphasizetheneedtounderstandthecurrentstate,envisionthefuturestate,andplantheapproach/roadmaptochange.Theplanningphaseisenteredwithacommittedleadershipteamcultivatedduringthestrategicphase.Theplanningphasebeginswithagroundedunderstandingofthecurrentstate.Lackofunderstandingregardingthepretransformationsituationcancauseconflictwithexistingprocessesandresultinoverlookinginterdependencies.Definingthefuturestateisaboutdevelopingaclearpictureofwheretheenterprisewillendup.Itisnotaboutfiguringoutthedetailsofhowtogetthere,buttheblueprintforwhattheresultswilllooklike.The“tobe”iscomparedwiththe“asis”toidentifywherechangesareneeded.Thisleadstoorinformsthesequenceofintegrationactivitiessuchthattheimpactoncurrentproductivityisminimized.Engagingkeystakeholdersearlyhelpstoensureeveryoneisworkingtowardthesameobjective,andhelpswithinvestmentandmindshareinthefinaloutcome—leadingtoorganizationalsuccess.IdentifyingstakeholdersemergesfromthestakeholdermappingprocessasdiscussedinthesidebarStakeholderIdentificationandAnalysis.Nowthatthefutureenterpriseisdefined,thereisaneedtodefinethenewstructuresandbehaviorsnecessarytoimplement.Thedesignundergoesfurtherelaborationandistestedforacceptanceandadoptionastheintegrationmovesforward.Theplanningprocesscreatesatransformationalprogramplan.ThisplanmusthaveelementsrelatedtoeachoftheinputsintheIntegrationFramework:processes,practices,andtools;organizationalenvironmentpeoplecompetencies;andcontextualfactors.Inaddition,abenefitsroadmapwouldbeoneoftheoutputsofthisactivityaspartofthecompleteintegrationtransformationprogramplan.13.3.3ExecutionPhaseWiththeintegrationtransformationplandefined,executioncanbegin.Itstartswithimplementingandcoordinatingthetransformationchangeplanforintegration.Programplansbynatureshouldbeagile.Theplanservesasabaselineforactivities,butultimatelyitshouldberesponsivetoadjustmentsalongtheway.Again,usingabenefitsroadmapallowsfortesting

319atthedefinedmilestonestodetermineifdesiredprogressisbeingmadeandwhetherornotadjustments(processortime)areneededtoensureultimatesuccess.Agoodprogramplanincludessettingupplansforfullyimbeddingthechangeintheorganization.Thismeansdefininganticipatedtransitioningactivityalongwithmetricstomeasuresuccessandassigningaccountabilityforresultsoverthelongterm.Thisisacentralcomponentofprogramsthatresultsinsustainmentofbenefitsoverthelongerterm(Thiry,2015).Bothframeworksforchangeemphasizethecyclicalnatureofchange.TheEnterpriseTransformationRoadmapshowsthateachstepispartofacycle.Additionally,thearrowsinthemiddleofthecircleshowshortandlongtermcorrectiveactions.Thisreflectstheimportanceofconsistentlyevaluatingthattheenterpriseisachievingitsgoalandbeingadaptiveaboutthechangeprocess.TheChangeLifeCycleFrameworkalsoindicatesthatchangeisiterativethroughtheuseofthe“AdaptiveChange”arrows.Theconstantevaluationthatthechangeisattainingthedesiredbenefits,or“realizedvalue,”isshowninarrowsatthebottomofFigure132.Anenterprisewidetransformationcantakeyears.Therefore,theseshorttermcorrectiveactionsoradaptivetechniquesareimportanttoensurethetransformationcontinuestobealignedwiththeenterprise'schangingecosystemandclimate(Combe,2014).StakeholderIdentificationandAnalysisThemeasurementoforganizationalsuccessinthepastwaslimitedtothesatisfactionandcreationofwealthfortheshareholder,termed“shareholdervalueanalysis.”Overtime,“theprocessofidentifyingstakeholdershasgrownmorecomplicatedasenterprisesrecognizedtheneedtoconsiderstakeholdersbeyondjusttheshareholder”(Srivastava,2014).Oneofthefirstandmostcitedauthorsinthefieldof“stakeholderanalysis”isEdwardFreeman(1984),whodefinedhisresearchintermsoffirmswho“affectorareaffectedbytheachievementoftheorganization'sobjectives”andwho“benefitfromorareharmedbyandwhoserightsareviolatedorrespectedby,corporateactions.”Onemustidentifythestakeholdersbeforebeginningtoengagethemintheformulationandrolloutofthechange.Itisoftentemptingtoconductthestakeholderanalysisusingtheorganizationalstructuremap.Theorganizationstructure,however,doesnotrepresentthepoliticalandrelationalaspectsoforganizationalinteraction.Abetterapproachistoconstructastakeholdermapbeginningwiththerecipientsofvaluefromtheenterprise,andthendepicttherelationshipsinfluencingandaffectingtherecipient.AsMillerandOliver(2015)noted,“Thisapproach…shiftsthinkingawayfromunderstandingtheformal,hierarchicalorganizationalstructuresinwhichaprogramorprojectistakingplacetounderstandingtheinformal,politicalflowsofanorganizationwherechangereallytakesplace(e.g.,changenetworkrelationships)”(p.6).Itiseasytomissanindividualstakeholderorgroupofstakeholderswhendevelopingthe

320listofstakeholders.Feng,Crawley,deWeck,Lessard,andCameron(2012)describedtheimportanceofidentifyingallstakeholdersandnotedthat“missingakeystakeholdercouldjeopardizethechanceforthefocalorganizationtosuccessfullyachieveitsobjectivesinthelongrun.”However,engagingallofthestakeholdersmaybecomeunrealisticasthenumberofstakeholdersincreases.Therefore,onemayneedtodetermineamethodofgroupingstakeholdersbytype,influence,orsomeotheridentifiablecharacteristic.Butcaremustbetakennottogrouparbitrarilyortooquicklyandthusriskmissingakeyinfluencer.Allstakeholdersexertsomelevelofinfluence,butclearlysomearemoreinfluentialorpowerfulthanothers.Clarkson(1995)realizedthatdifferentstakeholders'needsshouldbeweightedinsomerespecttotheinfluencetheywield;allstakeholdersmatterbutnotallstakeholdersareequal.Amethodofcategorizingstakeholdersbasedontheirpower,legitimacy,andurgencycalled“stakeholdersalience”wasdevelopedbyMitchell,Agle,andWood(1997).Murmanetal.(2002)builtupontheconceptofstakeholdervalueinthedevelopmentoftheValueCreationFramework.Aclosedloopprocessispartofthisframework,whichincludesidentification,proposition,anddelivery.Recentstakeholderanalysisliteraturespeakstotheincreasingcomplexityofidentifyingenterprisestakeholdersandprioritizingtheirneedsandvaluedelivery;indirectrelationshipsandinteractionsamongstakeholdersonanetworklevelarenowbeingviewedasnecessarytoincorporateinstakeholderanalysis(Fengetal.,2012).Thestakeholdermapthatresultsfromthestakeholderidentificationbecomesthebasisforfurtherstakeholderanalysiswheretheneedsandtypeofcommunicationandinteractionaredetailed.Oneshouldbecarefultonotconfinethestakeholderanalysistoonlyinternalstakeholders,butidentifyandcharacterizestakeholdersexternaltotheenterpriseaswell.Externalstakeholdersoftenexertasmuch,andpossiblymore,influenceonthesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementintegrationeffortthanmanyinternalstakeholders.Agoodstakeholdermapwillincludeallkeystakeholders,takingasystemsthinkingapproachtotheentiresphereofinfluenceandpower.Ifthelistofstakeholdersbecomesunwieldy,stakeholderscanbeprioritizedbyconsiderationofstakeholdersaliency.Thisinvolvesconsiderationofastakeholder'spower,legitimacy,andurgencywithrespecttotheenterprise(Srivastava,2012).Awidelyusedparadigmforprocesschangeistheplandocheckactapproach,alsoknownastheShewhartCycle(INCOSE,2015,p.138).ThePMBOK®Guide(PMI,2013)notesthattheplandocheckactapproachisusefulasthebasisforcontinuousimprovementaspartofthequalitymanagementKnowledgeAreaofprojects.Asthetwoframeworksindicate,thebasicconceptisthatoneplansthechange,measuresoutcomesalongtheway,andthenadjustsplansandactivitiesinresponsetoprogressmadeagainsttheplan.Whetheroneusesoneoftheseorselectsanotherframeworkormodel,theimportantthingtokeepinmindisthattheframeworkandmodelshouldbetailoredtothetypeofchangeandtheorganizationalcultureandcontextwithinwhichthatchangeisplanned.Innocaseshoulda

321frameworkormodelbeusedwithoutadaptationtotheuniquecharacteristicsofthechangeinviewandtheculturalenvironmentoftheorganization.LeadersofthechangeeffortmayfindtheinformationintheSidebar,CharacteristicsofaChangeAgent,useful.CharacteristicsofaChangeAgentAnengagedchangeagentisakeycontributortosuccessfulchange.ResearchconductedbyMcKinney,Arnold,andSheard(2015)identifiednumerouscharacteristicsofaneffectivechangeagent.Theysummarizetheirfindingsinthreedimensions:Philosophy:TheattitudeofachangeagentsuchaspersistenceandhandlingofchallengesKnowledge:Thefactsandinsightsabouthowtheorganizationworks,whichisconstantlychangingSkills:TheabilitytotranslateknowledgeintoactionOneofthekeyskillsissystemsthinking.Forexample,knowledgeofaneffectivechangeagentincludes:Whatstakeholderscareabout(soyoucanconnectwiththeirpassions)WhothekeystakeholdersareEffectofrecentandcurrentchangesontheeffortsThepolitical,economic,andsocialcontextinwhichanorganizationalchangeefforttakesplaceUnderstandingcurrentoperationsandsystemsInsightintowhateffectsandconsequencesthedifferentalternativesmayhaveMcKinney,Arnold,andSheard(2015)providetipsforsuccessinfacilitatingchange,brokendownbytheoriginationofthechange(i.e.,bottomup,topdown,ormiddleout).Thisworkalsodiscussesindicationsofwhentopushforchange,takingintoaccountenterprisematurityfortransformation.13.4ReadinessAssessmentAsdiscussedbrieflyaboveandhighlightedinFigure134,assessinganenterprise'sreadinessforchangeisanimportantpartofthestrategyphaseinatransformationalchangeeffort.Certaincharacteristicsofanorganizationcanindicateapriorithechancesofsuccessofatransformation.Understandingthecurrentstateofanenterprisebeforeachangeincludesnotonlythestatusoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringorganizations,butalso

322elementsthatindicatetheenterprise'swillingnesstochangetosupportintegratedprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.Anassessmentcanhelpinidentifyingenterprisestrengthsandweaknesses,andguidethetransformation.“Bygaininginsightsoncurrentperformance,pasttrends,anddesiredfutureperformance,decisionmakerswillbebetterequippedtodesignatransformationplanthatmeetstheneedsoftheorganizationandwillofferthemostlongtermbenefits”(LAI,2012,p.12).Itisimportanttounderstandthatwhatisbeingassessedisculturalreadiness,commitmentreadinessofkeystakeholdersandresources,andthecapabilityoftheorganizationtobeabletoexpendresourcestoimplementandsustainthechange(Combe,2014).Thisiscriticaltopredictingthepotentialrealizablevaluefromimplementingthechange.Figure134:AssessreadinessforchangeaspartoftheupfrontplanningforchangePMI,2013.Aswiththechangeframeworks,thischapterdoesnotprescribeanassessmenttool,butdoesreferenceindustrytoolstoillustratethekeyconcepts.Forexample,theBaldridgePerformanceExcellenceProgrampresentsawardseachyearthatrecognizeorganizationsthathavedemonstratedperformanceexcellence.Theassessmentcriteriaforthisawardmaybeusefulinenterpriseassessment,andthesecriteriacovercategoriesfromleadershiptoprocessmanagement.AnotherinformativetoolfordevelopingareadinessassessmentistheCapabilityMaturityModelIntegration(CMMI).Thematuritymodelassessesforfourdifferentareasoffocus:development,services,acquisition,andpeople.Althoughinitiallycreatedforsoftwaredevelopmentprocesses,theassessmenthasalsobeenappliedtosystemsengineeringprocessesandorganizationbusinessprocesses.AnotherassessmentframeworkistheLAIEnterprise

323SelfAssessmentTool(LESAT)(LAI,2012).Thefirstversion,LESAT1.0,wasdevelopedbyMIT'sLeanAdvancementInitiativeinjointcollaborationwithINCOSE,industry,government,andtheUnitedKingdomLeanAerospaceInitiative.LESAT2.0focusesonthecapabilitiesofanenterprisetotransformintoahighperformingenterpriseandsustainthetransformation.Allofthesetoolsprovideaframeworktoassessthecurrentstateoftheorganizationagainstastandardinordertoidentifyareasforimprovement,butitisequallyimportanttoassesshowreadytheorganizationisforchange.AsCombe(2014)pointsoutregardinganorganization'sreadinesstochange,“Changereadinesstakesintoaccountacompilationofmultipleviewpointstoassessnotonlywhethervariousaudiencesfeelconfidentinmakingthechange,butalsotoestablishrootcausesofdiscomfort”(p.6).Regardlessoftheassessmentmethodortool,assessingtheenterprise'sreadinessforchangeisanimportantstepinachievingsuccess.Combe(2014)recommendskeepinginmindthat“Changereadinesstakesacriticallookattheorganization'sresolve,fitandcapacitytosuccessfullydeliverthebenefitsofaproposedprogramorproject,andinitiatesappropriateactionstobringacurrentstateofreadinesstooneofconfidenceinlongtermsuccessoftheprogram/projectoutcomes”(p.6).Andlongtermvalueistheintentbehindtheintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.13.5TheRoadAheadandHowtoPrepareforItInordertoeffecttransformationalchange,topleadershipwithintheorganizationmustbefully“onboard”tosupportandchampiontheeffortasnotedintheHarringtonetal.(2015)SUSTAINmodelandKotter's(1996)changemodel.Thisisanimportantaspectofanychangeprogram.Employeesandotherleaderswithintheorganizationwillbequicktodetectalackofseniorleadershipsupportorengagement,andwillrespondwiththeirown,mirroredlackofengagement,andinsomecasesactiveresistance.Withoutcommittedandsustainedleadershipsupport,thelikelyresultisthattheorganizationwillultimatelyreverttotheoldwayofdoingthings.Withseniorleadershipcommittedtoandpersonallyengagedinachievingthebenefitsthechangewillbringabout,otherswithintheorganizationwillbeinspiredtodowhatittakestoseethechangethroughsothatitsucceedsandcontinuestoproducevaluefortheorganizationwellintothefuture.13.6SummaryResearchindicatesthatcompaniesthatadoptformalapproachestointegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesarelikelytoachievemorecompleteintegrationofthosedisciplines(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013).Transformationofanintegratedenterpriseiscriticalformaintainingcompetitivenessinadynamiceconomy.Integration,however,requireschange.Forthechangetobesuccessful,asystemsapproachtoimplementingchangeisrequired.Butchangeprogramsarenotoriousforfailingtoachievetheirobjectives.Beingalerttocommonsourcesofchangefailurecanhelptoavoidthesecommonpitfalls.

324Transformationalchangealsorequiresaholisticapproachthateffectivelyintegratesthespecificationandanalysisofthecurrentstate,thearticulationofafuturestate,andtheactualexecutionofthetransformationtoachievethespecifiedfuturestatevision.Thisisnotachievablewithoutaleadershipteamthatremainscommittedandengagedtothechangeeffort,understandstheneedtoimplementasystemofperformancemetrics,ensuresaflowofinformationacrosstheenterpriseincludingsuppliersandcustomers,andsponsorsasystemoforganizationallearningthatpromotessharingandcollaborationacrosstheprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers.Successfulchangeisincumbentuponunderstandingandincorporatingstakeholdervaluepropositions,bothwhattheywantandwhattheycontributetotheenterprise.Enablingasuccessfultransformationrequiresfocusondoingtherightthingbeforedoingitright.Lastlyitincludesunderstandingbothinternalandexternalinterdependencies.Thevignettespresentedinthenextchapterillustratethescaleandscopeofsuchsignificantchangeinitiatives.Theypresenttransformationalchangeprogramsperformedinsomeofthelargestandmostsuccessfulorganizationsintheworld.Intheseexamples,theimportanceofcarefulplanningandthesustainedengagementofseniorleaderscannotbeoverstated.Additionally,thereaderwillnodoubtnoticethateachoftheseinitiativesdescribeeffortsthatspanmonthsandinsomecasesyears,andimpactnearlyeveryaspectoftheorganization.Mostimportantly,theseeffortsarenotmerelyactivitiesthat“tinker”atthefringesoftheorganization.Rather,thechangesdescribedilluminatestrategiceffortsdesignedtopermanentlyalterthewaytheentireorganizationoperatesandperforms.Thispointshouldnotbetakenlightly.Whetherthechangeinitiativeisplannedforalarge,complexmultinationalenterprise,asmallbusiness,anonprofit,orapublicinitiative,theintegrationprogramwillhaveanimpactup,down,andacrosstheorganization—andtodeliverandsustainthetargetedbenefitsandimprovements,willmodifythewaytheorganizationperformsitsworknowandinthefuture.IBM(2008)reportedfindingsfromitssurveyofCEOsregardingstrategyimplementation.Thetopchallengestosuccessincluded:Changingmindsetsandattitudes(58%)Corporateculture(49%)Underestimationofcomplexity(33%)Thisfactmaygivepausetoallwhoareconsideringperformingsuchatask.Tohelpsoftenthischallengeandgiveguidancetoleadersabouttoembarkontransformationaljourneysfortheirorganizations,Chapter15providesguidancedesignedtolaythegroundworkforthemissionahead.13.7DiscussionQuestions1.Whatareexamplesoftransformationinitiativesorchangesthatyourenterprisehasalreadyexperienced?Werethesesuccessful?Whyorwhynot?2.Whyistakingasystemsapproachtotransformationmorelikelytosucceed?

3253.Describeaprograminwhichyouwereinvolvedandhowyouwentaboutidentifyingkeystakeholdersandgainingtheircommitmenttochange.Whatlessonsdidyoulearnintheprocess?4.Whattechniqueshaveyoufoundusefulformappinginternalandexternalinterdependencies?5.Canyouidentifyeffectivechangeagentsinyourprogrammanagementorganization?Whataboutinyoursystemsengineeringorganization?6.Identifyachangetransformationcaseinyourprogramandreflectonwhoresistedandwhytheyresisted.Inyourview,didtheprogrammanagerorchiefsystemsengineerattempttofunctionasachangeagent?13.8ReferencesAllison,S.(2014,February10).Theresponsiveorganization:Copingwithnewtechnologyanddisruption.Forbes.Retrievedfromwww.forbes.com/sites/scottallison/2014/02/10/theresponsiveorganizationhowtocopewithtechnologyanddisruption/Clarkson,M.(1995).Astakeholderframeworkforanalyzingandevaluatingcorporatesocialperformance.AcademyofManagementReview,20(1),92–117.doi:10.5465/AMR.1995.9503271994Combe,M.(2014a).Changeagility:Readinessforstrategyimplementation.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/learning/changeagilityreadinessforstrategyimplementation.ashxCombe,M.(2014b).Changereadiness:Focusingchangemanagementwhereitcounts.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org/learning//media/PDF/Knowledge%20Center/FocusingChangeManagementWhereitCounts.ashxConforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia,USA.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxFeng,W.,Crawley,E.F.,deWeck,O.L.,Lessard,D.R.,&Cameron,B.G.(2012,October).Understandingtheimpactsofindirectstakeholderrelationships:Stakeholdervaluenetworkanalysisanditsapplicationtolargeengineeringprojects.InStrategicManagementSocietySMSAnnualConference.Freeman,R.E.(1984).Strategicmanagement:Astakeholderapproach.Boston,MA:Pitman.Harrington,H.J.,Voehl,F.,&Voehl,C.F.(2015).Modelforsustainablechange.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/learning/Model_for_Sustainable_Change.ashx

326IBM.(2008).Makingchangework:Continuingtheenterpriseofthefutureconversation.Armonk,NY:IBMCorporation.Retrievedfromwww935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/gbe03100usen03makingchangework.pdfInternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).(2015).Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.).D.Walden,G.Roedler,K.Forsberg,R.Hamelin,T.Shortell(Eds.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.Kotter,J.(1996).Leadingchange.Cambridge,MA:HarvardBusinessSchoolPress.LeanAdvancementInitiative(LAI).(2012).LAIenterpriseselfassessmenttool(LESAT)version2.0:Facilitator'sguide.Retrievedfromhttps://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/84694/PRD_LESAT_2_Facilitators_Guide_Feb2012.sequence=1Lewin,K.(1947).Frontiersingroupdynamics:Concept,methodandrealityinsocialscience;socialequilibriaandsocialchange.Retrievedfromhttp://hum.sagepub.com/content/1/1/5McKinney,D.,Arnold,E.,&Sheard,S.(2015).Changeagencyforsystemsengineers.INCOSEInternationalSymposium.25(1),1209–1231.doi:10.1002/j.23345837.2015.00125.xMiller,D.,&Oliver,M.(2015).Engagingstakeholdersforprojectsuccess.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/learning/engagingstakeholdersprojectsuccess.ashxMitchell,R.K.,Agle,B.R.,&Wood,D.J.(1997).Towardatheoryofstakeholderidentificationandsalience:Definingtheprincipleofwhoandwhatreallycounts.AcademyofManagementReview,22(4),853–886.doi:10.5465/AMR.1997.9711022105Murman,E.,Allen,T.,Bozdogan,K.,CutcherGershenfeld,J.,McManus,H.,Nightingale,D.…Widnall,S.(2002).Leanenterprisevalue:InsightsfromMIT'sleanaerospaceinitiative.London,England:PalgraveMacmillan.Nightingale,D.J.,&Srinivasan,J.(2011).Beyondtheleanenterprise:Achievingandsustainingsuccessfulenterprisetransformation.NewYork:AMACOMPress.Ogburn,C.,Jr.(1957).Merrill'smarauders:Thetruthaboutanincredibleadventure.Harper'sMagazine,214(1280).Retrievedfromhttps://archive.org/stream/harpersmagazine214alde#page/n39/mode/2upProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013a).Managingchangeinorganizations:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013b).Aguidetotheprojectmanagementbodyofknowledge(PMBOK®Guide)(5thed.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.

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328NewYork:Doubleday.

32914SUCCESSFULCHANGEPROGRAMSTHATIMPROVEDINTEGRATION14.1IntroductionThischapterpresentsfiveshortcasestudies,orvignettes,describingchangeeffortstodeveloporstrengthenintegrationcapabilitiesinengineeringprogramsandorganizations.Thevignetteswerechosentoillustratethediversityofintegrationchallengesthatanorganizationmightface,andeachhighlightstheapplicationofdifferentfacetsoftheintegrationprinciplesdiscussedpreviously.Theyalsoillustratedifferentapproachestakentocreatethechangesneededtoincreasethelevelofintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringorrelatedtechnicaldisciplines.Assuch,thischapternotonlyillustratestheelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkpresentedinPartII,butalsoprovidesexamplesofwaystoimplementthem.Theeffortsdescribedinthevignettestakeplaceatbothprojectandprogramlevels.Thisillustratesthemultiscalenatureoforganizationalchange.Individualchangeprojectswithdiscreteoutcomeobjectivesmaybepartofanoverallprogramwithalargersetofbenefitstotheorganizationanditsstakeholdersdefined.Whenaformalchangeeffortisundertakenwithinaprogram,itcaninsomewaysbeconsideredasecondprogramwithinorparalleltotheprogram,withbenefitsdeliveredtotheprogramandtothelargerorganization.Themanagerofthesechangeprogramsmayeitherbeadedicatedchangeprogrammanager(tobediscussedinmoredepthinChapter15),amanagerwithintheprogram,orabusinessleaderinthelargerorganization.Thevignettesthatfollowwilldiscusschangeactivitieswithinspecificprojectsorprogramstodeliverproductsorservices,butwithinthecontextofaprogramtoproducesustainedchangeacrossprojectsandprogramsinthelargerenterprise.Thefirstvignettedescribessomeoftheearliesteffortstointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.ItshowshowthroughanumberofdifferentactionsLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompanywasabletoincreasethesuccessrateofthehighlyclassifiedCoronaSatelliteProgramfrom50%to80%in18months,andsubsequentlyto97%threeyearslater.Theseimprovementsresultedfromasignificantrevisionoftheprogrammanagementprocessesbyintegratingsystemsengineeringintothem.ThesecondvignetteillustratesthepioneeringuseofcertificationprogramstobetterintegrateprojectandprogrammanagementwithsystemsengineeringbytheU.S.governmentintheCentralIntelligenceAgency,theFederalAcquisitionInstitute,andtheDepartmentofVeteranAffairs.Inmanyinstances,professionalsinthoseagencieswereexposedtosystemsengineering,andtheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringforthefirsttimethroughthecertificationprocess.

330Thethirdvignettefocusesonsoftwaredevelopment,particularlytheintegrationandcollaborationbetweensoftwareengineersandprogrammanagers,atNationwideMutualInsuranceCompany.NationwidediscoveredthatsometeamswereperformingexceptionallywellusingAgiledevelopmentpractices,butothersusingthesamepracticesfailed.Theydiscoveredthatthekeysuccesscriteriawerealignmentand“cotransformation”oftheprogrammanagementorganizationalongwiththe“frontline”ITdevelopmentorganization.ThefourthvignettedescribesahighlysuccessfultransformationactivityundertakenbyBMW'sEngineeringDivision.Inordertomeetambitiousstrategicobjectives,engineeringproductivityneededtogrowby30%.Achangeprogrammanagementofficeorchestratedthetransformationprocessfromtheleadershiplevel,withathreeprongedapproachtoeffectchangeontheoperationallevel.Thefocusoftheeffortswastoincreasecollaborationacrossallboundaries,whichresultedinasignificantchangeinthewaydevelopmentprogramsweremanaged.ThefifthvignetteillustratesintegrationmechanismsthatwereemployedduringtheBostonBigDigprogram.Itdeliveredtheworld'smostcomplexinnercityandhighwayprogram,takingonanumberof“World'sFirst”technicalchallenges.Anumberofmechanismsrequiredtomanageaprogramofsuchcomplexityhadatitscoretheneedforgreaterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Theestablishmentofthesemechanismswastheprincipaldriverforintegrationintheprogram.Together,thediversityofexperiencesandapproachesdisplayedinthesevignetteshelptoillustratethepointthatthereisunlikelytobea“onesizefitsallapproach”tochange,aseachorganizationalandengineeringchallengeisdifferent.Theyalsodemonstratethatthiskindofchangeinprocesses,practices,andmindsetscomesfromactiveandsustainedeffortbytheorganizationanditsleaders.14.2RedefiningWhatIsPossible:TheMarriageofSystemsEngineeringandProgramManagementatLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompanyIn1957,theDiscovererSatelliteProgram(Coronawastheclassifiedname)wasstartedatLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany(LMSC).Thisprograminvolvedasetofnewtechnologies,includingthedevelopmentofasatellitethatcouldcarryphotographicequipmentandthatwouldprovideimagesofthenSovietactivities.Thegoalwastoachievesurveillancecapabilitiesequivalentto,andevenbroaderthan,thoseforwhichtheU2spyplanehadbeencountedonuntilitanditspilothadbeenshotdownoverRussia.ThisinformationwasconsideredcriticaltoU.S.defensepostureandtotheabilitytonegotiateanymilitaryandpoliticalaccommodationswiththeSovietUnion.ItbecameanEisenhoweradministrationmajorthrustwithbothcapabilitiesandscheduleaskeymotivations.ResponsibilitywasassignedtotheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency.Thiscasestudy1describesthedevelopmentofanintegratedprogrammanagementapproachatLMSCintheyearswhenthesystemsengineeringdisciplinewasstillinitsearlystages.

331LMSCSpaceSystemsDivisionwaschosenforthishighlyclassifieddevelopmentaleffort,whichwassoonacceleratedin1958afterthelaunchofSputnikbyRussia.Thefirstattempttolaunchthissysteminaproofofflightfashionblewuponthelaunchpad.Thenext12oftheseallhaddisastrousoutcomesuntilfinally,onAugust12,1960afterasingledayinorbit,Discoverer13yieldedacapsulerecoveredwithexposedfilm.Imaginghadbeenprovidedfroma24inchcameraandfilmtransportedintoarecoverycapsule.Thissuccessgeneratedhighexpectationsthatthiswouldprovidetheoverheadreconnaissanceneededthenandforthefuture.Indeed,CoronaprovidedmajorknowledgeofSovietandChinesemilitaryactivitiesuntil1972,when,afterhavingachievedanear100%successratewithuptofivefootgroundresolution,successorspacesystemswithmoreadvancedtechnologytookover.Butby1961itwasstillahighriskpropositionwiththegoalofachieving20footgroundresolutionimagery,obtainableonlythroughloworbitflightcircuitingtheEarthevery90minutes.Becauseofneedandfailurerates,launchesoccurredeverytwotofourweekswithorbitaltimeofuptofourdaysandcapsuleretrievalthroughsnaringaparachutedrecoveryvehiclecontainingafilmcassette.ThisdifficultexercisewasaccomplishedoverthePacificOceanusingalanyarddeployedfromtherearofanaircraftbasedinHawaii.ExtensivetrainingforthisremarkableoperationbytheU.S.AirForcewasrequired.Thewholeoperationinvolvedmanyelementsforpotentialfailure,fromthelaunchoftheDiscovererAgenasatelliteonThorDeltarockets,originallyintendedforballisticmissiles,tostabilityandcontrolofthespacecraftonceseparatedfromthelaunchvehicle.Addedtothiswerethemultifacetedelementsofspacecraftperformance,thatofthecamerasystemandtheretrievalofthefilm,and,finally,theseparationandrecoveryofthe“bucket”followingsecurecommandstoanonboardcomputer.Infact,outofthefirst30missionsthrough1961,only12wereconsideredsuccesses.Asuccessrateofonly50%forthesystembecamealmostacceptable,althoughtheAirForceandotheragenciesinvolvedintheprogramweredismayedatthelosses,recognizingtheimportanceofthephotographyaswellasthecostsofthesystem.ExplainingfailuresandthecorrectiveactionnecessaryaftereachfailureinvolvedhighlysophisticatedanalysisonthepartofLockheedandthetwoassociates,ITekforthecameraandGeneralElectricforthecapsule,buteachfailurewasanalyzedthoroughly,withthecauseofthatfailureaddressed.Unfortunately,thesourcesseemedtoberandom.Followingonefailureatacriticaltimeofgovernmentneed,theUndersecretaryoftheAirForcecametoLockheedinordertohearanexplanationofthelatestfailureandhowLockheedwasgoingtoachieveahighersuccessrate.Afterlisteningtothebriefing,hesaidpointedly:Lockheed,youpeopledoanincrediblejoboffailureanalysis,butyoudon'tseemtodoanequivalentjobforsuccess.Thisisaverycomplexsystemwe'redealingwithandthisisasystemsissue.Nowwhoisyourchiefsystemsengineer?LMSCSpaceSystemsDivisionstaffunfortunatelywasnotfamiliarwiththetermandtriedtoanswerwithavarietyofidentificationswithintheengineeringorganization.Afterall,theexistingclassicmatrixorganizationfollowedcloselythesuccessfulprojectengineertechnicalleadershipapproachoftheaircraftdivisions.Thisclearlydidnotsatisfytheundersecretary

332andheleftwithsomeveryuncomfortablecommentsandsuggestedthatLockheedsenditskeyengineeringmanagementtoreviewwhathecalled“systemsengineering”withGeneralShriever'sBallisticMissileDivisionoftheAirForce,whichhadbeendevelopingaprocessofanalysisanddesignatasystemslevelwithDr.SimonRamoandpersonnelofthenewRamoWoolridgeorganization.Followingshortlythereafter,achiefsystemsengineer,reportingdirectlytotheprogrammanager,wasappointedwiththetaskofunderstandingtheentireDiscovererprogram,allelementsastheyinteractedwitheveryaspectofthesystem,theirindividualfailuremodes,and,moreimportantly,eachelement'sinterfacesinternallyandexternally,identifyingtheirimplicationstosuccessorfailure.Thisintegratedsystemsapproachstartedwithrequirementsandtheirunderstanding,includingadefinitionofthemeansbywhichtheycouldbeverifiedasfulfilled,establishingacomplete,fivetieredarchitectureforthesystem,thenevaluatinganentiresetofelectricalandelectroniccircuitsaswellasstructural/mechanicalelements,allthroughintegratedschematics.Failureanalysiswasconductedviathese“tools,”evaluatingeachnodewithintheschematicsfortheirpotentialforfailureandnecessarypreventivemeasures.Evenmoreimportantwastherecognitionthattheirinterfacesinvolvedatleasttwonodesbeyondthepointbeinganalyzed—asignificantbasisforidentifyingrootsourcesoffailurepluscorrectiveaswellasfaulttolerantactions.Thesignificanceofthiseffortwasevidentthroughanimprovementfrom50%successrateto80%injust18monthsandthen,withinthreeyears,to97%success.Theadditionofthechiefsystemsengineertotheprogramorganizationalsochangedtherelationshipoftheprogrammanagerfrombeingastrongcoordinatortobecomingdirectorofalldisciplinesmakinguptheprogram,includingtechnicalcognizanceandauthorityoverthosefromassociateandsubcontractororganizations,aswellasresponsibilityforintegratedschedulesandrelatedcontrols.Thisrequiredvigorousandinsistentcustomersupport,andatransformationofitsSpecialProjectsteamtoprovideleadershipandresponsivenessforthecriticalaspectsofengineeringandmanagementpartneredinmanywayswithLockheed'sprogramoffice.Thisactivity,ofcourse,involvedadditionalandselectivemanpower,modificationofresourceallocation,togetherwithbudgetandscheduleadjustments—amajorchangeofmentalitywithintheprogrammanagementorganization.Theendresultinvolvednotonlyengineeringimplementationthatincludedredesignforhardwareandsoftware,butalsoextensiveverificationandtestsrequiringfacilityandcommunicationinstallationsinthefactoryandatthelaunchsite,allcoordinatedand,inmostcases,directedbytheprogrammanager.ThisapproachsoonbecametheprototypeforallprogramswithintheSpaceSystemsDivision,aswellasbecomingarequirementinAirForceprogramprocurement.Italsogeneratedarestructuringoftheprogrammanagementorganization,establishingthechiefsystemsengineerastheleadtechnicalindividual.Thechiefsystemsengineerpositionincludedastaffresponsibleforestablishingrequirementsandspecifications;definingallinterfaces;chairing,performing,orcertifyingallfailureanalysisandchanges;andassuringthatmanufacturing,testing,anddeploymentactivitiessatisfiedrequirements.Withtheposition'ssupporting

333personnel,plusaprogramcontrolsmanagerresponsibleforscheduleandbudget,programleadershipbecameaneffectivetriumvirate:Programandprojectadministrativestructuresconsistedofprogrammanager(typicallywithanassistant),chiefsystemsengineer,andcontrolsgoverningeffectiveprogrammanagement.Thisdidnotobviatetherolesofthefunctionalelements(i.e.,engineeringdesign,changecontrol,andreliability),usuallypartofthechiefsystemsengineergroup,manufacturingassembly,andtest,andsoon,pluscontractandsubcontractrelations,procurement,andothersgenerallyinthepurviewoftheprogrammanager'sControlsorganization.Tofurtheremphasizetheprogrammanagementprimacythatdeveloped,someprogramswereabletoorganizefullyusingaprogramorganizationstructure,withengineering,assemblyandtest,and,inseveralcases,subcontractors,directlyreportingtotheprogrammanager.Whilethisbecamethenormforprogramstartupandmajorprogramcontinuum,itbecameevidentthatwithasmanyprogramsaswereunderway,therewasahoardingoftalentbythelargestwellestablishedprograms.Theimbalanceclearlyrequiredsharingthattalentandexperience,requiringthepartialreestablishmentofthematrixapproach,butwiththecontinuedmanagingroleoftheprogrammanagerandhisdirectlyreportingchiefsystemsengineerandControlsorganizations.Inaddition,themove,promotion,andsalaryreviewofanyindividualfromaprogramorganizedgroupsuchasdesignengineering,testandassembly,andprocurement,requiredthemutualagreementoftheprogrammanagerandthecentralorganizationhead.Sortingouttheseissuestooknearlyfiveyears,withinterchangesofkeyleadershippersonnel,compromisesreflectedinthereferencetostartups,andtransitiontocentralorganizationinvolvementasprojectsmatured.Asnoted,Discovererprogramresultssignaledthefutureapproachforallprograms,includingtheproposalphasesofmediumtolargesizeprojects.Thehistoryofallprogramsbecametruesuccessstories.Forexample,theevenmorecomplexsuccessortoDiscovererforoverheadreconnaissance,namedHexagon,haditsinitialvehiclescheduledfor30daysinorbit,butachieved56andhadnofailuresin13subsequentmissions.ThearrangementbecamesorelatedtoprogramsuccessthattheprogressionfromchiefsystemsengineertoprogrammanagerbecamethenormfortheLMSCSpaceSystemsDivisionorganizationtothepointthatseveralpresidentsofthatdivisioncamethroughsuchachainofassignments.Thus,muchasbecomingtheprojectengineerwasthegoalofaspiringengineersintheaircraftworld,thegoaloftheambitiousengineeratLockheedSpaceSystemswastobeachiefsystemsengineeronprograms,notinthestaffpositionunfortunatelyprescribedbymanyothercompanies,butasthechieftechnicalofficer.14.2.1DiscussionThenewsystemsengineeringfunctionintheDiscovererprogramintroducednotonlymorethoroughrootcauseanalysisoffailurestosolvetheimmediatechallengeofhighfailurerates,butalsoamoreproactivesystemlevelunderstandingandintegrationoftheprogramonthetechnicallevel.Itcreatedthethoroughengineeringunderpinnings,fromhighqualityrequirementsverificationprocedurestoafivetieredsystemarchitecture,forexecutinga

334successfulprogram.Italsoresultedinbetterorganizationalintegration.Thenewroleofchiefsystemsengineerdidnotcompetewiththeprogrammanager,butenabledthatroletogrowfromamere“strongcoordinator”toatruedirectorofalldisciplines.Systemsengineeringprovidedthe“layer”necessarytoconnectthehighlycomplexengineeringrealitywiththerequirementsofrunningalargeprogram.Theprogrammanagerwasthusabletounderstandandinfluencetechnicalissues,includingthoseatthesubcontractorlevel.Thiscreatedalogicalcareerprogressionfromchiefsystemsengineertoprogrammanagerto,inseveralcases,divisionpresidents.Theactionstakeninthisexampletoincreaseintegrationincluded:Integratingplanningandresourceallocationforengineeringeffortsintotheprogrammanager'sresponsibilitiesRestructuringrolesofmanagersandfunctionalleadsintheprogramandinthedivisionDevelopingpoliciestomanagestaffingtoensureanappropriateandequitablebalanceoftherighttechnicalpeopleacrossprogramsDevelopingleadershiptransitionpathsfromchiefsystemsengineerthroughprogrammanagerandaboveAdaptingtochallengesbytestingnewintegrationapproachesovertimetoseewhatworksPilottestingnewideasononeprogram,andthendiffusingbestpracticestoothers14.3UsingCertificationtoFosterIntegrationinU.S.GovernmentAgencyAcquisitionProgramsIntheearly2000s,anumberofU.S.governmentagenciescreatedandimplementedprojectandprogrammanagementcertificationprogramsformanagersoftechnicallycomplexsystemdevelopmentefforts.EventuallytheseeffortswerecombinedandadministeredcentrallythroughtheU.S.FederalAcquisitionInstitute.Duringtherolloutofthiscertificationprocess,itbecameapparentthattheprocessofcertificationwasaneffectivewaytobringaboutchangeintheseorganizations,inadditiontoraisingthecompetencyoftheworkforce,asshowninthiscasestudy.2“Wedon'tneedthis”wasalamentthatwasheardfrequentlywhiletheU.S.CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)wascreatingandimplementingitsprojectmanagementcertification.Itwasheardagainduringthecreationandimplementationofthefirstgovernmentwideprojectmanagementcertificationforcivilianfederalemployees,and,mostrecently,whentheU.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairscreatedandimplementeditsversionofthefederalprojectmanagementcertification.Specifically,thelamentinvolvedsystemsengineering.Itstemmedfromprojectmanagersaswellasotherswhowereinvolvedwithprojectswithrelativelylimitedscopeandrelativelylowcomplexity.Thecryemergedfromfederalgovernmentemployeeswhowereadvancingtheirprojectmanagementknowledgeandskills;thesepeoplewerebeingexposedtotheintegrationofprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringforthe

335firsttime.TheCIAwasanearlyadopterofprojectmanagement.Theearliestformswerehomegrown.LaterformsbenefitedfromtheinfluencesofindustrythoughtleadersincludingKevinForsbergandHalMoozwhocoauthoredthepopulargroundbreakingbookVisualizingProjectManagement(Forsberg,Mooz,&Cotterman,1996).Theselaterformswerebasedonadetailedmultistepcyclethatfullyintegratedprojectmanagementandsystemsengineering,andservedtheneedsofCIA'sexperiencedengineersresponsibleforthelargerandmorecomplexprojects.Thoselessexperiencedwhowereworkingonthelimitedscopeandlowcomplexityprojectsdidtheirbesttoadoptthefullyintegratedprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringlifecycle,buttheyquicklybecamefrustrated.Theirfrustrationgrew,notbecauseofalackofdedicationoreffort,butbecauseoflimitationsinexperience,knowledge,andskills.Thehundredsofactivities,products,andcontrolgatesassociatedwiththisintegratedlifecyclewerenotseensomuchasanaidthatcouldbetailoreddowntoservetheneedsoftheirprojects,butasabewilderingandburdensomeprescriptiontobefollowedindiscriminately.SeniorofficialsattheCIA,whounderstoodthebenefitsofwellmanagedprojectslargeandsmallandwhounderstoodthatallprojectsweresystems,launchedthecreationandimplementationoftheCIAwideProjectandProgramManagementCertification.Theheadoftheprojectmanagementofficeledthateffortduringtheearlytomid2000s.HewastoextendtheintegrationofprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringtoalltypesofCIAprojectsandprojectmanagers,andtoimplementthisinamannerthathelpedthousandsovercometheirperceivedfrustrationsandburdens.TheapproachheselectedinvolvedestablishingaCIAwidecertificationcompatiblewithAGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMI,2013)aswellasSystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE,2015)intheirthencurrentversions.Thisapproachinvolvedcreatingaknowledgeandskillbasedcertificationthathelpedtheemployeesunderstandnotjustthe“how”and“when”associatedwiththelifecycleelements,butalsothe“why.”Equippedwithanunderstandingaboutwhythelifecycleelementexistedandwhatpurposeitservedallowedemployeestomakeintelligentdecisionsaboutthevaluetotheirparticularprojectandtotailoritappropriately.Theapproachalsoinvolveddevelopingatieredcertificationsystem,dividingthecertificationintofourlevels;alllevelsincludedsomeaspectsofsystemsengineering,withthethirdlevelfocusingalmostentirelyonit.Inthisway,overaperiodoffiveyears,CIAemployeesincreasinglyappreciatedtherelevanceofsystemsengineeringintheirprojects;indeed,89%ofthemreportedthatitwasapplicabletotheirjobs,afull30percentagepointshigherthantheyreportedpriortothecertificationprogram.Duringthelate2000s,theFederalAcquisitionInstitutedevelopedandimplementedtheFederalAcquisitionCertificationforProgramandProjectManagers(FACP/PM).ThatcertificationwascreatedtoextendtheintegrationofprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringfromtheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)toallcivilianfederalemployees,especiallythoseinvolvedwithlimitedscopeandlowercomplexityprojects.Theapproachcalledforcreatingacompetencybasedprogramandincludedstructuringtheprograminthree

336levels;somesystemsengineeringwasincludedinalllevels.Thecompetenciesthatunderpinnedthisprogramweredevelopedbasedonsurveysofsubjectmatterexpertsatmanyofthefederalagencies.Thesesurveys,whichwerebasedonDoDDirective5000(“TheDefenseAcquisitionSystem”),identifiedhowoftenandhowimportantparticularprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringactivitieswere.ThecompetenciesresultingfromthesesurveysweremandatedbytheOfficeofFederalProcurementPolicyin2007.Agovernmentwidestudy,conductedin2011togetaglimpseintotheearlystagesofimplementationofthisprogram,foundthatprogresswasfurthestalonginagencieswherepositiveprojectmanagementandtrainingattitudesalreadyexisted,andmosthamperedinagenciesthathadlittlehistoryofsupportingprojectmanagementortraining.Sincethen,moreagencieshavemadeprogressthanksinnosmallparttothecertificationtrainingavailabletotheiremployeesthatwasprovidedbytheFederalAcquisitionInstituteatnocost.TheDepartmentofVeteransAffairs(VA)wasoneoftheagenciesthatwasoutinfrontwiththeimplementationofFACP/PMdiscussedabove.In2008theVAformedanAcquisitionAcademytoaddressthegrowingacquisitionworkforcechallengestheywerefacing;aprogrammanagementschoolwascreatedwithinthatacademythattailoredtheFACP/PMtotheVAmissionandworkforce.Ittoointegratedprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringintoacompetencybasedprogram,wastargetedatthoseinvolvedwiththesmallerandlesscomplexprojects,andwasstructuredinthreelevelswithsomesystemsengineeringateachlevel.Posttrainingmetricsindicatedthatstudentsreturnedtotheirjobsabletosuccessfullycompleteprojectstheyotherwisewouldhavestruggledwithorfailed.Duringonesystemsengineeringforprojectmanagersworkshop,participantsreactedtoanexercisethatmayhavebeenrepresentativeofthose“wedon'tneedthis”lamentssofrequentlyexpressedduringthepreviousdecade.Thereactionscamefrommanagersofrelativelylimitedscopeandcomplexityprojectsaseachofthemindividuallyworkedtocompleteaquickpacedtimedexercise.Theexercisewasstructuredwithmanylevelswhereprogressiontothenextandmoredifficultlevelrequiredthedemonstrationofincreasingamountsofsystemsthinking.Sincestudentswereawareofeachother'srateofprogressionthroughthelevels,aninformalatmosphereofcompetitionevolved.Duringthefirstfewlevels,manyofthestudentswereopenlyvocalwiththeirfrustrationsandlamentsabouthowsillyanduselesstheexercisewas.Astheexerciseprogressedandthestudentsbecamemoreexperiencedwithsystemsthinking,manyofthelamentsdieddown.Attheendoftheexercise,allbutoneofthestudentsdeclaredthattheylikedtheexerciseandunderstoodthevalueofsystemsthinkinginprojectmanagement.Thatonestudentexceptionstatedthathedidnotunderstandthepurposeoftheexercise.14.3.1DiscussionWhilethemajorityofthosewhoreceivedthecertificationtrainingwereprojectmanagers,thetrainingwasalsoapplicabletoprogrammanagers.Theimplementationofthesecertificationswaspartofaprogramtoenhancetheskillsetsoftheacquisitionworkforceandtoincreasetheirabilitytointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringacrossarangeof

337programandprojecttypes.Aspartofachangeprogram,itwasimportanttoaddresstheinitial(semiautomatic)rejectionofthecertificationcontent,particularlybymanagersinvolvedinsmallerandlesscomplexprojectswhofelttheydidnotneedtheformalityofsystemsengineeringpractices.Essentialtosuccesswasthatthecertificationwasbasedonatailoredandwellresearchedcompetencebasedmodel(the“What”),itwasamultitieredcertificationsystem(3–5levels)thatgraduallyincreasedtheparticipant'sappreciationoftheissuesandproblemsthatthecertificationaddressed(the“Why”),beforeprovidingthetoolsandmethodstodealwiththem(the“How”).Whilebasedondetailedprocessesandmethods,thecertificationemphasizedthedevelopmentoftheabilitytotailortheapproachtotheneedsofaparticularproject,includingappropriateprocesssimplifications(the“When”).Theexperienceshowedthatorganizationsthatrunsmallprojectsprofessionallywillalsorunbigprojectsprofessionally.Italsoillustratedtheneedtodevelopcompetencesstepbystep,toenabletheparticipantstoappreciatetheneedforcertainprocessesandmethodsbeforetheyareintroduced.Thisexamplealsoillustrateshowsuccessfulchangesachievedinoneareacanbereplicatedandevolvedintonewareasthroughachangeprogramtoenablesuccessacrossabreadthoforganizations.Theactionstakeninthisexampletoincreaseintegrationincluded:Createintegratedcertificationforprogrammanagersthatdrewonbothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringstandardstoraiseprogrammanagerawarenessofsystemsengineering.Providetrainingtoprogramandprojectmanagersonawidespreadbasis,regardlessofthesizeoftheirprogramsorprojects.Provideamultitieredcertificationsystemtohelpincreasethedepthofunderstandingabouttheintegrationissuesbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Capturesuccessfulpracticesandinsightsanddisseminatethemacrossmultiplelocations.14.4IntegratingSoftwareEngineeringandProgramManagementatNationwideNationwideMutualInsuranceCompanyisoneofthelargestandmostdiversifiedfinancialservicescompaniesintheUnitedStates.Thecompanyprovidesproductssuchasretirementplanning,autoandhomeinsurance,farmownerinsurance,andcommerciallinesinsurancetoendconsumersandintermediaries.RevenuesexceededUS$25billionin2015andthecompanyisforecastingstrongcontinuedgrowthintheyearstocome.Informationtechnology(IT)playsavitalroleinthecompany'sstrategyandindeliveringitsOnYourSidecustomerserviceandprotection.Assuch,NationwidespendsmorethanUS$1billiononITonanannualbasisandemploysthousandsofITemployees.Thiscasestudy3demonstrateshowNationwideachievedgreaterintegrationthroughamiddleoutchangeprograminitsITorganization.Thecompanyspendsasignificantportionofthisbudgetonsoftwareprojects,includingnew

338development,enhancementsofexistingsystems,purchasingsoftwarepackages,andintegrationofsystemsofacquiredcompanies.Projectsrangefromsmall(<$50K)toverylarge(>$50M)andeverythinginbetween.Priorto2009,thedeliveryoftheseprojectswasdoneintraditionalfashionusingprimarily“waterfall”developmentwithteamscreatedforspecificprojectdeliveriesledbyaprojectorprogrammanager.Theemphasiswasonastrictdevelopmentlifecycleandphases,tightcontrols,andextensiveplanning.Whilethecompanyhadagoodtrackrecordoffinishingprojects,theywereoftenlateindeliveryandqualitylevelswerelessthandesired.Atthesametime,afewprojectsorteamswithinITwerehavingtremendoussuccessdeliveringontimesolutionswithhighqualitylevels—levelsvirtuallyunheardofwithinthecompanyhallways.ThesegroupswereusingasoftwaredevelopmentphilosophyknownasAgiletoproducetheresults.ThecorecharacteristicsofNationwide'sAgileteamsatthetimewereshort,rapidcyclesofwork,businessinvolvementthroughoutthedevelopmentprocess,teamcollaborationandselfdirection,visualmanagement,reflection,andanemphasisonsoftwareengineeringexcellence.Theseteamsalsostayedtogetherfromprojecttoproject.Teamswerenotformedforprojects;rather,projectscametotheteams.Butnotallteamsusingthisphilosophyweredeliveringgreatresultsandtheprocessseemedtoparticularlyalienateprogrammanagers.Nationwide'sITleadersquicklyrecognizedthattheresultsofthesuccessfulteamsneededtobereplicatedthroughouttheorganizationtoachievequalityanddeliverygoals.AfewsuccessfulAgileteamsweregreattohave,butnotallthatimpactfulonanoverUS$1billionorganization.Successfulteamswerecharacterizedbyadisciplinedsystemofrulesandahighdegreeofcollaborationbetweenprogrammanagersandsoftwareengineers.Thoseteamsexperiencinglesssuccesswerecharacterizedbyalackofprocessdisciplineandanattitudeofexclusion.Inparticular,theyrelegatedprogramandprojectmanagementtotheperipheryofthedevelopmentlifecycle.Thiscreatedtwoprimaryproblems.First,inNationwide'scomplexenvironmentofthousandsofsoftwareapplications,noteamcanisolateitself.Changestoonesysteminevitablyimpactanother,andisolatedteamswithnoviewintootheractivitiescancausetremendousproblemsbynotunderstandingthedependencies.Second,theteamswereunabletoeffectivelycommunicatewithadiversesetofbusinesscustomers—theylackedthesavvyandknowledgeofhowandwhentoinvolvebusinesscustomersbeyondsettingthescopeoftheprojectandperiodiccheckins.Thequestionbecamethen,howtoscalethepracticesandprocessesofthesuccessfulteamsacrossthecompany?Theanswertothisquestionwasprovidedbystudyingthesuccessfulteamsthemselves,andinapivotfromthinkingaboutAgileinadevelopmentsilo,tothinkingaboutAgileandprogrammanagementtogether.Nationwidestumbledontothisconnectionwithoutknowingitatfirst.Inlookingatsuccessfulteams,theywerealwayscharacterizedbyaninterestedandsupportingmanagementsystem.Whereastheunsuccessfulteamshadcontentiousrelationshipswithmanagement—especiallyprogrammanagement—atbest,thesuccessfulteamshadmanagersthathadessentiallyadoptedthesamephilosophiesastheteamsandappliedthemtotheworkofmanagement.ThisledtothehypothesisthatitwasnotthatthefrontlinestaffwasunabletotransformatscaletothisnewAgilewayofdeliveringsoftware,

339butratherthatwithoutaparallelmanagementtransformation,theresultsweredoomed.Inotherwords,totransformthesoftwaredevelopmentsystem,managershadtochangenotonlythewaytheyviewedtheworkdonebythedevelopmentteams,butalsotheirownwayofworking.Nowherewasthismoreprevalentthaninprogrammanagement.Tothatpointintime,Nationwide'sprogrammanagerswerefocusedoncontrolandriskmitigation—meaning,detailedplanningactivitiesandresourceallocationswerefinetunedandthenappliedtothestaffingandcontroloftheteams'work.Theprogrammanagersactedatanarm'slengthdistancefromtheteams,preferringtofocusonthebigpictureofdeliveryandcontinuallyrefiningtheirplansandputtingincountermeasuresiftheplanwentofftrack.Weeklyormonthlystatusreportswerethenorm,alongwithformalizedandbureaucraticprocessesforanychangestotheplan.Theprogramplanwasking,andanyvariancefromtheplanonthepartoftheprojectwaslookeduponasaproblemtobesolvedbytheprojectmanager.Thecompanyusedmetricssuchasscheduleadherence,resourceutilization,andchangerate(change=bad)toevaluateteams.Redstatuswasviewedinanegativelightandprogrammanagerswereincentivizedtogettheprojecttogreenasfastaspossible,usinganymeansavailable.Theprimaryroleofthemanagerwhenaprojectwentofftrackwastogetitbackontrack.Butoftentherealquestionthatneededansweredwas,“Wastheprojecteverontherighttrackfromthestart?”ContrastthegoalsoftraditionalITprogrammanagementwiththatofAgilesoftwaredevelopment:deliverplannedresultsversusdeliverdesiredresults.ThisinsightatNationwidewasstronglydrivenbytheadoptionwithinseniorITexecutivesofa“growth”versusa“fixed”mindset,inspiredbyCarolDweck's(2006)bookMindset:TheNewPsychologyofSuccess.Traditionalprogrammanagementfocusesonplanning,changecontrols,andperiodicstatusreporting.Agilesoftwaredevelopmentfocusesondiscovery,shortlearningcycles,visualmanagement,anddailyhuddles.Thesetwoperspectivesaresetuptobeinconflictwitheachother.Tocorrectthesedifferences,thecompanyundertookatransformationinhowsoftwarewasdeveloped,andtherolesandexpectationsofallthoseinvolvedintheprocess.Aneworganizationwascreated,theApplicationDevelopmentCenter(ADC),withafocusontechnicalexcellenceandprocessdiscipline.TheADCbuiltuponthesuccessesoftheoriginalAgileteams,whileincorporatingthesupportingroles,includingtheprogrammanager,directlyintothemodel.Standardizedroledefinitionsandbehaviors,referredtoas“standardwork”weredefinedforeveryone.Accountabilityandreinforcementsystemswereputinplace.Apointtonotethoughisthatallofthesethingswereputinplacetocreateasystemthatlearnsandadapts,continuouslyimprovingprocessandpractices.Forprogrammanagers,thismeantchangestotheirdailyinteractionswiththeteams.First,anacknowledgmentwasmadethatnoteverythingcanbeplanned,andinfact,somethingsshouldnotbeplanned.Nationwide'sprojectplanswereimplyingalevelofprecisionthatbeliedtheabilitytoaccuratelyscheduletheunknown.Softwaredevelopment,similartoproductdevelopment,canhavestandardprocessestogettoananswer,butcannothavestandardizedanswers,whichiswhatmanyoftheprogrammanagersweretryingtodointheirplanning.Whentheinevitableproblemhappened,insteadoflookingatitasanopportunitytolearn,

340programmanagementlookedatitasanuisancetobecorrectedatallcosts.ThestandardworkofprogrammanagersincludednewrulesonhowtointeractwiththeADCteams.Thisincludedparticipationindaily“huddlemeetings”(a15minutemeetingrelyingonvisualmanagementboards,focusingonprogress,problemsneedinghelp,andcreatingtransparencyandaccountability),usageofthevisualmanagementboardsforrealtimestatusupdates,actingasanescalationpointfortheteams,andcoordinatingdependenciesthroughavisualrepresentationintheteamworkareas.Newmetricswereputinplacetodrivetherightbehaviors.Scrappedweremetricssuchaschangerateandresourceutilizationinfavorofteamproductivityandcustomerhappiness.Allmetricsfortheprogramsweredisplayedvisuallytocreateanenvironmentoftransparencyandaccountability.Iftheteamwasnotmeetingitsgoals,theneveryoneneededtoknowaboutitandbeinvolvedinfindingasolution.Theprogrammanagerbecameacoachofsortsfortheteam.Thenewprimaryroleoftheprogrammanagerevolvedtoprovidetheguardrailsandgoals,whilenotmicromanagingeverypartofthesolution.Theresultsofthetransformationwereincredible.Intheperiod2009–2015,criticaldefectsreleasedintoproductiondecreasedby50%peryear,everyyear,onaverage.Employeeengagement(asmeasuredthroughGallup'sQ12process)increasedeveryyearaswell.Productivitylevelsalsoincreased,withover75%ofreleasesaboveindustrybenchmarks.Moreimportantforlongtermsustainabilityweretheunderlyingculturalchangesthatoccurred.Allmembersoftheteamsarealignedtowardacommonpurposeindeliveringgreatsolutionsforcustomers.Theprogrammanagementandtechnicalstaffarenolongeradversarialandinsteadworktogethertosolveproblems,eliminatingacultureofdistrustandblame.Nationwidecreatedacultureofcollaborationandintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsoftwareengineeringstaffthatcontinuestoprovidetremendousvalueforallstakeholders.14.4.1DiscussionThechangesdescribedinthiscaseinvolvedbothprogramsandprojects,buttheoverallefforttoimproveintegrationwasimplementedthroughachangeprogramthatworkedwiththeprogramsandprojects.TheresourcebaseforthechangeprogramreliedonanexistingLeanSixSigmainfrastructureinthecompanywithacadreofchangeagents/facilitatorstohelpwithtrainingandimplementation.NationwidediscoveredthatmanyestablishedprogrammanagementpracticesoftenhinderedsuccesswithAgileprojectsbecausetheytriedtoenforcetraditionalcontrolandriskmanagementpracticesthatwereincompatiblewiththeAgileapproach.Traditionalprimarysuccessmetricswerescheduleadherence,resourceutilization,and(low)changerates,becausechangewasseenassomethingbad.Anewmindsethadtobedeveloped:focusmanagementattentionon“desiredresults”ratherthan“plannedresults.”AnewentitycalledtheApplicationDevelopmentCenterbecametheorganizationthathelpedtoinstillthisnewmindsetthroughoutboththesoftwareengineeringaswellastheprogrammanagementcommunity,andfocusedbothontechnicalexcellenceaswellasprocessdiscipline.Programmanagerschangedtheirteaminteractionsfromweeklyormonthly“statusreports”todaily

341interactions,focusingonmeaningfulrollingplanningactivitiesatausefulandrealisticlevelofdetail.Theperformancemeasurementsystemwaschangedtoevaluateteamproductivityandcustomerhappiness,andperformancetrackingwasdoneinatransparentandopenlyvisualway.Thisresultedinsignificantimprovementsacrosstheboard,includingcontinuoussignificantreductionofcriticaldefects,increaseinemployeeengagement,veryhighproductivitylevels,andapervasiveculturethatfocusedondeliveringgreatsolutionsforcustomers.Theactionstakeninthisexampletoincreaseintegrationincluded:Changeprogramtoimproveprogrammanagementintegrationwithdevelopers,leveragingexistingchangeagentsandinfrastructuretorolloutchangeinitiativesacrossthecompany.TrackdowntherootcauseofinconsistentexecutionofAgileacrosstheorganization:alackofprocessdisciplineandanattitudeofexclusionbetweenprogramandprojectmanagementandthesoftwaredevelopers.RedefinetheprogrammanagementorientationtobetteralignwiththeAgiledevelopmentapproach.CreatetheApplicationDevelopmentCenterwithafocusontechnicalexcellenceandprocessdiscipline.Createstandardworkformanagersexplaininghowtheyshouldinteractwiththedevelopmentteams,includingreportingandpriorities.Developanewsetofperformancemetricsforprogrammanagerstotrackdevelopmentprogress.14.5ManagingChangeinEngineeringProgramOrganizations:BoostingProductivityinBMW'sEngineeringDepartment14.5.1IntroductionThiscasestudy4describesachangeprogramthatunfoldedovertheperiodfrom2007to2012.ItwasmanagedbyaprogrammanagementofficeandinvolvedalargenumberofindividualprojectstobringabouttheoverallvisionoftheBMWGroupandtheBMWengineeringdivisioncontributiontoachievingthatvision.Theintegrationofthemanyprojects,mostofthemtechnical,resultedinamoreintegratedprogrammanagementandengineeringenvironment.14.5.2BMWCompanyBackgroundTheBMWGroupisoneofthemostsuccessfulcarandmotorcyclemanufacturersintheworld.BMW,MINI,andRollsRoycearethreeofthestrongestpremiumbrandsintheautomobile

342industry.BMWisregardedasoneoftheworld'smostreputablecompanies,settingrecordsforreputationexcellencewithconsumers.BMWreportedthebestsalesvolumeperformanceeverachievedinthecompany'shistoryin2011,withalltimesalesrecordsforeachofitsBMW,MINI,andRollsRoyceMotorCarsbrands(1.7millionin2011,up21%from2006.)Despitethesesignificantachievements,BMWGroupisrelativelysmallcomparedwiththebigglobalautomanufacturers.Itsfinancialperformance,brandvalue,reputation,andtechnologybasewouldmakeitanattractiveacquisitiontarget.In2007thecompanylaidoutastrategyforthefuturecalledNumberONEthatidentifiedactionsneededtocontinuetogrowandremainastrongandindependentautomanufacturer.14.5.3TheChallengefortheEngineeringOrganizationKlausDraegerbecameamemberoftheOperatingBoardofBMWwithresponsibilitiesforresearchanddevelopmentinNovember2006.Hefacedatremendouschallenge:notonlywastheEngineeringDivision(the“EDivision”)alreadystretchedtothelimit,butmidandlongtermcorporatestrategycalledforyetanotherpushtogrowthenumberofofferedmodelswhileatthesametimemaintainingastableengineeringworkforce.ThegoalthatemergedwastoincreasetheefficiencywithintheEngineeringDivisionbyonethird,whichwasinterpretedasincreasethenumberofdevelopmentprojectsbyonethird,reducethedevelopmentleadtimebyonethird,improveproductqualitybyonethird,anddoallofthisusingthesamebudgetandstaffingbytheyear2012.Atthesametime,engineeringwastoremainonthefrontlineofBMWstrategy,withagoalofstabilizingengineeringspendingat5–5.5%oftotalrevenues.Anaggressiveinnovationstrategycombinedtheevolutionarydevelopmentofcombustionengineswith“revolutionary”developmentofalternativehybridandfullyelectricdrivetrains;increasedthestandardizationoftheproductarchitecture,commonality,andmodularityofsystemstorealizecostefficiency;andsupportedthelongtermgrowthstrategywithanincreasingsizeoftheproductportfolio(seeFigure141).

343Figure141:OneofthechallengesfacingtheEDivisionatBMW:AnexpandingrangeofvehiclesSource:BMWJune2012investorpresentation.14.5.4EngineeringChangeandIntegrationProgramTheEngineeringDivisionrespondedwiththeE3Program,anintegratedchangemanagementprogramthathadfivemajoraspects(seeFigure142).

344Figure142:ThefiveelementsofBMW'sengineeringtransformationprogram14.5.4.1BMWCorporateandDivisionStrategyTheE3Programwasputintoplacetotransformtheengineeringorganizationtoastatewhereitwouldbeabletosupporttheveryambitiouscorporatestrategyincludinganexpansionofthemodelrange,increaseofvehiclequality,andreductionofengineeringcostpervehicle,withastablenumberofemployees.Thetransformationactivitiesaddressedthreetoplevelchallenges,expressedinthename“E3”:Exhilaratingproducts.Howcouldtheengineeringdivisionbeclosertothecustomer'sneedsandmoreresponsivetothecustomer'sneeds?Howcouldengineeringactivitiesbetterfocusonwhatreallycreatesvalueforthecustomer;andultimatelyincreasecustomersatisfactionandgrowthecustomerbase?Howcouldthecompanychangesomefundamentalattitudesabout“whatthecustomerwants”andhowcouldthecompanytechnicallydeliveritthroughitsproduct?Efficientprocessesandstructures.Howcouldthecompanydevelopbetterproducts,inlesstime,andforlessmoney?Howcouldthecompanydevelopmoreproducts,andmoreexcitingproducts,andimproveproductivityandinnovationwithoutdrivingupcostandleadtime?Emotionsandteamspirit.Howcouldthecompanydevelopopennessandwillingnessforchange?Howcouldthecompanyassurethatemployeestakeownershipofandresponsibilityforchange?Howcouldthecompanyenablemanagerstobeeffectiveleaders

345ofchange?Howcouldthecompanymaintainanattractiveandinspiringworkenvironment,aswellaskeepeveryoneemployedwhileatthesametimedrasticallyimprovingproductivity?14.5.4.2E3ProgramManagementOffice:LeadershipandGovernanceAtthetoplevel,anintegratedleadershipteamstartingwiththeheadoftheEDivisionprovidedthenecessaryguidance,visibility,andresourcestotheE3program.Theleadershipteamwasinvolvedinthedefinitionoftheprogramobjectives,itsexecution,anditssupervision.ItincludedtheentiretoplevelmanagementteamoftheEDivision,whichwasakeyfactorinassuringthatthetransformationprogramfocusedonachievinganoveralloptimalsolutionacrossthefunctionaldomainsinengineering.Eachmanagerwasempoweredandheldaccountablefortheresultsintheirareasofresponsibility.TwointernaldepartmentsinparticularplayedvitalrolesintheE3changeeffortsandwerecoordinatedthroughtheProgramManagementOffice(PMO):EngineeringStrategyDepartment(partoftheEDivision)andChangeManagementConsultingDepartment(partofthehumanresourcesdivision).WithinBMW,thevariousstrategyandprocessdevelopmentgroupsassociatedwiththedifferentdepartmentswithintheengineeringdivisionalsoplayedamajorroleinsupportingtheE3programandwerealignedthroughthePMO.About20peoplewereinvolvedincentralPMOactivities(thoughnotallfulltime):SixfulltimestaffinthePMO,whichrepresentedabout80%ofthestaffingfromthestrategydepartment,withotherparticipantsfromControllingandInternalCommunicationsTwosupportstaffforbenchmarkingactivitiessupportingE3ThreeleadinganddevelopingbottomupimprovementactivitiesOthersprovidingconsultingsupportforspecificE3projects14.5.4.3E3ProjectsBenchmarkingstudiesbythestrategygroupshowedthatotherGermanpremiumcarmanufacturersheldastructuraladvantageoverBMWastheywerepartoflargercorporationsandbenefitedfrom“engineeringeconomiesofscale”throughplatformarchitectures.IfBMWwastoremainindependent,itwouldhavetodramaticallyincreaseitsengineeringefficiency.Manyofthethingsthatwouldhavetobeimprovedincludedengineeringprocesses,productdesignandproductlifecyclemanagement,andthewayinwhichengineeringprojectsweremanaged.Inshort,thechangesaddressedactivitiesthatspannedtheentireEDivisionand,consequently,wouldconstitutestrategicinitiativesinthedivision.Indecidinghowtoapproachthesestrategicinitiatives,thereweretwofundamentaloptions:haveexecutivesdefineprojectsandtellthemanagementwhattodoorempowerthemanagementtoidentifyandsolvechallengesthemselves.Acombinationofbothapproacheswaschosen.Initially,tobeabletorapidlyaddressthebiggestchallenges,theECircleconvenedandbyMay2007hadidentifiedthetop25challenges;laterthesebecamethefirstE3

346projects.Whilethelargescaleprojectsstartedup,itwasclearthatmanyofthemwouldnotyieldtangibleresultsforayearormore.Thequestionarose:Howcouldtheentireengineeringorganizationbeinvolvedintheimprovementeffort?Afterseveralscoutingandbenchmarkingactivities,bothwithinandoutsidethecompany,theWertschöpfungsorientierungor“ValueOrientation”(WO)bottomupimprovementinitiativewasstartedbasedonLeanmanagementphilosophy.Acentralized,topdownprocesswasusedtodrivelargescalechangesintheorganization.ThisconsistedofatoplevelsteeringcommitteeledbytheheadoftheEDivisionthatdevelopedandprioritizedprojectstodrivesignificantchangeintotheengineeringorganization.Thoseprojectstypicallyaveraged2–3yearsinduration,butcouldbeshorterorlongerdependingontheprojectobjectives.Theprojectsinvolved20–500people.Examplesincludedprojectstoincreasestandardizationofproductarchitecture,increasepartscommonalitybetweenproductswithoutcompromisingcustomerfacingindividuality,andvirtualizationoftheexpensiveandlengthyprototypingprocess.OneofthestrongenablingpointsoftheE3projectswasaneffectivegovernancestructure.DirectoversightbyasmallexecutiveboardallowedE3projectmanagersdirectaccesstothetopmanagementlevel.Atthesametime,theprojectmanagersweresupportedbyanetworkofstrategyandprocessdevelopmentgroups.Thiscreatedseveralimportantenablersforrapidandeffectiveaction:Ahighlevelofmotivationforprojectmembers—beingassignedtoanE3projectwasseenasasignofhighreputationorstatusintheEDivisionClosealignmentoftheprojectswiththeoverallstrategicgoalsAccesstothenecessaryfundingAccesstotherightpeopleEffectivelyremovingobstaclesintheorganizationFastdecisiontimes14.5.4.4ValueOrientationAdecentralizedanddistributedbottomupapproachwasusedtoenableemployeestodrivelocal,smallscaleimprovements.ThoseactivitieswerecenteredonaLeanproductdevelopmentframeworkemphasizinginparticularefficiencyimprovements(i.e.,productivityimprovementsandcostreductions).Itprovidedaframeworkfordefiningandexecutingrelativelysmallscaleimprovementprojectsaswellasprovidingaprojectgovernanceandmonitoringsystemandastructuredwaytoengagecolleaguesfromotherorganizationalunits.Practicallyspeaking,themajorityoftheEDivisionpersonnelwouldnotdirectlycontributetoE3projects,buttheywouldneedtoplayasignificantroleinachievingthestrategictargets.Thiswasenabledthroughthebottomupinitiative.Leanprinciplesservedasafoundationforthisapproach.Engagingtheimprovementand

347problemsolvingabilitiesoftheentireEDivisionworkforcewasnecessaryinordertomeetthegroupstrategytargets.BMWalreadyhadexperiencewithapplyingLeanprinciplesandpracticesinitsproductionoperationsinitsWPS(BMWvaluecreationorientedorLeanproductionsystem).EngineeringStrategyDepartmentconsultantsbenchmarkedLeanapproachesstartingwithWPS,butalsoreadbooksandarticles,investigatedothercompanies,andworkedwithuniversityacademicstounderstandhowLeanwasbeingappliedinproductdevelopment.Afterstudyingwhatothersweredoing,BMWdecidedtocreateitsownprogramtodrivetransformationfromthe“engineeringshopfloor.”WOwasdevelopedas“theimplementationofE3atthelocallevel”or“E3foreveryone.”ThecoreoftheWOframeworkwasafocusonvalue,withanumberofotherwidelyacceptedLeanprinciplesaddedthatwereadaptedspecificallytotheproductdevelopmentsetting.Employeesformallyidentifiedchallengesandimprovementopportunitiesandpresentedthoseideastotheirsuperiors.Theyappliedforresourcesandsupportfromtheirownteams,andalsofromotherteams,toexecutethem.Tofacilitatethework,theimprovementactivitieswerestructuredaroundtheLeanphilosophy.Employeeswerealsoprovidedwithadefinedtoolboxofmethodsthattheycoulduseintheirprojects.AgroupofWOexpertswascreatedwhoreceivedtwo,3daytrainingsinLeanmethods.TheirtaskwastosupportcomplexWOprojectswiththeirexpertise.14.5.4.5EChangeLIFEEChangeLIFEwasadedicatedchangeprograminitiatedandsupportedbyboththeheadoftheEDivisionaswellastheBMWboardmemberresponsibleforhumanresources.Itsaimwastoinvolveall8,000membersoftheengineeringdivisioninthechangeprocess,startingwithnearlyallmanagers,tocreateopennessandwillingnessforchangeaswellasestablishafeedbackculture.Inessence,itwasmeanttotransformtheworkmindsetofallthemembersoftheEDivision,hencetheuseofLIFEinthetitle.Itconsistedofseveralmodules,discussingtheimperativesforchange,thecorporatestrategyandhowitrelatestotheengineeringstrategy,aswellasmechanismstoengageinthechange.Itcontainedvariousmechanismsforfeedbackamongmanagersandemployees.Thedayandahalfworkshopsweresetupinsuchawaythattheyprovidedopportunitiesforallemployeesoftheengineeringdivisiontointeractwithcolleaguesfromotherdepartmentswithinengineering.Theworkshopswereledbyupperandmiddlemanagersratherthantrainersorconsultantsandwerefollowedupby2hourworkshopsaboutsixmonthslater.Theworkshopstookplaceinacasualatmosphere.Towardtheendofeachworkshop,anexecutivewouldjointheworkshopandenterintoadialoguewiththeparticipants,discussthebusinessprinciples,andreflectwiththemonhowtoliveandoperationalizethem.14.5.5ResultsThesemeasurescontributedtosignificantimprovementsinproductivityandhelpedBMWachieveitstargets.From2006to2011,totalrevenuegrewby40%,21%morevehiclesweredelivered,thevehiclequalityincreasedby32%,andthemodelrangewasexpanded

348significantlyby30%.Atthesametime,thenumberofcarmodelsandderivativesinthepipelineincreasedby53%andtheworkloadby35%,whiletheengineeringcostperderivativeandworkloaddecreasedby38%and31%,respectively.Theoverallleadtimedecreasedby14%,eventhoughthedevelopmentprocessofkeymodelsbecamemorecomplexaftertheintroductionofproductarchitectures,platformdesign,andfrontloadingofthedevelopmentofproductlines.Moreover,partwaythroughthechangestheglobaleconomicdownturnnegativelyimpactedtheautoindustry.Basedontheimprovementsthathadalreadytakenplace,BMWmanagedtoremainprofitableanddidnotcutitsworkforceasmanyotherautomakersdid.Itemergedfromthedownturnstrongerandmorecompetitivethanmanyrivals,witharapidreturntonormalprofitability.Oneinterestingaspectoftheefficiencyimprovementactivitiesistheoverallcostreductionthatcouldbeachieved.Figure143summarizesthecostreductionsthatthetopdownE3projectsandbottomupWOprojectscontributedtotheorganization.Eachyear,thebudgetoftheEDivisionwasrebaselined,subtractingreportedcostimprovementsfromthenextyear'sbudget.Thatmeantthat,forexample,thecostsavingsachievedin2009wererealizedwithinabudgetthathadalreadybeenreducedbythecostsavingsachievedthepreviousyear.Figure143illustrateshowtopdownandbottomupimprovementinitiativescomplementedoneanotheroverthelifecycleofthetransformation.Figure143:SavingsfromtheE3programrealizedoverafouryearperiodAnewcardevelopmentprogramdemonstratedtheoverallimpactofthesechanges,andparticularlytheintegrationthatresultedfromthetools,processes,mindsets,andclimatethatemergedfromthediversearrayofdifferentchangeeffortsunderwayintheEDivision.OneoftheearlyE3projectsfocusedonthevalidationofvehicleconceptswithminimalornophysical

349prototypes.Thesolutionpresumablylayinusingcomputerbaseddesignorvirtualtoolstoeliminate,wherejustifiedanduseful,physicalprototypes.BMWhadusedvirtualtoolsindesignforaslongas10yearsbeforethisnewmandatearrived.Whilemanyofthetoolswerealreadyavailable,itwasnotastraightforwardtransitiontousetheminawaythatdramaticallyreduceddevelopmenttime.Supplierswhopreviouslyonlysuppliedhardwareorsoftwarewerenowaskedtoprovidesimulationandmodelingresults.Otherdepartments,likeprocurement,hadtobecomepartoftheeffortbecauseofthesenewworkingrelationships,butfewpeopleinitiallyhadacompletepictureoftheentireprocess.Morefundamentally,themindsetofengineersandprojectmanagersonhowtousethesetoolstodotheirworkhadtochange.Theyneededtobedeliberateaboutusingthetoolstoreducecostsanddevelopmentcyclesandtothinkfundamentallyaboutthecoststructureinvalidationactivities.AftertwoyearsofeffortontheE3virtualprototypingproject,the6series4doorcoupeprojectwaslaunchedasapilotforthisapproach.Itsdevelopmentwascompletedtwoyearslater.Initsdevelopmentitusednoprototypesandwasvalidatedcompletelywithvirtualdesignandtestmethods.Notonlywastheprogramsuccessfulinthemarket,butthequalitywasvirtuallyperfect.WhiletheE3projectcreatedthecapabilitytodothis,itwasuptotheprogrammanagertoexecuteit.Modelswereusedacrossallprogramfunctions,trackingpartsforinstance,buttheoverallapproachwasdrivenbytheneedtofinishtheprogramintwoyears.Becauseofthissuccessfulexample,otherprogrammanagersbeganfollowingsuitandthelessonslearnedwerecapturedandspreadtootherprograms.14.5.6DiscussionTopdown,largescaletransformationprojectstackledcentralthemes,suchasdepartmentwideapproachestoengineeringarchitectureorvirtualprototyping.Bottomupinitiativesprovidedprocessesandmethodsforenhancingvaluecreation.Anoutreachprogramarticulatedtheneedfortransformationaswellashighlightedtheopportunitiesforparticipationtoeachmemberoftheorganization.Topdownprojectsyieldedsignificantsavingsandproductivityimprovementsquickly,butexploitedthemostimmediatelyimpactfulprojectsearlyon.Thebottomupapproachconsistently“rampedup”productivityimprovementsovertheyearstoeventuallyachieveacomparablelevelofsavingstothetopdownprojectsand,importantly,targetedthetransformationtowardamorecollaborativecultureintheEdivision.Theactionstakeninthisexampletoincreaseintegrationincluded:Seniorleadersprovidedthevisionandresourcesforthechangeandwerepersonallyinvolvedinsupportingit.Thecompanyanddivisionstrategywerecommunicatedtoallemployeesinspecialmeetingsandusedtodefinethechangeprojects.APMOmanagedthechangeprogramandprovidedresourcestoenablelocalleadersandemployeestoimplementthechange.Aninternalprofessionalchangemanagementgroupwithchangeagents,toolsets,andamodelforchangeassistedthePMO.

350Projectsincludedbothtopdownandbottomupchangeinitiativestoengagetheentireworkforce.Thescopeofchangesaddressedproduct,processes,tools,communication,leadership,andculture.14.6DeliveringtheWorld'sMostComplexInnerCityInfrastructureProgram:Boston'sBigDig14.6.1ProjectOverviewBoston'sCentralArtery/Tunnel(CA/T)program,commonlyknownastheBigDig,wasthelargest,mostcomplex,andtechnicallychallenginghighwayinitiativeinU.S.historyandincludedunprecedentedplanningandengineering.LargerthanthePanamaCanal,theHooverDam,andtheAlaskaPipelineinitiatives,itwasbuiltthroughtheheartofoneofthenation'soldestcities.TheBigDighasbeendepictedasoneofthegreatachievementsofthetwentyfirstcenturydespiteitsnumeroustechnicalandoperationalchallenges(Tobin,2001).ItslistofengineeringfirstsincludesthedeepestunderwaterconnectionandthelargestslurrywallapplicationinNorthAmerica,unprecedentedgroundfreezingandtunneljacking,extensivedeepsoilmixingtostabilizeBoston'ssoils,theworld'swidestcablestayedbridge,acomplexfiberopticcablesystem,andthelargesttunnelventilationsystemintheworld.Thiscasestudy5describestheintroductionofmanynewpracticesthatresultedingreaterintegrationduringamassiveandcomplexprogram.Almost30yearsinthemaking,thefrontendplanningphasebeganinthe1970s,thefirstshovelswentinthegroundintheearly1990s,andtheprojectwassubstantiallycompletedin2007.Theprogramwascomplicatedbythefactthatitwasstagedasafasttrackprogram,whereinitiationwasbeginningonsomeprojectswhileclosurehadbeenachievedonotherpartsoftheprogram.TheBigDig,likemostlargescaleinfrastructureprograms,grewfromavisionofasmallgroupofpeoplewhosawacityinneedofrevitalization.Theprogramhadnumerouschallenges,includingworkinginoneofthemostcongestedurbanareasinthecountry,andcoordinatingmorethan132majorworkprojects,54majordesignpackages,thousandsofsubcontractors,morethan9,000processesandprocedures,andorganizingmorethan5,000workersduringitspeakyearsofconstruction.TheBigDigwasnotalwaysonscheduleandbudget;however,itdideventuallydeliveroneofthemostcomplex,innercitytunnelingeffortsintheworld.TheBigDigprogramincludedmanyindividualprojects,someofwhichwereverylarge.Thechangemechanismsusedtocreategreaterintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctionsinthismassiveandcomplexentityareapplicableinprogramsofallsizes.14.6.2OrganizationalStructure

351TheBigDigwasaprojectbasedorganizationthathadacomplexgovernancestructurethatunfoldedoveralongperiodoftimeandwasdeliveredwithinacomplexstakeholderenvironment.Theprogramhadtwomajorsponsors:thefederalDepartmentofTransportation(DOT)andtheCommonwealthofMassachusettsthroughtheMassachusettsHighwayDepartment(MHD)andtheMassachusettsTurnpikeAuthority(MTA).In2009theMHDandtheMTAweremergedunderanewmegatransportationagency,theMassachusettsDepartmentofTransportation(MassDOT).Thesponsorsactedastheclientsoftheprivatesectormanagementconsultant:thejointventureofBechtelParsonsBrinckerhoff(B/PB).Bechtel,theReston,Virginia–basedconstructionandengineeringcompany,hasmanagedanimpressivelistofprograms,includingtheWashington,D.C.Metro,theHooverDam,andtheChannelTunnel.TheNewYork–basedfirmParsonsBrinckerhoff,alsoaworldleaderintransportationinfrastructureinitiatives,includingtheNewYorkCitysubwaysystem,theTaiwanhighspeedrail,andtheWoodrowWilsonBridge,hadcollaboratedinjointventureswithBechtelmanytimes.Thetwofirms'combinedexpertiseinplanning,engineering,projectcontrols,andconstructionmanagementprovidingthefullrangeofskillsnecessarytomanagelargeandcomplexpublicworksinitiatives.Sincemanyofthedecisionsweredelegatedtotheprojectteams,thetwofirmsplayedasignificantroleintheoversightoftheworkersandindailydecisionmakingrequiringfullintegrationofprojectteamsacrosstheorganizationbothhorizontallyandvertically.ThoughtheoverallresponsibilityfortheBigDigremainedwiththegovernmentsponsorsandowners,B/PBwasresponsibleformanagingdailyoperations,includingtheintegrateddesignandconstructionprogram,theintegratedscope,schedule,costandbudget,andtheprogrambenefitsdelivery.Thoughsystemsengineeringistypicallyusedintheaerospaceanddefenseindustries,itisincreasinglybeingusedinthecivilengineeringsectortomakecomplexprogramsmoremanageable.SystemsengineeringwasusedattheBigDigtointegratethevariouscomponentsofthe135majorprojectsintheprogramandprovideaholisticviewtothecomplexengineeringsystemsandrequirements.TheheadofengineeringmanagementservedbothasdeputyprogrammanagerfortheBigDigorganizationaswellasmanagerofengineering.Thisdualroleenabledamorecomprehensiveapproachtotheproblemsofintegratinglargesystemsinvolvingcriticalinfrastructureanduniquedesigndevelopment.TheEngineeringManagementDepartmentconsistedofanintegratedteamofsystemsintegratorsandengineersincludingtheAreaManagers,theSystemsIntegrationManager,theGeoTechnicalManager,theChiefStructuralEngineer,theUrbanDesignManager,theChiefBridgeEngineer,theM&ESystemsManager,theEnvironmentalManager,andtheDirectorofSystemsCommissioning,allofwhomreporteddirectlytotheDeputyProgramManagerforEngineering.Oneoftheimportantrolesofsystemsengineeringwasanalysisofthesafetyfailuremodesforallcriticalinfrastructureprojects.Duetotheinnovativetechnology,theenormouslevelofuncertainty,andthepotentialforcatastrophicloss,comprehensiveriskmanagementandqualityassurancewasestablishedandintegratedintotheprogramatalllevelsinatightlycontrolledenvironment.Further,integrationwasprovidedbyanextensiveprocessofperformancereviewatseverallevelspriortotheacceptanceandpaymentofanycontract.Thisincludedoveralltechnicalcompliancewith

352scopeandschedulespecifications,startup,testingandtestdata,andapprovalactivities(Greiman,2013,p.136).Systemsintegrationwasessentialtoensurethatthedesigners,engineers,managementconsultants,contractors,andeachprojectownerworkedcloselytogethertoensureacollaborativeenvironmentandsharedmissionofqualityexcellence.Asystemreviewprocesswasdevelopedtoevaluatecompliancetothecontract,establishrequirements,procedures,andpractices,includingthereviewofcontent,effectivenessoftheworkproductandidentityofdeficientareas,andopportunitiesforimprovement.Systemsengineeringincludedthemanagementofelectricalpowerdistribution,integratedprojectcontrolsystems,environmentalanalysis,trafficsurveillanceandcontrols,corrosioncontrol,seismicexposureevaluation,transitofhazardouscargo,geotechnicalinstrumentation,andtheimmersedtubetunnelventilationsystem.14.6.3AnIntegratedProjectOrganizationOneapproachusedtocopewiththechangingneedsoftheprogramwastochangetheprojectstructurefromatraditionalmanagementmodelwhereeachprojectemployeroperatedasadistinctentitytoanintegratedprojectorganization(IPO)—inessenceaprogrammanagementoffice.Fromtheinceptionoftheprogram,engineeringmanagement,construction,andprogrammanagementwereintegratedatalllevelsoftheIPO.Althoughthepersonnelwerenotformallyintegrateduntil2001,theprogramprocesses,procedures,andspecificationsmandatedintegrationamongtheengineers,contractors,andprojectmanagers.ThetransitiontoanIPOattheBigDigoccurredalmostsevenyearsafterinceptionoftheprogramduringthefirstyearofpeakconstruction,whenintegrationwasdesperatelyneeded.Importantly,theintegrationofB/PBintotheMTAprogramstaffrequiredtherevisionofmanyprocesses,whichwereincorporatedinchangestotheResidentEngineersManual(CA/T,2001).Thoughintegrationofteams,sponsors,andmanagementconsultantshasbeenwidelysupportedintheliteratureasanimportantgovernancetool,andwasrecognizedasacrediblesolutionattheBigDig,ithasalsobeencriticizedonsomeprogramsforcompromisingtheindependenceofthegovernmentasawatchdog(Richards,2003).Ideally,integratedprojectorganizationsshouldbeformedattheearlyplanningphaseandthenevaluatedandmonitoredforindependenceandeffectivenessthroughoutthedurationoftheprogram.14.6.4IntegratedProjectTeamsExtensiveenvironmentalfeasibilitystudies,riskassessments,andotherdocumentationwerecompletedpriortoinitiationandcontinuedtoevolvethroughouttheprogram'slonglife.AsnotedbytheNationalAcademyofEngineeringBoardonInfrastructureandtheConstructedEnvironment(2003),fewinfrastructureinitiativeshaveutilizedasmanyinnovativetoolstocontrolriskandcostastheBigDig.Forexample,teammembershadasharedandcommonvisionofthegoalsandobjectivesoftheprogram.Thespecificationsrequiredtheprojectmanagerstotaketechnicalgoalsintoaccountwhenprioritizingtheirtasksormakingdecisionsand,conversely,thesystemsengineerwasrequiredtotakemanagementgoalsintoaccount

353whenprioritizingtheirtasksormakingdecisions.IncentivesontheBigDigwerebasedonasharedcommitmenttoachievehighprogramperformanceinsteadofindividualperformance.Asexamplesofthissharedcommitment,rewardsweregiventotheteamratherthanindividualsforinnovationinvariousprogramsincluding:Safetyandhealthriskmanagement(SHARE)Contractorqualityinnovation(ContractorQualityAwards)Thevalueengineeringandimprovedconstructionmeansandmethodsprogram(VECP)14.6.5PartneringOneofthemostimportantinitiativesforproblemsolving,conflictresolution,andthereductionoftensionontheBigDigwasthroughthepartneringprocess.Theconceptof“partnering”wasfirstutilizedbyDuPontEngineeringonalargescaleconstructionprojectinthemid1980s,andtheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineerswasthefirstpublicagencytousepartneringinitsconstructionprojects.Partneringisnowwidelyusedbynumerousgovernmentandconstructionentitiesaroundtheworld.Itinvolvesanagreementinprincipletoshareriskandtoestablishandpromotepartnershiprelationships.OntheBigDig,partnershipswereusedtoimprovescheduleadherence,quality,safety,andperformance,aswellastoreducerisk,costs,claims,disputes,andlitigation.PartneringattheBigDigwasinitiallyimplementedin1992,primarilyonconstructioncontracts,butitssuccessinconstructionlaterledtoitsuseindesigncontracts,communitygroups,andthedevelopmentofinternalandinteragencypartnerships.Almost100partnershipsexistedontheBigDigbasedoncontractvaluesrangingfromUS$4milliontoahalfabillion.Thoughpartneringisnotalwayscontractuallyrequired,ontheBigDigitwasincludedinallconstructioncontractswithdurationsofatleastoneyearandavalueofUS$1millionormore(Daigle&Merlino,1998).Partneringsessionswereheldonaregularbasistodiscusstheneedsoftheprogram,toresolveproblems,andtoimprovecontrols.Partneringincludedleadershiptraining,seminars,executivemeetings,andotheractivities.Thefederalandstategovernmentofficialsandthecontractor'sprojectmanagementteammetregularlywithanindependentexperttoassistindevelopingasingle,integratedteam.Throughsharingknowledge,risk,andliability,partneringreducedthecostofcontractorclaims,increasedthenumberofvalueengineeringsavingsproposals,andhelpedkeepcomponentprojectsonschedule.14.6.6DiscussionTheintegrationofsystemsengineeringfunctionsandprogrammanagementattheBigDigenabledthetechnicalandprogramdecisionmakerstomakemoreinformedandconsequentlybetterdecisions.Leadershipacrossalldisciplineswasinvolvedascomponentprojectsbytheirverynaturewereinterdisciplinary.Decisionmakingengagedmanyviewsandperceptionsacrosstheentireprogramfromengineeringandconstructiontoprojectapprovalsandoperations.Akeytosuccessfulintegrationwasthedevelopmentofbroadbasedrelationships

354andpartnershipsdevelopedduringtheinitiationstageoftheeffort.Thisfosteredcollaborationthroughoutthelifeoftheprogramtomakesurethattheintendedbenefitsoftheprogramweredeliveredandsustained.Organizationalcohesionandorganizationallearningwerestrengthenedthroughintegratedriskandqualityassurance,aswellasamultilayeredperformancereviewprocess.AnIPOwaseventuallyadoptedtouniteengineering,construction,andprogrammanagement.Thisextendedtointegratedprojectteamswhereprojectmanagersandsystemsengineerswereheldmutuallyaccountableforeachother'sgoals.Theintegrationeffortswereextendedtoincludea“partneringprocess”thatenabledpositiveandforwardlookingproblemsolvingandconflictresolutionprocessestoreducetensionsamongsttheprogrampartners.Theactionstakeninthisexampletoincreaseintegrationincluded:Givingleaderssharedroles(e.g.,theengineeringmanager/deputyprogrammanager)toencourageanintegratedperspective.Directingprojectmanagersandengineerstoworktosharedgoalswithspecificdirectiontotakeintoaccounttheotherdisciplines'perspectiveindecisions.IntroducinganIPOandintegratedteamstructures.Establishingcomprehensiveriskmanagementandqualityassuranceintegratedintothecomponentprojects.Integratingperformancereviewsthatincludedoveralltechnicalcompliancewithscopeandschedulespecifications,startup,testingandtestdata,andapprovalactivitiesatseverallevelspriortotheacceptanceandpaymentofanycontract.Providingrewardstotheteamratherthantoindividualsforinnovation.Creatingpartneringprovisionsincontractsandhavingperiodicpartneringsessionstoprovidecommonawarenessacrosstheprogram.14.7SummaryThesevignettesillustratethedevelopmentandimplementationofactionstobringhigherlevelsofintegrationbetweencoreengineeringandmanagementfunctionsinorganizations.TheyallemployedpracticesandmethodsfoundintheIntegrationFrameworkandillustratehowthoseareimplementedthroughchangeefforts.Theyalsodemonstratethatthereisno“onesizefitsall”approachtoorchestratingsuccessfulchangeinengineeringprogramorganizations:Attheveryleast,everysituationisdifferent,everyorganizationisdifferent,andeverychangepursuesadifferentsetofbenefits.Inthefirstvignette,thechallengewastherepeatedtechnicalfailureofcomplexsystemsinanewandchallengingtechnologyarea.Theneedforchangewasclearandurgentwitheachsuccessiveandcostlymissionfailureandtheinabilityoftheprogramtodeliveranytangiblebenefits.Theimplementationofarigoroustechnicalprocessbydefiningandintegratingthe

355chiefsystemsengineerintotheprogramorganizationstructureprovidedessentialinformationtotheprogrammanagementtoimprovethequalityofdecisionsandcoordinationacrosstheentireprogram.Theprogrammanagerwasthereforebetterabletounderstandandinfluencetechnicalissues,includingthoseatthesubcontractorlevel.Missionsuccessratesimproveddramatically,andtheorganizationdemonstratedsustainedchangebythecontinueduseofthepracticesbydiffusingthemintofollowonprogramsandthroughtheirimpactonthedevelopmentoftheworkforce.Inthesecondvignette,thechallengewasaworkforcethathadlimitedexposuretoandunderstandingofprojectandprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,butwhoserolesrequiredthatbothbeperformedeffectively.Bywidelydeployingamultitieredtrainingandcertificationprocessthroughaprojectmanagementofficeand,eventually,acentralizedtrainingorganizationthatcrossedagencyboundaries,professionalswereabletograduallyimprovenotonlytheirunderstandingandskillsassociatedwithprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,butalsotailortheirapplicationintheirownprogramsandprojects.Theappreciationandapplicationofbothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpracticesincreasedsubstantiallyasaresultofthetraining.Inthethirdvignette,aspecificsoftwaredevelopmentmethod,Agile,wasbeingapplied,butwithoutcomeswidelyrangingfromunquestionedsuccesstodisappointment.Thecausewasdeterminedtobeamisalignmentbetweentheprogrammanagementorganizationandthetechnicalfunctions.ThecompanyembarkedonanumberofchangeinitiativesmanagedthroughanexistingLeanSixSigmaimprovementprograminfrastructureintheorganizationtotransformhowsoftwarewasdeveloped,includingtherolesandexpectationsofallthoseinvolvedintheprocess,afocusontechnicalexcellenceandprocessdisciplineincludingdefinitionofstandardwork,thedevelopmentofanewmindsetaroundcollaborationandinteraction,andtheapplicationofnewmetricstoevaluateperformance.Notonlydidthequalityandproductivityimprovesignificantly,butalsotheengagementoftheemployeesandtheclimateofcollaborationbetweenmanagementandtechnicalfunctionswasmarkedlyimprovedandsustainedasaresult.Inthefourthvignette,companystrategyrequiredanewlevelofoperatingperformancefromtheengineeringorganization.Thistranslatedintoadivisionwideformalchangeprogramthatplayedoutthroughanumberofchangeprojects.Topdown,largescaletransformationprojectstackledstrategic,centralthemes.Bottomupinitiativesprovidedprocessesandmethodsforenhancingvaluecreationbyindividualsandteams.Anoutreachprogramencouragedparticipationbyeachmemberoftheorganizationtoachieveanewmindsetaroundcollaboration.Engineeringproductivityimproveddramatically,butimportantlythecompanyavoideddisruptionduringtheglobaleconomiccrisis,expandeditsproductlinewithnoadditionalresources,andwasabletoachieveitsstrategicobjectives.Inthefifthvignette,thetechnicalandorganizationalcomplexityoftheprogrammeantthatmanyofitscoreprojectscouldnothavebeensuccessfulwithoutusingamoreintegratedoperatingapproach.Theprogramincreasedintegrationthroughtheimplementationofjointroles,integratedriskandqualityassuranceprograms,andmultilayeredperformancereview

356processes.Anintegratedprojectorganizationstructurewasimplemented,whichwasextendedtointegratedprojectteamswhereprojectmanagersandsystemsengineerswereheldmutuallyaccountableforeachother'sgoals.Theseapproacheswereextendedtoprogrampartnersaswell.Thesuccessoftheinitialapplicationoftheseapproacheswassocompellingthattheywereeventuallyappliedacrossmostaspectsoftheprogram.Thesevignetteswereselectedbecausetheydemonstrateadiversesetofchallengesandapproachestoimprovingintegrationandcollaborationacrossmanagementandtechnicalfunctions,andacrossdifferentbusinesssectorsandsettings.Acrossthevignettes,oneseessignificantdifferencesinthedegreeofurgencytocompletethechange,thescopeofthechangeeffort,andthepathtaken.Nevertheless,eachillustratesadeliberate,systematicapproachtoimprovingelementsofintegrationineachorganization.Insomecases,theeffortswereformallydesignatedaschangeandimprovementprogramswithintheorganizationwithcommensuratestatusandresources.Thespecificobjectivesandelementsofeacheffortweretailoredtoaddressthespecificchallengestheorganizationfaced;but,nevertheless,someelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkcanbeseeninallthecases.Alldemonstratehowtheseprinciplesweresuccessfullyappliedacrossarangeoforganizationalandprogramsettings.14.8DiscussionQuestions1.Whichvignettebestrelatesthechallengestointegrationthatyouhaveexperiencedinyourownworkplace?Whatspecificelementsofthevignettearemostrelevanttoyoursituation?2.WhichelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworkdidyouseeemployedmostfrequentlyinthevignettes?Werethereanynoteworthymissingexampleswhereoneormoreoftheprincipleswasnotapplied?3.Imaginethatyouhavebeenaskedtoinvestigateoptionsforimprovingtheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringinyourorganization.Pickoneofthevignettesasamodelforthechallengesbeforeyourorganization.Identifythefollowing:a.Whatisthegeneralsituationoftheorganizationandtheparticularintegrationchallengeyouface?b.Whatprinciple(s)ofintegrationwouldyouproposeapplyingtoresolvethechallenge?Whataspectsofthisbookcanbeusedwhere?c.Howwouldyouapproachtheimplementationoftheseintegrationprinciplesintoyourorganization?d.Whatchallengestoimplementationwouldyouexpecttoencounter,bothintheneartermandthelongerterm?14.9ReferencesBoardonInfrastructureandtheConstructedEnvironment.(2003).CompletingtheBigDig:

357ManagingthefinalstagesofBoston'sCentralArtery/TunnelProject.NationalAcademyofEngineering,NationalResearchCouncil,TransportationResearchBoardoftheNationalAcademies(NationalAcademy),CommitteeforReviewoftheProjectManagementPracticesEmployedontheBostonCentralArtery/Tunnel(“BigDig”).Washington,DC:NationalAcademiesPress.CentralArtery/TunnelProject(CA/T).(2001).Revisionstoresidentengineer'smanual.Boston:MassachusettsTurnpikeAuthority.Daigle,M.G.,&Merlino,D.(1998).CentralArteryTunnelProjectPartneringManual.Boston:MassachusettsHighwayDepartment.Dweck,C.(2006).Mindset:Thenewpsychologyofsuccess.NewYork:RandomHouse.Forsberg,K.,Mooz,H.,&Cotterman,H.(1996).Visualizingprojectmanagement.Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.Greiman,V.(2013).Megaprojectmanagement:LessonsonriskandprojectmanagementfromtheBigDig.Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).(2015).Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.).D.Walden,G.Roedler,K.Forsberg,R.Hamelin,T.Shortell(Eds.).Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013).Aguidetotheprojectmanagementbodyofknowledge(PMBOK®Guide)(5thed.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.Richards,M.(2003).MassachusettsOrganizationofStateEngineersandScientists(MOSES).TestimonybeforetheMassachusettsStateLegislature.Boston,MA.Tobin,J.(2001).Greatprojects:TheepicstoryofthebuildingofAmerica,fromthetamingoftheMississippitotheinventionoftheInternet.NewYork:FreePress.Endnotes1.ContributedbyStanleyI.Weiss,consultingprofessoratStanfordUniversity,UniversityofCaliforniaDavis,DelftUniversityofTechnology,andNationalUniversityofSingapore.2.ContributedbyMichaelO'Brochta,PresidentofZozer,Inc.3.ContributedbyTomPaider,AssociateVicePresident,ITBuildCapabilityandGuruVasudeva,SeniorVicePresident&CIOofApplication&DataServicesatNationwide.4.ContributedbyEricRebentisch,ResearchAssociateattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyandJosefOehmen,AssociateProfessoratTechnicalUniversityofDenmark.(AdaptedfromACaseStudyontheTransformationoftheEngineeringOrganizationatBMW20062012,Version2.0.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2013.Copyright

358andallrightsreserved.MaterialfromthispublicationhasbeenreproducedwiththepermissionofMIT.)5.ContributedbyVirginiaGreiman,ProfessorofMegaprojectsandPlanningatBostonUniversity.

35915LEADINGANINTEGRATIONCHANGEPROGRAM15.1IntroductionHavingreviewedanumberoftheorganizationalchallengesrelatedtointegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andreadaboutthebenefits,targetoutcomes,andefficienciesthatcanberealizedfromintegratingthesetwodisciplines,onemaywonderhowthiscanbedirectlyappliedandachievedinfastmoving,rapidlychangingorganizations.Thischapterlookscloselyintothechangemanagementaspectsoftheefforttointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering;considerstheuniquecharacteristicsofthechangeinitiativerequiredtoachieveanintegratedenvironment;andprovideskeyguidanceforleadingsuchaninitiativewithinavarietyoforganizationalsettings.Thischapterreferences,elaborates,andexpandsupontheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdescribedinChapter6andillustratedinFigure61.Chapter13servesasastartingpointfortheorganizationalchangemanagementthinkingthatmustbepresentbefore,during,andaftertheexecutionoftheintegrationprogram.Beforebeginning,itmaybebeneficialtoclarifytheuseoftheterms“leader”and“organization”aspresentedinthischapter.Leadersarenotonlythosewholeadanddirecttheenterpriseasawhole,butincludecomponentleaders,thosewhooverseealargeshareofanorganization'sresourcessuchasfinance,operations,productdevelopment,ordivision,region,andsectorleaders.Inthiscontext,becausetheyalsoinfluence,lead,anddirectalargepercentageoftheorganization'sresources,programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineersareincludedinthisgroup.Todifferentiatetheminthediscussion,theirrolesarecalledoutspecifically.Organizationalleaderswillbequalifiedassuch;systemsengineersandprogrammanagerswillbereferredtocollectivelyasprogramleaders,oridentifiedintheirspecificroles.Theuseoftheterm“organization”includestheconceptthatprogramsareorganizationsaswell,andcanfunctionasunique,identifiableentitieswithintheenterprise.Withthisinmind,referencesto“organization”refertotheenterpriseaswellastheindividualprogramsunderwaywithintheenterprise.15.2UnderstandingtheWorkAhead:TheOrganizationalContextWhetherdiscussingasmallbusiness,alargemultinationalfirm,anonprofit,oragovernmentorganization,thefoundationalcomponentsandapproachtoimplementingchangeremainssurprisinglyconsistent.Forinstance,theframeworkandcommunicationsplansrequiredforachangeinitiativewithinasmallbusinessareessentiallythesameastheframeworkand

360communicationsplansforalarge,multinationalorganization,thoughthescaleandthemethodsforperformingtheseactivitiesdiffer.Specificssuchasidentifyingstakeholdersandstakeholdergroupsandengagingtheminthechangeprocess;determiningstakeholderlevelofinfluenceandauthority;developingtailoredcommunicationstomeettheirspecializedneeds;anddevelopingprocessestodelivercommunicationsemployingthemostappropriatemethod,mode,andfrequencywillbecomposedoffundamentallythesameelementsregardlessoftheorganizationsizeorindustry.Eachwillbetailoredtomeettheneedsoftheorganizationtheyserve,whilethecoreelementsremainfunctionallythesame.15.2.1ManagingOrganizationalChangeWhetherthecauseforconcernhasitsrootsinissuessurfacedthroughinteractionswithemployees,managers,seniormanagers,orexecutives,orperhapsfromcommunicationwithexternalstakeholders,bythetimebusinessleadersbeginseekingmeaningfulalternativesandsolutions,thechallengingissuesthatfirstinspiredtheirinvestigativeresearchhavelikelyalreadytakenatoll,leavingasignificantandlastingimpactonatleastonepartoftheorganization.Itisthisrealizationthatcausestheleadertoact—respondingwithanincreasedsenseofurgency.Thisrealizationthat“somethingmustbedone”alsoplacestheleaderinadifficultposition.Suddenlybecomingawarethat“somethingwithintheorganizationmustchange”impliesthenotionthatsubtle,orinsomecasesobvious,signalsthatindicatedtheneedfororganizationalchangehadbeenmissedormisinterpretedatsomepointalongtheway.Whenthisoccurs,itisimportantfortheleadertopauseandpondertheproperwayforward.Leadersmustcarefullychooseanapproachforaddressingchangethatwillmorelikelyfostersuccessthanfailure,andmuststandfirminthefaceofconsiderableorganizationalresistanceintheircommitmenttoachieveit.Additionally,tobesuccessfulatbringingaboutmeaningfulandlastingchange,leadersmustlookforwardtowardpositivestructuralchangefortheorganizationusingfactsandinformationabouttheexistingconditionsasastartingpointwhileresistingtheimpulsetoimposehastilyconceivedsolutions,refrainingfrompushingforquickresolution,orlookingbackwardintothecurrentstateseekingtoidentifythepartyorpartiestowhomresponsibilityfortheexistingtroubledconditionscanbeassigned.AsPamelaErskine(2013)describesinherbookITILandOrganizationalChange:[S]omeorganizationsfostersuch[negative]behaviorbyallowingleaderstoblameteammembers,whilefailingtorecognizeapatternwhichmayrelatetoaleadershipissue.Withoutaccountabilityatthehighestlevelsofthechangeinitiative,itwillbedifficulttotrulyrealizethedesiredoutcomes.Findingandassigningblamefororganizationaldifficultywillnotcontributetothecreationofanatmosphereforchangewithintheorganization.Infact,doingsohasquitetheoppositeeffect.Assigningblameservesonlytounderminethechangeleader,buildmistrust,andsilenceopen,creativeproblemsolving;oftendrivingteammembersawayfromseekingamorepositiveenvironment.15.2.2SelectingtheAppropriateWayForward

361Inresponsetotheneedforeffectivechange,leaderswillfollowoneoftwosimilarbutuniquepaths.Onepathisbasedonadecisiontocontractwithoutsideconsultantsandexpertswhowillbebroughtintotheorganizationtoidentifykeyimprovementopportunities,thendesignandleadthenecessaryorganizationalchange.Thealternaterouteistheselectionofchangeagentsandchampionsfromwithintheorganizationwhowillbeempoweredtocreatetheenvironmentforchangeandwilldeliveronacommitmenttomakeithappen.Selectionofthelatterpathisbasedontheknowledgeoranassumptionthatthenecessaryvisionandtalentisavailablewithintheorganization.Itisimportanttonoteherethattheindividualschosentoleadorganizationalchangearevitallyimportanttotheoverallsuccessoftheeffort.Leadinganactiveorganizationthroughtransformationalchangeisacomplexandchallenginginitiative.Aculturalchangeprogram,suchasaninitiativetointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,willbeelaboratedwithinandacrosstheorganizationoveranextendedperiodoftime.Thesetypesofeffortsaremostoftenmeasuredinyearsratherthanmonths.Theselectionofchangeleadersforinitiativessuchasthese,therefore,mustbeperformedwithstudiedanddeliberatecare.Theleaderschosenfortheseinitiativesmustbeperceivedbystakeholdersasinspirational,influential,persuasive,dynamic,andeffective,ortheyfaceseriouschallengeleadingtheorganizationthroughdifficultandextendedtransformationalchange.Whetherselectingchangeleadersfromwithinorbringingthemtotheorganizationfromtheoutside,bothpathscomewithauniquesetofbenefitsandchallenges;asingleaspectmakestheselectionofoneovertheotheranimportantleadershipdecision—thesustainmentofachievedimprovementsbeyondthecloseoftheprogram.Bringingconsultantstoanorganizationmayaccelerateinitialprogresstowardtheintendedoutcomes;however,consultantsrarelyremainwiththeorganizationtoimplementproposedchangesandmanagethesustainmentofbenefits.Thismeansthatasignificanteffortmustbeputintoplanning,performing,andmonitoringthetransitionofchangeownershipandsustainmentofbenefitsfromtheconsultantstotheleadershipandemployeesoftheorganization(Kotter,2012).Choosingchangeleadersandchampionsfromwithintheorganizationmayinitiallyappeartobeaslowerapproachastheorganizationorientsitselftonewleadershipmodels,elevatesandacceptsnewindividualleaders,andclarifiestheworkahead.Asthechangeprogramprogresses,however,thenaturalevolutionandacceptanceofnewprocessnormsrequireslittle,ifany,transitionastheorganization'sstructureandpracticehavealreadybeenpreparedduringthechangeprogramforongoingbenefitsownershipandsustainment.Theimportantdifferenceistheneareliminationofthetransitioneffortformanagingandsustainingimprovementsandbenefits.Selectingthemostappropriateapproachforintegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctionsisderivedfromcarefulanalysisoftheexistingorganizationalculture,structure,norms,andleadership.Whateverthecase,eitherapproachrequiresthecommittedinvolvementoftheorganization'sleadersoveranextendedperiodoftime(PMI,2013),aswellasthesteadyhandofthechiefsystemsengineerandprogrammanagerwhowillguidetheorganization'snavigationthroughanumberofimportantorganizationalchangeenablingandtransformationalactivities.Moreover,establishingandtrackingaclearsetoftargetbenefitswillprovidedirectionandfocustotheeffort.

362Intheend,whethertheorganizationchoosestoimplementchangebycallinguponexpertsfromoutsideordrawsuponleadersandchangeagentsfromwithin,manyofthebenefitsofthechangeinitiativemaynotbefullyrecognizedorrealizeduntilaftertheconclusionoftheprogram.Mostimportantly,realevidenceoftheimpactoftheorganizationalchangewillbeseenintheongoingandsustainedoperationoftheorganization.Certainly,therewillbetangibleimprovementsalongthewaywhilesmallwinsandchangestakehold,buttrueevidenceofthesuccessofasignificantorganizationalchangeiswitnessedinthedaytodayactivities,culture,andperformanceoftheorganizationovertime(Garvin&Roberto,2005).Istherea“newnorm”forthewaytheorganizationoperates—initscommunications,practices,culture,andoverallperformance?Examplesofobservablechangesincludeanswerstothefollowingquestions:Areseniorleaderstypicallyengagedinsupportingchangeactivities—dotheytakeonchangechampionroles?Howaredecisionsmade12monthsafterthecloseoftheprogram?Aredecisionscollaborativelydevelopedorhastheorganizationrevertedtothetechnicalandprogramassignmentforauthority?Howisauthorityandinfluenceshared?Arethechangeleader,systemsengineering,andprogrammanagementrolesclearandinusewithintheorganization?Howdosystemsengineersandprogrammanagerscollaborateonworkactivities—aretherefewercontentiousarguments?Howdotheseleadersresolveconflicts?Howareambiguityanduncertaintyhandled?Howaremissedtargetsdealtwithandmanagedbytheteam?Doprogramteammemberstypicallyandnaturallyconductbusinessandinteractwitheachotherinwaysthatarerecognizablydifferentfromthewaytheyconductedbusinesspriortothechangeeffort?Wouldthe“oldways”ofinteracting,working,andconductingbusinessseemforeignandunusualnow?Ifnot,thenperhapsthereismoreworktodo.15.3PlanningforChangewithintheOrganizationalContextThefollowingsectionsexaminetheorganizationalcontextforimplementingtheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,elaboratethefoundationuponwhichachangeprogramwillstand;anddetailafivepart,successenablingapproachtoimplementingsuchaprogram.Thesectionshighlightexamplesofsuccessfulandnotsosuccessfulorganizationalchange,specificallyunderscoringlearningsandguidance,includinganadditionalframeworkfocusedonmeaningfulmeasurementsthatallowonetobringaboutthesuccessfulintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpracticewithinorganizations.Inthefollowingdiscussion,organizationalleaderswithinafictitiousorganizationhave

363recognizedthatsomethingisamiss.Defectsandreworkareastandardcomponentofdaytodayoperations.Throughputimprovementsseemtobeslowincoming,productadvancementislagging,andthereisaconstanthumofdiscordbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Territorialbattlesforauthorityoverstrategicprogramdirectionandsophisticatedtechnicaldecisionsseemtobeanacceptedwayofdoingbusiness,requiringregularexecutiveintervention.Theseconditionshavecaughttheattentionoforganizationandprogramleadership,andtheyareeagertodosomethingtoimprovethesituation.Embarkingonanefforttointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwithinacurrentlyactiveorganizationisnotasimpleortrivialexercise.Firstandforemost,organizationalleadersaswellasprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringleadershipmustrecognizethatthisprogram,likeanyotherprogramunderwaywithintheorganization,isimportanttotheorganization'swellbeingandrequiresthesamefocusedattentionandcommitmentasotherbenefitsproducinginitiatives.Aprogramdesignedtocreatechangewithinanactiveorganizationcanbeaschallengingasanyprogramundertakentoproducecomplexproducts,systems,orcomponents.Ifthisisthecase,wheremusttheleadersresponsibleforthechangeprogram'stargetobjectivesbegin?Beforeansweringthatquestion,itwillbehelpfultoclarifythemakeupofthesmallleadershipteamthatwillbereferredtoovertheremainderofthechapter.Tobemosteffective,thechangeleadershipteamistypicallycomposedof:ExecutiveSponsor.Amemberoftheorganization'sexecutiveteam,thisindividualwillbeseenastheultimateorganizationalchampionfortheinitiativetointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwithintheorganization.ProgramManager.Theprogrammanagerwillbechargedwithoversightandleadershipofthechangeinitiativefrominceptionthroughconclusionandtransitiontothosewhowillberesponsibleforsustainmentoftheoutcomes,processes,andbenefitsgeneratedbytheprogram.SystemsEngineeringDomainLeader(s).Thesystemsengineeringdomainleaderbringsdeeptechnicalexperienceandexpertisetotheprogramteam,representingtheorganization'sbroadsystemsengineeringenvironment.Thisindividualisintimatelyawareofthetypicalinteractionbetweensystemsengineeringresourcesandotherorganizationalentitiesincludingprogrammanagers,leadsthesystemsengineeringlandscapeacrosstheorganization,andcanspeaktothedaytodayoperationalcultureoftheorganization'sengineeringresources.Thisindividualistypicallythemostseniorsystemsengineeringexecutivepresentintheorganization.Inlargeandhighlycomplexengineeringorganizations,thisrolemayberepresentedbymorethanoneindividualifthosesystemsengineeringfunctionsareseparateanduniquelygrouped,suchasmechanical,electrical,structural,andsoon.ProgramManagementDomainLeader(s).Programmanagementdomainleadersbringtheuniquechallengesofbusinessprogramleadershipexperiencefromacrosstheorganizationtotheleadershipteam.Asinthecaseofthesystemsengineeringdomain

364leaders,individualsinthisrolearefamiliarwiththedaytodayinteractionsofprogrammanagersandcanaccuratelyandfullyrepresentthebodyofprogrammanagementthinkingfromacrosstheorganization.GovernanceBody.Theseleadersaretypicallyexecutive,decisionmakingmembersofthechangeprogram'sgovernanceteamwheretheyarejoinedbyotherorganizationalleaderswhoincludepartnersandinternalandexternalstakeholders.Thegovernanceteamsupportsandguidestheprogramanddetermineswhichprogramcomponents(activities,projects,operationalwork)willbeinitiated,supported,modified,orretired.Extensiveliteratureisavailableregardingthefunctionandmakeupofthegovernanceteam.ThreeinformativereferencesareTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI,2013),ProgramManagement(Thiry,2015),andGovernanceofPortfolios,Programs,andProjects:APracticeGuide(PMI,2016).15.3.1ObservingandInterviewingTobegin,ifthereisasuspicionamongleadersthat“somethingisamiss,”andspecificallythatprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringarenotworkingtogetheraswellastheymight,itmaynotbesufficientoreffectivefororganizationalleaderstosimplyactonthatsuspicion—implementinghastilyconceivedsolutionsintendedtoresolvewhateverperceivedissuestheremaybe.Whenthisdoesoccur,frequentlythoseimpactedbytopdownattemptssuchasthesewillignoreorrejecttheimposedsolutions,sometimesimmediately,sometimesafteratrialperiod,citingleadership'slackofunderstandingofthe“real”issues,orperhapsholdingtoabeliefthatleadershipmaybemakingchangestosatisfytheirownspecificagendaorother“hidden”issues.Tobesuccessful,thoseresponsibleforconductingtheproposedintegrationprogrammustbewillingtoinvestthetimenecessary(Sirkin,Keenan,&Jackson,2005)tofullyassesstheenvironment,andtoestablish,withoutbiasoragenda,thetrueconditionsandsourceofthetrouble.Thisisaparticularlyimportantactivity,foritallowstheorganizationtostepbackfromdaytodayoperationstoviewtheorganizationasanintegratedwhole,aliving,functioningsystemmadeupofindividualsandgroupswhoareperformingagainstthetasksbeforethem.Additionally,theperceptionsandstronglyheldbeliefsthatareilluminatedanddocumentedthroughobservationcanbeusedtoformthebaselinefromwhichtheprogramwillbeinitiated.Documentedobservationswillbecomeparticularlyvaluablewhenconsideringthemetrics,measures,andindicesthatwillbeusedtogaugetheprogram'sprogressandsuccess.ThisaspectisdiscussedatlengthinSection15.3.5.Astheinitialstepoftheprogram,observingdaytodayoperationsandtalkingwith(interviewing)programleaders,stakeholders,teammembers,andotherstaffwillhaveanadditionalimmediatebenefit—engagement.Speakingwithprogramparticipantsandlisteningintentlywhiledocumentingtheirperceptionswillletthemknowthereisaseriousattemptunderwaytofullyunderstandtheissuestheyfaceandwillengagetheminthedefinitionoftheproblemlongbeforethereisanattempttosolveit.Whethertheeffortisledbyoutsideconsultantsorbyleadersfromwithintheorganization,

365theremustbeaconcertedattemptbyallresponsiblepartiestoresistjumpingtoanearlysolution.Theweaknessofswiftlyassessedproblemsandhastilyimplementedsolutionsisimmediatelysensedbytheorganization'semployeesaswellastheprogram'steammembersandstakeholders.Engagingprogramleaders,teammembers,stakeholders,andstaffinthedefinitionoftheorganization'schallengeswillserveanumberoffunctions.Approachingthechallengeinthiswaywill:Communicatethatteammembersandstakeholdershaveavoiceindefiningthe“real”issues.Surfacethetruestateoftheenvironmentandthesentimentofthoseworkingwithinit.(May)uncoverissuesthatwerepreviouslymissedormisunderstood.Establishaclearbaselineofconditionsthatwillbeusedtofocustheintegrationprogram'schangemanagementandprocessimprovementactivities.Signalthattheinitiativewillnotbebasedonaquickappraisalbyadistantauthoritywhowillimposeunstudiedsolutionsonstakeholders.Figure151illustratesthespecificareaoftheIntegrationFrameworkaddressedbyobservationandinterviewswithprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringstaff.Figure151:ThedimensionoftheIntegrationFrameworkinviewforinitialengagementactivitiesAsanexample,theresearch(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013)suggeststhedefinitionofrolesfortheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerareoftennotformallydefinedwithinorganizations.Inquiringabouttheclarityofrolesisagoodplacetobeginobservationsandinterviews.Thisissueservesasanexampleoftheapproachrecommendedforobservation,discussion,andinterviewsthatwilladdressanyandallissuesfortheorganization.

366Thebulletedlistofquestionsthatfollowsisanonexhaustivesetofquestionsonemayaskabouttheclarityoftheprogrammanagementandchiefsystemsengineeringroles.Whatisthedegreeofclaritythatyouperceiveregardingthescopeandauthorityoftheprogrammanagementroleonyourprogram?Ofthechiefsystemsengineeringroleinyourprogram?Arebothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesgivenequalsupportbyleadership?Doyoubelievetheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineeragreeontherolesandresponsibilitiestheyeachoccupy?Towhatdegreedotheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineercollaborateontechnicalandnontechnicaldecisionsthataffecttheprogramandyourfunction?Ifthereisconflictbetweentheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,towhatdegreedoyoubelievethatconflictisbasedonthecurrentdefinitionanddelineationoftheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesratherthanparticulartraits,behaviors,orcharacteristicsoftheindividualswithinthem?Isthereagreementamongteammembersaboutrecentdecisionsthathavebeenmaderegardingtheprogram?Isthereagreementamongotherstakeholdersaboutrecentdecisionsthathavebeenmaderegardingtheprogram?Hastheprogrammanagerorchiefsystemsengineerexplainedthemeasuresandmetricsthatareusedtogaugetheprogram'sprogress?Ifyouhadamagicwandthatyoucouldwaveandonekeyaspectoftheprogramwouldinstantlyimprove,whatwouldthatbe?Responsestotheseandotherquestionsandrelatedinformationreflectthetypeofinformationthatiscollectedanddocumentedforuseindevelopingthealternativesdiscussedinthenextsection.15.3.2Synthesizing,Sharing,andMappingThediscussionsmaybedirectedatveryspecificprogramcomponentsandmayaddresstopicsthatareverydifferentfromtheexamplepresentedabove,ormaybebroadinscopeandaddressconcernsthatspantheentireprogramsuchasoverallprogramcommunicationsorprogramcomponentauthorization.Regardlessofthesubjectareastheobservationsandinterviewsareintendedtoaddress,theinformationmustbetiedtoelementsoftheIntegrationFrameworksotherelevantissuescanbeeasilyarticulated,grouped,communicated,prioritized,and,ultimately,understood.Figure152presentstheframeworkelementsthatmustbepresenttoachieveanintegratedprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringenvironmentwheretherecognizedcharacteristicsoftheprogramare:effectivecollaborativework,effectiveinformationsharing,

367andrapidandeffectivedecisionmaking.Figure152:ThefourinputdimensionsthatinfluencetheeffectiveintegrationdimensionThesamplequestionsetinquiredabouttheperceivedclarityofroles,responsibilities,anddecisionmakingauthorityfortheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Thisinformationisgroupedandalignedwiththekeycontentintheprocesses,practices,andtoolsoftheframeworkandrepresentsanimportantelementofthebaselinethatwillbeestablishedforthechangeprogramitself.Otheraspectsoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsdimensioncouldincludetoolsandmethodsusedintheprogramtodeliverthebenefitsandmayrangefrominformationinfrastructuretoanalysistools,andphysicaltovirtualinnature.15.3.2.1SynthesizingVariousobservations,interviews,andcollectedinformationcanbegroupedandalignedtooneofthefourframeworkdimensionsshownontheleftsideoftheIntegrationFramework,whichleadstotheeffectiveintegrationdimensionshownontheright.

368Whentheobservations,collecteddiscussions,andinterviewinformationhavebeengrouped,summarized,andalignedtotheframework,thenextstepistosharetheinformationwiththevariousleadersandstaffwhocontributedtothediscussion.Thismustbeadelicatelyexecutedandcarefullyperformedtask,foritisthefirststepingeneratingtrustforthechangeprogramandthepeopleconductingit.Thecollectedandsummarizedinformationwillultimatelybesharedbroadlyacrosstheorganizationasasignificantcomponentofthebaseliningactivity.Thosewhovolunteerinformationthroughdiscussionandinterviewmustfeeltheinformationaccuratelyrepresentstheirviewsandperceptions.Theymustalsobelievetheinformationwillnotbeusedtopunishnorwillitbeusedtodiscreditstronglyheldviewsandbeliefsofthecontributors.Contributorswhovolunteerinformationwilllikelyexpecttoseethisinformationreflectedbacktotheminwaysthataccuratelyrepresenttheircommentsandperceptions,butprotectstheiranonymityanddoesnotcallthemoutindividuallyormakereferencetospecificevents.ThisalignstoDimensionIIoftheIntegrationFramework:OrganizationalEnvironment.15.3.2.2SharingBeforesharingbroadly,thecollectedinformationshouldbecharacterizedasasetofobjectiveconditionsthatcanbeseenasareflectionoftheorganizationasawholeratherthananindictmentofspecificpeople,organizationalcomponents,orevents.Theintentoftheobservations,discussions,andinterviewsistodevelopasetofdeidentifiedcommentsandperceptionsthatformageneralized“statementofcondition”fortheorganization,andtobuildtrustwithintheorganizationthathonestanddirectfeedbackcanbesharedwithoutthethreatofsanctionorfearofretaliation.Sharingthecollectedinformationservesmanypurposesduringprogramstartup:Validation.First,sharingthecollectedinformationwiththosewhoprovideditensuresthattheobservations,comments,andviewscollectedandsummarizedareaccurate.Honestfeedbackmustbevalidatedwiththosewhooriginallycontributeditbeforeitisusedforanyotherpurpose.Duringthisvalidationprocess,ifmodificationandadjustmentsarenecessary,thoseadjustmentsmustbemadeandagainvalidatedbeforetheinformationissharedmorebroadly.Ifdifferencesremainbetweenwhatindividualsbelievetheyhavesharedandwhattheyseereflectedbacktothemeitherdirectlyorindirectly,therewillberesistancetofutureattemptstoengagethem.Thisresistancemayberootedinaperceptionthattheinformationisbeingusedforapurposeotherthanwhatwasstatedandwhetherthatperceptionisaccurateornot(orifthedifferencesareintentionalornot),thefactswillnotmatter.Ifthisvalidationisnotperformedanddifferencesremain,significantandlastingdamagetotheprogramwillhavebeendone.Trust.Sharingtheinformationwiththeoriginalcontributorsvalidatestheinformationanddemonstratesthatthefeedbackwillbeusedexclusivelyforthepurposeofsettingtheorganizationalbaselineandnotasavehicleforimposingsanctionsandcontrols.Thisstepalsohelpsbuildtrustbetweenthosewhoarecollectingandsummarizinginformationandleadingtheprogramandthosewhowillparticipateinandbeaffectedbytheintegration

369process.Creatingtrustisacornerstoneactivityforthechangeprogramanditsleaders,andmustbekeptinfocusbytheprogrammanager,thechiefsystemsengineer,andtheorganization'sleadership.Thechangeprogram'ssuccessorfailurewillbalanceonthedegreeoftrustbuiltandsustainedbetweenthechangeprogram'sleadersandthosewhowillparticipateinit.Engagement.Mostimportantly,sharingtheinformationwiththeoriginalcontributorswillengagethemintheproblemdefinitionprocessandwillsetthetoneforfurtherdialoginthefuture.Clear,open,andhonestcommunicationamongandacrosstheprogram'sparticipantsisessentialfortheongoingsuccessoftheprogram.15.3.2.3MappingAfterfinalreviewandacceptancebytheoriginalparticipants,theintegrationprogram'sleaderswillmapthegroupedandsummarizedinformationtothevariousdimensionsoftheIntegrationFramework.Linkingissuesidentifiedthroughobservation,discussion,andinterviewtodimensionsoftheframeworkwillgroundfuturediscussionsinaformalstructurethatwillfacilitatecommunicationsandwillallowtheorganizationtoreview,study,question,and“makesense”oftheinformationasitispresentedtothem.Thismappedinformationwillmakeupthecontentfortheinitialcommunicationsanddiscussionsheldwiththeorganizationalleaders,programsponsors,programparticipants,andstakeholders.15.3.3CommunicationsPlanning:PresentingandPrioritizingAlternativesBeforeembarkingonaninitiativethatwillbringaboutsignificantchangetoanorganizationsuchasaninitiativetointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,itwillbeimportantfortheentireorganizationtounderstandtheissuesitfacesasclearlyasafewselectindividualsseethem.Numerousfailurescenarioshavebeendocumentedwhereonepartofanorganizationdeterminedasignificantorganizationalchangewasnecessaryandwentaboutimplementingchangewithoutcommunicatingwithandengagingotheraffectedcomponentsoftheorganization.Inoneexample,organizationalleadersfromamultinationaltelecommunicationscompanyconcludeditwouldbemoreefficientandfinanciallyadvantageoustocentralizeallhumanresourcesandadministrativeoperations.Thismeantthatregionalhumanresourcesandadministrativesupportgroupswouldhavetorelinquishcurrentprocesses,methods,andsystemsthathadbeendevelopedovermanyyearstomeettheneedsoftheirexistinglocalorganizations,requiringthemtoadoptthecentralorganization's“standard”processeswhileagreeingtotailortheseprocessesonlyslightlyfortheirlocalenvironments.Thisdecisionwasmadeandimplementedbytheorganization'sfourglobalbusinessunitdirectorsandappearedtohaverealmeritwhenreviewedonpaper.Unfortunately,theseleadersmisunderstoodtheimpactofsuchadecision—misreadingtheveryreallikelihoodofdisruptiontodaytodayoperations.Additionally,theyfailedtoclearlyarticulatethereasonsbehindtheirmove,theintendedbenefits,ortheprocessesthatwouldbefollowedtomakethechange.Thisleadership

370teamspentlittletimecreatingasharedsenseofurgencywithintheorganizationabouttheneedforchange,claimingtheneedforcentralizationwas“obvioustoeveryone.”Itwasnot.Inadditiontothis,theseleadersskippedtheimportantinitialstepofengagingemployeesindiscussionofthechangeandignoredordiscountedvalidprotestsfrommembersofregionalteamsoutsidetheheadquartersorganization.Therewerefewinfluentialmembersacrosstheorganizationthatsupportedthisdecision,mostdutifullyfollowingwhattheybelievedtobefailedandillconceiveddirectiveswhilequietly(andcorrectly)anticipatingdoom.Theensuingchaosnotonlystalledhumanresourcesandadministrativefunctionsacrosstheenterprise,allorganizationalcomponentsthatreliedonhumanresourcesandadministrativefunctionswereaffected,includingsales,productdevelopment,service,andsupport.After60days,theinitiativewasbroughttoanabrupthaltbytheorganization'schiefexecutive.Threeofthefourregionalleaderswerereleasedoverthenext60days.Ittooknearly16monthsfortheorganizationtorecover.Toproperlygroundanimportantchangeinitiativewithinanorganization,thoseempoweredtomakeithappen,includingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringleaders,mustdomorethantheybelievetheyshoulddotoensurethattheorganizationfullyunderstandstheneedforthechange.Andtheymustequallycommunicatetheconsequencesthatwilllikelyaccompanyinaction.ToquoteSirkin,Keenan,andJackson(2005),“whenyoufeelyouaretalkingupachangeinitiativeatleastthreetimesmorethanyouneedto,yourmanagerswillfeelyouarebackingthetransformation.”Withthisstatementinmind,individualsmaywonderhow,asmembersoftheorganization'sleadershipteam,aprogrammanagerorchiefsystemsengineermightgoaboutcommunicatingtheneedforchange.HavingdonethehomeworkdescribedinSection15.3.1,organizationalleadersarenowpreparedtoembarkonabroadcommunicationscampaignwithintheorganization.Thisstepaddressesthefirsttwooffivekeychangeenablingactivities:Creatingasenseofurgency;andCommunicatingthevisionandalternatives.UsingJohnKotter's(2012)eightstepchangeprocessasastartingpoint,onecangroupthestepsintofivefoundationalchangeenablingactivitiesasshowninFigure153.Initialcommunicationsaboutthechangeprogramwillbedesignedtoaddressthesefirsttwoelements.Figure153:JohnKotter's(2012)eightstepchangeprocessgroupedintofivechangeenablingactivities

371Asanorganizationpreparesthesefirstcommunications,theprogram'ssponsorsandleadersmustacknowledgethatalltheworkwillnotbeaccomplishedinasingle,sweepingaction—andmustdesignthecommunicationsaswellastheprogramitselftoaddressasetofprioritizedprogramelementsthatwillbeaddressedovertime.Followingprioritization,theprogramwillbeginwiththemostobvious,mostbeneficial,and,insomecases,easiestfirst.TheprioritizationprocessisfurtherdiscussedinSection15.3.5;however,theconceptishighlightedherebecauseitmustbeanelementoftheinitialcommunications.Ifprogramstakeholders,includingtheorganization'semployees,perceivetheywillbeaskedtotakeonavirtual“mountain”ofcorrectiveactions,processes,andadditionalworkoverandabovetheirdaytodayresponsibilities,thementalimagethiscreatescanmakeitdifficultfortheorganization'sleaderstogetbeyondthefirstfewcommunicationswithoutseriousresistance.Thereareanumberofelementsorganizationalleaders,includingtheprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineers,mustconsiderwhenplanninghowtheywillcommunicatewhathasbeengatheredaboutthecurrentstateoftheorganization.Theseinclude:Leadership.Selectingtherightleader(s)whowilldelivercommunications.Deliverymethods.Selectingappropriatecommunicationsmethodsandmodessuchasstanduppresentations,roundtablediscussions,leadership“roadshows,”discussionforums,livetrainingsessions,videopresentations,emailmessages,publishedFAQs,atransformationprogramwebsite,supportcenterorhelpfunctions,progresstracking,andsoon.Messaging.Refiningthemessagingtocreateasenseofurgencyandcommunicatetheforwardlookingvision.Figure154isanexampleofthecontenttoincludeinthemessaging.Frequencyofcommunications.Answerquestionsaboutthefrequencyofcommunications;definehowoftenleadersdelivercommunications;howoftenothersdelivercommunications;clarifywhowilldeliverwhichcommunications.Audience.AnticipatingandansweringkeyquestionfromstakeholdersandemployeessuchasthoseshowninFigure155.

372Figure154:ExampleofthemessagingcontentFigure155:ExampleofquestionsforwhichtheaudiencewillwantanswersCreatingasenseofurgencyrequiresthatcommunicationsarefactual,accurate,andeasilyunderstood.Noteveryonewillbeconvinced,butthedualactivitiesofestablishingandreinforcingatrustingenvironmentforcommunicationsandsharingunvarnished“truths”aboutthecurrentconditionswillbeginlayingthegroundworkformoredifficultactivitiesahead.Therearetwoessentialcomponentsofthiscommunication:adetailedexplanationofwhatis

373anticipatedifnoactionistaken,andahighlevel“vision”ofwhatthefuturecanlooklikefortheorganizationwithacalltoaction.Referencingthescenariodescribedearlierandusingitasanexample,informationabouttheimpactoftheseconditionsmustbegathered,articulated,andpresented.Defectsandreworkareastandardcomponentofdaytodayoperations.Theobviousimpacttoproductquality,reliability,andsaleabilitycanbecharted.Decliningsales,increasingsupportcosts,andincreasedoverallproductioncostscanbedocumented,graphed,andpresented.Negativeinternal,employeerelatedmetricscanalsobelinkedtothisconditionwhereemployeeturnoverincreases,personaltimeoffincreases,documentedcomplaintsandchallengesareontherise,andsoon.Throughputimprovementsseemtobeslowincoming,productadvancementislagging.Thisisaseriousconditionandcanbedirectlyrelatedtotheorganization'smarketposition.Anindustryleadingorganizationdoeseverythingitcantoavoidhavingitsmarketsharedeteriorate.Laggingproductadvancementopensthedoortocompetitionandrenderstheorganizationvulnerable.Thiscanbeanticipatedandtheassumptionsoftheimpacttotheorganizationcanbegraphedintrendlineswithsurprising,andsometimesfrighteningaccuracy.Theorganizationcanensurethatthedatausedtocreatethetrendsareaccurate,andcanproducethedataitselftoreinforcethiscommunication.Then,ifthereisabeliefthatthetrendsreflectareasonableestimationofthefuture,theobviousimpacttotheorganizationisbeyondrefute.Thereisaconstanthumofdiscordbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctions.Tohighlightthisissue,overallprogramperformanceismeasured,detailed,andfactuallycommunicated.Theimpactofthistypeofdisagreementcanleadtoextendedschedules,incorrectlyinterpretedrequirements,poorlyderivedsolutions,flaweddesigns,and,ultimately,productfailures.Communicatingdetailedinformationsuchasthispaintsastarkanddismalpictureforanorganization.Thatiswhyitisparticularlyimportantformessagesofthissorttobeaccompaniedbyavisionforadifferentfutureandahighlevelplanforachievingit.Moreover,uponseeingandhearingthismessage,amajorityoftheorganization'semployeesmustperceive,orbeyondthat,believe,thatthereisabetterfutureahead,andmustalsofeeltheycanbeameaningfulpartofcreatingthatfuture.Itwillbetheprimarychallengeoftheorganization'sleaderstosharethistypeofinformationinawaythatenablesaclearmindedunderstandingoftheconditionswhiledrawingabalancebetweentheconcernsandfearthiscommunicationcreatesandtheenergyandcommitmentforadifferentfuturethatcanbedemonstratedinwordsanddeeds.IntheirHarvardBusinessReviewarticle,ChangeThroughPersuasion,DavidA.GarvinandMichaelRoberto(2005)describeanexampleofhowoneindividualturnedafailingmergerbetweentwoleadinghospitalsintoarousingsuccess,artfullycreatingabalancebetweenasenseofurgency,valuefortheemployees,andanew,betterfutureforthemergedorganization.Regardlessofthesizeoftheprogramortheorganization,thesecommunicationselementsmustbecarefullyputinplacebeforecommunicationsbegin.Inaddition,changechampions,those

374whowillbevisiblerepresentativesoftheorganization'scommitmenttosupporttheprogramthroughtotheendandwhowillleadtheprogramthroughtheentiredurationoftheeffort,shouldbeclearlyidentifiedandaffordedasmuchauthoritytoactascanbereasonablybestowedontheorganization'smostseniorleaders.15.3.4LeadersandDecisionMakers:TheirRequiredCommitmentandInvolvementOrganizationalcommunicationsareaccomplishedthroughverbalandnonverbalmeans.Mostorganizationsfocusonwritten,spoken,andvisualcommunicationsandoftenignorethebehavioraspectsofcommunication.Elaboratepresentationsandwrittencommunicationsareoftenpreparedfortheorganizationandaresharedthroughemails,videos,discussions,trainingsessions,andlivepresentations.Organizationalleaders,however,frequentlydownplay,misinterpret,ormisunderstandthemessagethatisdeliveredbytheselectionofthe“who”ofthecommunications.Inorganizationalcommunications,employeescanbequiteperceptiveandquicktoassessamismatchbetweenwordsanddeeds.Forexample,anurgent,impactful,organizationspanningmessagedeliveredbyindividualswhoareperceivedbytheorganization'semployeesasnoninfluencersandnondecisionmakers,communicatesthattheurgencyandimportanceofthemessagedoesnotalignwiththeactualbehavioroftheorganization'sleaders.Iftheissuesbeingdiscussedareurgentandcriticallyimportanttotheorganization'sfutureandsuccess,wouldnotsuchamessagebedeliveredbytheorganization'stopleaders?Incommunicatingkeymessages,selectingtherightpeopletochampionanddelivercommunicationscanbeasimportantas—andinsomecasesmoreimportantthan—themessageitself.Asstatedearlier,thecommitmentoforganizationalleaderstolongtermengagementiscriticaltothesuccessofachangeprogramdesignedtointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Withthisinmind,securingvariousorganizationalleaders'commitmenttotheprogramfromthebeginningandthroughoutthedurationoftheprogramandbeyondisakeyfactorforestablishingthecommunicationsplanfortheprogram.Ideally,itistheseleaderswhowillchampionthevisionfortheintegratedorganization.Theyaretheadvocatesforthechangethatmusttakeplace,andcommunicationplanningisabouthelpingthemgettheirmessageacross.Manyoftheseleaderswillbeaskedtodeliverimportantcommunicationsthroughoutthelifecycleoftheprogramand,giventhat,theywillberequiredtosustaintheirsupportandenthusiasmfortheprogram'sintendedoutcomesforthelongterm.Additionally,theseleaderswillbeseenas“standardsbearers”fortheprogramandwillfinditnecessaryto“walkthetalk,”sotospeak,whenconductingbusiness.Ineffect,theseleaderswillbeseenas“onstage”duringanyandallcommunicationsandinteractions.Whetherdirectlyrelatedtothechangeprogramornot,allbehaviorofaprogramleaderwillbeseenasifitwererelatedtotheprograminsomeway.Aleaderwhoverballysupportsachangeinoutwardcommunications,yetmakesitdifficultforanyoneworkingwithintheprogramtofind30minutesontheleader'scalendartodiscusstheprogram,iscommunicatingonethinginwordsandanotherwithbehavior.

375Bythesametoken,anorganizationalleaderwhodeliversaninitialmessageforanimportantinitiativeandthendelegatesallfuturecommunicationsiseffectivelycommunicatingthattheinitiativeisnotimportantenoughforhimorhertoremainengaged.Employeesareparticularlyadeptatpickingupthesesubtleyetrevealing“communications.”Theconsistencyofthemessagingandthesustainedcommitmentoforganizationalleadersiscriticaltocommunicatingasenseofurgencyandbuildingalastingvisionforthelongterm.15.3.5BuildingthePathforChangeEstablishingapositiveenvironmentforchangereliesonthecompletionofthetwoelementsdetailedearlier:CreatingasenseofurgencyandCommunicatingthevisionandalternatives.Theyarethefoundationfortrust,clarityofpurpose,andsupportthatwillberequiredfromtheorganizationforthechangestheyareabouttoundertake.Thenextstepwillengagetheprogram'sparticipants,stakeholders,andleadersincreatingthepathforwardfortheprogram.15.3.5.1PrioritizingInitiativesWiththecollectedobservationandinterviewinformationasastartingpoint,thechangeprogram'sleaderswillbegintheprocessofprioritizingthevarioussubelementsandprogramcomponentsthatwillbeconducted.Thiscanbeaccomplishedthroughfacilitateddiscussionswithprogramandcomponentleadsselectedtooverseespecificprogramcomponents.Theirselectionismostoftenbasedontheirabilitiesasleaders,aswellastheirexperience,skill,andknowledge.(SeealsoChapter10,“DevelopingIntegrationCompetenciesinPeople.”)Thesefacilitateddiscussionscanleadtorankedprioritizationofprogramactivitiesandinitiativesbasedonanumericvalueassignedtotwointersectingattributes,suchasOverallImpactvs.LengthofTimeRequiredtoComplete;Urgencyvs.AvailabilityofResources;Impactvs.EaseofImplementation;etc.Figure156,basedontheworkofSirkin,Keenan,andJackson(2005),illustrateshowaprioritymatrixcanbedevelopedbyassigningnumericvaluestotheattributes(inthiscaseImpactvs.ResourceAvailability),orientingthemontheXandYaxesofatableandrankingtheinitiativesbasedonatotalmultipliedvalueforeach.

376Figure156:PrioritizationmatrixexampleThisprioritizationtableshowshowanorganizationcanselectinitiativestobeginworkingbyassigningactionstothevaluegroupings.Inthistableinitiativeswithlowervalueswillbegivenpriorityoverthosewithhighervalues.Thistablealsogroupsthevaluesintothreecategories:Values1–3:TakeActionNowValues4–7:AddressNextValues8–16:Wait,ReevaluateThenumericvaluesthatmakeupthegroupingscanbeadjustedtoalignwiththespecificenvironmentandconditionsoftheorganization.Withthesegroupingsestablished,initiativescanbeplacedinthecells(oneinitiativepercell)toestablishpriority.Evaluationoftheinitiativesisbasedonconsiderationofthetwointersectingaspects.Asanexample,usingthefocusissuepresentedearlierwherethereisaperceptionthatprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesarenotclear,theprioritizationteammightconsidertheimpactofsuchaconditionas“Significant”or“Critical”totheorganization'songoingperformance.Ifthatisthecase,thenontheYaxisinthetableshowninFigure157,“ClarifyingPMandSERoles”couldbeplacedintheYaxiscells.FortheXaxis,theprioritizationteammayagreethattheresourcesforclarifyingtherolesmightbepresentontheprogramteam.Ifthatisthecase,theteamcouldplace“ClarifyingPMandSERoles”intherowsalignedwith“ResourcesReadilyAvailable.”Multiplyingthevaluesfortherelatedcellsproducesthevaluesasdescribedabove.Ifoneassumesthatallinitiativeswithvaluesbetween

3771and3willbeprioritized,then“ClarifyingPMandSERoles”willbeoneofthefirstinitiativestheteamundertakes.Figure157:PrioritizationtablethatrevealsfocusonclarifyingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesThiswillbecontinuedforallthecategoriesofinputfromobservationandinterview,resultinginasetofactionsthatwillbeaddressedfirst,thosethatwillbeinlineforactionassoonasothersarecompleted,andagroupingofactionsthatareonthe“watchlist”forreevaluationandfutureprioritization.15.3.5.2Measures,Metrics,andReportingBeforebeginninganychangeactivity,however,meaningfulmeasuresandtargetmetricsforeachmustbeputinplaceandbaselinedsoprogressagainstimprovementtargetscanbemeasuredandreported.Thisisanessentialpartoftheprogrammanagementprocess.Programparticipants,stakeholders,andorganizationalleaderswillwanttoknowhowtheprogramisprogressing,andtheywillnotbesatisfiedwithvague,subjective,or“soft”answerssuchas

378“we'remakinggoodprogress”or“itappearswearedoingbetter.”Measuresofimprovementcanandshouldbetranslatedintomeaningfulnumericvaluesthatcanbetracked,plotted,andreported.Baseliningthecurrentstatewillbecomethestartingpointformeasurement.Toillustrate,oneelementoftheinitiativetointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringandonefictitiousmetrictomeasureprogresswillbeused.Ifitisbelievedthatthereislittlecollaborationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineers,thenoneshouldbeabletoquantifytheamountofcollaborationthatdoesexistbetweenthesetwodisciplinestoday.Perhapscollaborativedecisionsarereachedbyprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersonlytwiceoutof10opportunitiesforthemtocollaborate.Thatwouldmeancollaborationishappeningonly20%ofthetime.Animprovementinitiativemightincludeanumberofcreativeandinterestingactivitiestoencouragecollaboration,andtheimprovementtargetscouldbesetforanearlyachievementnumber,amidtermtarget,andafinalgoal.Forthepurposeofillustration,thesetargetsarearbitrarilysetat30%,45%,and60%respectively.Foractualprograminitiatives,onewouldnodoubtspendconsiderablymoretimealigningallimprovementtargetssothattheyaremeaningful,realistic,andachievable.Alongwiththemetrics,theactivity'smeasurementintervalmustbeset.Sirkin,Keenan,andJackson(2005)recommendthatprogrammeasurementoccurattwomonthintervalsorless.Theirresearchhasproventhatregardlessofthesizeoftheprogram,reviewandmeasurementintervalsthatarelongerthantwomonthscontributetotheunderperformanceriskoftheprogram.Sowiththemeasuresinplace,thetargetimprovementobjectivesclarified,andthemeasurementintervalset,theworkofthechangeactivitycanbegin.Astimepasses,measurementofactualprogressversusplancanbeconductedanddocumented.Theimprovementpointscanbedemonstratedovertimeinagraphicalrepresentationandadjustmentstotheprogramactivitycanbeconsidered,iftheyarenecessary.Finally,relyingonthecommunicationsguidanceoutlinedabove,allofthiscanbereportedorsharedvisuallywiththeprogram'sparticipants,stakeholders,andleadersfollowingeachofthemeasurementintervals.Thiseliminatessubjectiveorvaguedescriptionsofprogramprogressandestablishesaclearmeansforcommunicatingrealresultsandachievement.15.3.6AchievingandSustainingNewWaysofWorkingOneofthemostelusiveaspectsofchangemanagementprograms,surprisingly,isnottheachievementoftargetobjectivesandbenefits,butrathersustainingchangesandbenefitsoncetheyhavebeenachievedanddelivered.Earlier,variousexamplesoffailedprogramssuchasprogramsthatbeginwithstrongsupportandendwithnone;programsthatfailtodeliverintendedoutcomesandbenefits;programsthatarebroughttoahaltduetotheirnegativeimpactonthesponsoringorganization;programsthathavebeenrenderedunnecessaryduetochangingculture,technology,orlawsweredescribed.Lookingcarefullyatsomeoftheseprograms—evensuccessfulones—revealsaninterestingconditionthatisoftenoverlooked:programsthatinitiallysucceedinbringingaboutintendedchangesarelaterfoundtobeunsuccessfulbecausethechangesbroughtaboutbytheprogramarenotingrainedintheorganizationandthebenefitsthatwereachievedarenotcontinuingtoaccrue.Thishasbeenobservedmanytimesin

379organizationswhereelaboratesystemsaredevelopedandsuccessfullyimplemented,onlytohavethesystemssitidlefromlackofuseorapplicability.Or,perhaps,asuccessfulorganizationalchangethathastakenmonthsandyearstoimplementisreversedalmostimmediatelyafterthechangechampionleavestheorganization.Maybenewmanagementtakesoveranddoesnotbelievetheinitiativehasmerit.Whateverthefactsoftheindividualcasesmaybe,theunderlyingcauseforthiscanbetracedtooneofthemostimportantcomponentsoftheprogram—benefitssustainment.Programsdesignedtobringaboutorganizationalchange,suchasanefforttointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,arebytheirverynaturedisruptive.Oldwaysofworkingandcommunicatingmustbemodified,toolsandprocessesreconfigured,rolesandresponsibilitiesrealigned,andsystemsthatsupportallofthisredesignedorreplaced.Thesechangesaloneareenoughtogivepausetoorganizationsconsideringsuchastructuralchangegiventhepotentialforextendeddisruptionto“thewaythingswork.”Organizationsthatchosetotakeonthispotentiallydisruptivechangeacknowledgethepotentialdisorderandpurposelycreateprogramcomponentsspecificallydesignedtogettheworkdone.Unfortunately,carefullyconsideringandactingonmodificationtosystems,processes,andtoolswillnotbeenoughtoensuresuccess.Tomakechanges“stick”withintheorganization,andtoensureachievedbenefitscontinuetodeliverdividendsbeyondtheendoftheprogram,requiresthoughtfullyplannedeffortstosustainthem.Thinkingthroughtheactivitiesthatwillbeundertakentosustainbenefitsisnotanaddonconceptoranancillaryaspectofprogrammanagementthatcanbecasuallyaddressedtowardtheendofaprogram.Quitethecontrary,asdiscussedearlier,benefitssustainmentisanimportantelementofthebenefitsmanagementplanthatisatthecoreofprogramdesign.Andtheearlierintheprogrambenefitssustainmentactivitiesareconsidered,theeasiertheywillbetoimplement,andthemorevaluetheywillultimatelydelivertotheprogram'sconstituents.Whenoneconsidersthechangesthatwilloccurwithinanorganizationaspartofaprogramdesignedtointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,whereeffectivecollaborativework,effectiveinformationsharing,andrapidandeffectivedecisionmakingarethedesiredoutcomesandwillultimatelybecomethenorm,onecaneasilyenvisionanumberofchangestoorganizationalmores,resources,and“standards”thatwillberequiredtoimplementthenecessarychanges.Hereareafewexamplesthatrelatedirectlytothedesiredoutcomes.Therearelikelymanymore.CollaborativeWork.Organizationswhoseworkisheavilyorientedtowardengineeringactivitiestypicallycreateenvironmentswheretechnicalresources(humans,systems,materials)arephysicallygroupedtogethertoenablethemtoworktogetherseamlesslyandeasily.Businessandbusinessrelatedfunctionssuchasfinance,procurement,humanresources,administration,andprogramandprojectmanagementarealsoroutinelygroupedtogethertoenablethemtoeasilyshareinformationandcollaborate.Frequently,however,thesetwofunctionsarenotlocatedinornearthesameofficesasseniorexecutives.Engineeringandprogrammanagementfunctionsmayalsonotbephysicallylocatedinthesameroomoronthesamefloorinabuilding;and,iftheyare,itislikelytheyarenotboth

380inthesamebuildingastheexecutives.Sometimesprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctionsdonotsharethesamebuildingorthesameofficecampus,oreventhesamecity.Creatinganenvironmentwhererepresentativesfromeachofthesefunctions(executive,technical,andbusiness)arecolocatedsotheycanworktogethertowardacommonsetofprogramgoals,outcomes,andbenefitsmaytakeconsiderableplanning,effort,time,andfunding.InformationSharing.Informationandcommunicationsresourcesthatsupportengineeringfunctionsaredesignedandtailoredtofacilitateeasyaccesstoinformation,plans,designs,processes,tools,etc.Bythesametoken,theresourcesthatsupportbusinessandbusinessrelatedfunctionsareobtained,planned,integrated,andconfiguredtosupporttheuniqueneedsofbusinessfunctions.Seldomdothesetwofunctionssharethesametechnologyorknowledgewareplatforms.Iftheydo,thereareoftenduplicatesetsofresources—onededicatedtothetechnicalfunctions,theothercreatedforbusinessfunctions.Ifthereisinformationsharing,itisoftencharacterizedbyemail,videocontent,andpresentationssharedoveralowtechinformationexchangefacility.Informationisoftenexchangedbysendingit“overthewall”orpresentingitfromonefunctiontotheother.Transformingthistoanenvironmentwherethereisasharedcommonknowledgestorethatiseasytounderstandandnavigateforbothtechnicalandprogrammanagementresources,andestablishingsystems,physicalenvironments,orforumsforcollaborationandinformationsharingisnotonlytechnicallycomplex,butpresentsanumberofsignificantsocialchallengesaswell.DecisionMaking.Iftechnicalandbusinessdecisionsaretraditionallydividedbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementandsenttothemrespectivelyallowingeachexclusivedecisionmakingauthorityoverissueswithintheirdomain,changingthistoapracticewhereprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringjointlyconsider,evaluate,andresolvedecisionsaffectingprogramsforwhichtheyareresponsiblewillbeasubstantialundertaking.Asdiscussed,organizationsmaydeterminethatsomeorallofthiswillberequiredtotransformtheirorganization.Numerousexamplesidentifiedcaseswhereorganizationshaveconsciouslyacknowledgedthetime,effort,andresourcesnecessarytotakethison,andhavesteppedintothebreachwillinglyonlytofindthatafterconsiderableexpenditureoftime,effort,andresources,theprogramfailstodeliverthedesiredoutcomes.Whydoesthisoccurwithsuchregularity?First,asoutlinedatthebeginningofthechapter,allfourinputdimensionsoftheIntegrationFramework(showninFigure158)mustbeaddressedbytheprogram.

381Figure158:TheIntegrationFrameworkforprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering15.4PuttingtheFourInputDimensionsforChangeTogetherTheprevioussectiondiscussedatlengthwaystocreatetheorganizationalenvironmentforintegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Italsoelaboratedtheprocessesandconstructsnecessaryforeffectivelycommunicatingthecurrentconditionsandfuturevision.Accompanyingthisdimensionoftheframeworkaretheotherthree:Processes,Practices,andToolsPeopleCompetenciesContextualFactorsAnd,thefinalanswertothequestionpresentedatthebeginningofthissectionliesintheamountofbenefitssustainmentplanningthatisincludedintheprogramalongwiththeobviousworkthatisdescribedinthedesiredoutcomesabove.Thereareconsiderationsforsustainmentthataccompanyeachofthedesiredoutcomes,andthesemustbecomeanintegralpartoftheplanningandperformanceoftheprogram.Ineverycase,thesustainmentactivityinvolvespeople.Hereisthekeymessage:

382Toensureintendedchangestakeholdandbecomeingrainedwithintheorganizationbeyondtheendoftheprogram,andtoensurethebenefitsachievedbytheprogramcontinuetoaccrueaftertheprogramhasended,thePEOPLEwhowillberesponsibleforcarryingtheseactivitiesforwardmustbeidentified;mustacknowledgetheirrolesandthedauntingchargethataccompaniesthem;andmustbewillingtocarryoutthoseroles.Thismeansthattheprogram'sleadersmustidentifyupfrontandthroughouttheprogramexecutionthefuture“owners”(leaders/champions)oftheorganizationalmodels,processes,tools,communications,andrelatedactivitiesthatwillsustainthechangesandbenefitsaftertheprogramhasbeencompleted,theconsultantshavebeenreleased,andtheprogram'smembersandparticipantsdisbanded.Waitinguntiltheendoftheprogramtoidentifythefuture“sustainersoftheneworder”willputtheseindividualsatadistinctdisadvantage,astheywillhavelittleunderstandingofwhatwentintodefiningtheirnewrolesortheuniqueaspectsoftheserolesthatwillberequiredtocarrythemout.Thefutureownersofthenewenvironment,newwaysofworking,andnewwaysofmakingdecisionsmustbeidentifiedearlyintheprogram'slifecycle,mustparticipateinthetransformationalprogramthatbringsaboutthechanges,andmustbewillingto“carrythetorch”intothefuture.Sonow,whendiscussingtheplanningthatmustgointotheprogramforintegratingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,onemustconsidertheremainingthreeinputfactorsforenablingtheprogram,andmustalsoidentifytheorganizationalleaderswhowillberesponsiblenotonlyfordeliveringtheinitialprogramoutcomesandbenefits,butthosewhowillcarrythemodifiedconstructsoftheorganizationintothefuture.Insomecases,thoseleaderswillbetheverysamekeyparticipantswhoperformtheworkoftheprogram,inotherstheworkwillbetransitionedtothem.Transitionofrolesandresponsibilitieswilloccurwhenconsultantsarebroughtintoleadtheeffortinitiallybutwillnotremainwiththeorganizationafteritends.Orperhaps“changeleaders”willtransitionthenewprocesses,tools,andapproachesto“operationalleaders”whoseroleandexpertiseisnotintransformationalchangebutthatofoperationalexcellence.Whateverthecase,thiscriticalcomponentoftheprogramcannotbediscountedorignored.15.4.1Processes,Practices,andToolsToachievethekeyfactorsofprocesses,practices,andtools,andreapthebenefitstheypromise,programleadersmustansweroutstandingquestionsandconsideranumberoffactorsthatwillfacilitateachievingthem.Forexample,whichprocessesmustbemodifiedtoreducefrictionbetweentheorganizations,rewardtherightbehavior,andprovideaplatformforimprovedinformationsharinganddecisionmaking?Thefollowingareafewexamples.Roledelineation.Inagivenorganization,ifitisagreedthatprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringrolesarenotclearlyarticulated,whowillberesponsibleformodifyingthem?Thiscannotbeaccomplishedwithoutconsultinganumberofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineerswithintheorganization,andultimatelytheorganizationasawholemustcometosomeunderstandingofhowtheseroleswillworktogetherinthefuture.Onceestablished,theserolesmustthenbeincorporatedintotheoperational

383functionswithintheorganizationsotheycanbeusedforrecruiting,scopedefinitionfortheroles,andperformanceevaluation.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whentheseroleshavebeendefinedandaccepted,whowillberesponsibleforensuringtheybecomethenormfortheorganization?Howwillthathappen?Whowillberesponsibleformaintainingthemandforensuringtheycontinuetoreflectthenecessaryrequirementsandboundariesoftherolesastheorganizationcontinuestoevolve?Humanresourcessystems.Iftherolesandexpectationsofprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersaretoberedefined,thentheperformancestandardsfortheseemployeesmustalsochange.Oldstandardsthatencourageseparationofdutiesandexclusivedecisionmakingmustbereplacedwithperformanceobjectivesandmeasuresthatencourageandrewardcollaborativework,informationsharing,andcollaborativedecisionmaking.Itwillbeimpossibletoachievetheintendedobjectivesofthechangeprogramifemployeesaregivenanewsetofobjectivesandmeasuresthatencouragescollaboration,butperformanceandrewardsystemsarestructuredinwaysthatencouragejusttheopposite.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whoaretheindividualswhowillmakethesechangeshappeninbackofficeoperationalfunctions?Whoaretheindividualswhowillensurethesechangesaremadepermanentandbecomethestandardforperformancebeyondtheendoftheprogram?Whatpeopleandsystemswillbeusedinthefuturetoevaluateandrewardperformance?Howwillperformancethatdoesnotalignwiththenewstandardsbedealtwith?Physicalenvironmentandsupportinginformationsystems.Modifyingtheenvironmenttoencouragecollaboration,sharingofinformation,andjointdecisionmakingisacostlyanddisruptiveundertaking.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whowillberesponsibleforlayingoutthevariousprojectsthatwillbeconductedtomakethishappen?Whowillensurethosechangesaremade?Whowillcontinuetocommunicatethebenefitsofthenewenvironment,ensuringthechanges“stick”withintheorganization,andthatemployeesdonotrevertbacktotheoldwaysofworking?Toolsandmethods.Whileagreatdealofthecommunicationandcoordinationtoimproveintegrationliesinthemanagementdomain,asignificantportionofthebenefitscreatedbytheprogrammayresultfromactivitiesthatareprimarilytechnicalinnature.Workprocessesandmethodsandanalytictoolsplayanimportantroleinenablinggreater

384collaborationandcommunicationacrossdisciplineboundariesintheworkoftheprogram.Insomeinstances,increasedintegrationmayrequireimprovementstoexistingprocesses,practices,ortools.Theseimprovementscouldinfactconstitutemajorchangeprogramsintheirownright,aswasdemonstratedintheBMWEDivisioncasestudyinChapter14.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whowilldeterminewhetherexistingtoolsandmethodsarestructuredsothatintegrationisanaturaloutcomeofwork?Whowillberesponsiblefordefiningthevariousprojectstoupgradeorchangethetoolsandmethodstomakethishappen?Whowillprovidetheresourcesandsupportformajorupgradestotoolsandmethods?Whowillberesponsibleforassessingandmaintainingtoolsandmethodstoensurethattheycontinuetofosterandenableintegrationovertheirlife?15.4.2OrganizationalEnvironmentTheprevioussectionsofthischapterdiscussedanumberofactivitiesthatcontributetocreatingtheorganizationalclimateforchange.Butcreatingtherightclimateforchangewillnotbesufficientfortheorganizationtoreapthebenefitsofthechangeinthelongterm,allowingthemtoweavenewwaysofworkingintothefabricoftheorganizationsothattheneworganizationalenvironmentbecomestherecognizedorganizationalstandard.Duringtheprogram,thoseinfluentialthoughtleaderswithintheorganizationwhowillcontinuethethemesofthechangeintothefuturemustbeidentified.Duringandfollowingtheprogramtheywillberesponsibleforsustainingthepositiveoutcomesoftheprogramandwillbetheindividualswhocommunicateandreinforcethetrustthatisdeveloped,theclarityofthemessagingthatiscommunicated,andwillbethevisibleexamplesoftheorganization'scommitmenttotheongoingsustainmentofbenefitsandcontinuousevolutionoftheorganization.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whoarethechangechampionsfortheorganizationnow?Aretheythesameoneswhowillcarrythemessageforwardinthefuture?Ifnot,howwillthefutureleaderslearnwhattheywillberequiredtodotoensuretheorganizationalenvironmentissustainedandcontinuestoimprove?Iftherightleadersarenotpresentintheorganization,howwilltheybefoundandbroughtonboard?Howwilltheirrolesbearticulatedandhowwilltheirperformancebemeasured?Answerstothesequestionsmustbeknownlongbeforetheprogram'send.15.4.3PeopleCompetenciesAlignmentofanumberofphysicalandenvironmentalfactorsmustoccurwithinanorganizationinordertoachievethetargetoutcomesandbenefitsdiscussed.Includedarethepeoplewho

385makeuptheorganizationnowandinthefuture.Ifprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringarenotperformingwelltogetherintheorganizationtoday,itisverylikelytheindividualsintheserolespossesscertainabilities,knowledge,experience,andcompetenciesthatreflectaparticularapproachtothework.Ifanewwayofworkingforprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersistheobjective,itisverylikelythepeopleintheseroleswillhavetoadoptnewwaysofapproachingtheworkandwillbeexpectedtoacquirenewinteractingandinterpersonalskillsandcompetencies.Collaborativework,effectiveinformationsharing,andrapidandeffectivedecisionmakingrequiresindividualswhoareskilledandconfidentabouttheirrespectivedomains,butareopentonewideas,collaborativeandengagingbynature,andareeagertoseemorethanasingleviewofaparticularchallenge.Asdescribedinthebulletsonhumanresourcessystems,thesenewcompetenciesandpeopleskillsmustbeincorporatedintotheroledescriptionsforprogrammanagersandsystemsengineers,performanceandmeasurementsystemsshouldbealignedwiththem,roledefinitionsforfutureleadersinthesepositionsmustincludethem,andstaffing/employmentprocessesupdatedtoseekthemout.Questionstobeansweredinclude:Whoaretheorganizationalleaderswhowilldefinethenewcompetenciesandleadershipcriteria?Whoaretheindividualswhowillmeasureandevaluatecurrentleadersintheseroles?Howwillfutureleadersbeidentifiedandbroughtonboard?Howwilltherolesbemaintainedandkeptcurrent?15.4.4ContextualFactorsFinally,programcharacteristics,teamcharacteristics,organizationalcharacteristics,andstakeholderengagementallimpacthowtheprogram,programteam,andtheorganizationasawholeapproachandevaluatedeliveryofoutcomesandbenefits.Changingsomeofthesecontextualfactorsmayrequireadaptingtheorganization'soverarchingstrategytoincludeadditionalelementsthatenableincreasedintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Itwillbetheresponsibilityofthechangeprogram'sleadersalongwiththeorganization'sexecutivestojointlybringtogetheralloftheworkofthechangeinitiativeandguideitstrajectorythroughouttheeffort,fromhumbleandsometimeschallengingbeginningstoafuturethatenablescollaborativework,effectiveinformationsharing,andrapidandeffectivedecisionmaking.Questionstobeconsideredinclude:Dothecurrentproductandserviceofferingshavearchitecturesandtargetmarketsthatmakeintegrationacrossfunctionsandprogramseasyordifficult?Docurrentapproachestoteamstructure,governance,resourcing,andlocationenablecollaborativework,effectiveinformationsharing,andrapidandeffectivedecisionmaking?Dotheorganizationalstructure,legal,andoperationalrelationshipswithsuppliers,partnersandallies,andgeographiclocationofoperationsenableorimpedeintegration?

38615.5PracticestoConsiderItisimportantforprogrammanagerstounderstandtheuniquecharacteristicsofthesystemsengineeringrole—theconcepts,approach,skills,andabilities.Anditislikewiseimportantforsystemsengineerstounderstandthepracticeoftheprogrammanagementrole—theknowledge,competencies,businesscontext,andapproach.Forapersoninoneoftheserolesunderstandingtherequirements,knowledge,andnuancesoftheothers'enablesimprovedcollaboration,sensemaking,trustdevelopment,communication,andoverallperformance.Nothingreplacesthevalueanindividualbringstothetablefromyearsofpracticeandexperience.Experiencedpractitionersachievetopperformancethroughfocusedattentiontocontinuouslearning—buildingknowledge,developingandusingtoolsandpractices,andrefiningone'sapproach.Tobecomeaskilledpractitioner,aprogrammanagerorsystemsengineermustspendmanyyearsdeveloping,expanding,andhoningtheirrespectiveskills.Whentheseexperienced,skilledindividualsarebroughttobearinhighlytechnicalbusinesssettings,theyareoften,butnotalways,abletoproducesurprising,oftenunexpectedimprovementandprogress.Thereisalsoacreativesidetotheseroles.Oncetheskills,knowledge,andexperiencearedevelopedtoapointwherethepractitionercanperformthemconsistentlyandperhapseffortlessly,practitionersarethenabletousetheothersideoftheirbrains—thecreativeside—tofindinventive,novel,andgamechangingwaystoapplytheirskill.15.5.1ElementsthatDriveSuccessThereareeightkeyfactorsrequiredforthesuccessofachangeinitiativetointegratesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement,orvirtuallyanychangeprogram,inanorganization.Everyoneinvolvedandwhowillbeaffectedmustbeshownthegravityofthecurrentstate.Asenseofurgencymustbeuniversallyacknowledgedacrosstheorganization.Asacomponentofthis,alternativesforchangingtheorganizationmustbeevaluatedforthecontributiontothechange(e.g.,donothing,makesmallimprovementsthatwillenablecertaincomponentstofunctionbetterintheshortterm,focusontransformingtheorganization).Seniorleadershipsupportandcommitmentforthelongtermefforttointegratesystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementwithintheorganizationisacriticalfactorforchangemanagementsuccess.Thisincludescommitmentfromseniorleadershiptoprovidecriticalresourcesforimplementation.Aclearsetoftargetoutcomes,waysofperformingandinteracting,ongoingperformancetargets,andindicatorsmustbeestablishedatthestartoftheprogram.Meaningfulmeasuresandmetricsforgaugingprogressagainsttargetedobjectivesmustbeestablishedatthestartoftheinitiative,andfrequentlyreviewedduringthelifeoftheprogram.

387Processesformonitoringandgoverningthechangeinitiativemustbeestablishedtoprovideaforumforregularreviewandadjustmentofprogramcomponents.Clearlydefinedrolesforbothsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersareanessentialingredienttotheintegrationoftheseroleswithinanorganization.Delineationbetweenthetworolesisalsoessential.Carefulselectionoftheproperlyskilledindividualswhowillleadthechangeinitiative.Systemsandtechnologysolutionsthatsupporttheintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementwithintheorganizationmustbeputinplaceormodifiedtosupporttheinitiative.Examplesincludeperformanceappraisalandreviewsystems,targetobjectivesforindividualperformancethatalignwiththetransformationobjectives,andreviewandrewardintervalsandcriteria.Ecosystemsthatareunabletosupportthetransformationmustberedesignedorreplaced.15.5.2NoShortcutstoSuccessAnumberoffactorsthatarepresentinsuccessfulchangeprogramsdesignedtoachievethedesiredoutcomesofcollaborativework,informationsharing,andeffectivedecisionmaking,ultimatelyresultinginimprovedprogramperformancehavebeenreviewed.ThedimensionsoftheIntegrationFrameworkandlinkedkeyprogramsuccessenablingactivitiestothosedimensionshavebeenarticulated.Afivestepprocessfordevelopingandleadingachangeprogramwithinanorganizationwashighlighted,andmeasuresandmetricscalledoutthatwillbeusedtogaugeandcommunicateprogramsuccess.Initialresearchandexperiencethattheframeworkandfactorsdescribecandeliverimprovedprogramperformanceandsustainableoutcomes.Research,observation,andpracticeconfirmthateachofthedimensionsoftheframeworkandeachofthestepsoutlinedintheprogramsuccessenablingactivitiesmustbeperformedtoachievetargetobjectivesandbenefitsincomplexprograms.Whilevariousactivitiesorcomponentscanbereordered,orperhapstheemphasisonparticularelementsoftheframeworkcanbeincreasedorreduced,noneoftheelementsoftheframeworknorthesuccessenablingactivitiescanbeskippedorignoredwithoutdirectimpacttotheprogram'slikelihoodfor,ordegreeofsuccess.ReferringtotheIntegrationFrameworkorthefivestepenablingactivities,howwouldanintegrationchangeprogramsucceedwithouttheclimateforchangebeingestablishedandcommunicatedbyinfluentialleaderswithintheorganization?Or,ifthedesiredchangeclimatehadbeeneffectivelycreated,wouldthechangeprogramsucceedwithoutnecessarymodificationstorolesandresponsibilities,performancereviewandrewardsystems,communicationsprocesses,andemployeeengagement?Instanceswhereelementsoftheprocessesdescribedandactivitiesrecommendedhavebeenskippedoreliminatedtosavetime,effort,orresources,inotherwords,shortcuttingthechangemanagementprocess,leadstofailedprogramsortheinabilityoftheorganizationtosustainthebenefitsinitiallyachieved.AndthatfailurecanbedirectlytiedtotheabsenceofoneofthedimensionsoftheIntegrationFrameworkorsuccessenablingactivities.

388Whileitmaybetemptingtoshortenorreducethescopeofthechangeprograminanattempttoachievetheprogram'sintendedbenefitsanddesiredoutcomesmorequicklyormoreeasily,therearenomeaningfulshortcutstoachievingsuccessinaprogramdesignedtointegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringwithinanactiveorganization.Eachofthestepsmustbecarefullyunderstood,planned,performed,reviewed,reported,andrepeated.Skippingchangeprogramstepsorreducingscopeinevitablywillhaveadamagingeffectonoutcomes.15.5.3SharedAuthorityandAccountabilityWhenconsideringandmovingfromanonintegratedenvironmentandculturetoanintegratedone,theendresultshouldbesharedauthorityandaccountabilitybetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringfunctionstoachievetheprogram'sintendedoutcomes,enactedandempoweredbytheorganization'sleadership.Theintegratedprogramreflectsthissharedresponsibilityandaccountabilityasbothskilldomainsbringunique,complementary,andessentialcompetenciestobearontheworkandchallengesoftheprogram.Inintegratedprogramenvironments,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineercollaborateeffectivelytomovetheprogramforward.Whenthisisthecase,theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerviewthemselvesaskeypartnerswhotogethershareresponsibilityfortheprogram'sprogressandoutcome.Innonintegratedprogramenvironments,theorganizationalculturereflectsacharacteristicdivisionoflabor,responsibility,andaccountabilitywhereprogrammanagementjealouslydefendsitsroleasbusinessoverseeranddecisionmakerwhilethesystemsengineeringfunctionprotectsitsauthoritativeroleasexclusivetechnicalexpertiseandthedecisionpointforalltechnicalissues.Inorganizationalenvironmentssuchasthese,programissuesthatarisearedividedintotechnicalandprogrammaticchallenges.Theissuesarethenassignedtotheonedomainwithlittlecommunicationorconcernfortheother.Whentechnicalissuesareencountered,thesystemsengineeringfunctionmaintainsexclusivecommandauthorityoverthesedecisions.Whenuncertainty,ambiguity,orscheduling,resource,andcostissuesemergetheprogrammanagementfunctionisthe“decider.”Section15.2explainedhowthisapproachtomanagingcomplexprogramscanhaveameasurablenegativeimpactonprogress,productivity,quality,andtheendresult.AGeneralMotorsignitionproblemthatwentonuncheckedfor10yearsandresultedin124verifiabledeaths,andtheNASAChallengerandColumbiadisastersaredisturbingexamplesofhowthisdividedmanagementapproach,carriedtotheextreme,cancreateanorganizationalcultureandbehaviorthatisdifficulttocomprehend.Inintegratedprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringenvironments,programissues,challenges,anddecisionsarebornebybothdisciplines.Thoughtechnicalissuesmayarise,theprogrammaticimpactoftheseissuesisalsoconsidered.Resolvingtechnicalchallengesimpactsnotonlythetechnologicalandengineeringaspectsoftheprogram,butwillbereflectedwithequalimpactinchangestoother,lesstechnicalandnontechnicalelementssuchastheprogram'soveralltrajectoryanddirection,intendedbenefits,schedule,cost,resources,design,quality,andultimately,fitnessforuse.Withthisbeingthecase,alltechnicalissuesareshared,analyzed,evaluated,andresolvedjointlybytheprogrammanagerandchiefsystems

389engineer.Bythesametoken,changesthataffecttheprogram'sscope,schedule,cost,quality,intendedbenefits,andoutcomescannotbemadewithoutconsiderationoftheimpacttoengineering.Changesthatmodifytargetoutcomes,scope,addoreliminateprogramcomponents,orlengthenorshortentheschedulehaveanimmediateimpactontheprogram'sengineeringfunctions.Withacomplexsetoftechnicalcontributors,dependenciesthatexistbetweenthedeliveryandintegrationoftechnicalcomponentsmustbereanalyzed,reconsidered,reenvisioned,or,insomecases,entirelyscrappedtoaccommodatetherequestedchanges.Giventhisinterdependency,itisclearthatprogramaffectingdecisionsarenotexclusivelytechnicalorprogrammatic,butrathercompositedecisionsthatareconsideredandresolvedjointlybytheprogram'stwoleadingdomainexperts—theprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer.15.5.4WhatHappensWhenThingsDon'tGoasDesigned?Evenwiththebestpossibleplanningcompleted,themosttrustedleadersinplace,andastrongplantosupportandencouragechange,sometimesthingsdonotgoasplanned.Whatdosuccessfulorganizationsdo?Inorganizationswhereanabilitytoeffectivelymanagechangeiswovenintothefabricofhowtheydobusiness,thefailureofcertaincomponentsoftheeffortisacommonoccurrence.Whenthishappens,theorganizationmethodicallyreevaluatesthevariouscomponentsoftheprogramasdescribedearlierinthischapterandsetsaboutreprioritizingtheworkandthecomponentstofocusattentiononweakerareas,strengtheningitsresolvetocontinuallypursuethedesiredoutcomesandbenefits.Organizationsthatsuccessfullyimplementchangeoverthelongtermrepeattheprocessesoutlinedinthischapteronacadencethatfocusestheentireorganizationoncontinualimprovement.Theybuildtherequiredtoolsandprocesses,reinforcethepositiveclimateforchange,recruitandretaintoptalent,andinfuseeacheffortwiththecapacityforcontinuousimprovement.15.6SummaryToconcludethischapterandtosummarizethediscussionabouttheneedtothoroughlyconsidertheproperapproachtotheimplementationofachangeprogramthatwillintegrateprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,thefollowinglistofkeytakeawayswillhelponenavigatetheorganizationalimpacttopeople,processes,tools,andculture.Programmanagersandsystemsengineerseachmustunderstandtheroleoftheotherinatechnicalbusinesssettingandrespecttheuniqueskills,talent,experience,andcontributionsoftheother.Oneroledependsontheotherfortopteamperformance—theyarenotcompetitorsforthesamework,noraretheyopponentsworkingtowarddifferentobjectives.Rather,theyarepartnersandcollaboratorswhoworktogether,dependentononeanothertodeliversustainedtopteamperformance.

390Collaborationisbuiltuponunderstandingoftheothers'roleandtrustintheothers'abilitytoperformthatrolewell.Onemustworktocontinuouslyimproveone'sownskill,knowledge,andexperience.Leadershipmustcreateandsustainanenvironmentwheretheserolesareabletoworktogethereffectively.Pickingmeaningfulmetricsandmonitoringachievementisafoundationalcomponentofchangemanagementsuccess.Achievementandprogresstowardintendedoutcomesmustbeclearlymeasurable—andresultsagainstprogressmustbesharedacrosstheorganization.Pickingtherightpeopleandsettingthetoneistheroleofthecoach/leader.Communicationsisking.Continuallycommunicatingandreinforcingnewwaysofworking,adjustingtoperformanceinformationasitisoccurring,andencouragingandrewardinggoodperformanceisrequiredtochangebehavior.Developingarewardsystemthatreinforcesgoodbehavioranddiscouragesthewrongbehaviorisimportanttooverallsuccess.Strong,supportive,engagedleadership,continualcommunications,modelingandreinforcinggoodbehavior,achievingsmallwins(early),creatingandsustaininganenvironmentwitheffectivesupportsystemsup,down,andacrosstheorganizationareessentialelementsforsuccess.15.7ReferencesConforto,E.C.,Rossi,M.,Rebentisch,E.,Oehmen,J.,&Pacenza,M.(2013).Surveyreport:Improvingintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering.Presentedatthe23rdINCOSEAnnualInternationalSymposium,Philadelphia,USA.Retrievedfromwww.pmi.org//media/PDF/BusinessSolutions/LeanEnablers/PMIINCOSEMITIntegrationStudy.ashxErskine,P.(2013).ITILandorganizationalchange.Ely,England:ITGovernancePublishing.Garvin,D.A.,&Roberto,M.(2005,February).Changethroughpersuasion.HarvardBusinessReview.Kotter,JohnP.(2012).Leadingchange.Cambridge,MA:HarvardBusinessReviewPress.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013a).Managingchangeinorganizations:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2013b).Thestandardforprogrammanagement(3rded.).NewtownSquare,PA:Author.

391ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).(2016).Governanceofportfolios,programs,andprojects:Apracticeguide.NewtownSquare,PA:Author.Sirkin,H.L.,Keenan,P.,&Jackson,A.(2005,October).Thehardsideofchangemanagement.HarvardBusinessReview.Thiry,M.(2015).Programmanagement(2nded.).England:GowerPublishing.

392PartIVACALLTOACTIONThefactorsthatleadtobetterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringmaynotallbewithintheinfluenceofaspecificprogramororganization.ThebookconcludeswithadiscussioninChapter16offactorsthatshouldbeaddressedbeyondtheimmediateorganizationorprogramtoimproveintegration.Whilesummarizingkeypointsinthebook,Chapter16isforwardlookingwithadiscussionoftheimplicationsoftheoverallmessageofincreasingintegrationacrossarangeofstakeholders,bothwithintheorganizationandinthelargersocietalcontext.Theafterwordrepresentsanadmonitiontoindividualpractitionerstoreflectonthekeymessagesofthisbook,identifyaplanofaction,andtakeactiontocreatebetterintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintheirownsphereofinfluence.Italsoreflectsuponsomeoftheinsightsgainedduringthecreationofthisbookanddiscussessomeofthoseinsightswithaviewtowardfutureeffortstoadvancetheknowledgeandpracticeofintegration.

39316CALLSTOACTIONTransformationalchangeoftenoccursduringparticularlyturbulentperiodsinhistory.Itmaybegininsmallways,butthenexpandsasmomentumbuildsandfeedsonitself.Somemightarguethatkeyingredientsforatransformationalstagearealreadyheatingup.Lyricswritten50yearsagoillustratetheissues:“There'ssomethinghappeninghere;whatitisain'texactlyclear”(Stills,1966).Corporateshareholdersarechallengingtheirorganizations'leadersoverstrategieswhosepoorperformancehasweakenedthecompanies.Taxpayersarerevoltingagainsthighertaxesthatpersistdespitelacklusterpublicservicesandanunsustainablelevelofgovernmentwasteandinefficiency.Manycollegegraduatesaroundtheworldhavedifficultyfindingentryleveljobsintheirfields,andnewentrantstotheworkforcearechallengedbycultures,systems,androlesthatremainunchangedinafasterpaced,technologyenabledworld.Despitetalkofcollaborationandalignment,workersinbusinessandgovernmentremainsiloed,unabletobreakthroughmultiplelayersofbarriersbasedonrole,function,andstructure.Insomecases,workersaresimplyacceptingthestatusquoandnolongerpushingforthekindofpositivechangethatcanturnaverageorganizationsintoextraordinaryones.Inengineeringprograms,alloftheseelementsexisttoday,butaremorequicklyreachingaboilingpoint.Governmentleadersarerealizingthattheirportfoliosofengineeringprogramsarenotsustainableforthelongtermastheycurrentlyfunction.Corporateleadersseetheemergenceofleaner,moreadaptivecompaniesasloomingchallengestotheirmarketdominance.Neitherbusinessnorgovernmentcanrelyonasmallcadreofexceptionalleaderstosweepinandsavethem,particularlyaslargeswathsofseasonedprofessionalsplantoretire.Engineeringdegreeprogramsareunderpressuretodelivergraduateswhoarereadytostepintoprogramteamsandimmediatelystartperforming.Tradeandprofessionalsocietiesfinditchallengingtokeeppacewiththeexternalchangesthatarepressuringtheirmembers,andtheirmembersarefindingothercommunitiestomeetthoseneedsorarecreatingtheirownonthefly.So,theengineeringprogramsystemisalreadyinastateoftransformationalchangeaimedataddressingafuturethatwillrequireprofessionalstoimmediatelycontributetosuccesswhileenablingsustainableprogramquality.Ratherthansimplyreactingtothepressureofexternalforces,leadersstillhavetheopportunitytoproactivelydrivechangeinengineeringprogramperformance.Programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineerscertainlyhavecriticalrolestoplay,buttheyalonecannotundertakeorsustainsuchchangeontheirown.Indeed,asthisbookhasdemonstrated,allsystemelementsmustactivelyparticipateinthetransformation.Theremainderofthischaptershouldnotbeconstruedasactionitemswithspecificassignmentsandtimeframes,butratherasameansforfurtherreflectingupontheissuesraisedwithinthisbook.Thischapterlooksspecificallyatfivegroupsthatcanplayaroleindrivingprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration:academia,enterpriseleaders,policymakers,professionalsocieties,andresearchers.Eachofthesegroupshasalreadycontributedtosomeextent,butmoreremainsto

394bedoneinfurtheringtheefforttointegratedeeplyandfullysystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement.16.1CalltoActionforAcademia:HelpBuddingProfessionalsLearntoAdaptAcademicdegreesarebuiltuponthecompletionofadefinedsetofrequiredcourses,oftenoriginatingfromwithinareasofdeepspecialization.Intheengineeringdiscipline,therearefourprimarybrancheswithalmost40subspecialties,includingsystemsengineeringandengineeringmanagement(Hamilton,2000).Aroundtheworld,therearethousandsofdegreegrantingprograms,althoughnoaccurateglobalfiguresexist.Intheareaofsystemsengineering,thereareover300degreeprogramsattheBaccalaureate,Master's,Doctoral,andPostDoctorallevels(INCOSE,2016).Anyoneembracingacareerinvolvingtechnologymustanticipatealifetimeofcontinuouslearningbeyondtheachievementofacademicdegrees.Engineersofanyspecializationmustmaintaincurrencyintheirfield.Systemsengineersdealwithtechnologyandemergentpropertiesofsystems,requiringmaintenanceofsystemsengineeringskillsaswellasawarenessofthetechnicalchangesaffectingtheircolleagues.Thedisciplineofprogrammanagementcontinuestoevolveanditisincumbentontheprogrammanagertoremaincurrentwithdevelopingpractices.Bothprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersmustthriveonchange—andworktogethertorisetothechallengesofchange.Formostofitshistory,project,program,andportfoliomanagementhavebeeninterdisciplinary.Individualswhochosetomoveintothoseroles,orwereplacedintothoseroles,usuallycomewithdegreesinotherfieldssuchasengineering,businessadministration,orinformationtechnology.Startinginthelate1980s,academiccurriculabegantorecognizeandadoptproject,program,andportfoliomanagementasauniquefieldofstudy.In2001,afterrecognizingthegrowingneedforestablishingqualityeducationalstandardsinuniversityprogramsofferingacademicawardsinthefieldofstudy,theProjectManagementInstitutecreatedtheGlobalAccreditationCenterforProjectManagementEducationPrograms(GAC)asanindependentacademicaccreditationbodyforaccreditinguniversityprogramsinproject,program,andportfoliomanagement(PMI,2015).Sinceitsestablishment,theGAChasaccreditedmorethan100degreeprogramsattheBaccalaureate,Master's,Doctoral,andPostDoctorallevels(PMI,2016).Themid1990salsorepresentedawatershedmomentforengineeringprogramaccreditation,particularlyintheUnitedStates.In1996,theAccreditationBoardforEngineeringandTechnology,Inc.(ABET)changeditsaccreditationrequirementstoincludeabroaderarrayofprofessionalskillsbeyondengineering,math,andscience.Thechangesrecognizedthatengineeringgraduatesneededtoentertheworkforcewithabroaderrangeofskillstocompeteeffectively,specificallyinsuchareasascommunication,collaboration,problemsolving,andethics(ABET,2006).Thesechangesalsoopenedthedoorfortheinclusionofprojectmanagementinundergraduateengineeringcurriculaandprogrammanagementingraduateand

395doctorallevelprograms.Justasgraduatelevelsystemsengineersarerequiredtoembraceprogrammanagementprinciples,thetechnicaldemandsareincreasingbeyondtheclassicsystemsengineeringprinciplestoincludesystems,systemsthinking,andassociatedcompetencies.Moderndesignphilosophiesdemandsystemsthinkinginordertosupportthedeepintegrationoftechnicalsystemsandorganizationsarerequiredtosupplythetypesofservicesnowexpected.Systemsengineeringhelpsensurethatthesystemdeliveredisacoherentandeffectivesolutiontothesystemneed(Pysteretal.,2012,Section1.1).TheEuropeanUnionbeganeffortstoharmonizehighereducationapproachesamongMemberStates.TheintentionoftheEuropeanHigherEducationArea(EHEA)initiativeistoremovebarrierstoeducationalequivalencythatcouldobstructworkforcemobilitywhileallowingMemberStatestoretainnationalstandardsandpractices.OneresearchpaperstudyingsomeoftheimpactsoftheEHEAeffortnoted,“itisstressedthatoneofthemeasuresnecessaryforachievingemployabilityisdevelopingtransversalskillsandcompetencies,suchascommunicationandlanguages,theabilitytohandleinformation,tosolveproblems,toworkinteams,andtoleadsocialprocesses”(delosRios,Cazorla,DiazPuente,&Yagüe,2010).Aseparatestudyreinforcedtheneedforthe“transversalskills”(seeTable161)andspecificallycalledoutgroupwork,projectmanagement,effectivecommunication,andongoinglearningasmainengineeringcompetenciesthatstudentsneededtodevelop(Rouvraisetal.,2006).Producingstudentswithsuchcapabilitieswascritical,theresearchernoted,because“Todayenterprisesdemand,morethanexperiencedexperts,[theyexpect]competentprofessionals”(delosRiosetal.,2010).So,asintheUnitedStates,Japan,Australia,andothercountriesaroundtheworld,manyEuropeancollegesanduniversitieshaveaccelerateddevelopmentofmoreinterdisciplinarycurriculatoaddressworkforcemobilityandcompaniesseekingmore“readymade”professionals.

396Table161MaincompetenciesforengineeringstudentsRouvraisetal.,2006.ReprintedbypermissionofTaylor&FrancisLtd,www.tandfonline.comTransversalCompetenciesInterpersonalcommunications(groupwork,creativity)LearningtolearnOralcommunication(presentations,meetings)Writtencommunication(technicalreports,argumentationtechniques)ProjectmanagementScientifictechnicalDesigning(plan,writespecifications)CompetenciesModelling(applyingtheoreticalknowledgeandmethodologies)DevelopingTesting,assessing,andvalidatingsolutionsInterdisciplinaryapproachThechallengeforcollegesanduniversitiesistofigureouthowtoincorporatethesenewskillsintoacurriculumthatisalreadypackedwithrequiredcoursework.ABETdidnotprovideclearguidanceforeffectivelyintegratingthenewcriteriaintoexistingprograms,leavingmanyuniversitiesstrugglingtomeetthecriteria(Banik,2015).Lackingclearguidanceorroomtoaddmorecoursestotheircurricula,manyschoolshaveattemptedtoembedthenewskillsintothesyllabioftheirexistingcourses.Forprojectmanagement,acapstonecourseoftenrepresentsthebestvehicleforbridgingbetweendiversesourcesofknowledgeinundergraduatedegreeprograms(Rebentisch,2015).ButsomeschoolsaretakingmoreradicalchangeapproachesinresponsetotheABETstandards.TheDepartmentofCivilandArchitecturalEngineeringatTennesseeStateUniversityhasincorporatedintoitscurriculumaprojectmanagementcourseforcivilengineers,architecturalengineers,andconstructionengineers.Thecoursefocusesonthemanagementandleadershipcapabilitiesrequiredtosuccessfullyexecuteconstructionprojects.Astrongfocusonmanagementofstakeholders,cost,andscheduleisbalancedwithaddressingsafetymanagement,useofsoftwaretools,buildingandleadingteams,andprofessionalethics(Banik,2015).TheElectrical,Computer,Software,andSystemsEngineeringDepartmentatEmbryRiddleAeronauticalUniversityundertookeffortstointegrateseveralgraduatesystemsengineeringandsoftwareengineeringcourses.Theinitiativealsoincorporatedprojectmanagementpracticesandsoftwarecapabilitiesintothesyllabus.Buildinganintegratedprogramuncoveredakeyobstacle—therewerenobookspresentingsuchaninterdisciplinaryapproach.Babiceanu(2015)reportedthatfacultydevelopedtheircoursematerialsbyintegrating

397componentsfromvariouspublications,including:AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide)(PMI,2013)SystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE,2015)SystemsEngineeringHandbook(NASA,2007)GuidetotheSystemsEngineeringBodyofKnowledge(SEBoK)(INCOSE,2016)GraduateReferenceCurriculumforSystemsEngineering(Pysteretal.,2012)SystemsEngineeringCompetencyCareerModel(SECCM)(Whitcombetal.,2015)SoftwareEngineeringBodyofKnowledge(SWEBoK)(IEEE,2014)Indesigningthecourse,thefacultymadeaninterestingobservation:[T]hecoursematerialsaredesignedsuchthatstudentsgainanindepthunderstandingofboththeengineeringprojectmanagementandsoftwareprojectmanagementareas….Regardlessoftheregisteredstudents'softwareorcomputerengineeringbackground,theprojectmanagementprocessisfairlysimilarforbothsoftwareandhardwaresystemsdevelopment,sotheneedtoreconcilethetwoviewsisnotasacuteasinthecaseofrequirementsengineering(Babiceanu,2015).TheGraduateReferenceCurriculumforSystemsEngineering(GRCSE™)(Pysteretal.,2012)recognizedthevalueofincorporatingprojectmanagementintoengineeringcourseswhentheyquotePysterandOlwell(eds):SE[systemsengineering]incorporatesskillsetsfrommanydisciplines;includingtraditionalengineeringdisciplines(electrical,mechanical,civil,etc.)aswellasmoremanagementfocuseddisciplines(projectmanagement,programmanagement,industrialengineering,etc.).ItisimportantthatsystemsengineerspossessbasicknowledgerelatedtothesedisciplinesandalsounderstandhowSEisrelatedtootherdisciplines.AstudentshouldbeabletoarticulatehowSEcouldandshouldinteractwiththesedisciplinesandwhatcommonpitfallsmayoccurwhentheserelationshipsarenotproperlymanaged.Thisisdiscussedin“Part6:RelatedDisciplines”oftheSEBoK(p.18).TheGRCSEgoesontostate:Giventheincreasingcomplexityofmodernsystems,itisimperativeforgraduatesofSEprogramstounderstandandappreciatethefundamentalconceptsofprojectmanagement,theirrelationshipwithSE,andthewaysinwhichcomplexitycanbemanagedinprojects.Inadditiontothegeneralrelationships,somedisciplines,suchashumanfactors,arenowheavilyentwinedwithsystems.Humanfactorsdealswithcomplexsystemsthataregenerallyoperatedand/orusedbyhumans;inthesesystems,issuesassociatedwithusabilityandergonomicsplayamajorroleinsystemsuccessorfailure(p.18).Atthegraduateanddoctorallevel,prospectivestudentswillfindtheyhaveoptions.Therearespecificdegreeprogramsrelatedtoproject,program,andportfoliomanagement.Infact,most

398oftheGACaccreditedprogramsareattheMaster'sandDoctorallevelinprojectmanagement.Prospectivestudentswillalsofindgraduateanddoctoraldegreesinengineeringwithaconcentrationinprojectand/orprogrammanagement.Theanalysisoftheresearchuponwhichthisbookisbasedconfirmedrolesandskillsforengineeringprogramleaders(programmanagersandchiefsystemsengineers)thatareconsistentnotonlywithtraditionalengineeringeducationandtrainingprograms,butalsowithprofessionalstandardsandcertifications.Thisreinforcesthenotionthattheserolesareindeedpartoffunctionaldisciplinesbasedinspecializedknowledge.Whileeachofthesedomainshasuniquerolesandskills,therearesignificantareasofoverlappingorsharedresponsibility.Bothprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersareviewedasjointlyaccountableformanagingprogramandprojectrisk,externalsupplierrelations,qualitymanagement,andlifecycleplanning.Ineachoftheseareas,thereareuniqueperspectivesandanalysesthateachfunctionbringstothesharedresponsibility.Nevertheless,successfulintegrationmaynotbesomuchintheaccumulationofmultipleanalysesasitisthewayinwhichoneanalysisorperspectiveinformstheother,andultimatelyshapestheunifiedprogramlevelapproach.Thissuggeststhattheabilitytosynthesizeintegratedsolutionsfrommultipleperspectivesisanimportantengineeringleadershipskill.Whetherthroughsharedresponsibilitiesorfromtheneedtoshareknowledgederivedfromuniquefunctionalresponsibilities,therespectivefunctionsrequiretheabilitytoworktogetherinanintegratedfashion.Theprogrammanagerclaimsthatthemostimportantskillsforthatroleincludeleadershipandstakeholdermanagement(Conforto,Rossi,Rebentisch,Oehmen,&Pacenza,2013).Combined,thesesuggesttheabilitytobringtogetherdiverseintereststoembraceacommonobjectiveandworkcollaboratively.Chiefsystemsengineersclaimedthatthemostimportantskillsforthatroleincludesystemsthinkingandrequirementsmanagement,whichsuggestsanabilitytolinkoverarchingobjectivestodetailedelementsinaholisticintegratedperspective.Bothprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineerssharecommunicationasakeyskill(Confortoetal.,2013).Aneducationalorprofessionaldevelopmentprogrammaynotnecessarilyneedtodevelopalloftheseskillsinitsstudents,butitshouldneverthelessstrivetodevelopanunderstandingandappreciationofthedifferentrolesthatarerequiredinanintegratedprogramleadershipteam.Innovativeengineeringleadershipeducationprogramsincreasinglyemphasizetheintroductionofmoreelementsoflifecycleprocessesandoperationsforengineeredsystems,includinginterpersonalskillsandleadership.Yettheystillmaynotaddresssomeoftheimportantorganizationalandrelationalelementshighlightedinthisbook,particularly,integrationacrossfunctionalandorganizationalboundaries—animportantelementofengineeringprogramsuccess.Unproductivetensionbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesresultswhenintegrationofthedisciplinesisinformal,adhoc,orjustineffective.Therootsofunproductivetensionmayultimatelyliewithpoorlydefinedrolesandrelationshipsintheprogramandorganization.Asengineeringeffortsbecomemoreintegrated,andasrelationshipsbecomemoreexplicitandformallydefined,theunproductivetensioninorganizationsdecreases.Thissuggeststhatorganizationalorprogramdesignmayplayasignificantroleinshapingtheeffectivenessofengineeringefforts.Whileengineeringstudents

399maylearnagooddealaboutproductdesignduringthecourseoftheireducation,theymaynothavemuchexposuretoinformationaboutthedesignoforganizationsandtherelationshipstheyembody.Theseissuesshouldbeconsideredforadditioninfutureengineeringleadershipcurricula.Academiashouldalsoconsiderwhethertherearebetterapproachesforachievingtrueinterdisciplinaryeducation.TheAmericanAssociationofCollegesofNursingpresentedapowerfuldefinitionofinterdisciplinaryeducationinitsPositiononInterdisciplinaryEducationandPractice(AACN,n.d.).Itdefinedinterdisciplinaryeducationas:Aneducationalapproachinwhichtwoormoredisciplinescollaborateinthelearningprocesswiththegoaloffosteringinterprofessionalinteractionsthatenhancethepracticeofeachdiscipline.Suchinterdisciplinaryeducationisbasedonmutualunderstandingandrespectfortheactualandpotentialcontributionsofthedisciplines.Currentcurricula“reengineering”activitiesarelargelyfocusedonfittingnewcontentintoexistingcurriculaor,inthecaseofproject,program,andportfoliomanagement,developingspecificdegreeprogramsinthefield.Attheundergraduatelevel,currentapproachesreinforceasiloedenvironmentfocusedonaspecificdisciplinethatmayincorporateelementsfromanotherdiscipline.Atthegraduateanddoctorallevels,theremaybemoreopportunitytoachievetheobjectiveoffosteringinterprofessionalinteractions,althoughengineeringprogramsarelikelytohaveapredominanceofindividualswithengineeringundergraduatedegrees.Sohowdoestheacademicenvironmenttransformtobecomemoreinterdisciplinary?Intheirwebresourcepost,InterdisciplinaryApproachestoTeaching,Goldsmith,Hamilton,Hornsby,andWells(n.d.)proposethatfacultyleadthechangebydoingthehardworkrequiredtobuildatrulyinterprofessionalandinterdisciplinaryprogram.TheyadvocateamodelproposedbyAllenRemkoandJamesWelshthatempowersfacultytoembracetheirroleastransformers.ThetransformationthatGoldsmithandcolleagues(n.d.)proposeisnotjustofthedegreeprogram,butoftheindividualfacultymembersthemselves.Themodelrequiresthatfacultymembersbecomeinterprofessionalandinterdisciplinarythroughtheirresearch,engagementswithacademiccolleagues,andoutreachtoindustryandgovernment.AccordingtoGoldsmithandcolleagues,onlybylivingandembodyingthetransformationcanfacultiesdemonstratetostudentsthecriticalityofbeinginterprofessionalandinterdisciplinary.TheCalltoActionforacademicinstitutionsandfacultyistobetterpositionstudentsforacompetitiveworkforceby:Incorporatinginterdisciplinarypractices,casestudies,andrelatedmaterialintoexistingcoursestothegreatestextentpossibleExposingstudentstomorerealworldengineeringprogramsbybringingexperiencedprofessionalsintotheclassroomandarrangingforstudentstovisitengineeringprogramworksitesCreatingnewcoursesinengineeringprogramandprojectmanagementordeveloping

400synergieswithallieddepartment'scoursesEstablishingnewdegreesinengineeringprogrammanagementthatfullyintegratekeyskillsandcompetenciesfrombothdomains16.2CalltoActionforEnterprise:BuildtheRightEngineforStrategyImplementationEnterpriseleaderscareaboutoutcomes—theachievementofstrategyormission.Achievingoutcomesrequiresthatorganizationshaveanenginethatiscapableofeffectivelyimplementingstrategicobjectives.Onesuchapproachisan“engine”withfive,interlockingcomponents:Culture.Culturereflectsthosebehaviorsandactionsthatarerecognized.Ifaroleisrecognizedashavingatargetonitsback,likethatofprogrammanagerorchiefsystemsengineer,whointheorganizationwillwantthatrole?Ifindividualshavetobetoldtoworkacrosssiloes,thencollaborationintheorganizationisweak.Soleadersmustdemonstratethebehaviorstheyexpecttheirteamstomirror.Theyshouldalsoacknowledgewhentheirteamsexhibittherightbehaviorsandcoachthemwhentheydonot.Vision.Theremustbeaclear,obtainableobjectivethatpeoplecanunderstandanddirecttheireffortstoaccomplish.Theymustunderstandtheimportanceoftheobjectivetotheorganizationaswellastheircontributiontoachievingtheobjective.Talent.Findingtherightpeoplewiththerightskillsandthosepositiveattributesthatreflectaneffectiveorganizationalcultureispartofthetalentcomponent.Inaddition,goodtalentmanagementmustincludeongoingprofessionaldevelopmenttoensurethattheskills,competencies,andexperienceoftheworkforceremainleadingedge.Andperformanceincentivesshouldbelayeredtorewardarangeofaccomplishmentsforteamsaswellasforindividuals.Capabilities.Therightpeopleneedcapabilitiesthatenablethemtodelivertheirbestperformanceonbehalfoftheorganization.Themethods,processes,andtoolspeopleuseintheirworkshouldenableexcellencebybeingtailoredbyandfortheusercommunity.Leadership.Regardlessofanindividual'sformalroleintheorganization,theorganizationshouldbuildandencourageleadershipatalllevelstohelpstaffengagewiththeirworkandwitheachother.Leadershipmustenergizepeopletogivetheirbesteffort,empowerthemwiththeappropriateauthority,andenablethemtobuildcollaborativenetworksthatdeliverresultsfortheorganization.Drivingstrategyimplementationrequiresthattheseelementsbecomeconstituentsofaclimateorecosystemthatenablesintegrationtotakeplacewithintheorganizationmorereadily.Anditisthejoboftheleaderswhoarethestewardsofthisecosystemtoacttoensurethattheecosystemencouragesandrecognizestheimportanceofintegration.Ashasalreadybeendemonstrated,noeffortisrequiredtoconvinceexecutiveleadersthattheirorganizationsneedtochange.Cultureisoftenpointedtoasthemostprominentcauseoffailure

401inprogramsandprojects.InastudyofCEOs,IBM(2008)identifiedthetopchallengestosuccessfullyimplementingstrategicchange.Corporateculturewasmentionedasachallengebyhalftherespondents,secondonlyto“changingmindsetsandattitudes.”Recognizingthatneediskeepingmanyofthemawakeatnightalongwithtwokeyquestions:Istheorganizationcapableofthechangerequired?Howdoestheorganizationmanageandsustainthechangeinitiative?Mostleadersbelievethatculturealoneisthetargetoforganizationalchange.Infact,Combe(2014)pointsoutthattherearethreeinterlockingmechanismsthatmustworkintandemtoeffectivelyexecuteandsustaintrueorganizationalchange:culture,commitment,andcapacity.Achievingthenewmindset,towhichsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementmustalignpracticesinordertobetterenablecollaborationanddelivergreatervalueandcustomersatisfaction,isattheheartoftheculturalchangedescribedinthisbook.Itisimperativethatexecutiveleadersfirstmodelthroughtheirownactions,thenholdprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersaccountablefordemonstratingthebehaviorsandattitudesthatwillembedthemindsetwithintheirteams.Atthesametime,theleadershipalsoneedstoensurethatotherpartsoftheorganizationhelptobuildandsustainthecapacitynecessaryforthechangestotakeholdandbecomeengrainedinthenewculture.Butmostimportantly,executiveleadersmustholdthemselvesaccountabletoleadbyexampleandmakeoneoftheirprimaryjobsthementoringofthenextgenerationofenterpriseleaders.Talentmanagementactivitieshelpsupporttherightmindset,empowerindividualstodotheirpart,andsustaincriticalchanges.Fornewemployees,theproperorientation,mentoring,andcoachinghelpsthemadapttotheorganization'senvironment,performanceexpectations,andculturalnorms.Developingintegrativetrainingprogramsforteammembersfromvariousdisciplineshelpsthemlearntogether,worktogether,andunderstandeachother'scontributionstotheprogramorproject.Leveragingseasonedemployeesascoachesandmentorsenablescriticalknowledgetransferabouthow:RealworkgetsdoneBarrierscanbeovercomeInsightfromexperienceandlessonslearnedavoidsrepetitionofpastmistakesIntheworldofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagement,therearesolidexamplesoftalentmanagementprogramscreatedwithinorganizationsthatfocusoncreatingandsustaininganintegrativeandcollaborativemindset.NASA'sAcademyofProject/ProgramandEngineeringLeadership(APPEL)isoneexample.NASA(n.d.a)describestheprogramthisway:

402TheAcademy'scorecurriculumoffersacomprehensive,integratedapproachtolearningforNASA'stechnicalworkforce.Thesequenceofmaterialsisdesignedtohelpparticipantsexpandtheirthinkingtomakeconnectionsamongmanysystemsengineeringandprojectmanagementprinciplesandconcepts,seethe“bigpicture,”andunderstandthecontextandinterrelationshipsofthetopics.Thisframeworkpromotesthetimelytransferofknowledgeandskillsintotheworkenvironment.Corecoursesrangefromthefoundationsofaerospacetoadvancedprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringtopics.APPELoffersabroadrangeofcoursesdesignedtoensurethatsystemsengineersandprogrammanagersunderstandvitalelementsofeachother'sdisciplinesandkeypointsofintegrationsotheyarebetterabletocommunicate,collaborate,anddeliverresults.Educationalprogramstargetindividualsatalllevels,fromnewhirestoseasonedprofessionals,andsome“students”mayultimatelybecomeprograminstructors.Beyondcoursework,NASAProjectTeamDevelopmentSupportprovidescoaching,workshops,andgroupsessionsaimedatincreasingaproject'sprobabilityofsuccess.Supportisavailabletohelpprogram,project,andengineeringleaderspreparetheirteams.Itincludestheavailabilityofsubjectmatterexpertstosupportplanningandscheduling,programcontrolanalysis,systemsandintegrationsupport,riskmanagement,andsoftwaremanagement.Anditfeaturesassessmentstohelpuncoverbehavioralchallengesthatmayultimatelyaffectteamcohesionandperformance.Asisoftenthecase,NASA'sAPPELevolvedfrommajorculturalgapsthatledtosmallandlargemissionfailures,includingboththeChallengerandColumbiaspaceshuttledisasters.Thosefailuresforcedtransformationalchangeafterlossoflife.Thepostdisasterinvestigationfoundevidenceofapersistentsiloedculturethatinhibitedalignmentofpractices,effectivecommunication,mutualrespect,andcollaboration.APPELhelpstosustainachangedmindsetthroughitsintegratedmissionfocusandbyindoctrinatingstaffmembersatalllevelstothecurrent,collaborativewayofdoingthings.Theculturechangesustainedbybuildingtherightcapabilitieswithintheteamstrengthenseveryone'scommitmenttodowhatittakesfortheprogrammissiontosucceed.Besideseffectivetalentmanagement,anotherkeycapabilitythatenablesorganizationstosuccessfullyexecutetheirprojectsandprogramsistheestablishmentofmethodologies.AsexploredinChapter8,amethodologyanditsrelatedpoliciesestablishasystemofpractices,techniques,procedures,andrulesusedbyadisciplinetomeetrequirementsanddelivervaluetostakeholders.Researchshowsthatorganizationswithstandardizedpractices,suchasdefinedmethodologies,performbetterthanthosethatdonot,andtheyhavehigherratesofachievingtheiroriginalbusinessgoals.Despitetheirvalue,manyorganizationsdonotutilizedocumented,aligned,andintegratedmethodologies(PMI,2016),insteadrelyingonmoreadhocprocesses.Why?Becausebusinessprocessmanagementandongoingprocessimprovementisoftennotvaluedbyorganizationalleaders.Forcommercialorganizations,suchactivitiesdonotgeneratedirectrevenue,andareconsideredasoperationaloverheadthattheorganizationmustbear.Forgovernmentorganizations,theresources,time,andexpertisemaynotbe

403availablewithintheagencytosupportprocessdevelopmentandimprovement.Withinorganizationsthathaveestablishedmethodologiesinplace,appropriateelementsoftheprocesses,practices,andtoolsusedbyprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersmustalignincomplementarywaysandintegrateatcriticalintersectionpoints.Forexample,bothprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersuseriskmanagementpracticestoidentifyandpreparetomitigatebusiness,technical,supplier,andotherrisksthatcouldimpacttheprogram.Ifprojecttechnicalrisksthatcouldaffectotherprojectsand,ultimately,thesuccessoftheprogramarenotvisibletotheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineer,programperformancecanbeaffected.Similarly,ifbusinessrisksarenotsharedandclearlyunderstoodatalllevelsoftheprogram,projectmanagersandengineerscouldmakedecisionswithoutfullyunderstandingtheimplicationsofthosedecisions.AstudybyMITRECorporationCommandandControlCenter'sEnterpriseSystemsEngineeringFocusGroupuncoveredtheimportanceofintegratedengineeringprogramcapabilities.Whilefocusedspecificallyonevolvingsystemsengineeringapproachesandtechniques,thestudylookedatthesystemthroughanengineeringprogramlens.Infact,“TheobjectiveswereclearlystatedtoimproveprogramperformancethroughtheapplicationofESE(enterprisesystemsengineering)”(Crider&DeRosa,2007).ThestudybeganbyidentifyingkeyESEprocesses:technicalplanning;enterprisearchitecture;capabilitiesbasedengineeringanalysis;enterpriseanalysisandassessment;andstrategictechnicalplanning.Next,aseriesofcasestudiesweredevelopedtoevaluatetheapplicationoftheESEprocessesto“tackleanexistingenterprisechallengeand/orfulfillacriticalenterprisecapabilityneed”(Crider&DeRosa,2007).Thecasestudiesreflectedarangeofprogramsandprojects,includingsomethathadalreadybeencompleted.Participantsincludedabroadrangeofengineeringandprojectprofessionals.Thestudyfoundthattheprocessesidentifiedweresoundandwerebeingappliedinvariouswaysbasedontheuniqueaspectsoftheprojectorprogram.ThemostsignificantfindingscalledoutbyCrider&DeRosa(2007)relatedtoelementsofbuildingenterpriseengineeringprogramcapabilitiesare:Organizationsneed“toestablishanenablinginfrastructure(technical,business,operational)toachieveenterpriseoutcomes.”Capabilitiesmustextendbeyondjusttechnicalskillsandincludesuchkeyleadershipandbusiness/strategymanagementskillsas“Leadership,strategicvision,conflictmanagement,balancingcooperationandcompetition,coalitionbuilding.”Realtimelessonslearnedneedtofuelimprovementthroughouttheenterprise.Specifically,thestudyfoundthatriskmanagementpracticesofbothprogram/projectmanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplineswereinsufficientforcomplexprograms.Infact,someprogramsshiftedfroma“riskmanagement”mindsettoan“opportunitymanagement”framework.Theprogramteam“builtasuccessful[opportunitymanagement]integrationfacilityfortheirprogram.However,asitgainednotorietywithinthelargerenterprise,theyshifteditspurposeandexpandedittobecomeanenterpriseresource.”

404Thesestudiesandexamplesclearlydemonstratethatorganizationalleadersmustembracecultureandcapabilitydevelopmenttoeffectivelydrivestrategyandengagement.Organizationalculturemustvalueongoinginternalimprovementandputresourcesandsupportstructuresinplacetobuild,assess,andimproverequiredcapabilities.Ifthecompanyvaluesitandenablesittohappen,engineeringprogramteamswillcommittosustainingit.TheCalltoActionfororganizationalleadersistoenhancetheirorganization'sabilitytoeffectivelyimplementitsstrategiesby:Beingactiveshepherdsoftheorganization'sculture,demonstratingtherightbehaviorsandenforcingtheexpectationthatotherswillmirrorthosebehaviorsEnsuringthattheorganizationenablesintegrativeapproachesthatenhancevaluedeliverytocustomersandrealizestrategicbenefitsforthecompanyContributingtoengineeringprogramteamsuccessbymakingtimelydecisions,removingroadblocksfromtheteam'spath,helpingtobuildconsensus,andkeepingtheteamenergizedaroundthevisionEnsuringthatstaffareactivelydevelopingthemselveswithinandoutsideoftheorganizationthroughinternalknowledgesharingnetworks,externalscanningandscoutingforleadingpracticesatindustryandprofessionalevents,andparticipationinresearchconsortia16.3CalltoActionforPolicymakers:RefocusOversightandAccountabilityintheRightWaysTherearetwounique,butoverlappingfunctionswithingovernmentthat,dependingontheformofgovernment,maybecarriedoutbyoneormultipleentities.Thesefunctionshavecomplementaryrolestoplayinthetransformationofgovernmentengineeringprogrammanagementcapabilities:Policymakers—thosewhothroughlegislationvehiclesestablishrequirementsforengineeringprogramoversight,accountability,andcontrols.Governmentexecutiveleaders—thosewhocarryoutpublicpolicydirectives.TheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehman,2012)outlinedthechallengesassociatedwithdrivingimprovementsinengineeringprogramperformancewithingovernment.Thosechallengeshavetheirrootsindecisionsandapproachesadoptedbypolicymakersandgovernmentexecutiveleaders:PolicymakerdecisionsandapproachesUnstablefundingenvironment.Discontinuitiesanduncertaintiesinthefundingofaprogramtendtocauseinstabilitieswithprogramstaffingandsubcontracts,andthusmakeefficientandeffectiveprogrammanagementmoredifficult.Policiesdemandingearlysubcontracting.Somegovernmentprogramshavea

405policydrivendemandtosubcontractmanyprogrammanagementactivities,evenintheveryearlyphases.Thesepoliciesrisksubcontractingofcriticalcoordinationandintegrationfunctionscreatingsignificantimpedimentstoeffectiveprogramplanningandexecution.Geographicallydispersedsubcontractingstrategy(e.g.,“madein50states”).Politicalforcescreateincentivesforcontractorsofgovernmentsponsoredprogramstosubdivideprogramactivitiesamongasmanystates,provinces,orotherjurisdictionsaspossible.Thiscouldcontradictthoseenablersthatdemandefficientorganizationalstructuresintheprogramenterprise.GovernmentexecutiveleaderdecisionsandapproachesProgramleadershiprotation.Thepersonneldevelopmentpolicy,especiallyinthemilitaryservices,mightcallforaregularrotationofthegovernmentsideprogrammanager.Thisiscontrarytomaintainingclearandstableresponsibility,accountability,andauthorityonboththecustomerandcontractorsides.Italsoimpactshavingtopleaderswithdeepprogramspecificbusinessandsystemsengineeringknowledgeforthetopprogramleadership.Lackofrigorinexercisingknownbestpractices.Publishedgovernmentacquisitionandprogrammanagementguidelinesandpoliciescontainalargenumberofusefulpracticesthatsupportstrongperformance.However,thosepracticesarenotalwaysfullyimplemented,afactthatisregularlyidentifiedinformalprogramauditsandevaluations.Mismatchbetweencontractingvehicleandriskprofile.Thespectrumfromfixedpricetocostpluscontractscreatesspecificincentivesforbehavioronthegovernmentandthecontractorsides.Mostimportantly,itassignstheresponsibilitiesforcarryingcostrisksdriven,forexample,bytechnologyuncertaintyorproductioninefficienciesbetweentheparties.Iftheriskprofileofaprogramisnotalignedwiththecontractingvehicleandtheincentivesitcreates,theresultingprogramenvironmentwillnotbeconducivetocontrollingcost.Promotingabureaucracyofartifacts.Riskaversionandthedemandforoversightcancreateacultureandenvironmentthatkeepsprogramandengineeringleadershipbusywithdocumentationandadministrativetasks,ratherthanfocusingtheireffortsonperformanceandresults.Thecontinuedpoorperformanceofmanygovernmentengineeringprogramsandtighteningbudgetsispushingpolicymakersandgovernmentexecutivestotransformtheirthinking,particularlyrelatedtoprogrammanagementcapabilities.IntheUnitedKingdom,theMajorProjectsAuthority(MPA)wasestablishedin2011withamandatetooverseethegovernment'sportfolioofapproximately200largeprogramsandprojects,totalingcloseto£500billioninpublicfunding.MPAmanagesalargenumberofengineeringprogramsandprojectscoveringtransportation,infrastructure,technologysystems,andmilitarydefensewithitslargestprogramsandprojectswithintheMinistriesofDefenseandHealth(CabinetOffice,2015).

406Sinceitsestablishment,MPAhasadvanceddevelopmentofgovernmentprogramandprojectmanagementcapabilitiesandexpertiseaswellastheaccountabilityofmajorprojectbusinessowners.Itskeyaccomplishments,asreportedinthe2015annualreport,include:Transparencyacrosstheportfolioofthelargestpublicsectorprogramsandprojectswithmeasurestrackingthelikelihoodofsuccessandlifecyclecostestimates.Movingsomeprogramsandprojectstohigherconfidencelevelsofsuccess.Troubledprogramsandprojectsareclearlyidentifiedandopentofurtherevaluationandprogressiondecisions.MPA'sleadershipreflectedthetypeofinterdisciplinaryperspectiveneededtotransformengineeringprogramperformance.TonyMeggs,MPA'sseniorexecutive,broughtsignificantexperienceasabusinessandtechnicalleaderintheprivatesector,includingoverseeingBritishPetroleum'stechnology,projects,andengineeringfunctions.Hisdeputydirector,SteveVine,wasanexperiencedsystemsengineer.InJanuary2016,MPAmergedwithInfrastructureU.K.(IUK).IUK,adivisionofHerMajesty'sTreasury,wasestablishedin2010tosupportpublicsectorcapitalinvestmentininfrastructureandtodevelopfinancingschemestoencourageprivatesectorinvestmentininfrastructure.Theneworganization,theInfrastructureandProjectsAuthority(IPA),combines“governmentexpertiseinthefinancing,deliveryandassuranceofinfrastructureprojects”(CabinetOffice,n.d.).Meggsleadstheneworganization,andexpectationsarehighthatprogramandprojectperformancewillcontinuetoimprove.IntheUnitedStates,the114thCongresspassedlegislationthatfocusesonbuildingthefederalgovernment'sprogrammanagementcapabilities.Thelegislationhasseveralkeycomponents,including:TheOfficeofManagementandBudget,theexecutiveagencyresponsibleforoversightofagencyperformance,federalprocurement,andfinancialmanagement,isrequiredtoestablishstandards,policies,andguidelinesforprogram/projectmanagement.TheOfficeofPersonnelManagementischargedwithdevelopingafederaljobseriesforprogrammanagementprofessionalswithrequisitecompetencies,skills,andexperiencerequirements.Eachgovernmentagencyisrequiredtodevelopafiveyearstrategicplanfordevelopingandimprovingitsprojectandprogrammanagementcapabilities.Eachagencyisrequiredtodesignateaprogrammanagementimprovementofficerandtocoordinateimprovementeffortsacrossagenciesthroughaninteragencycouncil.Ongoingreviewsoftheportfolioofgovernmentprogramsdeemedhighriskbygovernmentauditors,aswellasrequirementsforindividualgovernmentagenciestoreviewtheirportfolios.Withregardtosystemsengineering,U.S.policymakershavereceivedreportsforover16yearsidentifyingopportunitiestoimproveweaponsystemsacquisitionprogramsthroughmore

407effectiveuseofsystemsengineeringpractices.InMarch2001,theGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)reportedtoCongressthatsystemsengineering,appliedtoweaponsystemsbeforeproductdevelopmentbegan,reducedcostanddeliveredbetterresults(GAO,2001).TheGAOnotedthatDepartmentofDefensepolicydidnotallowsystemsengineeringapplicationuntilafterrequirementswereset.InJune2015,theGAOcompletedananalysisof78majordefenseprogramrequirements(GAO,2015).Again,theGAOcitedtheneedforapplicationofsystemsengineeringwithintheprograms.Butthistime,chiefswithintheDepartmentofDefenseacknowledgednotonlytheneedforsystemsengineering,butalsoofstrongerengineeringprogramintegration:Poorprogramoutcomescanbetracedtoacultureinwhichthemilitaryservicesbeginprogramswithunrealisticrequirements,immaturetechnologies,andoverlyoptimisticcostandscheduleestimates….Wepresentedourassessmentoftherequirementsproblemtocurrentandformerservicechiefsandtheygenerallyagreedwithit.Severalservicechiefsnotedthatmoreintegration,collaboration,andcommunicationduringtherequirementsandacquisitionprocessesneedstotakeplacetoensurethattradeoffsbetweendesiredcapabilitiesandexpectedcostsaremadeandthatrequirementsareessential,technicallyfeasible,andaffordablebeforeprogramsgetunderway.TheGAOalsoreportedthattheservicechiefsfeltthatthegovernmentneededtoimproveitsoverallcapabilitiesassociatedwithsystemsengineering:Almostalloftheservicechiefsstatedthatthereisaneedtofurtherenhanceexpertisewithinthegovernment,andseveralspecifiedexpertiseinsystemsengineering.Severalservicechiefsindicatedthatsystemsengineeringcapabilitiesaregenerallylackingintherequirementsdevelopmentprocess,anddonotbecomeavailableuntilafterrequirementsarevalidatedandanexpensiveandriskysystemdevelopmentprogramisunderway.Someservicechiefsadvocatedthathavingsystemsengineeringcapabilitiesavailabletothemilitaryservicesduringrequirementsdevelopmentcouldhelptoensureearlierassessmentofrequirementsfeasibility.Thechief'sassessmentsuggestsanopportunityforsystemsengineeringimprovementaccountabilitylegislation,similartothatforprogrammanagement.Thesearecriticalfirststepsinaddressingprogramchallengesandinenablingstrongerperformance.GiventhatintheUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStates,andmanyothercountries,engineeringprogramstargetinginfrastructure,technology,security,anddefenserepresentlargepercentagesoftheirbudgets,asimilarfocusisrequiredtostrengthensystemsengineeringcapabilities,ensurestrongerpracticealignment,andenablecollaboration.TheCalltoActionforpolicymakersistouseitsoversightandauthorizationpowerstoimprovegovernmentengineeringprogrammanagementcapabilitiesby:Holdingagencyorministryleadersaccountableforactinguponcapabilityimprovementopportunitiesuncoveredinauditreports,particularlywhenthoseopportunitiesarenotacteduponbytherelevantagencyorministry

408Evaluatingandchanginggovernmentpoliciesandpracticesthatinhibitintegratedapproachesformanagingengineeringprograms,suchasacquisitionandprocurementlawsandcustomarypracticeswiththeircorrespondingrootcausesEnsuringthatthecivilservicehastherightroles,skills,andcapabilitiestomanagecomplexengineeringprograms,includingsupportforongoinglearninganddevelopmentforcivilservantsAcknowledgingandpromotingimprovementsachievedinengineeringprogramperformance16.4CalltoActionforIndustryandProfessionalSocieties:TakeanInterdisciplinaryViewTradeandprofessionalassociationsplayasignificantroleinidentifyingandshapingeffectivepracticesthatinfluencetheirorganizationalandpractitionermembers,particularlyintheareasofstandardsandcertifications.Inthefieldofsystemsengineering,thelargestistheInternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE).INCOSEisanotforprofitmembershiporganizationfoundedin1990toshare,promote,andadvancesystemsengineeringprinciplesandconcepts.INCOSE'smembersfillrolesthatrangefromstudenttoseniorpractitionerandtechnicalengineertoprogramandcorporatemanagement(Rebentisch,2015).Manyotherengineeringsocieties,suchasIEEE,theAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineersandtheAmericanInstituteofAeronauticsandAstronautics,alsohavecommunitieswithintheirmembershipfocusedonsystemsengineering.Inthefieldofproject,program,andportfoliomanagement,thelargestglobalprofessionalorganizationistheProjectManagementInstitute(PMI).PMIisanotforprofitprofessionalmembershipassociationfoundedin1969.OtherorganizationsassociatedwithprojectandprogrammanagementaretheProjectManagementAssociationofJapan(PMAJ);andtheInternationalProjectManagementAssociation(IPMA).Oneimportantmethodforadvancingskillsandrolesforprofessionalsisthepromulgationofstandardsandcertifications.Developmentofstandardsandcertificationisanimportantfunctionthattradeandprofessionalassociationsadvanceonbehalfoftheirmembers.Inthestandardsarea,thereareseveralstandardsassociatedwithprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering,andevenmorerelatingtospecificpractices,suchasriskmanagement,configurationmanagement,costestimating,etc.Astandardaddressesthequestion,“Whatshouldwedo?”Themostimportantinternationalandcommercialstandardsinthefieldofsystemsengineeringareindustryspanningandinclude:SystemsandSoftwareEngineering—SystemLifeCycleProcesses(ISO/IEC/IEEE15288:2015)

409SystemsandSoftwareEngineering—LifeCycleProcesses—ProjectManagement(ISO/IEC/IEEE16326:2009)SystemsandSoftwareEngineering—SoftwareLifeCycleProcesses(ISO/IEC12207)PMIpublishesconsensusbasedstandardsdetailingthewidelyacceptedpracticesrelatedtoprojectandprogrammanagementas:AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide)(ANSI/PMI990012013)TheStandardforProgramManagement(ANSI/PMI080022012)Complementingthesefoundationalstandardsarearangeofpracticestandards,frameworks,andpracticeguidesthatfurtherelaborateonspecificprojectandprogrammanagementpracticesandapproaches.Withtheirlargepoolofprofessionalstoserveassubjectmatterexperts,tradeandprofessionalsocietiescantaptheirmembers'expertisetofillgapsinexistingstandards,particularlyrelatedtohowthevariousstandardsconnectandalignwitheachother.Ratherthanpromulgatingmorestandards,membershiporganizationscandevelopguidelines,whitepapers,andotherresourcesthathelptheirmembersaligntherecommendedpracticesinexistingstandards.Suchactivitieswouldnotonlyhelptointegratepractices,butcouldalsohelptoestablishacommontechnicallanguageunderstoodbybothdisciplines.Animportantroleofprofessionaldisciplinecommunitiesistoincreasethedepthandspecializationofknowledgewithinthecommunity.Professionalcertificationsprovideanobjectivemethodforevaluatinganindividual'sabilitytoapplyknowledgeandexperiencetoreallifeproblemsandchallenges.Becausethefieldofsystemsengineeringismuchsmallerthanthefieldofprojectmanagement,othersystemsengineeringcertificationprocessestendtobeassociatedwithindividualorganizations.Forinstance,INCOSEofferstheINCOSEASEP(Associate),INCOSECSEP(Certified),andINCOSEESEP(Expert)certifications.TheObjectManagementGroup(OMG,n.d.a)describesitselfasaninternationaltradeassociationthatdevelops“enterpriseintegrationstandardsforawiderangeoftechnologiesandanevenwiderrangeofindustries.”OMG'sCertifiedSystemsModelingProfessional™isafourtieredcertificationprogramthattargetssystemsengineersutilizingModelBasedSystemsEngineeringpractices(OMG,n.d.).Manyuniversitiesthatofferengineeringdegreeprogramsalsohavecertificateprogramsfocusedonsystemsengineering.Thelistofprogrammanagercertificationsinthemuchlargerfieldofprojectmanagementismorebroadanddiverse,asshowninTable162.

410Table162ProjectmanagementprofessionalcredentialsandcertificationsCAPM®(CertifiedAssociateinProjectPRINCE2FoundationManagement)PMP®(ProjectManagementProfessional)PRINCE2PractitionerPgMP®(ProgramManagementIPMALevelA®(CertifiedProjectsDirector)Professional)PfMP®(PortfolioManagementIPMALevelB®(CertifiedSeniorProjectProfessional)Manager)PMIRMP®(PMIRiskManagementIPMALevelC®(CertifiedProjectManager)Professional)PMISP®(PMISchedulingProfessional)IPMALevelD®(CertifiedProjectManagementAssociate)PMIACP®(PMIAgileCertifiedP2M(ProjectManagementSpecialist)Practitioner)PMIPBA®(PMIProfessionalinBusinessP2M(ProjectManagerRegistered)Analysis)P2M(ProjectManagementArchitect)Certificationsandtherequisitecontinuingprofessionaldevelopmentrequirementsforrecertificationencourage,enable,andrewardincreasingknowledgespecializationandlifelonglearning.Butincreasingspecializationcarriestheriskofcreatinggreaterdistancebetweendisciplinessuchasprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringthatmustultimatelycollaborateoncomplexprograms.Thereisagrowingconcernthatprogrammanagersandsystemsengineersviewstakeholders'needsfromwithintheirowndisciplinaryperspectives,andasaresultapplydistinctlydifferentapproachestothekeyworkofengineeringprograms—managingtheplanningandimplementation,definingthecomponentsandtheirinteractions,buildingthecomponents,andintegratingthecomponents.Tomitigatethisrisk,thereareopportunitiesfortradeandprofessionalsocietiestodevelopcollaborativelyeducationalprogramsandotheractivitiesthatincorporatemultidisciplinaryperspectives,similartoNASA'sAPPELprogram.TheCalltoActionforindustryandprofessionalsocietiesistofosterinterdisciplinaryintegrationby:OfferingjointeducationalprogramsforpractitionersthroughcollaborativedevelopmentofstandardsandguidelinesthatenablecommonpracticesandmethodsCollaboratingonadvocacyandeducationaleffortsregardingthevalueofintegrationtargetedtoorganizationalleadersinbusinessandgovernmentFacilitatingcollaborativeresearchprogramswiththeacademic/researchcommunity,organizationalleaders,andpractitionerstoidentifyleadingpracticesformanaging

411complexengineeringprograms16.5CalltoActionforResearchers:ExploreInterdisciplinarySystemsNASA'sApolloprogramachievedfameforlandingamanonthemoonandforthetechnologicaladvancesitdeliveredandenabledforthefuture.Itsmostimpactfulachievement,however,hasreceivedinsufficientattention.EvenNASA'sownwebsiteanditstreasuretroveofdocumentsfailtohighlightitskeylegacy.NASA'sfirstadministrator,Dr.T.KeithGlennan,immediatelyrecognizedthemostcriticalrisktotheApolloSpaceProgram.Theinadequacyofsystems,structures,culture,andpracticestoenableprogrammanagementandtechnicalleadershiptoeffectivelyaligntheirworkandachieveperformanceobjectivesthreatenedtoderailtheprogramfromthestart.GlennanconstructedNASA'sprogrammanagementcapabilitiesinthelate1950s,borrowingfromtheexperienceofthearmedforcesanditscontractors.ThosecapabilitiessolidifiedwhenU.S.AirForceMajorGeneralSamuelC.Phillipsestablisheda“programmanagementoffice”that“centralizedauthorityoverdesign,engineering,procurement,testing,construction,manufacturing,spareparts,logistics,training,andoperations”(NASA,n.d.b).Glennan'sofficialsuccessor,JamesE.Webb,tookGlennan'sworktothenextlevel.WebbrealizedhenotonlyhadtocontinueNASA'sengineeringprogrammanagementtransformation,healsohadtoinfluencefuturegenerationsofprogramandprojectmanagers,systemsengineers,andscientiststothink,behave,andworkdifferently.Andacademicresearchersexploringresearchanddevelopmentapproacheswere“notpayingmuchattentiontoorganizationalvariablesortoinnovationasamultistage,multiperson,complexprocess”(Roberts,2007).Throughpartnershipswith13oftheleadingengineeringuniversitiesacrosstheUnitedStatesandwithfundingfromNASA,Webbsupportedtheestablishmentofmanagementoftechnology(MOT)programs.TheMOTprogramstargetedtheeducationoffutureprogramleadership;but,moreimportantly,academicresearchfocusedonimprovingapproachesformanagingcomplextechnicalprograms.SchoolssuchasMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT),UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,VanderbiltUniversity,PolytechnicInstituteofNewYorkUniversity,GeorgiaInstituteofTechnology,andtheUniversityofNewMexicoacceptedthechallenge.Collectively,theuniversitiesandNASAembarkedonarelationshipthatspannedthreedecadesandproducedabroadrangeofresearchthatisappliedtotoday'sengineeringprograms.NASA'sassessmentoftheApolloSpaceProgrampointsoutthesignificanceoftheMOTprogram:Itmayturnoutthat[thespaceprogram's]mostvaluablespinoffofallwillbehumanratherthantechnological:betterknowledgeofhowtoplan,coordinateandmonitorthemultitudinousandvariedactivitiesoftheorganizationsrequiredtoaccomplishgreatsocialundertakings(NASA,n.d.).FromMIT'sperspective,itsMOTprogram“haschangedthewaytheworldthinksabout

412innovation—howinnovationistaught,howinnovationisbestemployedintherealworld,andthepowerofinnovationtopropelthetransformationofproductsandbusiness”(MITSloan,2014,p.8).Eventually,theMOTprogramsshutdownorevolvedintootherprogramswithintheuniversitiesthathadincubatedthem;andtodaythereisscantinformationaboutavailableprograms.Buttheneedforrigorousresearchandinsightintocriticalareasofengineeringprogrammanagementstillremain,particularlyinareassuchas:AppropriateresearchmethodsforstudyingcomplexsystemsUnderstandinghowdiverseteamswork,particularlymanagementandengineeringComplexsystemsdevelopmentthatcombinesboththetechnicalandmanagementsystemdesignAsystemsviewofthedynamicsofinterdisciplinaryeffortsoncomplexprojectsandprograms,particularlyrelatedtohowindividualrolesandprofessionalpracticescombineinaprogramenvironmenttodeliverresultsEffectivepractices,tools,andapproachesformanagingcomplex,adaptiveengineeringprograms,especiallyrelatedtoriskmanagement,costmanagement,andprocurementmodelsChettiparamb(2007)foundthattheaboveelementscouldbenefitfrominsightutilizingevolvingapproachesininterdisciplinaryresearchthatcanresultin:Integratingexistingframeworksandtheirassociatedpractices,approaches,andmethodsExploringthelinksinexistingknowledgeinsuchawaythatcompletelynewframeworksevolveand,inturn,establishnewpractices,approaches,andmethodsExpandingexistingframeworksandtheirassociatedpractices,approaches,andmethodsbyincorporatingknowledgefromamorediverserangeoffieldsThegreatadvantagethattheresearchcommunityoffersisthatitbringsanobjectiveviewpointthathelpstoframeissuesandopportunitiesinawaythatdoesnotgetboggeddownininterdisciplinarypoliticsorturfbattles.Couplingthatobjectivitywithinamultidisciplinaryresearchteamcouldproducegroundbreakinginsightandknowledge.TheCalltoActionforresearchersistoadvancethebodyofknowledgeassociatedwithengineeringprogrammanagementby:IncentivizingresearchproposalsfocusedonapproachesforstrengtheninginterdisciplinaryteamperformanceandimprovingeffectivenessofengineeringprogramperformanceCopyingleadingindustrialpracticesbybuildingmultidisciplinaryresearchteamstotacklebigproblems16.6References

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416http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4768

417AFTERWORD:TOWARDANINTEGRATEDFUTURETheCaseforIntegrationThebasicpremiseofthisbookisthatbetterprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration,includingmoreeffectivedecisionmaking,collaborativework,andinformationsharing,willleadtohighperformingprograms.Thebookaddressedthisinthethreemainparts:PartImadethecaseforwhythereadershouldbeconcernedaboutintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.PartIIdescribedingreaterdetailwhattodotoincreaseintegrationbetweentheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplines.PartIIIaddressedhowtomakeintegrationarealityinprogramsbycreatingsustainedchangetowardanewwayofworkingtogether.Thefindingsfromtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationresearcharedocumentedinthebook,makingthecasethatthisintegrationisimportantandthereareanumberofactionsthatcanbetakentoincreaseitsimpactinorganizations.NewInsightsGainedAlongtheWayThereisasaying,“Youdon'tknowwhatyouknowuntilyoutrytowriteitdown.”Thatwascertainlyconfirmedduringthecourseofwritingthisbook.Theunderlyingresearchfindingsrevealedmuchaboutintegration.Thewritingprocessquicklyidentifiedtheareasthatwerenotwellposed,reliedonfuzzilydefinedconcepts,orjustlackedasufficientknowledgebase.Anumberofthosegapswerefilledalongthewaytothecompletedmanuscript.Sourcesincludedpublishedresearchbyothersorknowledgecapturedbypractitionersspecificallyforthispublication.Inothercases,though,theinformationneededtocloseaknowledgegapcouldnotbefound.Forinstance,therearenumerouspublishedreportsdocumentingprojectsandtheiroutcomes,includingprojectmanagementexperiencesandbestpractices.Therearedramaticallyfewerpublishedreportsdescribingprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringandhowthetwodisciplinesworktogetherintheproject.Therearefewpublishedreportsdocumentingprogramsandprogrammanagementexperiencesandleadingpractices,particularlyoutsideofthegovernmentprogramssector.Beyondthisbookanditsassociatedresearchactivities,therewasanextremelylimitednumberofreportsdocumentinghowtheprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringdisciplinesworktogetheronprograms.Casestudyexamplesusedinthisbookwererepurposedandcombinedfromotherexistingsourcesintendedtodemonstratedifferentpoints,orwerecreatedspecificallyforthiswork.

418Duringtheintegrationresearchinterviews,eachindividual,almosttoaperson,hadadifferentdefinitionofintegrationthanthenext.Nonehadformalizedconceptsordefinitionsofintegrationinuseintheirorganizations,andcertainlywerenotmeasuringit.Anumberofthemwereusingpracticesortoolsthatledtomoreintegratedefforts,buttheyweredrivenmorebythoughtfullytryingtoavoidormitigateselfinflictedproblemsthanbasedonaformalunderstandingoftheprinciplesofintegration.Asdiscussedintheforeword,knowledgebuildsandevolvesaspeopleapplyitinnewwaystoaddresschallenges.Asconceptsmature,theybecomeformallydefinedandstandardized,anditbecomeseasiertotransfer,replicate,andadapttheminnewsettings,andthusbuildnewknowledge.Theresearchexperienceshowedthattheunderstandingandformalapplicationofthefundamentalsofintegrationstillarenotverymature.Theresearchandwritingofthisbookinvolvedaverycollaborativeprocess,withpractitionerexpertsfromboththeprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringcommunities.Anumberofpeoplewereexposedtoemergingresearchfindingsandinturnprovidedtheirperspectivesonthefindings.Thisincludedacademiccolleagueswhoofferedideasandsuggestionsduringthecourseoftheresearch,audienceparticipantsatconferencepresentations,andsubjectmatterexpertsfromboththeprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringcommunitieswhoreviewedanearlydraftofthebookmanuscript.Overwhelmingly,thefeedbackwasthatintegrationbetweensystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementwasanimportantissuetoaddress,thatitwasnotwelladdressedbyexistingpublicationsorpractices,andthattheemergingfindingsoftheresearchrangtruetotheexperienceofthepractitionerexperts.This,theysaid,wasabookthatwasurgentlyneeded.Asaresultofthisfeedback,manyquestionswereansweredandimprovementsweremadeinthemanuscript.However,additionalquestionswereraisedinthisprocess,someofwhichremainunanswered.Thefollowingisasampleofthequestionsthatemergedfromthereviewandwritingphaseofthiseffort.Aretheprinciplesandconceptsofintegrationpresentedhereuniversallyapplicableoraretheyuniquetoacertainprogramcontextandsetofcharacteristics?Howcantheintegrationconceptsbetailoredsothattheycanbeappliedsuccessfullyacrossawiderangeofcontextsandsettings?Howdothesizeandscopeoftheprogramororganizationaffectthespecificintegrationpracticeschosenandapplied?Dosomeintegrationpracticesthatworkatonescalebecomesuboptimalorevencounterproductiveatanother?Giventhepreponderanceofevidencefromagivensetting(e.g.,NorthAmerica,aerospace,andlargecivilinfrastructure),wouldthesamefindingsbeobservedinexamplesfromothernationalculturesandbusinesssectors?Wouldthesameobservationsholdwhereotherstandardsandprofessionalorganizationsdominatethepractice?Howdoothersaddressintegration,anddotheyhavethesameprogrambehaviorsrelatedtopoorintegrationbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering(ortheirequivalents)thatareaddressedhere?

419Howmightorganizationsmeasuretheextenttowhichtheirteamsareintegratedinordertotargetareasforimprovement?Howistheongoingdevelopmentofgoodpractices(enhancingcurrentpractices),aswellasthecreationofemergentpracticestodealwithuniquesituations,addressedbytheintegrationofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering?Whataretherespectiverolesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersinanintegratedenvironment?Whatrolesdotheprogrammanagerandchiefsystemsengineerplay,individuallyandtogether,inmanagingandrealizingbusinessbenefitsovertheprogram'slifecycle?Whatiseffectivestakeholderengagementintheprogramdomain?Wheredotherolesandresponsibilitiesofprogrammanagersandchiefsystemsengineersoverlaprelatedtostakeholders?Howisintegrationaffectedbyturnoverinprogramleadershiproles,particularlywhenpoorinitialplanninganddecisionsareinheritedbythenewleadershipandcannotbeundone?Howdoesthatimpacttheapproachtointegrationthatcanbetaken?Whatisthebestwaytomanagetalentforintegratedoperations?Howdoorganizationsidentifycandidates,developthemthroughtraining,andbuildbenchstrengthwithintheirprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringworkforce?Whatisthebestcareerdevelopmentstrategyforintegratedprofessionals?Isitnecessarilythecasethatengineersmusteventuallybecomeprogrammanagers,orcanbothbetrainedinhowtodo“integration”fromwithintheirrespectivedisciplinebasesandroles?Bothprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringhaveanumberofcommonrootsandoperateingenerallythesameenvironment.Yettheyhavedifferentstandardsandmeansofprofessionalprogression.Woulditbebeneficialtocreateanintegratedsetofstandardsthatencompasstheessentialelementsofbothdisciplinesoratleastprovidea“crosswalk”betweenthetwotoenablethedevelopmentofjointcertificationsforprofessionals?Manyoftheproblemsassociatedwithengineeringprogramfailuresdiscussedinthisbookappeartobesymptomsofunderlyingproblemsratherthantherootcausesofthoseproblems.Whataretherootcausesinengineeringprogramfailures?Someofthesequestionsmightberaisedbecausetheresearchisstillinanearlystagewheretheconceptsarestillbeingrefinedandproven.Asmallnumberofstudiescannotrealisticallybeexpectedtoanswerallthequestionsthatmightariseinacomplexorganizationalsystem.Theseissuesarenotfundamental,however,andcanbeaddressedasmoreresearchisundertakentoanswerquestionssuchasthese.Giventheopportunitytobothshapethepracticeofintegrationandtoimproveoveralloutcomes,hopefullysomewillbeinterestedinexpandingtheknowledgebase.

420ThePathForwardThefutureofintegration,itseems,isfullofopportunity.Thediscussionandevidencepresentedinthisbookhashopefullyinspiredthosewithinterestinimprovingprogramoutcomestoworktoimproveprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration.Butwheretostart?Thereisnoshortageofadviceinthisbookonwhattodo:PartIIidentifiedanumberofactions,methods,andtoolsthatifappliedwillencouragegreaterprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration.PartIIIidentifiedanumberofactionsformakingthechangesnecessarytoincreaseintegrationand,importantly,theorganizationalclimateandthehumancapitalandtalentbaseconducivetointegration.PartIVidentifiedanumberofactionsforvariousprogramstakeholderstoenableactionsrecommendedinthepreviousparts.Implementingtheseactionssothatthereissustainedimprovementinthedegreeofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegrationcouldpotentiallystretchacrossyears.Individualandinstitutionalinitiativeandadaptivenesswillcarrythedayastheintegrationplaybookisstillbeingwritten.Nevertheless,itisacourseofactionthatwilllikelyproducevaluablereturnsbasedontheevidenceseensofar.Itisalsopossiblethatevendoingthesethingsisonlyjustbeginningtoscratchthesurfaceoraddressthesymptomsofwhythesetwoimportantdisciplinesinmanycasesdonotworktogetheraseffectivelyastheycould.Therootcausesoftheseconflictsmayverywellberelatedto“softissues”exploredintheorydomainssuchaspsychology,sociology,politicalscience,politicaleconomy,andthelike,ratherthantheimmediatetechnicalandmanagementdisciplines.Exploringtheserootcauseswillrequirelongerterm,sustainedeffortinthisareathroughresearchorotherstudies.Regardless,astartingpointonthepathforwardhasbeendefinedinvariouspartsofthisbook.Itmaylosesomedefinitionabitfurtheroutandcouldbendinanewdirectionatonepointoranother.Theonlywaytoknowwhatliesnextwithanygreaterclarityistobeginthejourney.Goodluckwithyoureffortstoimproveprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringintegration.Andasyouproceed,pleaseshareyourexperiences,yoursuccesses,andalsoyourfrustrations.Theauthorswelcometheopportunitytolearnfromyourexperiences,butalsotohelpsharethelessonslearnedthroughoutthecommunityofpractitionersandresearchersworkinginthisimportantarea.

421GLOSSARYAgile.Acollectivetermthatrepresentsacomprehensiverangeoftools,techniques,methods,andpracticesappliedtothemanagementofprojectswithadaptivecharacteristics.Whilethetermislargelyassociatedwithsoftwaredevelopmentprojects,Agileapproachescanapplytoanyproject.Agileapproachesuseshortdevelopmentcycleswithfrequentreviewandreplanningmeetingstocoordinateprojectactivities.BenefitsManagement.Seeprogrambenefitsmanagement.Benefits.Anoutcomeofactions,behaviors,products,orservicesthatprovideutilitytothesponsoringorganizationaswellastheprogram'sintendedbeneficiaries.BusinessAnalysis.Apracticeforelicitinganddefiningprojectandprogramrequirementsthatincorporatesinputfrombusinessownerstouserswiththeobjectiveoffullydefiningtherequirementsearlyintheprojectorprogramlifecycle.BusinessCase.Thebusinesscaseisdevelopedtoassesstheprogram'sbalancebetweencostandbenefit,andincludeskeyparametersusedtoassesstheobjectivesandconstraintsfortheintendedprogram.Capability.Theabilitytodosomethingorperformaspecifictask.ChangeAgent.Anearlyadopterofaproposedchangewhoworkstoensurethechangeisintegratedintotheorganizationinasustainableway.ChangeChampion.Anyonewhoseesthevaluetobegainedbythechangeandworkstopromotethechangewithinasphereofinfluence.Often,thechangechampiondoesnothavearoleassigned,butisidentifiedbytheprogramteamasasupporterwhocaninfluenceothers.ChangeManagement.Acomprehensive,cyclic,andstructuredapproachfortransitioningindividuals,groups,andorganizationsfromacurrentstatetoafuturestatewithintendedbusinessbenefits.(Source:Managingchangeinorganizations:Apracticeguide.ProjectManagementInstitute.)ChiefSystemsEngineer.Therolewithinaprogramthathastheultimatetechnicalauthorityandaccountabilityfortheproductorsystembeingdeveloped.Collaboration.

422Theresultwhenacollectivegroupofindividualsworktogetherclosely,thecontributionsofalldisciplinesarevalued,andinformationissharedopenly.Communications.Intheprogramcontext,providingandmaintainingclearvisibilityintoallaspectsoftheprogramasitprogressessothatallstakeholders,bothinternalandexternal,arepresentedwithasinglepointofviewofthedetailsthroughouttheprogramlifecycleandunderstandhowanycontributiontheymakefitswithinthewhole.Competency.Anunderlyingcharacteristicofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringthatincludesasetofskills,attributes,andknowledgewhichresultsineffectiveperformance.Competenciesmustbemeasurableandarefundamentaltosuccessfulindividual,team,andorganizationalperformance.Complex.Theinteractionsbetweenthepartsofasystemexhibitselforganization,wherelocalinteractionsgiverisetonovel,nonlocal,emergentpatterns.(Source:Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.)InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering).Complicated.Theinteractionsbetweenthemanypartsofasystemaregovernedbyfixedrelationships.Thisallowsreasonablyreliableprediction.(Source:Systemsengineeringhandbook:Aguideforsystemlifecycleprocessesandactivities(4thed.)InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering).ConfigurationManagement.Aprocessformanagingversioncontrolofrequirements,specifications,andwork.ContextualFactorsDimension.TheIntegrationFrameworkdimensionthatdealswithmultipleinternalandexternalfactors.Itcaptureselementsthatmaypositivelyornegativelyimpacttheintegrationperformanceinagivenprogramandbusinesscontext.CostBenefitAnalysis.Atechniquethatcomparesactualorplannedcostsagainsttheexpectedoutcome,enablingthedeterminationofvaluegainedversustotalresourceinvested.CreativeTension.Tensionisthestressthatexistsbetweenwhatisandwhatisdesired.Itbecomescreativewhenitproducesideasandsolutionsthatmayhavenotbeenconsideredhadthetensionnotexisted.Culture.Seeorganizationalculture.CurrentState.Theexistingorganizationalstructure,processes,oractivitiesastheyexistatapointintime.Thecurrentstateservesasabaselineagainstwhichthedesiredfuturestateis

423comparedproducingagapreportthatidentifiesrequiredchangesforachievingthefuturestate.DecisionTheory.Theprocessthroughwhichthehumanmindtakesininformationandformulatesaresponse.Discipline.Afieldofparticularstudythatincludesacommonbodyofknowledgerelatedtotheworkundertaken.EffectiveIntegrationDimension.TheIntegrationFrameworkdimensionthatdealswiththeintegrationperformanceanditsthreekeyelements:rapidandeffectivedecisionmaking,effectivecollaborativework,andeffectiveinformationsharing.EmotionalIntelligence.Thecapabilitythatenablesoneto“tunein”toone'semotionsandtheemotionalstateofanotherandtherebyadjustinteractionsrelativetothesituation.EnterpriseEnvironmentalFactors.Changingcircumstancesandconditionsoutsidetheprogram'sboundary,whichmayconsistofcorporate,environmental,andgovernmentalvariablesthatconstraintheabilityofaprogramtoachieveitsgoals.Enterprise.Acomplex,integrated,interdependentsystemofpeople,processes,andtechnologythatcreatesvalueasdeterminedbyitskeystakeholders.EpisodicIntegration.Processes,practices,andtoolsappliedatspecificintervalswithinthelifecycleofaprogramorproject.Framework.Thestructureormodelthatrepresentsatheory,concept,system,orasetofinterconnectedelements.FutureState.Theintendedoutcomeandpositioningofanorganizationatsomefuturepointintime,whichistobeachievedthroughtheexecutionofaportfolioofprogramsandprojects.GateReviews.Decisionpointsintheprogramorprojectlifecycle,usuallyaftercompletingaphase,wherethegovernanceteamreviewsprogresstoplanandmakesago/recycle/nogodecision.Governance.Systemsandmethodsbywhichaprogramanditsstrategyaredefined,authorized,monitored,andsupportedbyitssponsoringorganization.(Source:TheStandardforProgramManagement.ProjectManagementInstitute.)HybridMethodologies.Thecombinationofprinciples,practices,techniques,andtoolsfromdifferentmanagement

424approachestodevelopasystematicprocessaimedtofitthemanagementcapabilitytothebusinesscontextandneedsandspecifictypesofprograms.Thegoalistomaximizeprogramperformanceandproductresults,andallowtheteamtobalancepredictabilitywithflexibility,reducerisks,andincreaseinnovationinordertodeliverbetterresultstothebusinessandaddedvaluetoallstakeholders.Improvisation.Thepracticeofreactingwhilemakingandcreating.Improvisationislinkedwithaspectsoftimeand,particularly,pressuretoachieveagainstademandingorcompressedtimetable.Incentives.Therewardsforperformingatoraboveatargetlevel.Incentivesmaybetiedtosuchthingsasdeliveringprogramsorprojectsaheadofschedule.Theymayalsobeusedinbehaviormodificationwherecertainpositivebehaviorsarerewardedandnegativeorundesiredbehaviorsarepenalized.IntegratedDelivery.Anapproachthatlinkspeople,systems,businessstructures,andpracticesintoaprocessthatfosterscollaborationandtrust.IntegratedProductandProcessDevelopment.Anapproachthatusesmultidisciplinaryteamsindesigntojointlyderiverequirementsandscheduleswithequalemphasisonproduct(i.e.,design)andprocess(i.e.,manufacturing)development.Itisalsoreferredtoassimultaneousengineeringordesignbuild.IntegratedProductTeam.Alinkedframeworkforengagingprogramparticipantsinordertoavoidanindividualizedfocusassociatedwithprogramworkanddeliverables.Thestructureenablessharedownershipandresponsibilityfortheworkproduced.IntegratedProjectDelivery(IPD).Aprojectorprogramorganizingapproachthattakesintentionalactiontoensureallorganizationalunitsaffectingoraffectedbyaprogramparticipateintheplanninganddeliveryprocess.Itisausefultoolthatpromotesintegrationbetweenandacrossdisciplines.IntegratedProjectOrganization(IPO).Anapproachforaligningstafffromaprogramownerandamanagementconsultantcompanyunderoneintegratedorganizationalstructure.Integration.Alignmentofprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringpractices,toolsandtechniques,experience,andknowledgeinacollaborativeandsystematicapproachtoincreaseteameffectivenesstowardachievingacommongoal/objectiveincomplexprogramdevelopmentenvironments.IntegrationFramework.Theframeworkthatillustrateshowintegrationworksinprograms.TheIntegrationFrameworkencompassessixdimensions:I)Process,practicesandtools;II)Organizationalenvironment;III)Peoplecompetencies;IV)Contextualfactors;V)Effective

425integration;andVI)Programperformance.IntegrationIndex.Asinglevariablethatprovidesanoverallscoreforthedegreeofintegrationachievedandrepresentsall17variablesassociatedwiththeIntegrationFramework.IntegrationPerformance.AmeasurethatshowsthelevelofintegrationwithinaprogrambasedonelementsoftheeffectiveintegrationdimensionoftheIntegrationFramework.InterdisciplinaryTeam.Agroupofdiversedisciplinesthatcometogetherandfunctioninterdependentlyasawholetoproduceasharedoutcome.IterativeDevelopment.Arepeatingapproachtoprojectworkthatutilizesshortburstsofdevelopmentactivityfollowedbyreviewandadditionalcyclesofdevelopmenttofurtherenhanceormodifyoutputsuntilrequiredattributesarerealized.Leadership.Apeopleorientedcompetencyfocusedonmotivatingandenablingindividualsorteamstomaximizetheireffortstoachievedesiredoutcomes.LifeCycle.Thespanofactivitiesrelatedtoprogramandprojectexecutionfrominitiationtoclosureoftheinitiative.Thetermisalsousedtodefinethestagesthroughwhichaproductmovesfromconceptionthroughimplementationandeventuallytoretirement.MeasuresofEffectiveness(MOE).Evaluationofthedegreetowhichasystemachievesitsstatedmissionoroperationalobjectives.MeasuresofPerformance(MOP).Evaluationofthephysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicsorattributesrelatedtothesystemoperationconsideringoperationalenvironmentconditions.Methodology.Adocumentedapproachforintegratinginteractingorinterdependentpractices,techniques,procedures,andrulestodeterminehowbesttoplan,develop,control,anddeliveradefinedobjective.ModebasedProgramPlanning.Asinglemodelrepresentingtherelationshipswithinaprogramtodisplayitsoverallstructure,relationships,andcriticaldependencies.Obeya.Aroomwhereacrossfunctionalteammeetstofigurativelyorliterallybreakdowntheproductcompletelyandinvestigatechangestoitinrealtime.OODALoop.Acontinuouscycleofobserving,orienting,deciding,andacting(OODA)fordecisionmaking.

426Organization.Acollectivereferencetopeople,structures,andotherassetsassembledtogethertofulfillamissionbyachievingaspecificvision.OrganizationalAgility.Theabilityofanorganizationtoabsorbchangesorquicklyadaptinresponsetointernalorexternalfactors,marketconditions,customerdemandsandtrends,competition,andtechnologyevolution,aswellastocopewitheconomic,environmental,political,andsociologicalshifts.OrganizationalCulture.Thecollectivevalues,philosophy,andpracticesoftheorganization'smembersasdemonstratedinthebehaviorsandattitudesofthepeopleintheorganization.OrganizationalEnvironmentDimension.AnIntegrationFrameworkdimensionrelatedtoelementsoftheorganizationcontext,structure,culture,andsoon,primarilyfocusedwithintheorganizationratherthanonitsexternalenvironment.OrganizationalClimateisarelatedconcept.Itdefinesthosethingsthatacompanyrewards,supports,andexpects.PeopleCompetenciesDimension.AnIntegrationFrameworkdimensionthatdealswithcompetenciesamongpeople,includingexperience,education,skills,abilities,andthelike.Individualcompetenceisgenerallyrecognizedasthecombinationofknowledge,skills,andability.PerceptualControlTheory.Whenappliedtoteams,perceptualcontroltheoryisathreestepprocesswhere,oncefocusedonagoal,theteamtalksaboutthegoaldailytokeepitattheforefrontofteammembers'mindsandreviewsperformanceregularlytoensureinformationisshared.PerformanceIndicators.Asetofqualitativeorquantitativevariablesusedtomonitorandevaluateplannedgoalsandobjectives.PerformanceMeasurementSystem.Aclearlydefinedprocessforcollecting,analyzing,andreportingprogramperformancestatustosupportdecisionmakingacrossdifferentlevelsoftheorganization.PerformanceMetrics.Thesetofmeasures(managementandtechnical)usedtomonitor,evaluate,andimprovetheefficiency,effectiveness,andresultsofaprogram.Managementandtechnicalmetricscanbetangibleandintangible.PervasiveIntegration.Processes,practices,andtoolsappliedcontinuouslythroughoutthelifecycleofaprojectorprogram.PortfolioManagement.Thecentralizedmanagementofoneormoreportfoliosofprojects,programsandotheractivitiestoachievestrategicobjectives.(Source:TheStandardforPortfolio

427Management.ProjectManagementInstitute.)Principles.Asetofpropositionsandgeneralrulesthatserveasthefoundationofamanagementapproach,method,orbehavior.ProcessMaturity.Formalizedandmanagedprocessesthatleadtomorevaluableandconsistentoutcomes.Program.Agroupofrelatedprojects,subprograms,andprogramactivitiesthataremanagedinacoordinatedwaytoobtainbenefitsnotavailablefrommanagingthemindividually.(Source:ThePMIlexiconofprojectmanagementterms.ProjectManagementInstitute.)ProgramBenefitsManagement.Programbenefitsmanagementestablishestheprogramarchitecturethatmapshowcomponentprojectswilldelivertheintendedcapabilitiesandoutcomestoachievetheprogrambenefits.Itfocusesprogramstakeholdersontheoutcomesandbenefitstobeprovidedbythevariousactivitiesconductedduringtheprogram'sduration.(Source:TheStandardforProgramManagement.ProjectManagementInstitute.)ProgramKickoffWorkshop.Ameetingthatbringstogetherallkeyprogramstakeholdersatthebeginningoftheprogramtogatherinsightandinformationandidentifycriticaldependenciesasearlyaspossiblebeforemajordecisionsandcommitmentsaremade.ProgramLifeCycle.Theprogramlifecyclespansthedurationoftheprogramandincludesthreemajorphases:programdefinitionphase,programbenefitsdeliveryphase,andprogramclosurephase.(Source:TheStandardforProgramManagement.ProjectManagementInstitute.)ProgramManager.Therolewithinaprogramthathastheultimateauthorityandaccountabilityforrealizingtheoverallprogramobjectivesandbenefits.ProgramPerformance.Evaluationofthestatusofaprogramintermsofprogressandresultscomparedtoasetofplannedgoals,objectives,andexpectations.Itisbasedontheevaluationofasetofperformanceindicators.ProgramPerformanceDimension.AnIntegrationFrameworkdimensionthatmeasurestheperformanceoftheprogramintermsofschedule,budget,clientsatisfaction,andclientrequirements,andrelatesthoseoutcomestooverallprogrambenefits.ProgramPerformanceManagement.Definestheexpectedresultstoberealizedbytheprogramandhowtheprogrambenefitswillbeachieved.Seealsoperformancemeasurementsystemandperformancemetrics.ProgramSuccessFactors.Asetofmeasurableoutcomesthatmustbepresentorachievedinorderforaprogramtobe

428deemedsuccessful.Project.Atemporaryendeavorundertakentocreateauniqueproduct,serviceorresult.(Source:ThePMIlexiconofprojectmanagementterms.ProjectManagementInstitute.)ProjectManager.Therolewithinaprojectthathasultimateauthorityandaccountabilityfortheprojectdeliverables.PulsedProductIntegrationandIterativeDevelopment.Ongoingworktoalignproductcomponentsintomorecomplexcomponentsorintocompleteproductsthatusesshortcyclestocreateanddeliverproductincrements,partsoftheproduct,orotherdeliverablesrelatedtoaprogram.RACI.AcronymforResponsible,Accountable,Consulted,andInformed.Itisatoolforcategorizingtheroleofastakeholderinaprojectorprogramandusingtheresultstotailorcommunications.ReadinessAssessment.Ameasurementofthedegreetowhichanorganizationispreparedtoundertakeachange.Itevaluatesorganizationalculture,structure,capacity,andprocessesamongmanyothercharacteristicsoftheorganizationanditsenvironment.RequirementsManagement.Theprocessbywhichthefunctionalityorcapabilityoftheprogramorprojectoutputisensured.Theprocessbeginswithelicitationfromstakeholdersofneedsandwantsandprogressesthroughdocumentationandvalidationfordesign,development,anddelivery.RiskManagement.Theidentificationandmediationofpotentialeventsthatcanaffecttheoutcomesofaprogramorproject.ScheduleComplianceRiskAssessmentMethodology(SCRAM).Anapproachforidentifyingriskstomeetingtheprogramschedule.Itcanbeusedfortheassessmentandimprovementofscheduleriskcomplianceinprojectsandprograms.SetbasedDesign.Anengineeringprocessthatevaluatesawiderangeofpotentialproductfeaturesandsystematicallyremovesinfeasibleconfigurationsinordertorapidlyconvergeonthepreferredsolution.SharedSpace.Thecommonfunctions,activities,andworksharedbetweenthesystemsengineerandtheprogrammanagerwithrespecttotechnicalmanagementprocesses.Itincludesplanning,assessmentandcontrol,decisionmanagement,riskmanagement,configurationmanagement,informationmanagement,measurement,andqualityassurance.Silo.Seestovepipementality.

429SociotechnicalSystem.Acharacterizationofcomplexsystemsthatacknowledgesthatboththepeopleandthetechnologyelementsofthesystemareinterdependentandinfluenceeachother.Thisperspectivemaybeappliedatmultiplescalesofactivity,rangingfromthedesignofindividualorgroupworkwithinorganizationstotheinteractionsbetweensociety'scomplexinfrastructuresandhumanbehaviors.Sponsor.Theindividual,oftenfromtheexecutivelevel,whoistheultimateorganizationalchampionfortheinitiativewithintheorganizationandwhoisabletomarshalresourcesasneeded.Stakeholder.Anindividual,group,ororganizationwhomayaffect,beaffectedby,orperceiveitselftobeaffectedbyadecision,activity,oroutcomeofaproject,program,orportfolio.(Source:AGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge(PMBOK®Guide).ProjectManagementInstitute.)Standard.Adocumentedstatementthatrepresentsbroadlyacceptedprinciplesofwhatconstitutesgoodpracticeorcommonguidelines.Standardsaddresswhatneedstobedoneatahighleveltypicallywithoutspecifyingexactlyhowsomethingistobedone.StovepipeMentality.Pursuingworkonaprogrambyapplyingone'sspecializedknowledgeandpracticeswithoutregardtootherpotentiallyaffectedrolesandfunctions.Sometimesreferredtoasworkinginasilo.StrategyImplementation.Thecollectiveorganizationalefforttoexecutestrategybyinvestingintherightinitiativestodeliverdesiredbusinessbenefits.SystemDynamicsModeling.Asimulationtechniqueusedtoanalyzecomplexanddynamicsystemswithmultiplerelationshipsbetweenendogenousandexogenouselements.SystemLifeCycleStages.Theprogressionofasystemastheresultofactions,performedandmanagedbypeopleinorganizations,usingprocessesforexecutionoftheseactions.(Source:ISO/IEC/IEEEE15288:2015.)SystemofSystems.AnSOI[SystemofInterest]whoseelementsaremanageriallyand/oroperationallyindependentsystems.Theseinteroperatingand/orintegratedcollectionsofconstituentsystemsusuallyproduceresultsunachievablebytheindividualsystemsalone.(Source:SystemsEngineeringHandbook.InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering.)SystemsEngineer.Theroleonaprojectorprogramteamthatappliestheconceptofsystemsengineeringtothedevelopmentofaproduct,service,capability,oroutcome.

430SystemsEngineering.Aninterdisciplinaryapproachandmeanstoenabletherealizationofsuccessfulsystems.Itfocusesondefiningcustomerneedsandrequiredfunctionalityearlyinthedevelopmentcycle,documentingrequirements,thenproceedingwithdesignsynthesisandsystemvalidationwhileconsideringthecompleteproblem.(Source:www.incose.org.InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering.)SystemsEngineeringTechnicalReview.Aformalreviewandevaluationastowhetherrequiredsystemsengineeringtaskshavebeensatisfactorilycompletedpriortoproceedingtothenextstageofdevelopment.SystemsThinking.Theprocessbywhichoneattemptstolookatthewholeratherthantheindividualpartstogainabetterunderstandingofhowthepartsinteractandareinterdependentwithinthelargersystem.Tailoring.Theprocessofadaptingandfittingprocessesandapproachestothespecificneedsoftheorganizationandtheprojectorprogram.Teaming.Thegoodofthewholeisvaluedmorethantheindividualdisciplinesthatleadstoaccomplishingmorethancanbeachievedbyeachdisciplineseparately.TechnicalPerformanceMeasures(TPM).Attributesorcharacteristicsofasystemelementaccordingtothedefinedrequirementsorgoals.TransformationalChange.Achangeimplementedthroughprogramsthataffectsthewayanorganizationconductsitsbusinessactivities.Uncertainty.Theinabilitytopredictorknowanoutcomeduetoinfluencesthatmaybeoutsidethecontroloftheindividualorsysteminteractingwithasystem.UnproductiveTension.Atermusedtodescribeanyissue,situation,orbehaviorbetweenindividualsorteamsthatmightnegativelyaffectprogramperformancebyproducingstressandconflictthatworksatcrosspurposeswithprogramsuccess.ValueStreamMap.Atoolusedtovisualizethepathorpossiblepathsforaccumulatingvaluecontributingtoandbuildingtheintendedprogrambenefits.Value.Seebenefitsmanagement.VeeModel.AvisualizationmethodusedtoBreakdownthe“problemtobesolved”intoasequenceofstepsinvolvingcomponentactivities,shownasadescendinglistontheleftsideoftheVee,

431andthenreassemblingasthecomponentsarecompletedascendinguptherightsideoftheVee.VerySmallEntity.Atermusedtodefinemicroenterprises,orinsomecasessmallprojects,thatinteractwithmuchlargerorganizationsbycontributingengineeringexpertiseinhighlyspecializedareasoftechnology.WorkPackages.Identifiablecollectionsoftasksthatmaybedevelopedsequentiallyorinparallelwithotherworkactivitiesbeforelatercombinationintothewholeofthedeliverable.

432INDEXAAcademia,callstoactionforAcademyofProject/ProgramandEngineeringLeadership(APPEL)(NASA)AccountabilityAccreditationBoardforEngineeringandTechnology,Inc.(ABET)AdvancedCollaborativeEnvironment(ACE)AgileprogramscasestudiesIntegrationFrameworkandmindsetforintegrationandoverviewpulsedproductintegrationAirbusAmericanAssociationofCollegesofNursingAmericanInstituteofArchitects(AIA)AmericanSocietyforEngineeringManagement(ASEM)AnzacClassFrigate(RoyalAustralianNavy)(casestudy)APMBodyofKnowledge(AssociationforProjectManagement)Apolloprogram(NASA)ApplicationDevelopmentCenter(ADC)Arnold,E.AssessmentdevelopingintegratedengineeringprogramassessmentsaspervasiveintegrationmechanismreadinessforchangereevaluationAssociationforProjectManagement(APM)

433Aurora(Colorado),PrairieWatersprojectofAuthorityroledefinitionandsharedBBabiceanu,R.F.BAESystemsBaldridgePerformanceExcellenceProgramBarnard,C.I.Barreto,F.Becerril,L.Bechtel/ParsonsBrinckerhoffBest,A.BigDig(Boston)casestudyoverviewprogramlifecycleBMW(casestudy)BoeingBoisjoly,RogerBook,organizationofBoston(Massachusetts),CentralArtery/Tunnelproject.SeeBigDig(Boston)BostonGlobeBoyd,JohnBritishAirportAuthority(BAA)BritishAirwaysBureaucracyBusinessplans

434CC2HMHillCaliforniaAirResourcesBoard(CARB)CaliforniaHigh-SpeedTrainProject(CHSTP)CallstoactionforacademiaforenterpriseforindustryandprofessionalsocietiesoverviewforpolicymakersforresearchersCareerpaths,integratedCatmull,EdCEATechnologiesCenterforAlternativeFuels,EnginesandEmissions(WestVirginiaUniversity)CentralArtery/Tunnel(Boston).SeeBigDig(Boston)CentralIntelligenceAgencyCernan,GeneChallengercasestudy(NASA)ChangeinitiationachievingandsustainingnewwaysofworkingcommitmentandinvolvementrequiredofleadersanddecisionmakerscommunicationsplanningIntegrationFrameworkinputdimensionsformeasures,metrics,andreportingobservingandinterviewingorganizationalcontextforoverviewplanningforpracticesneededfor

435prioritizinginitiativessynthesizing,sharing,andmappingChangeLifeCycleFramework(PMI)Changepracticescasestudies(SeeChangeprograms(casestudies))impactofleadingintegrationchangeprogram(SeeChangeinitiation)overviewreadinessassessmentsustaining(SeealsoSustainedchange)Changeprograms(casestudies)BigDig(Boston)BMWLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany(LMSC)NationwideMutualInsuranceCompanyoverviewU.S.governmentagencyacquisitionprograms“ChangeThroughPersuasion”(Garvin,Roberto)CharteringprocessChettiparamb,A.Chiefsystemsengineersassignmentofdefined(seealsosystemsengineers)Clinton,BillCollaborationcreatingknowledgefoundationthroughexploratoryresearchF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleforimplementingchangeIntegrationFrameworkandeffectiveintegrationmindsetfor

436overviewProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFrameworkforsuccessofhigh-functioningprogramsCollectiveconsciousness,creatingColocationCombe,M.CommunicationchangeinitiationandcommunicationsplanningchangeinitiationandinformationsharingF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleintegrationconceptsandIntegrationFrameworkandeffectiveintegrationProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFrameworkforsuccessofhigh-functioningprogramsCompetitiveadvantage,workforceandorganizationalcapabilitiesforComplexitydefinedreducingConforto,E.C.ConsortiumforEngineeringProgramExcellence(CEPE)(MIT)ContextualFactorsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIV)changeinitiationF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleoverviewContinentalAirlinesContingencytheoryControltheoryConway'sLawCrawford,GaryCredier,K.A.

437CrewResourceManagement(CRM)CynefinFrameworkDDecisionmakingchangeinitiationandcollaborationexampledecisiontheorydecisiontheoryandOODALoopF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleinformationsharingandIntegrationFrameworkandeffectiveintegrationprogramgatereviewsProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFrameworkforteamempowermentexampleDeFaber,LDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgencyDemaria,A.Deming,W.E.DenverInternationalAirport(DIA)DepartmentofDefence(Australia)DeRosa,J.K.Design,simplicityofDiBella,A.J.DieselTechnologyForumDiscoverer(LockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany)DisneyDragon2(SpaceX)Dweck,CarolDyer,Joseph

438EEasternAirlinesEChangeLIFE(BMWcasestudy)EconomistIntelligenceUnit(EIU)EducationEffectiveness,ofintegrationprograms.SeeProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFramework(dimensionVI)E/Fprogram(F/A-18E/FSuperHornetexample)Eisner,H.Electronicwarfare(EW)Embry-RiddleAeronauticalUniversityEmissionsscandalexample(Volkswagen)EncyclopediaofLeanEnablers(MITCEPE)Engagement“Engine”approach,forstrategyimplementationEngineeringStandardWork(ESW)(Pratt&Whitney)Enterprisecallstoactionforenvironmentalchange.SeeOrganizationalcultureenvironmentalfactorsEnterpriseTransformationRoadmap(LAI)EpisodicintegrationmechanismsdedicatedteammeetingspacejointplanningoverviewprogramgatereviewspulsedproductintegrationanditerativedevelopmentsummarizedSeealsoProcesses,Practices,ToolsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionI)Erskin,Pamela

439EuropeanHigherEducationArea(EHEA)FF-80fighterplanes,developmentofF/A-18E/F,The(InstituteforDefenseAnalyses)F/A-18E/FSuperHornetE/Fprogramandhierarchyimproveddecisionmakingprocess(SeealsoDecisionmaking)integrationenabledbyreducedprogramcomplexityIntegrationFrameworkpracticesused(SeealsoIntegrationFramework)overviewparallelintegrationprocessinNAVAIRprogrambackgroundandcontextofintegrationprogramdeliveryprograminitiationSeealsoProcesses,Practices,ToolsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionI)Falcon9Rocket(SpaceX)FederalAcquisitionInstituteFederalAviationAdministrationFifthDiscipline,The(Senge)FinancialissuesofF/A-18E/FSuperHornetofhigh-functioningprogramsofprogramperformanceofsustainedchangeForce-fieldanalysisFormalintegrationpractices,assessingForsberg,KevinFromCrisistoOpportunity(ProfessionalServicesCouncil)Frosch,Robert

440FutureCombatSystems(FCS)(U.S.Army)GGallupGantt,HenryGarvin,DavidA.GatedecisionprocessGeneralElectric(GE).SeealsoF/A-18E/FSuperHornetGenericlifestylestages,oflarge-scaleprogramsGeraldi,J.Glennan,T.KeithGlobalAccreditationCenterforProjectManagementEducationPrograms(GAC)GlobalPartnershipforSocialAccountability(GPSA)(WorldBank)Godwin,GibGoldsmith,A.H.“Go/nogo”reviewGovernancechangeleadershipteamcompositionpervasiveintegrationmechanismsprogramperformanceandGraduateReferenceCurriculumforSystemsEngineering(GRCSE)GuidebookofProject&ProgramManagementforEnterpriseInnovation,The(ProjectManagementAssociationofJapan)GuidefortheApplicationofSystemsEngineeringinLargeInfrastructureProjects(INCOSE)GuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms,The(“TheGuide”)(Oehmen)ondevelopingintegrationcompetenciesmindsetforintegrationandoverviewonpolicyonprogramperformance

441GuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledge,A(PMI)HHamilton,D.Harrington,H.J.HarvardBusinessReviewHawthorneEffectHeathrowTerminal5programHigh-functioningprogramsuccessBigDig(Boston)exampleintegration,definedLEAP(RockwellCollins)exampleNextGenerationLaunchTechnologyProgram(NASA)exampleoverviewPrairieWaters(Aurora,Colorado)exampleSkunkWorks(LockheedMartin)examplesummarizedHMASWarramungaHornetWEB(McDonnellDouglas)Hornsby,K.HubbleSpaceTelescope(NASA)HumanresourceschangeinitiationandsystemsofdevelopingmultidisciplinaryteamshumanrelationsmovementIntegrationFrameworkandtalentmanagementforprogramperformancetalentmanagementneedsSeealsoManagement;PeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIII)

442II-15ReconstructionProgram(SaltLakeCity)Industry,callstoactionforInformalintegrationpractices,assessingInformationsharing.SeeCommunicationInfrastructureandProjectsAuthority(IPA)InstituteforDefenseAnalysesIntegratedManagementInformationControlSystem(IMICS)IntegratedProductandProcessDevelopmentIntegratedProductandProcessDevelopmentCaseStudy(InstituteforDefenseAnalyses)IntegratedProductTeam(IPT)(McDonnellDouglas)definedtechnicalperformancemanagementSeealsoF/A-18E/FSuperHornetIntegratedProjectDelivery(IPD)(AmericanInstituteofArchitects)Integratedprojectorganizations(IPO)Integrationconceptsassessingintegrationbetweendisciplinesattributesofintegrationincomplexorganizationseffectiveintegration,ofIntegrationFramework(dimensionV)formalizedapproachtointegrationfutureofintegrationintegration,definedoverviewpractitionerperspectivesonintegrationsummarizedSeealsoIntegrationFramework;IntegrationimportanceIntegrationFrameworkchangeinitiationwith

443contextualfactors(dimensionIV)effectiveintegration(dimensionV)(SeealsoProgramlifecycle)integrationinpractice(SeeF/A-18E/FSuperHornet)OrganizationalEnvironment(dimensionII),overview(SeealsoOrganizationalEnvironmentofIntegrationFramework(dimensionII))overview,xlix,liiiPeopleCompetencies(dimensionIII)(SeealsoPeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIII))Processes,Practices,Tools(dimensionI)(SeealsoProcesses,Practices,ToolsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionI))ProgramPerformance(dimensionVI)Integrationimportancedifficultyofintegrationdivergenceasproblem(SeealsoTensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineering)overview,liiiprogrammanagement,definitionsprojectmanagementandsystemsengineeringdifferencessystemsengineering,definitionsSeealsoIntegrationconcepts;MindsetforintegrationInterdisciplinaryApproachestoTeaching(Goldsmith,Hamilton,Hornsby,Wells)InternationalCouncilonCleanTransportation(ICCT)InternationalCouncilonSystemsEngineering(INCOSE)calltoactionforprofessionalsocietiesGuidefortheApplicationofSystemsEngineeringinLargeInfrastructureProjectsoverviewPathwaystoInfluencesystemsengineeringdefinedbySystemsEngineeringHandbookSystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE)systemsengineeringlifecyclestages

444onsystemsthinkingAWorldinMotionSeealsoPMI/INCOSEstudyInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)InternationalProjectManagementAssociation(IPMA)InternationalSpaceStationInterviewing,forchangeinitiationIPMACompetenceBaseline(InternationalProjectManagementAssociation)Isaacson,WalterITILandOrganizationalChange(Erskin)JJackson,A.JetPropulsionLaboratory(NASA)Jobs,SteveJohnson,ClarenceL.JointPlanningJones,C.KKC-46aerialrefuelingtankersKeenan,P.Keleher,DanKennedy,JohnF.KnowledgecreationknowledgesharingimportancethroughexploratoryresearchKotter,J.Kowalski,C.

445LLAILAIEnterpriseSelf-AssessmentTool(LESAT)Large-scaleinfrastructureprograms(LIPs)BigDigleadershipstyleexampleprogramlifecycleLarge-scaleprograms,challengesofLeadershipBigDigprogramlifecycleandleadershipstyleBMWchangeprogramcasestudyintegrationconceptsandOrganizationalEnvironmentofIntegrationFramework(dimensionII)PeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIII)programperformanceandLeadSystemsIntegrator(LSI)LeanAdvancementInitiative(MIT)LeanAerospaceInitiative(UnitedKingdom)Leanengineeringacceleratedplanning(LEAP)team(RockwellCollins)LeanprogramschangeprogramcasestudiesTheGuidetoLeanEnablersforManagingEngineeringPrograms(Oehman)Lemke,LarryLessard,D.Lewin,K.LexiconofProjectManagementTerms(PMI)Linebacker(softwarearchitecture)Locatelli,G.LockheedMartinLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany(LMSC)(casestudy)LondonOlympicsAuthority

446Loufrani-Fedida,S.Lucae,S.Lund,RobertMMaani,K.E.Majaraj,V.MajorProjectsAuthority(UnitedKingdom)ManagementcommitmenttochangeinitiationbyprogramperformanceandstrategyrealizationandManagementoftechnology(MOT)programsManagingChangeinOrganizations(PMI)ManagingSuccessfulProgrammes(AXELOS)Mancini,M.Mantel,S.J.Mappingforchangeinitiationvalue-streammappingMaritimeElectronicWarfareSystemsProgramOffice(MEWSPO)MARSPathfinder(NASA)MarsScienceLaboratory(NASA)MassachusettsHighwayDepartment(MHD)MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT)MassachusettsTurnpikeAuthority(MTA)Mayo,E.McChrystal,StanleyMcDonnellDouglasCorporationF/A-18E/FSuperHornet,overview

447HornetWEBIntegratedProductTeam(IPT)(McDonnellDouglas),defined(SeealsoF/A-18E/FSuperHornet)IntegratedProductTeam(IPT)(McDonnellDouglas),technicalperformancemanagementSeealsoBoeing;F/A-18E/FSuperHornetMcKinney,D.Measurement/metrics.SeeProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFramework(dimensionVI)Meredith,J.R.Methodologies,aspervasiveintegrationmechanismMiller,R.Mindset(Dweck)MindsetforintegrationcompetitiveadvantageenablingcollaborationwithexamplestrategyrealizationandgoodmanagementstrivingforperfectionincomplexworkMiniatureSeekerTechnologyIntegration(MSTI)(NASA)Mission,developingMissionassurance,inroutineoperationsMissonier,S.MITRECorporationModel-basedprogramplanningModernContinentalModularSixDegreesofFreedom(ModSDF)Mooz,HalMorris,P.W.G.Morton-ThiokolMüller,R.Multidisciplinaryteams,developing

448Musk,ElonNNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)AcademyofProject/ProgramandEngineeringLeadership(APPEL)ApolloprogramcalltoactionforresearchersChallengercasestudycollaborationandintegrationbyHubbleSpaceTelescopeInternationalSpaceStationJetPropulsionLaboratoryMarsScienceLaboratoryMiniatureSeekerTechnologyIntegrationNextGenerationLaunchTechnologyProgramPeopleCompetenciescasestudySpaceXandsystemsengineeringdefinedbyNationalAuditOffice(UnitedKingdom)NationwideMutualInsuranceCompany(casestudy)NavalAirSystemsCommand(NAVAIR)NavalSeaSystemsCommandNextGenerationLaunchTechnologyProgram(NASA)Nightingale,D.J.Nimgade,A.Northrop.SeealsoF/A-18E/FSuperHornetOObeyaObserving,forchangeinitiation

449Observing,Orienting,Deciding,Acting(OODA)LoopOehmen,J.OfficeofGovernmentCommerce(UnitedKingdom)Ogburn,C.,Jr.Olwell,D.H.OlympicGamesOpticalSystemsFailureReport(NASA)OrganizationalculturechangeinitiationandcompetitiveadvantageandenvironmentalchangeandintegrationintegrationconceptsandIntegrationFrameworkandorganizationalenvironment(dimensionII)mindsetforintegrationOrganizationalEnvironmentofIntegrationFramework(dimensionII)OrganizationalEnvironmentofIntegrationFramework(dimensionII)challengesofintegrationinlarge-scaleprograms(systemsfailure)changeinitiationcharacteristicsofsuccessfulprogramintegrationInternationalSpaceStationasmodelofsystemsintegrationorganizationalenvironmentalfactorsoverviewstructuraldimensionsofintegrationsummarizedteam-drivenprocessforproblemsolvingSeealsoIntegrationFrameworkOrganizationDesignTeam(ODT)(NASA)OrganizationtheoryP

450ParraguezRuiz,P.PartneringconceptPathwaystoInfluence(INCOSE)PeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIII)backgroundandcasestudychangeinitiationdevelopingintegrationcompetenciesidentifyingintegrationcompetenciesleadershipmanagingintegrationcompetenciesoverviewsummarizedPervasiveintegrationmechanismsgovernanceintegratedproductandprocessdevelopmentoverviewrequirementsmanagementriskmanagementstandards,methodologies,assessmentssummarizedtechnicalperformancemanagementworkdesignprocessesSeealsoProcesses,Practices,ToolsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionI)PhillipsLaboratoriesPinto,J.K.PixarPlanningchangeprocessandepisodicintegrationmechanismslackof

451programperformanceandSeealsoChangeinitiation;IntegrationimportancePMI/INCOSEstudyassessingintegrationbetweendisciplinesimportanceofintegrationofsystemsengineeringandprogrammanagementIntegrationFramework,overviewIntegrationFrameworkelements(SeealsoIntegrationFramework)overviewonprogramperformanceonstandardsSeealsoAssessment;Callstoaction;Changepractices;IntegrationFramework;StandardsPolicymakers,callstoactionforPositiononInterdisciplinaryEducationandPractice(AmericanAssociationofCollegesofNursing)PowersofTwo(Shenk)PrairieWaters(Aurora,Colorado)Pratt&WhitneyPrioritization,forchangeProcesses,Practices,ToolsofIntegrationFramework(dimensionI)changeinitiationdefinedepisodicintegrationmechanismsoverviewpervasiveintegrationmechanismstailoringSeealsoIntegrationFrameworkProductconceptforplanningproductdevelopmentandpervasiveintegrationmechanismsProfessionalServicesCouncil

452Professionalsocieties,calltoactionforProgramgatereviewsProgramlifecycleBigDigleadershipstyleexampleintegrationandgenericlifecycleIntegrationFrameworkeffectiveintegration(dimensionV)large-scaleinfrastructureprogramslifecycleintegrationoverviewprogrammanagementlifecyclecharacteristicssystemsengineeringlifecyclecharacteristicsProgrammanagementasdefinedbyPMIasdefinedworldwidebenefitsmanagementlifecyclecharacteristics(SeealsoProgramlifecycle)overviewprogramdeliveryandF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleprojectscomparedtoprogramssystemsengineeringcomparedto(SeealsoIntegrationimportance)understandingprogrammanagers(SeealsoProgrammanagers)ProgramManagementProfessional(PgMP®)(PMI)credentialProgrammanagersassignmentofcollaborationwithsystemsengineerscompetenciesdefinedpractitionerperspectivesonintegrationrolesofteammembers(SeealsoIntegrationFramework)understanding

453SeealsoProgrammanagementProgramorganization/processesProgramperformancecomplexityoflargeengineeringprograms,overviewDenverInternationalAirportbaggagehandlingexampleFutureCombatSystems(FCS)(U.S.Army)exampleOlympicGamesexamplesoverviewscopeofprogramsandtypicalengineeringprogramchallengesVolkswagenemissionsscandalexampleProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFramework(dimensionVI)changeinitiationmeasures,metrics,andreportingeffectivecollaborationeffectivedecisionmakingeffectiveinformationsharingimportanceofmeasurementintegrationascatalystforprogramperformancekeyelementstomeasureintegrationmanagementandtechnicalprogramperformancemetricsoverviewRoyalAustralianNavy'sAnzacClassFrigate(casestudy)summarizedSeealsoIntegrationFrameworkPrograms,definedProjectandProgramManagementforInnovation(ProjectManagementAssociationofJapan)ProjectManagementAssociationofJapan(PMAJ)ProjectManagementInstitute(PMI)calltoactionforprofessionalsocieties

454ChangeLifeCycleFrameworkAGuidetotheProjectManagementBodyofKnowledgeintegrationimportanceandLexiconofProjectManagementTermsManagingChangeinOrganizationsmindsetforintegrationoverviewprogrammanagementdefinedbyProjectManagerCompetencyDevelopmentFrameworkPulseoftheProfession®In-DepthReport2014TheStandardforProgramManagementPulseoftheProfession®In-DepthReport2012SeealsoPMI/INCOSEstudy;StandardforProgramManagement,The(PMI)ProjectManagerCompetencyDevelopmentFramework(PMI)Projectmanagers,definedProjects,definedPulsedproductintegrationanditerativedevelopmentPulseoftheProfession®In-DepthReport(PMI)20122014Pyster,A.QQuadrennialDefenseReview(1996)(U.S.Navy)RReagan,RonaldRebentisch,E.Remko,AllenRequirementsbreakdownstructures(RBS)

455RequirementsmanagementResearchers,calltoactionforResponsibleEngineeringAuthorities(REAs)Rhodes,D.H.Richmond,BarryRiskmanagementF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexamplepervasiveintegrationmechanismsprogramperformanceandsuccessofhigh-functioningprogramsandSeealsoProgramPerformanceofIntegrationFramework(dimensionVI)Roberto,MichaelRockwellCollinsRoedler,G.RogersCommissionRoledelineationforchangeinitiationdefiningrolesIntegrationFrameworkprocesses,practices,tools(dimensionI),overviewrolesofteammembers(SeealsoPeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFramework(dimensionIII))Romano,E.Rossi,M.Roth,G.RoyalAustralianNavy'sAnzacClassFrigate(casestudy)SSaabAustraliaScheduleComplianceRiskAssessmentMethodology(SCRAM)(AustralianDepartmentofDefence)Schein,E.

456Schimmoller,H.Schwalb,J.ScientificmanagementSecor,DeborahSenge,PeterSharing,forchangeinitiationSheard,S.Shenk,JoshuaWolkShewarkCycleSiemensglobalR&Dnetwork(casestudy)SimplicityofdesignSirkin,H.L.SkunkWorks(LockheedMartin)Smit,J.Snowden,DavidSopko,J.A.SpaceprogramsInternationalSpaceStationKennedyonLockheedMissiles&SpaceCompany(LMSC)(casestudy)NASASpaceXexampleU.S.AirForceSpaceShuttle(NASA)SpaceStationControlBoard(SSCB)SpaceXCorporationSpecializationSpectrumAstroSrinivasan,J.Stakeholders

457commitmenttochangeinitiationbyprogramperformanceandstakeholderidentification/analysisforchangeStandardforProgramManagement,The(PMI)overviewonprogramlifecyclephasesonprogramperformanceStandardsIntegrationFrameworkprocesses,practices,tools(dimensionI)InternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)ManagingSuccessfulProgrammes(AXELOS)PeopleCompetenciesofIntegrationFrameworkandpervasiveintegrationmechanismsprogrammanagementasdefinedworldwideTheStandardforProgramManagement(PMI)systemsengineeringSystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE)tailoringofSeealsoIntegrationimportanceuseofStapletonInternationalAirport(Denver)StateoftheAmericanManager,The(Gallup)Steidle,CraigE.Stephenson,BrettStrategicDefenseInitiativeStrategyimplementationStructuraldimensions,ofintegrationSuccess,ofhigh-functioningprograms.SeeHigh-functioningprogramsuccessSustainedchangechangeagentcharacteristics

458changeinitiationandframeworksandmodelsforchangeoverviewpreparingforreadinessassessmentforstumblingblockstosummarizingSUSTAIN(modelforsustainablechange)thinkingaboutchangetransformationalchangeSynthesizing,forchangeinitiationSystemofsystems(SoS)definedprogramperformanceandSystemsDynamicsModelingtechniquesSystemsengineeringasdefinedbysmallentitiesISOdefinitionlifecyclecharacteristics(SeealsoProgramlifecycle)NASAdefinitionorganizationtheoryandintegrationconcepts(SeealsoIntegrationconcepts)overviewprogrammanagementcomparedto(SeealsoIntegrationimportance)programperformanceandapplicationof(SeealsoProgramperformance)forsuccessofhigh-functioningprograms(SeealsoHigh-functioningprogramsuccess)systemsengineeringtechnicalreviews(SETRs)understandingsystemsengineers(SeealsoSystemsengineers)U.S.DepartmentofDefensedefinitionSystemsEngineeringHandbook(INCOSE)Systemsengineers

459collaborationwithprogrammanagersdefinedpractitionerperspectivesonintegrationrolesofteammembers(SeealsoIntegrationFramework)SeealsoSystemsengineeringSystemsthinkingTTacticalIntelligenceFusionforFires(TUFF)program(NASA)Tailoring“Talentedmanagement”Taylor,FredrickTeamingchangeleadershipteamcompositiondedicatedteammeetingspaceF/A-18E/FSuperHornetexampleinterdisciplinaryteamsOrganizationalEnvironmentofIntegrationFramework(dimensionII)andinterdisciplinaryteamssuccessofhigh-functioningprogramsteam-drivenprocessforproblemsolvingTechnicalperformancemanagementTennesseeStateUniversityTensionbetweenprogrammanagementandsystemsengineeringauthoritynotclearlydefinedconflictingpracticesbetweendisciplinescreativelackofintegratedplanningovercomingoverview

460practitionerperspectivesaboutsharedresponsibilitiesandunproductiveTeslaThiry,M.Thomke,S.Thuessen,C.ToyotaToyStory(film)TrainingTrustTurner,R.UUnitedAirlinesUnitedLaunchAlliance(ULA)UnitedTechnologiesCorporation(UTC)U.S.AirForceU.S.ArmyU.S.Congress,on“go/nogo”reviewU.S.DepartmentofDefenseU.S.DepartmentofJusticeU.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairsU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)U.S.governmentagencyacquisitionprograms(casestudy)U.S.Navy,integrationusedby.SeealsoF/A-18E/FSuperHornetVValidation

461Value-streammappingVeemodelconceptVerticalintegrationVisualizingProjectManagement(Forsberg,Mooz)Voehl,C.F.Voehl,F.VolkswagenWWaltDisneyCompanyWebb,JamesE.Weber,MaxWelch,JackWells,D.Welsh,JamesWestVirginiaUniversity“Whiteelephant”issuesWholesystemoptimizationWhyGoodStrategiesFail(EconomistIntelligenceUnit)Winch,G.Wirt,BobWorkbreakdownstructure(WBS)WorkdesignprocessesWorldBankWorldCup(2014,Brazil)WorldEconomicForumWorldinMotion,A(INCOSE)WorldWarIIimplementingchangeactivityduringSkunkWorks(LockheedMartin)and

462systemsengineering,projectmanagement,andprogrammanagementevolutionduringZZ6SystemsEngineeringCompetencyFrameworkZeer,Jack

463WILEYENDUSERLICENSEAGREEMENTGotowww.wiley.com/go/eulatoaccessWiley’sebookEULA.

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